Melbourne–Evans collision
Encyclopedia
The Melbourne-Evans collision was a collision between the light aircraft carrier of the Royal Australian Navy
(RAN) and the destroyer of the United States Navy
(USN). On 3 June 1969, the two ships were participating in SEATO
exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea
. At approximately 3 am, when ordered to a new escort station, Evans sailed under Melbournes bow, where she was cut in two. Seventy-four of Evans crew were killed.
A joint RAN-USN Board of Inquiry was held to establish the events of the collision and the responsibility of those involved. This inquiry, which was believed by the Australians to be biased against them, found that both ships were at fault for the collision. Four officers (the captains of Melbourne and Evans, plus the two junior officers in control of Evans at the time of the collision) were court-martialled based on the results of the Inquiry; while the three USN officers were charged, the RAN officer was cleared of wrongdoing.
on 15 April 1943, but construction was stopped at the end of World War II. She was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 1948, along with sister ship , but was heavily upgraded while construction was completed and did not enter service until the end of 1955. In 1964, Melbourne was involved in a collision
with Australian destroyer , sinking the smaller ship and killing 82 of her crew.
USS Frank E. Evans was an Allen M. Sumner class destroyer
. She was laid down on 21 April 1944, and commissioned into the United States Navy on 3 February 1945. She served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and earned eleven battle stars.
and . Stevenson held a dinner for the five escort captains at the start of the exercise, during which he recounted the events of the Melbourne-Voyager collision
, emphasised the need for caution when operating near the carrier, and provided written instructions on how to avoid such a situation developing again. Additionally, during the lead-up to the exercise, Admiral Crabb had strongly warned that all repositioning manoeuvres performed by the escorts had to commence with a turn away from Melbourne.
Despite these warnings, a near-miss occurred in the early hours of 31 May when USS Larson turned towards the carrier after being ordered to the plane guard
station. Subsequent action narrowly prevented a collision. The escorts were again warned about the dangers of operating near the carrier and informed of Stevenson's expectations, while the minimum distance between carrier and escorts was increased from 2000 to 3000 yd (1,828.8 to 2,743.2 m).
aircraft, Stevenson ordered Evans to the plane guard station, reminded the destroyer of Melbournes course, and instructed the carrier's navigational lights to be brought to full brilliance. This was the fourth time that Evans had been asked to assume this station that night, and the previous three manoeuvres had been without incident. Evans was positioned on Melbournes port bow, but began the manoeuvre by turning starboard, towards the carrier. A radio message was sent from Melbourne to Evanss bridge and Combat Information Centre, warning the destroyer that she was on a collision course, which Evans acknowledged. Seeing the destroyer take no action and on a course to place herself under Melbournes bow, Stevenson ordered the carrier hard to port, signalling the turn by both radio and siren blasts. At approximately the same time, Evans turned hard to starboard to avoid the approaching carrier. It is uncertain which ship began to manoeuvre first, but each ship's bridge crew claimed that they were informed of the other ship's turn after they commenced their own. After having narrowly passed in front of Melbourne, the turns quickly placed Evans back in the carrier's path. Melbourne hit Evans amidships at 3:15 am, cutting the destroyer in two.
Melbourne stopped immediately after the collision and deployed her boats, liferafts, and lifebuoys, before carefully manoeuvring alongside the stern section of Evans Sailors from both ships used mooring lines to lash the two ships together, allowing Melbourne to evacuate the survivors in that section. The bow section sank quickly; the majority of those killed were believed to have been trapped within. Members of Melbournes crew dived into the water to rescue overboard survivors close to the carrier, while the carrier's boats and helicopters collected those farther out. Clothing, blankets, and beer were provided to survivors from the carrier's stores, some RAN sailors offered their own uniforms, and the ship's band was instructed to set up on the flight deck to entertain and distract the USN personnel. All of the survivors were located within twelve minutes of the collision and rescued before half an hour had passed, although the search continued for fifteen more hours.
Seventy-four of the 273 crew on Evans were killed. It was later learned that Evanss commanding officer, Commander Albert S. McLemore, was asleep in his quarters at the time of the incident, and charge of the vessel was held by Lieutenants Ronald Ramsey and James Hopson; the former had failed the qualification exam to stand watch, while the latter was at sea for the first time.
, arriving there on 9 June. After being stripped for parts, the hulk was decommissioned on 1 July, and was later sunk when used for target practice.
Melbourne travelled to Singapore, arriving on 6 June, where she received temporary repairs to her bow. The carrier departed on 27 June, and arrived in Sydney on 9 July, where the she spent until November docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs and installation of the new bow.
