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Anatta
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In Buddhism, anatta (Pali) or anatman (Sanskrit) refers to the notion of "not-self". One scholar describes it as "meaning non-selfhood, the absence of limiting self-identity in people and things." In the Pali suttas and the related agamas (referred to collectively below as the nikayas), the agglomeration of constantly changing physical and mental constituents ("skandhas") comprising a human being is thoroughly analyzed and stated not to comprise an eternal, unchanging self (often denoted "Self").
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In Buddhism, anatta (Pali) or anatman (Sanskrit) refers to the notion of "not-self". One scholar describes it as "meaning non-selfhood, the absence of limiting self-identity in people and things." In the Pali suttas and the related agamas (referred to collectively below as the nikayas), the agglomeration of constantly changing physical and mental constituents ("skandhas") comprising a human being is thoroughly analyzed and stated not to comprise an eternal, unchanging self (often denoted "Self"). In the nikayas, the Buddha repeatedly emphasizes not only that the five skandhas of living being are "not-self", but that clinging to them as if they were an immutable self or soul (atman) gives rise to unhappiness.
On the other hand, the early scriptures see an enlightened individual as someone whose changing, empirical self is highly developed. According to Buddhist teachings, this phenomenon should not, either in whole or in part, be reified, either in affirmation or denial. The Buddha rejected the latter metaphysical assertions as ontological theorizing that binds one to suffering.
Some Mahayana Buddhist sutras and tantras present Buddhist teachings on emptiness using positive language by positing the ultimate reality of the "true self" (atman). In these teachings the word is used to refer to each being's inborn potential to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices, and future status as a Buddha. This teaching, which is soteriological rather than theoretical, portrays this potential or aspect as undying.
Anatta, along with dukkha (suffering/unease) and anicca (impermanence), is one of the three dharma seals, which, according to Buddhism, characterise all conditioned phenomena.
Anatta in the Nikayas
The Buddhist term anatta (Pali) or anatman (Sanskrit) is used in the suttas both as a noun and as a predicative adjective to denote that phenomena are not, or are without, a Self, to describe any and all composite, consubstantial, phenomenal and temporal things, from the macrocosmic to microcosmic, be it matter pertaining to the physical body or the cosmos at large, as well as any and all mental machinations, which are impermanent. Anatta in sutra is often used in conjunction with the terms dukkha (imperfection) and anicca (impermanence), and all three terms are often used in triplet in making a blanket statement as regards any and all compounded phenomena. “All these aggregates are anicca, dukkha and anatta.”
The one scriptural passage where Gautama is asked by a layperson what the meaning of anatta is as follows: [Samyutta Nikaya] At one time in Savatthi, the venerable Radha seated himself and asked of the Blessed Lord Buddha: “Anatta, anatta I hear said venerable. What pray tell does Anatta mean?” “Just this, Radha, form is not the self (anatta), sensations are not the self (anatta), perceptions are not the self (anatta), assemblages are not the self (anatta), consciousness is not the self (anatta). Seeing thusly, this is the end of birth, the Brahman life has been fulfilled, what must be done has been done.”
The nikayas state that certain things (the five aggregates), with which the unlearned man identifies himself, do not constitute a personal essence and that is why one on the path to liberation should grow disgusted with them, become detached from them and be liberated.
“Whatever form, feelings, perceptions, experiences, or consciousness there is (the five aggregates), these he sees to be without permanence, as suffering, as ill, as a plague, a boil, a sting, a pain, an affliction, as foreign, as otherness, as empty (suññato), as Selfless (anattato). So he turns his mind away from these and gathers his mind/will within the realm of Immortality (amataya dhatuya). This is tranquility; this is that which is most excellent!”
In Samyutta Nikaya (SN) 4.400, Gautama Buddha was asked if there “was no soul (natthatta)”, which it is conventionally considered to be equivalent to Nihilism (ucchedavada). The Buddha himself has said: “Both formerly and now, I’ve never been a nihilist (vinayika), never been one who teaches the annihilation of a being, rather taught only the source of suffering, and its ending.” The early Suttas see annihilationism, which the Buddha equated with denial of a Self, as tied up with belief in a Self. It is seen as arising due to conceiving a Self in some sort of relationship to the personality-factors. It is thus rooted in the 'I am' attitude; even the attitude 'I do not exist' arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.
