|
|
|
|
Operation Ajax
|
| |
|
| |
The 1953 Iranian Coup d’état was the Western covert operation that deposed the democratically-elected Government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; the CIA and MI6 effected it by aiding and abetting pro-West Iranians and mutinous Iranian army officers. CIA man Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., organised Operation Ajax
to aid retired General Fazlollah Zahedi and Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri to establish a pro–US and –UK government, by bribing Iranian government officials, reporters, and businessmen.
Discussion
Ask a question about 'Operation Ajax' Start a new discussion about 'Operation Ajax' Answer questions from other users |
Encyclopedia
The 1953 Iranian Coup d’état was the Western covert operation that deposed the democratically-elected Government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; the CIA and MI6 effected it by aiding and abetting pro-West Iranians and mutinous Iranian army officers. CIA man Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., organised Operation Ajax
to aid retired General Fazlollah Zahedi and Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri to establish a pro–US and –UK government, by bribing Iranian government officials, reporters, and businessmen.
This Anglo–American coup d’état was to ensure Western control of Iran’s petroleum and to prevent Eastern (USSR) hegemony upon Iran. Moreover, the Iranian motivations for deposing P.M. Mosaddeq included reactionary Clerical dissatisfaction with a secular government, fomented with CIA propaganda.
Originally, the Eisenhower Administration considered Operation Ajax a successful secret war, but, given its blowback, now is considered a failure, because of its “. . . haunting and terrible legacy” of anti-American terrorism. In 2000, Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, apologised to Iran, saying that “intervention by America” in the “internal affairs” of Iran was a “setback for democratic government”. This anti-democratic coup d’état was a “a critical event in post-war world history” that destroyed Iran’s post-monarchic, secular parliamentary democracy, by re-installing the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as absolute ruler, replacing an elected and native democracy with a pro-foreign monarchic dictatorship. In the event, in 1979, it provoked the Iranian Revolution, which deposed the Shah and replaced the monarchy with an anti-Western Islamic Republic.
Background
The principal motive for executing Operation Ajax (the coup d’état) was Western (US and UK) refusal to accept the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the business agreement, between the Imperial British and the Iranian civil governments.
Early oil development
In May 1901, Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia, sought to pay debts owed to Britain by granting a 60-year petroleum search concession to William Knox D'Arcy. The exploration took seven years, was almost canceled, but yielded an enormous oil field — from which Persia would receive only 16 percent of the future profits.
The company slowly grew, until World War I, when Persia's strategic importance led the British Government to buy a controlling share in the company, essentially nationalizing British oil production in Iran for a short time, becoming the Royal Navy's chief fuel source in defeating the Central Powers; British soldiers occupied Persia's strategic parts.
Post–World War I
The Persians were dissatisfied with the royalty terms of the British oil concession, the Anglo–Persian Oil Company (APOC), whereby Persia received only 16 per cent of net profits. Furthermore, the British exacerbated said business dissatisfaction, by intervening in the national, internal affair of the Persian Constitutional Revolution (the transition from dynastic to parliamentary government), and by attacking Russia, from Persia, in attempting the re-enthronement of Tsar Nicholas II, whom the Bolshevik Revolution had deposed.
In 1921, a military coup d’état — “widely believed to be a British attempt to enforce, at least, the spirit of the Anglo–Persian agreement” effected with the “financial and logistical support of British military personnel” — permitted the political emergence of Reza Pahlavi, whom they enthroned as the “Shah of Iran”, in 1925. The Shah modernised Persia to the advantage of the British and the Iranians (Persians); one result was the Persian Corridor railroad for military and civil transport.
In the 1930s, Nazi Germany negotiated with the Shah for their secure petroleum access. Moreover, the Shah terminated the APOC concession, but resettled it within the year; as such, it reduced the exploited petroleum-area and increased Iranian profits. Then, on 21 March 1935, Reza Shah Pahlavi, decreed that, henceforth, foreign business correspondence address the country as Iran, not Persia; in the event, the APOC (Anglo–Persian Oil Company) was re-named the AIOC (Anglo–Iranian Oil Company).