817 Squadron RAN
, which was responsible for the Westland Wessex
helicopters embarked on Melbourne at the time of the collision, was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their rescue efforts. Five other decorations were presented to Australian personnel in relation to the rescue of Evans’ crew: one George Medal
, one Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE)
, one Air Force Cross
, and two British Empire Medal
s. Fifteen additional commendations for gallantry were awarded by the Australian Naval Board.
The Board was made up of six officers. The RAN representatives were Rear Admiral David Stevenson
(no relation to Melbournes Captain Stevenson), Captain Ken Shards, and Captain John Davidson. The USN officers were Captains S.L. Rusk and C.B. Anderson. Presiding over the Board was United States Navy Rear Admiral Jerome King: considered to be an unwise posting as he was the commanding officer of both the forces involved in the SEATO exercise and the fleet unit Evans normally belonged to, and was seen during the Inquiry to be biased against Captain Stevenson and other RAN personnel. King's attitude, performance, and conflict of interest were criticised by the Australians present at the inquiry and the Press, and his handling of the inquiry was seen as detrimental to relations between the two countries.
Despite admissions by members of the USN, given privately to personnel in other navies, that the incident was entirely the fault of Evans, significant attempts were made to reduce the US destroyer's culpability and place at least partial blame for the incident on Melbourne. At the beginning of the inquiry, King banned one of the RAN legal advisors from attending, even as an observer. He regularly intervened for American witnesses, but failed to do so on similar matters for the Australians. Testimony on the collision and the subsequent rescue operation was to be given separately, and although requests by American personnel to give both sets of testimony at the same time in order to return to their duties were regularly granted, the same request made by Stevenson was denied by King. Testimony of members of the RAN had to be given under oath, and witnesses faced intense questioning from King, despite the same conditions not applying to USN personnel. There was also a heavy focus on the adequacy of Melbournes navigational lighting. Mentions of the near miss with USS Larson were interrupted with the instruction that those details could be recounted at a later time, but the matter was never raised by the Board.
The unanimous decision of the Board was that although Evans was partially at fault for the collision, Melbourne had contributed by not taking evasive action sooner, even though doing this would have been a direct contravention of international sea regulations, which stated that in the lead up to a collision, the larger ship was required to maintain course and speed. The report was inconsistent in several areas with the evidence given at the inquiry, including the falsity that Melbournes navigational lights took significant time to come to full brilliance. Several facts were also edited out of the transcripts of the inquiry.
charging him for his role in the incident might be required. Two charges of negligence—for failing to explicitly instruct Evans to change course to avoid collision and for failing to set the carrier's engines to full astern—were laid on 15 August, with the court martial held from 20 to 25 August. Evidence presented during the hearing showed that going full astern would have made no difference to the collision, and on the matter of the failing-to-instruct charge, the presiding Judge Advocate concluded that reasonable warning had been given to the destroyer and asked "What was [Stevenson] supposed to do—turn his guns on them?". Of the evidence and testimony given at the court-martial, nothing suggested that Stevenson had done anything wrong; instead it was claimed that he had done everything reasonable to avoid collision, and had done it correctly.
The reasons for the court-martial given by historians vary. One reason suggested was that it was to appease the USN, which had court-martialled three officers from Evans and had threatened to prevent US ships from operating as part of Australian-led forces if no action was taken against Stevenson. The other view is that the court-martial was used in an attempt to clear Stevenson's name and to allow the RAN to distance itself from the findings of the Joint Board of Inquiry.
The defence submitted that there was "no case to answer", resulting in the dropping of both charges and the verdict of "Honourably Acquitted". Despite the findings, Stevenson's next posting was as chief of staff to a minor flag officer; seen by him as a demotion in all but name. The posting had been decided upon before the court-martial, and was announced while Stevenson was out of the country for the courts-martial of Evanss officers; he did not learn about it until his return to Australia. Following the events, publicly considered to be another scapegoating of a Melbourne commander, Stevenson requested retirement, as he no longer wished to serve under people he no longer respected. This retirement was initially denied, but was later permitted.
In 1999, McLemore publicly claimed that the collision was his responsibility, as he had left two inexperienced officers in command of his ship.