Anatta is not meant as a philosophical position. According to Peter Harvey, One uses 'not-Self', then, as a reason to let go of things, not to 'prove' that there is no Self. There is no need to give some philosophical denial of 'Self'; the idea simply withers away, or evaporates in the light of knowledge, when it is seen that the concept does not apply to anything at all, or, as the Suttas put it, when it is seen that everything is 'empty' of Self. A philosophical denial is just a view, a theory, which may be agreed with or not. It does not get one to actually examine all the things that one really does identify with, consciously or unconsciously, as Self or I.
The nikayas refer to a level of mind called "luminous mind" which may be seen as a basic mode of mind in terms of which the "evolution" of beings through the round of rebirths may be understood.
The Buddha criticized conceiving theories even of a unitary soul or identity immanent in all things as unskillful. In fact, according to the Buddha's statement in Khandha Samyutta 47, all thoughts about self are necessarily, whether the thinker is aware of it or not, thoughts about the five aggregates or one of them.
At the time of the Buddha some philosophers and meditators posited a "root": an abstract principle out of which all things emanated and which was immanent in all things. When asked about this, instead of following this pattern of thinking, the Buddha attacks it at its very root: the notion of a principle in the abstract, superimposed on experience. In contrast, a person in training should look for a different kind of "root" — the root of dukkha experienced in the present. According to one Buddhist scholar, theories of this sort have most often originated among meditators who label a particular meditative experience as the ultimate goal, and identify with it in a subtle way.
Anatta and moral responsibility
While the Buddha attacked the assumptions of existence of an eternal Self, he would refer to the existence of a conventional self-subject to conditional phenomena and responsible, in the causal-moral sense, for karma. Peter Harvey writes that according to the suttas, It can thus be said that, while an empirical self exists - or rather consists of a changing flow of mental and physical states which neither unchangingly exists nor does not exist - no metaphysical Self can be apprehended.
There are many statements in the suttas to the effect that a person acts, and then reaps the consequences. These statements are made to rebut the various theories circulating among philosophers of the Buddha's time that denied the efficacy of moral action, attributing all change to fate; these were forms of determinism. The Buddha's statements are not metaphysical in nature, and do not imply an unchanging subject of experience. Instead, continuity is maintained not by positing an extraempirical entity such as a Self, but by a theory of causality.
The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility; the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which came to be known as "atthikavaada", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which came to be known as "natthikavaada". He rejected them both on empirical grounds. The following interaction of the Buddha pertains to the latter theory: The Buddha was silent to the questions of the paribbajako (wandering ascetic) Vacchagotta of “Is there a self?” or “Is there not a self?” [SN.5:44,10]. When Ananda later asked about his silence, the Buddha said that to affirm or deny the existence of an eternal self would have sided with sectarian theories and have disturbed Vacchagotta even more. The early Suttas see even Annihilationism, which the Buddha equated with denial of a Self, as tied up with belief in a Self. It is seen as arising due to conceiving a Self in some sort of relationship to the personality-factors. It is thus rooted in the 'I am' attitude; even the attitude 'I do not exist' arises from a preoccupation with 'I'. The Buddha appealed to experience in his refutation of natthikavaada, saying: "To one who sees, with proper understanding, the arising of the things in the world, the belief in nonexistence would not occur."
The Buddha was also careful not to allow an atthikavaadin interpretation of his doctrine of causality. In response to the question from a man named Acela Kassapa as to whether or not suffering is self-caused, the Buddha gave a negative reply; "A person acts and the same person experiences [the result] — this, Kassapa, which you emphatically call 'suffering self-wrought', amounts to the eternalist theory." In responding in this way, the Buddha indicated the connection between the problem of personal identity and moral responsibility.