In 1941, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the British and Commonwealth forces and the Red Army invaded Iran, to secure petroleum (cf. Persian Corridor) for the Russian Communists fighting the Nazis in the Eastern Front and for the British elsewhere; to wit, monarchic Britain and communist Russia deposed the pro–Nazi Shah Reza, and enthroned his twenty-two-year-old son, Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the Shah of Iran.
In Iran, a constitutional monarchy since 1906, nationalist leaders became powerful in seeking reduction of long-term foreign intervention in their country — especially the greatly-profitable British oil concession. In particular, the AIOC's refusal to allow auditing of accounts to determine whether or not the Iranian government was being paid its due royalties in full. The AIOC's refusal escalated nationalist demands to: an equal share of petroleum revenue. Finally, the crisis was the AIOC's closing rather than accepting Iranian government "interference" in its business. The AIOC and the Iranian government resisted nationalist pressure to a renewed deal in 1949.
1950s
Support for nationalization
In 1951, the AIOC's resistance to re-negotiating their petroleum concession — and increasing the royalty paid to Iran — created popular support for nationalising the company; the nationalisation impulse was not only strong, but passionate. In March, the pro-Western P.M. Ali Razmara was assassinated; the next month, the parliament legislated the petroleum industry's nationalisation, by creating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This legislation was guided by the Western-educated Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq, then a member of the Iranian parliament and leader of the nationalisation movement; by May, the Shah had appointed Mosaddeq Prime Minister.
That summer, American diplomat Averell Harriman went to Iran to negotiate an Anglo-Iranian compromise, asking the Shah's help; his reply was that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he could say a word against nationalization". Harriman held a press conference in Tehran, calling for reason and enthusiasm in confronting the "nationalisation crisis". As soon as he spoke, a journalist rose and shouted: "We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mossadegh and oil nationalization!" Everyone present began cheering and then marched out of the room; the abandoned Harriman shook his head in dismay.
Nationalization
The National Iranian Oil Company suffered decreased production, because of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC's orders that British technicians not work with them, thus provoking the Abadan Crisis that was aggravated by the Royal Navy's blockading its export markets to force Iran to not nationalise its petroleum. The Iranian revenues were greater, because the profits went to Iran's national treasury rather than to private, foreign oil companies. By September 1951, the British had virtually ceased Abadan oil field production, forbidden British export to Iran of key British commodities (including sugar and steel), and had frozen Iran's hard currency accounts in British banks.
The United Kingdom took its anti-nationalisation case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague; P.M. Mossadegh said the world would learn of a "cruel and imperialistic country" stealing from a "needy and naked people". Representing the AIOC, the U.K. lost its case. Yet they worried about their other Iranian interests, believing the misconception that Iran's nationalism was Soviet-backed. They persuaded Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Iran was falling to the Soviets — effectively exploiting the American Cold War mindset — yet President Harry S. Truman never agreed to overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. Later, in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, they convinced him to a joint coup d'état deposing Iran's only democratically-elected government in order to re-establish foreign (British) control of Iran's petroleum.
Although nationalization of the oil industry increased Iranian revenues, it inevitably resulted in a socialist style economy, addicted to subsidization and impervious to taxation. With all revenues flowing into the national treasury, the Iranian people now saw the central government as the answer to all their needs. The government — rather than independent industries — became responsible for providing jobs, building the infrastructure and providing education. Moreover, the expectation grew that the government should provide heavy subsidization on almost all essential needs. However, the lack of effective mechanisms for distribution of subsidies or enforcing taxation lead to extremely poor distribution of wealth and an unsustainable economy — and became a main source of widespread dissatisfaction with both the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic republic .
Origins
Overthrowing Mosaddegh's government was a British idea for which they asked President Truman's aid; he refused. Later, in 1953, when Eisenhower became president, the British asked him and he agreed to their jointly deposing the elected Iranian civil government.
Prime Minister Mosaddegh, having decided that Iran must profit from its own petroleum, acted to nationalise that natural resource previously controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Britain complained the Iranian government was violating the AIOC's legal rights and headed a worldwide boycott of Iranian petroleum, provoking a financial crisis for Iran's economy. The monarchy, supported by the U.S. and the U.K. invited Western oil companies back to exploit Iran's petroleum.
