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Battle of the Granicus
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The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was the first of three major battles fought between Alexander the Great and the Persian Empire. Fought in Northwestern Asia Minor, near the site of Troy, it was here where Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, including a large force of Greek mercenaries led by Memnon of Rhodes.
The battle took place on the road from Abydos to Dascylium (near modern day Ergili, Turkey), at the crossing of the Granicus River (modern day Biga Çayi).
owing the assassination of Alexander's father, Philip II of Macedon, and the subsequent consolidation of Alexander's Greek and Macedonian positions, he set out into Asia in 334 BC.
He crossed the Hellespont from Sestos to Abydos, and advanced up the road to Dascylium, which was the capital of the Satrapy of Phrygia.
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The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was the first of three major battles fought between Alexander the Great and the Persian Empire. Fought in Northwestern Asia Minor, near the site of Troy, it was here where Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, including a large force of Greek mercenaries led by Memnon of Rhodes.
The battle took place on the road from Abydos to Dascylium (near modern day Ergili, Turkey), at the crossing of the Granicus River (modern day Biga Çayi).
Background
Following the assassination of Alexander's father, Philip II of Macedon, and the subsequent consolidation of Alexander's Greek and Macedonian positions, he set out into Asia in 334 BC.
He crossed the Hellespont from Sestos to Abydos, and advanced up the road to Dascylium, which was the capital of the Satrapy of Phrygia. The various satraps of the Persian empire gathered with their forces at the town of Zelea and offered battle on the banks of the Granicus River. Memnon suggested a scorched-earth policy of burning the grain and supplies and retreating in front of Alexander, but his suggestion was rejected by the commanding satraps.
Deployment of Persian Troops
Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch all mention the battle, with Arrian providing the most detail. The Persians placed their cavalry in front of their infantry, and drew up on the right (east) bank of the river. Historians differ significantly on the effectiveness of the Persian dispositions. Some consider it a tactical mistake on the Persian side, others feel it was an attempt to take advantage of their superior number of cavalry, while Sir William Tarn felt "the Persian leaders had in fact a very gallant plan; they meant if possible to strangle the war at birth by killing Alexander."
The battle
Alexander's army met the Persians on the third day of May from Abydos. Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenion suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but Alexander attacked immediately. This tactic caught the Persians off guard. The Macedonian line was arrayed with the heavy Phalanxes in the middle, and cavalry on either side. Alexander was with the Companions on the right flank. The Persians expected the main assault to come from Alexander's position and moved units from their center to that flank.
The battle started with a cavalry and light infantry feint from the Macedonian left, from Parmenion's side of the battle line. The Persians heavily reinforced that side, and the feint was driven back, but at that point, Alexander led the horse companions in their classic wedge-shaped charge, and smashed into the center of the Persian line. The Persians countercharged with a squadron of nobles on horse, and accounts show that in the melee, several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a Persian nobleman named Spithridates. Before the noble could deal a death-blow, however, he was himself killed by Black Cleitus. Alexander quickly recovered.
The Macedonian cavalry then turned left and started rolling up the Persian cavalry, which was engaged with the left side of the Macedonian line after a general advance. A hole opened in the recently vacated place in the battle line, and the Macedonian infantry charged through to engage the poor quality Persian infantry in the rear. At this, and with many of their leaders already dead, both flanks of the Persian cavalry retreated, seeing the collapse of the center. The infantry also routed, with many being cut down as they fled.
Total casualties for the Macedonians were between 300 and 400. The Persians had roughly 1,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry killed, mostly in the rout. The Greek mercenaries, under the command of Memnon of Rhodes, who fought for the Persians were abandoned after the cavalry retreat. They attempted to broker a peace with Alexander but to no avail. As a result after the battle, Alexander ordered his infantry, who until this point had played no role in the battle, to slaughter the mercenaries to a man. 18,000 mercenaries were killed and 2,000 enslaved and sent back to Macedonia in chains for hard labour.
Historian Peter Green (in his book, Alexander of Macedon, from University of California Press) has a different theory of the battle. According to Green, the riverbank was guarded by infantry, not cavalry, and Alexander's forces were badly mauled and forced to retire. Alexander then grudgingly accepted Parmenion's advice, crossed the river during the night in an uncontested location, and fought the battle at dawn the next day. The Persian army hurried to the location of Alexander's crossing, with the cavalry reaching the scene of the battle first before the slower infantry, and then the battle continued largely as described by the ancient sources. Green accounts for the differences between his theory and all the ancient accounts by suggesting that Alexander later covered up his initial failed crossing. Green devotes an entire appendix to his interpretation and it is well thought out, and it seems eminently reasonable.
The traditional view of the Persian infantry and mercenaries holding behind the cavalry is, from a military point of view, stupid. While no one would accuse the Persian leadership of genius in the battle, to hold a river bank with cavalry (which by its nature is an offensive, not defensive force) strains credulity. Far wiser it would be to have the infantry (however poor quality, they are still more suitable than the cavalry) hold the river line, with stakes and whatever else could reinforce the line, while the cavalry sits behind to thwart any breakthrough (much like the German Panzer divisions behind the 'Atlantic Wall' before D-Day).
However, both because of his huge ego and from political considerations back home, Alexander could not admit even a temporary defeat. Thus, the defeat was covered up by his propagandists, by a very heroic (and Homeric) suicide charge into the teeth of the enemy.
However, Green freely admits this is merely a theory.
Aftermath
Alexander came close to dying in the battle. Mithridates, Rhoesaces, Spithridates and several other Persian leaders were killed, while Arsites fled and shortly after committed suicide in his satrapy. The Greek cities in Asia Minor were liberated by Alexander, and a beachhead was established so that further campaigns against the Persian empire could be accomplished. Darius III continued to leave the responsibility of battling against Alexander to his satraps and gave Memnon a commanding role over the navy and coastal areas. Not until the Battle of Issus would Darius decide to confront the Macedonian conqueror in person.
Sources
- Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
- Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
- Fuller, John F. C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: De Capo Press.
- Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.
- Moerbeek, Martijn (1997). Universiteit Twente.
- Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.
- Warry, J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.
- Welman, Nick. and . Fontys University.
See also
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