This process-view of a person does not see personality as a chaotic flux, but as a law-governed moving pattern which only changes in so far as supporting conditions change. In spite of the changes taking place in a person, some character-patterns are repeated, even over many lives, before they are worn out or replaced by others in accordance with the law of dependent origination. The complex of conditions arises out of an interaction of those processes internal to a person's own stream of psychological processes, that is, past or present karma, with those from the external world. Some of the external conditions will in turn be influenced or generated by internal processes. Thus the person-process both changes and is changed by its environment.
The principles of causality are key to the Buddha's teachings; they provide a vital perspective on his doctrine as a whole and show how to see it integrated positively in the causal relationships of the mental-physical factors of the experience of life. Causal relationships were detailed in the Buddha’s analysis of dependent origination and idappaccayata (lit. “This is founded on that”).
This analysis is applied to knowing the interplay of senses within the mental-physical factors just as they are. It is a careful analysis of these realities in terms of their changefulness, instability or un-satisfactoriness and that these lack inherent personal identification. And this leads to wisdom (prajña, pañña), cessation of craving (nirodha), and to liberation (nirvana) of the will/mind (citta).
The goal of the Buddhist contemplative is to develop freedom of the will/mind (citta) from entanglement with things as they seem; through the delusions of desire and consequential self-identity with events, resultant fear, aversion and projected hopes—to awaken to things as they are; coming home to a natural understanding of reality with ones given abilities at work in an ever changing evolution of experience. “The mind (citta) is cleansed of the five skandhas (pañcakkhandha)” [Nettippakarana 44]
Developing the self
While the suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self, they see an enlightened being as one whose changing, empirical self is highly developed. One with great self has a mind which is not at the mercy of outside stimuli or its own moods, but is imbued with self-control, and self-contained. The mind of such a one is without boundaries, not limited by attachment or I-identification. One can transform one's self from an "insignificant self" into a "great self" through practices such as loving-kindness and mindfulness. The suttas portray one disciple who has developed his mind through loving-kindness saying: "Formerly this mind of mine was limited, but now my mind is immeasurable."
At the culmination of the path is the Arahant, described as "one of developed self" (bhavit-atto), who has carried the process of personal development and self-reliance to its perfection. Such a person has developed all the good aspects of their personality. An arahant is described as "one with a mind like a diamond", it can "cut" anything and is itself uncuttable; nothing can affect it. The suttas portray "one of developed self" in the following ways:
- Virtue, wisdom, and the meditative and other spiritual faculties are well-developed;
- Body is "developed" and "steadfast";
- Mind is "developed", "steadfast", "well-released" and without ill-will;
- When confronted with objects of the six senses, he or she has equanimity and is not confused, seeing only what is seen, and hearing only what is heard, not mental projections and elaborations such as attachment, desire, and aversion;
- The six senses are "controlled" and "guarded";
- He or she is "self-controlled" (atta-danto) and "with a well-controlled self" (attana sudantena); and is
- "Unlimited, great, deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom, with much treasure, arisen (like the) ocean."
Buddhism and the Self of the Upanishads
The pre-Buddhist Upanishads link the Self to the feeling "I am." The Chandogya Upanishad for example does, and it sees Self as underlying the whole world, being "below," "above," and in the four directions. In contrast, the Buddhist Arahant says: "Above, below, everywhere set free, not considering 'this I am.'"
While the pre-Buddhist Upanishads link the Self to the attitude "I am," others like the post-Buddhist Maitri Upanishad hold that only the defiled individual self, rather than the universal self, thinks "this is I" or "this is mine". According to Peter Harvey, This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations. The Upanishadic "Self" shares certain characteristics with nibbana; both are permanent, beyond suffering, and unconditioned. However, the Buddha shunned any attempt to see the spiritual goal in terms of "Self" because in his framework, the craving for a permanent self is the very thing which keeps a person in the round of uncontrollable rebirth, preventing him or her from attaining nibbana. Harvey continues: Both in the Upanishads and in common usage, self/Self is linked to the sense of "I am" ... If the later Upanishads came to see ultimate reality as beyond the sense of "I am", Buddhism would then say: why call it 'Self', then?