"The crushing of Iran's first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on U.S. aid and arms", wrote Dan De Luce in The Guardian in reviewing All the Shah's Men, by New York Times reporter Stephen Kinzer, who, for the first time, reveals the details of the coup d'état.
Cold War
Among the controversies involved in the coup is the importance and/or legitimacy of American and British fears of Communist influence in Iran. In the decades following the October Revolution, Iran's very large northern neighbor, the Soviet Union, had expanded its domain to rule over tens of millions of Muslim in Central Asia, and following World War II over much of Eastern Europe. On June 26, 1950, as the movement for oil nationalization was gathering momentum in Iran, communist North Korea, with Soviet approval, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea beginning the Korean War. Three years later, just before the coup d'état in Iran, the Soviets crushed an uprising of strikes and protests in East Germany. In Iran itself, the well-organized, pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, greatly exceeded the National Front in the sized of its rallies as the crisis became worse.
In the view of American mainstream public and elite opinion, the crisis in Iran was a part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world," rather than a nationalist struggle against Western colonialism. Consequently,
the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge.
According to Sam Falle, a young British diplomat at the time of the coup,
1952 was a very dangerous time. The Cold War was hot in Korea. The Soviet Union had tried to take all Berlin in 1948. Stalin was still alive. On no account could the Western powers risk a Soviet takeover of Iran, which would almost certainly have led to World War III
From the Anglo-American perspective, Iran's internal affairs crisis, featuring the large and popular pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, became just another part of the Cold War between Communism and "the Free world".
But according to Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, the coup d'état was "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the “`Communist threat` was a smokescreen” in responding to Pres. Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.
Throughout the crisis, the “communist danger” was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue — i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse ... Despite 20,000 members and 110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mossadeq was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.
As part of the post–coup d'état political repression of the Tudeh, the imposed imperial government revealed that the party had 477 members in the Iranian armed forces: "22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets", however, none was member of the tank divisions, stationed around Tehran, that might have participated in the Shah's anti-democratic coup d'état; he had carefully screened them.
Besides fear of Soviet influence in Iranian internal affairs, the Cold War influenced the U.S. to support — or not oppose — Britain's anti-Mossadegh policy towards Iran; using British support of the U.S., the P.M. Winston Churchill insisted they not undermine his campaign to isolate Iranian P.M. Mossadegh: "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect Anglo-American unity on Iran".
Planning Operation Ajax
As a condition for restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the U.S. required collapsing the AIOC's monopoly; five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were to draw Iran's petroleum after the successful coup d'état — Operation Ajax.
As part of that, the CIA organized anti-Communist guerrillas to fight the Tudeh Party if they seized power in the chaos of Operation Ajax. Per released National Security Archive documents, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the CIA had agreed with Qashqai tribal leaders, in south Iran, to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded guerrillas and spies could operate.
Operation Ajax's formal leader was senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., while career agent Donald Wilber was the operational leader, planner, and executor of the deposition of P.M. Mossadegh. The coup d'état depended on the impotent Shah's dismissing the popular and powerful Prime Minister and replacing him with Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, with help from Col. Abbas Farzanegan — a man agreed by the British and Americans after determining his anti-Soviet politics.
Execution
The BBC spearheaded Britain's propaganda campaign, broadcasting the go-code launching the coup d'état against Iran's elected government. At the start, the coup d'état briefly faltered — and the Shah fled from Iran, however, after a short Italian exile, the CIA successfully returned him to Iran. Gen. Zahedi replaced the deposed Prime Minister Mosaddeq, who was arrested, given a show trial, and condemned to death. Showing "generosity of spirit", the Shah commuted Mossadegh's death sentence to three-years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by perpetual house arrest.