Unlike other naval casualties during the Vietnam War
, the names of the 74 Evans crew killed are not inscribed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
. Despite operating in Vietnamese waters immediately before deployment to Exercise Sea Spirit, and being scheduled to return to activities supporting the war effort after the exercise, it was determined that as Sea Spirit was not directly linked with US operations in Vietnam, and the exercise took place outside the geographical limit for the conflict as defined by the outer edge of Market Time operations, the crew was ineligible for inclusion on 'The Wall'. Vietnam veterans have argued that inclusion on the monument should not be determined by geographic location, and exceptions to this rule have previously been made for soldiers killed as part of the conflict but not in Vietnam itself; for example those involved in operations in Laos
, and those dying in transit to or from Vietnam. These exceptions would also apply to those killed in the Melbourne-Evans collision, but an act of Congress specifically permitting the inclusion of their names on the memorial is required. Legislation to this end has been introduced on several occasions, but has so far failed to gather sufficient support.
A memorial to the collision is located in Niobrara, Nebraska
. The memorial specifically commemorates the three Sage brothers, all of whom were aboard Evans and were killed in the collision. They were the first group of siblings permitted to serve on the same ship since World War II, a result of the policy introduced when the five Sullivan brothers
were killed following the sinking of .
Royal Australian Navy
The Royal Australian Navy is the naval branch of the Australian Defence Force. Following the Federation of Australia in 1901, the ships and resources of the separate colonial navies were integrated into a national force: the Commonwealth Naval Forces...
(RAN) and the destroyer of the United States Navy
United States Navy
The United States Navy is the naval warfare service branch of the United States Armed Forces and one of the seven uniformed services of the United States. The U.S. Navy is the largest in the world; its battle fleet tonnage is greater than that of the next 13 largest navies combined. The U.S...
(USN). On 3 June 1969, the two ships were participating in SEATO
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was an international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, signed in September 1954 in Manila, Philippines. The formal institution of SEATO was established on 19 February...
exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea
South China Sea
The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around...
. At approximately 3 am, when ordered to a new escort station, Evans sailed under Melbournes bow, where she was cut in two. Seventy-four of Evans crew were killed.
A joint RAN-USN Board of Inquiry was held to establish the events of the collision and the responsibility of those involved. This inquiry, which was believed by the Australians to be biased against them, found that both ships were at fault for the collision. Four officers (the captains of Melbourne and Evans, plus the two junior officers in control of Evans at the time of the collision) were court-martialled based on the results of the Inquiry; while the three USN officers were charged, the RAN officer was cleared of wrongdoing.
Ships
HMAS Melbourne was the lead ship of the Majestic class of aircraft carriers. She was laid down for the Royal NavyRoyal Navy
The Royal Navy is the naval warfare service branch of the British Armed Forces. Founded in the 16th century, it is the oldest service branch and is known as the Senior Service...
on 15 April 1943, but construction was stopped at the end of World War II. She was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 1948, along with sister ship , but was heavily upgraded while construction was completed and did not enter service until the end of 1955. In 1964, Melbourne was involved in a collision
Melbourne-Voyager collision
The Melbourne-Voyager collision, also referred to as the "Melbourne-Voyager incident" or simply the "Voyager incident", was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy ; the aircraft carrier and the destroyer...
with Australian destroyer , sinking the smaller ship and killing 82 of her crew.
USS Frank E. Evans was an Allen M. Sumner class destroyer
Allen M. Sumner class destroyer
The Allen M. Sumner class was a group of 58 destroyers built by the United States during World War II. Another twelve ships were completed as destroyer minelayers...
. She was laid down on 21 April 1944, and commissioned into the United States Navy on 3 February 1945. She served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and earned eleven battle stars.
Lead up
Melbournes commanding officer during the SEATO exercise was Captain John Phillip Stevenson. Rear Admiral John Crabb, the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet, was also embarked on the carrier. During Sea Spirit, Melbourne was assigned five escorts: the US destroyers , , and and the frigates HMNZS BlackpoolHMS Blackpool (F77)
HMS Blackpool was a Whitby-class or Type 12 anti-submarine frigate of the Royal Navy. Blackpool was loaned to the Royal New Zealand Navy between 7 June 1966 and 1971....
and . Stevenson held a dinner for the five escort captains at the start of the exercise, during which he recounted the events of the Melbourne-Voyager collision
Melbourne-Voyager collision
The Melbourne-Voyager collision, also referred to as the "Melbourne-Voyager incident" or simply the "Voyager incident", was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy ; the aircraft carrier and the destroyer...
, emphasised the need for caution when operating near the carrier, and provided written instructions on how to avoid such a situation developing again. Additionally, during the lead-up to the exercise, Admiral Crabb had strongly warned that all repositioning manoeuvres performed by the escorts had to commence with a turn away from Melbourne.