Buddhist mysticism is also of a different sort from that found in systems revolving around the concept of a "God" or "Self": If one would characterize the forms of mysticism found in the Pali discourses, it is none of the nature-, God-, or soul-mysticism of F.C. Happold. Though nearest to the latter, it goes beyond any ideas of 'soul' in the sense of immortal 'self' and is better styled 'consciousness-mysticism.'
Possibly the main philosophical difference between Hinduism and Buddhism is that the concept of atman was rejected by the Buddha. Terms like anatman (not-self) and shunyata (voidness) are at the core of all Buddhist traditions. The permanent cessation of the reification of the perceived self is integral to the enlightenment of an Arhat.
The Buddha criticized conceiving theories even of a unitary soul or identity immanent in all things as unskillful. In fact, according to the Buddha's statement in Khandha Samyutta 47, all thoughts about self are necessarily, whether the thinker is aware of it or not, thoughts about the five aggregates or one of them. One of the Buddha's uses of his five-fold classification of human experience was to refute the conception of a Self held by Upanishadic thinkers.
At the time of the Buddha some philosophers and meditators posited a "root": an abstract principle out of which all things emanated and which was immanent in all things. When asked about this, instead of following this pattern of thinking, the Buddha attacks it at its very root: the notion of a principle in the abstract, superimposed on experience. In contrast, a person in training should look for a different kind of "root" — the root of dukkha experienced in the present. According to one Buddhist scholar, theories of this sort have most often originated among meditators who label a particular meditative experience as the ultimate goal, and identify with it in a subtle way.
Nibbana and anatta
Two characteristics of nibbana are permanence and an absence of suffering. The relationship between nibbana and the anatta is a different matter. Walpola Rahula shows that the early attempts of Western scholars to find the atman doctrine in the Pali canon are a result of mistranslations of the original Pali. Rahula further says, though, that in declaring "all dhammas are anatta," the Buddha included even nirvana in his blanket statement that all things are not one's self; this standard Theravada interpretation also hinges on interpreting the word "sankhara" in the widest sense. Peter Harvey agrees with this interpretation; see below.
Thanissaro Bhikkhu and Nanavira Thera disagree, finding that the word "dhamma" is used here only to refer to objects of mental consciousness or mental analysis. They instead assert that the self/not-self analysis does not extend to nibbana at all. While there are passages that describe nibbana as an object of consciousness (such as AN 9.36), this applies only up to the level of non-returning. For the arahant, however, it is directly known without mediation of the mental consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, and is the transcending of all dhammas. In SN V.6, for one example, the Buddha calls the attainment of the goal the transcending of all dhammas; thus nibbana cannot always be included in the scope of the word "dhamma." In fact, according to Thanissaro Bhikkhu, the teaching "all dhammas are not-self" applies directly to those who experience nibbana without finality; its use in verses 277-279 of the Dhammapada make clear that the statement is directed at the path, not the goal. The statement reminds the meditator that he or she should not regard the deathless with any form of self-identification, and thus clinging, at all.
Nanavira Thera holds that "all dhammas are not-self" can be read as "all objects of mental analysis are not-self." Since "self" arises in the first place merely as a delusive figment of the mind, and is then attributed by the mind to "the five aggregates of clinging or one of them," a statement that mental analysis finds no "self" in any of its objects is, given the fact that the mind is the only means there is of investigating anything at all, equivalent to a complete denial of the "self" concept.
According to this analysis, the Buddha did not make the metaphysical assertion that nibbana is not self, but neither did he hold the metaphysical view that it is self. In fact, a statement by the Buddha that nibbana is atta or that it is anatta is nowhere to be found it the Canon, and according to Nanavira Thera, both statements regarding nibbana from the perspective of the arahant are inconsistent with statements he did make. In this analysis, the self/not-self dichotomy simply is not applicable there. As AN 4.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the complete realization of unconditioned consciousness is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All:" The Blessed One said, 'What is the All? Simply the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, intellect and ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, "Repudiating this All, I will describe another," if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." Thus someone who is not liberated should not cling to any object of the six sense spheres, including nirvana if it has been tasted but not fully realized, as a permanent self, and for a liberated individual who has gone beyond experiencing nirvana as an object, ideas of self and non-self do not apply.