Media report
In 2000, The New York Times newspaper partially published a censored version of the CIA document Clandestine Service History — Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran — November 1952–August 1953 describing the planning and execution of the Anglo-American coup d'état. The newspaper published this as a scanned image, not as machine-readable text; in the event, the document was properly published uncensored. The Clandestine Service History — Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran — November 1952–August 1953 is at . Linguistically, in this document the word 'blowback' publicly appears for the first time.
Aftermath
Iran
Gen. Zahedi replaced the deposed Prime Minister Mosaddeq, who after being arrested was given a show trial, and condemned to death. Showing "generosity of spirit", the Shah commuted Mossadegh's death sentence to three-years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by house arrest for life in his village.
An immediate consequence of the coup d'état was the political repression of National Front opposition and especially of the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in the Shah and his courtiers. Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium — British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954-1955 to $181 million in 1956-1957, and continued increasing, and the United States sent development aid and advisors.
Moreover, the sight of the Shah of Iran fleeing the country until foreigners re-enthroned as Shah of Iran was the major cause of his deposition in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The occupation of the U.S. embassy by the religious revolutionaries severed American-Iranian relations. Remembering the embassy's command-centre role in the 1953 coup d'état led them to its preventive occupation in 1979.
Jacob G. Hornberger, founder and president, of The Future of Freedom Foundation, said, "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes — until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979". According to him, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond".
Internationally
The 1953 coup d'état was the first time the U.S. had openly overthrown an elected, civil government. In the U.S., Operation Ajax was a success, with "immediate and far-reaching effect. Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert action came to be regarded as a cheap and effective way to shape the course of world events" — a coup against the elected Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, which had nationalised farm land owned by the United Fruit Company, followed the next year.
A pro-American government in Iran gave the U.S. a double, geographic and strategic advantage, as Turkey, also bordering the U.S.S.R., was part of NATO.
In 2000 US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and "came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before".
The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. ... But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.
The Islamic Republic
In the Islamic Republic rememberance of the coup is quite different then that of history books published in the West, and follows the precepts of Ayatollah Khomeini that Islamic jurists must guide the country to prevent "the influence of foreign powers". According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, the government tries to ignore Mosaddeq as much as possible and allocates him only two pages in "high school textbooks." "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddeq as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." This is despite the fact that Kashani came out against Mosaddeq by mid-1953 and "told a foreign correspondent that Mossaddeq had fallen because he had forgotten that the shah enjoyed extensive popular support." A month later, Kashani "went even further and declared that Mosaddeq deserved to be executed because he had committed the ultimate offense: rebelling against the shah, `betraying` the country, and repeatedly violating the sacred law." [Cited by Y. Richard, `Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic Republic?` in Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. N. Keddie, (Yale University Press, 1983)]p.109
Conspiracy theories
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main exposé of the 1953 coup d'état, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, by Stephen Kinzer, has been censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'état. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling élite" whom the Iranian Council of Guardians has twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'état in 1953, saying Mossadegh, himself, was obeying British plans:
In my opinion, Mossadegh was the director of the British plans and implemented them ... Without a doubt Mossadegh had the primary and essential role
in the August 1953 coup. Kashani says Mossadegh, the British and the Americans worked against the Ayatollah Kashani to undermine the role of Shia clerics. According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, this theory is contradicted by the fact that "the second person who spoke on Radio Tehran announcing and celebrating the overthrow of Mossadegh was Ayatollah Kashani’s son, who was hand-picked by Kermit Roosevelt".
This allegation also is posited in the book Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust), published in the Islamic Republic and allegedly written by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer. It claims that Mohammad Mossadeq was not a mortal enemy of the British, but had always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves". Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the Islamic Republican authorities may have had Fardoust tortured, and the fact that his death was announced before the publication of the book may be significant.
See also
Footnotes
External links
- Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, 182–215
- —a look back at the 1953 U.S.-backed coup in Iran
- —New York Times report based on uncovered CIA documents
- —Provided by the National Security Archive
- —new book from the National Security Archive reexamines the coup
- —interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
- —Interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men
- —interview with Steven Kinzer
- [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no2/article10.html Review of All the Shah's Men] by David S. Robarge
- —critique of All the Shah’s Men
- by Guardian Unlimited
|
| |
|
|
