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Battle of Caporetto
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The Battle of Caporetto (also known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo or the Battle of Karfreit as it was known by the Central Powers; ), took place from 24 October to 9 November 1917, near the town of Kobarid (now in Slovenia), on the Austro-Italian front of World War I. The battle was named after the Italian name of the town of Kobarid (known as Karfreit in German).
Austro-Hungarian forces, reinforced by German units, were able to break into the Italian front line and rout the Italian army, which had practically no mobile reserves.
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Encyclopedia
The Battle of Caporetto (also known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo or the Battle of Karfreit as it was known by the Central Powers; ), took place from 24 October to 9 November 1917, near the town of Kobarid (now in Slovenia), on the Austro-Italian front of World War I. The battle was named after the Italian name of the town of Kobarid (known as Karfreit in German).
Austro-Hungarian forces, reinforced by German units, were able to break into the Italian front line and rout the Italian army, which had practically no mobile reserves. The battle was a demonstration of the effectiveness of the use of stormtroopers and the infiltration tactics developed in part by Oskar von Hutier. The use of poison gas by the Germans played a key role in the collapse of the Italian Second Army.
The Battle
The German offensive began at approximately two in the morning on October 24 1917. Due to the inclement weather, particularly the mist, that morning, the Italians were caught by complete surprise. The battle opened with a Geman artillery barrage of explosives, poison gas, and smoke, and was followed by an all out charge against the Italian lines. The defensive line of the Italian Second Army was breached almost immediately. The German forces made extensive use of flamethrowers and hand grenades as a part of their infiltration tactics, and the combination tore gaping holes in the Italian line. By the end of the first night, von Below's men had advanced a shocking . German and Austro-Hungarian attacks on either sides of von Below's central column were less effective, however. The Italian Army had been able to repel the majority of these attacks, but the giant success of von Below threw the entire Italian Army into disarray. Forces had to be moved along the Italian front to attempt to supplement the failing joints, and this weakened the points that had until this point held out against the forces from the Central Powers. This initiated further attacks by the attacking forces, which now threatened the bulk of the Italian force at the Tagliamento River.
Capello, realizing his forces were ill-prepared for this attack and were being routed, requested to withdraw back to the Tagliamento. He was overruled by Cadorna, however, who believed that the Italian force could regroup and hold out against the attackers. Finally, on 30 October 1917 Cadorna ordered the majority of the Italian force to retreat to the other side of the river. It took the Italians four full days to cross the river, and by this time the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were on their heels. By 2 November 1917, a German division had established a bridgehead on the Tagliamento. About this time, however, the rapid success of the attack caught up to them. The German and Austro-Hungarian supply lines were stretched to the point of breaking, and they were not able to launch another concerted attack as a result. Cadorna took advantage of this by retreating farther, to the Piave River, where his forces arrived by 10 November 1917.
Failures of the German Logistics
Even before the battle, the German logistics were stretched dangerously thin. Rommel often bemoaned the demands placed on his "poorly fed troops." The Allied blockade of the German Empire, which the Kaiserliche Marine had repeatedly failed to break, was allowing malnutrition to sweep across the Central Powers. When this was combined with the grueling night marches preceding the battle of Caporetto, a heavy toll was extracted from the German and Austro-Hungarian Forces. Given the immense success of the initial campaign, however, the logistical flaws were briefly overlooked by the German commanders. As the area that the combined Central Powers forces expanded, it quickly outgrew the already limited logistical capacity. By the time the attack reached the Piave, the soldiers of the Central Powers were running low on supplies and were feeling the physical effects of exhaustion. As the Italians began to counter the pressure put on them by the Central Powers, the German forces lost all momentum and were once again caught up in another round of attrition warfare.
Aftermath
Italian losses were enormous: 11,000 were killed, 20,000 wounded and 265,000 were taken prisoner. Furthermore, roughly 3,000 guns, 3,000 machine guns and 2,000 mortars were captured by the Austrians along with an untold amount of stores and equipment. In addition, a large number of Italian soldiers deserted the army following the battle. Austro-Hungarian and German forces advanced more than 100 km in the direction of Venice, but they were not able to cross the Piave River. Although to this point the Italians had been left to fight on their own, after Caporetto they were reinforced by six French infantry divisions and five British infantry divisions as well as sizeable air contingents. The Piave served as a natural barrier where the Italians could establish a new defensive line, which was held during the subsequent Battle of the Piave River and later served as springboard for the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, where the Austro-Hungarian army was utterly defeated.
The battle led to the conference at Rapallo and the creation of a Supreme War Council, with the aim of improving Allied military co-operation and developing a unified strategy.
Luigi Cadorna was forced to resign after the defeat. The defeat alone was not the sole cause, but rather the breaking point for an accumulation of perceived failures by the Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Throughout much of his command, including at Caporetto, Cadorna was known to have maintained poor relations with the other generals on his staff. In addition, he was detested by his troops as being too harsh. He was replaced by Armando Diaz and Pietro Badoglio.
This led governments to the realization that fear alone could not adequately motivate a modern army. After the defeat at Caporetto, Italian propaganda offices were established, promising land and social justice to soldiers. Italy also accepted a more cautious military strategy from this point on. Just one fifth of the total 650,000 Italian casualties during the war occurred after Caporetto, a marked improvement.
After this battle, the term "Caporetto" gained a particular resonance in Italy. It is used to denote a terrible defeat - the failed General Strike of 1922 by the socialists was referred to by Mussolini as the "Caporetto of Italian Socialism". Many years after the war, Caporetto was still being used to destroy the credibility of the liberal state.
Popular Culture
The Battle of Caporetto has been the subject of a number of different books. The Swedish author F.J. Nordstedt (e.g. Christian Braw) wrote about the battle in his novel Caporetto. The bloody aftermath of Caporetto was vividly described by Ernest Hemingway in his novel A Farewell to Arms.
External links
- . The Foundation preserves, restores and presents the historical and cultural heritage of the First World War in the area of the Isonzo Front for the study, tourist and educational purposes.
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