Peter Harvey agrees with the Theravada view that "all dhammas are not-Self" includes nibbana in its scope. He states, "where Self and nibbana differ is with respect to the very aspect of Self-hood, I-ness." He continues, "Nibbana itself is not-Self as it is the stopping of the breeding-ground for the 'I am' attitude, beyond all possibility of I-ness. Thus, where there was formerly impermanence and a supposed 'I', there is now permanence and no grounds at all for 'I'. All the personality-factors are dropped because they fall short of the Self-ideal ... [Nibbana] is that which is 'not dependent on another' attained by not depending on anything as 'Self. It is the 'ultimate empty thing' [this is a reference to the Patisambhidamagga], which is true permanence and happiness."
As one scholar has written, If one would characterize the forms of mysticism found in the Pali discourses, it is none of the nature-, God-, or soul-mysticism of F.C. Happold. Though nearest to the latter, it goes beyond any ideas of 'soul' in the sense of immortal 'self' and is better styled 'consciousness-mysticism.'
Anatta in the Tathagatagarbha Sutras
Some Mahayana scriptures declare the existence of "atman," which in these scriptures is equated with buddha-nature.
Tathagatagarbha genre as orthodox
According to some scholars, the "tathagatagarbha"/Buddha nature discussed in some Mahayana sutras does not represent a substantial self (atman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of sunyata (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. It may be based on the phenomenon known as luminous mind in the Pali canon, discussed in places such as the following in the Anguttara Nikaya:
Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements. Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
Prior to the period of these scriptures, Mahayana metaphysics had been dominated by teachings on emptiness in the form of Madhyamaka philosophy. The language used by this approach is primarily negative, and the Tathagatagarbha genre of sutras can be seen as an attempt to state orthodox Buddhist teachings of dependent origination using positive language instead, to prevent people from being turned away from Buddhism by a false impression of nihilism. In these sutras the perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self; the ultimate goal of the path is then characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously by essentialist philosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.
In the Tathagatagarbha Sutra, the Buddha is potrayed telling of how, with his buddha-eye, he can actually see this hidden "jewel" within each and every being: "hidden within the klesas [mental contaminants] of greed, desire, anger, and stupidity, there is seated augustly and unmovingly the Tathagata's [Buddha's] wisdom, the Tathagata's vision, and the Tathagata's body [...] all beings, though they find themselves with all sorts of klesas, have a tathagatagarbha that is eternally unsullied, and replete with virtues no different from my own". This represents a being's potential to become a Buddha; it is the "true self" in the sense of being the ideal personality, not a metaphysical essence. As the Buddha is portrayed as proclaiming in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra;
Good son, there are three ways of having: first, to have in the future, Secondly, to have at present, and thirdly, to have in the past. All sentient beings will have in future ages the most perfect enlightenment, i.e., the Buddha nature. All sentient beings have at present bonds of defilements, and do not now possess the thirty-two marks and eighty noble characteristics of the Buddha. All sentient beings had in past ages deeds leading to the elimination of defilements and so can now perceive the Buddha nature as their future goal. For such reasons, I always proclaim that all sentient beings have the Buddha nature.
Tathagatagarbha genre as monist
Not all scholars subscribe to the interpretation that the tathagatagarbha or 'Self' is not indicative of a monistic Absolute within the being. Some scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references. Writing on the diverse understandings of tathagatagarbha doctrine, Dr. Jamie Hubbard comments on how some scholars see a tendency towards monism in the tathagatagarbha texts [a tendency which Japanese scholar Matsumoto, however, castigates as un-Buddhist]. Dr. Hubbard comments:
'Matsumoto [calls] attention to the similarity between the extremely positive language and causal structure of enlightenment found in the tathagatagarbha literature and that of the substantial monism found in the atman/Brahman tradition. Matsumoto, of course, is not the only one to have noted this resemblance. Takasaki Jikido, for example, the preeminent scholar of the tathagatagarbha tradition, sees monism in the doctrine of the tathagatagarbha and the Mahayana in general … Obermiller wedded this notion of a monistic Absolute to the tathagatagarbha literature in his translation and comments to the Ratnagotra, which he aptly subtitled “A Manual of Buddhist Monism” … Lamotte and Frauwallner have seen the tathagatagarbha doctrine as diametrically opposed to the Madhyamika and representing something akin to the monism of the atman/Brahman strain ... Yet another camp, represented by Yamaguchi Susumu and his student Ogawa Ichijo, is able to understand tathagatagarbha thought without recourse to Vedic notions by putting it squarely within the Buddhist tradition of conditioned causality and emptiness, which, of course, explicitly rejects monism of any sort. Obviously, the question of the monist or absolutist nature of the tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature traditions is complex.’
The problem of evil
With this monistic interpretation arises the problem of evil akin to the theistic problem of evil. The Ratnagotra-vibhaga sees the tathagatagarbha as the basis for all mental activity, including "unsystematic attention", which is in turn the basis for moral and spiritual defilements. The Lankavatara Sutra specifically says that the tathagatagarbha "holds within it the cause for both good and evil." Tathagatagarbha thought, seeking to avoid the conclusion that genuine evil can arise from the pure tathagatagarbha, portrays mental defilements as insubstantial illusions produced by delusion. It portrays mental defilements as unreal, and nirvana not as the actual extinction of anything, but as being already existent in a concealed state. Why the illusory mental defilements should be imagined by the deluded mind is stated to be a mystery that only a Buddha can understand. The absolutist language of tathagatagarbha thought thus tends to introduce a gulf of non-relation between the realms of enlightenment and deluded existence. This dualism brings with it the conundrum of relating enlightened and unenlightened existence.
Opposed to early Buddhism and Yogacara
In early Buddhism, in contrast, nibbana, which is Pali for "blowing out", is the extinguishing of the three fires of greed, hatred, and delusion. Furthermore, it is not the recognition of a pre-existing or eternal perfection, but is the attainment of something that is hitherto unattained. This is also the orthodox Yogacara position. The early scriptures also reject monism (ekatta) and pluralism (nanatta) as speculative views. See middle way.
Teaching of Self in the 'Chanting the Names of Mañjusri'
The Buddhist tantric scripture entitled Chanting the Names of Mañjusri (Mañjusri-nama-sa?giti), as quoted by the great Tibetan Buddhist master, Dolpopa, repeatedly exalts not the non-Self but the Self.
Thus, the "non-Self" doctrine is presented in the Mañjusri-nama-sa?giti (and in certain tantric texts) as a merely partial, incomplete truth rather than as an absolute verity. Dolpopa's ideas were quite controversial in Tibet and were vociferously attacked by Tsongkhapa.
Anatman in other Indian traditions
The term anatman is found not only in Buddhist sutras, but also in the writings of Shankara, the founder of Advaita Vedanta. Advaita Vedanta was strongly influenced by Buddhism, which was itself 'reformed Brahmanism' .In Advaita Vedanta, anatman is a common via negativa (neti neti, not this, not that) teaching method, wherein nothing affirmative can be said of what is “beyond speculation, beyond words, and concepts” thereby eliminating all positive characteristics that might be thought to apply to the soul, or be attributed to it. In this thinking, the Subjective ontological Self-Nature (svabhava) can never be known objectively, but only through “the denial of all things which it (the Soul) is not.”
Relationship to secular philosophy
David Hume's "bundle theory of the self" is in some ways similar to the Buddha's skandha analysis, though Hume's denial of causation led him opposite conclusions in other areas.
Derek Parfit's reductionist account is also reminiscent of Buddhism. Parfit devotes a small appendix in his book Reasons and Persons to showing that "Buddha would have agreed" with his account.
See also
Bibliography
- Doctrine of the Buddha, George Grimm
- Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, Perez-Remon, Mouton, 1980
- Lama, Dalai (1997). Healing Anger: The Power of Patience from a Buddhist Perspective. Translated by Geshe Thupten Jinpa. Snow Lion Publications. Source: (accessed: Sunday March 25 2007)
External links
- Audio discussion of Anatta from Buddhist Society of Western Australia.
- English translation of the Nirvana Sutra by Kosho Yamamoto.
- An analysis of in the Nikayas
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