Despite these warnings, a near-miss occurred in the early hours of 31 May when USS Larson turned towards the carrier after being ordered to the plane guard
Plane guard
A plane guard is a warship or helicopter tasked to recover the aircrew of planes or helicopters which ditch or crash in the water during aircraft carrier flight operations.-Ships:...
station. Subsequent action narrowly prevented a collision. The escorts were again warned about the dangers of operating near the carrier and informed of Stevenson's expectations, while the minimum distance between carrier and escorts was increased from 2000 to 3000 yd (1,828.8 to 2,743.2 m).
Collision
On the night of 2–3 June, Melbourne and her escorts were involved in anti-submarine training exercises. In preparation for launching a S-2 TrackerS-2 Tracker
The Grumman S-2 Tracker was the first purpose-built, single airframe anti-submarine warfare aircraft to enter service with the US Navy. The Tracker was of conventional design with twin engines, a high wing and tricycle undercarriage. The type was exported to a number of navies around the world...
aircraft, Stevenson ordered Evans to the plane guard station, reminded the destroyer of Melbournes course, and instructed the carrier's navigational lights to be brought to full brilliance. This was the fourth time that Evans had been asked to assume this station that night, and the previous three manoeuvres had been without incident. Evans was positioned on Melbournes port bow, but began the manoeuvre by turning starboard, towards the carrier. A radio message was sent from Melbourne to Evanss bridge and Combat Information Centre, warning the destroyer that she was on a collision course, which Evans acknowledged. Seeing the destroyer take no action and on a course to place herself under Melbournes bow, Stevenson ordered the carrier hard to port, signalling the turn by both radio and siren blasts. At approximately the same time, Evans turned hard to starboard to avoid the approaching carrier. It is uncertain which ship began to manoeuvre first, but each ship's bridge crew claimed that they were informed of the other ship's turn after they commenced their own. After having narrowly passed in front of Melbourne, the turns quickly placed Evans back in the carrier's path. Melbourne hit Evans amidships at 3:15 am, cutting the destroyer in two.
Seventy-four of the 273 crew on Evans were killed. It was later learned that Evanss commanding officer, Commander Albert S. McLemore, was asleep in his quarters at the time of the incident, and charge of the vessel was held by Lieutenants Ronald Ramsey and James Hopson; the former had failed the qualification exam to stand watch, while the latter was at sea for the first time.
Post-collision events
Following the evacuation of Evanss stern, the section was cast off while the carrier moved away to avoid damage, but against expectation, it failed to sink. The stern was recovered and towed by fleet tug to Subic BaySubic Bay
Subic Bay is a bay forming part of Luzon Sea on the west coast of the island of Luzon in Zambales, Philippines, about 100 kilometers northwest of Manila Bay. Its shores were formerly the site of a major United States Navy facility named U.S...
, arriving there on 9 June. After being stripped for parts, the hulk was decommissioned on 1 July, and was later sunk when used for target practice.
Melbourne travelled to Singapore, arriving on 6 June, where she received temporary repairs to her bow. The carrier departed on 27 June, and arrived in Sydney on 9 July, where the she spent until November docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs and installation of the new bow.
817 Squadron RAN
817 Squadron RAN
817 Squadron is a Royal Australian Navy Fleet Air Arm squadron.-Current Roles:817 is currently active as a helicopter squadron equipped with Westland Sea King Mk 50 helicopters. 817 Squadron is a land based squadron operating the Sea King helicopter in Fleet Utility Support roles, including Search...
, which was responsible for the Westland Wessex
Westland Wessex
The Westland Wessex is a British turbine-powered version of the Sikorsky S-58 "Choctaw", developed under license by Westland Aircraft , initially for the Royal Navy, and later for the Royal Air Force...
helicopters embarked on Melbourne at the time of the collision, was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their rescue efforts. Five other decorations were presented to Australian personnel in relation to the rescue of Evans’ crew: one George Medal
George Medal
The George Medal is the second level civil decoration of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth.The GM was instituted on 24 September 1940 by King George VI. At this time, during the height of The Blitz, there was a strong desire to reward the many acts of civilian courage...
, one Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE)
Order of the British Empire
The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire is an order of chivalry established on 4 June 1917 by George V of the United Kingdom. The Order comprises five classes in civil and military divisions...
, one Air Force Cross
Air Force Cross (United Kingdom)
The Air Force Cross is a military decoration awarded to personnel of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, and formerly also to officers of the other Commonwealth countries, for "an act or acts of valour, courage or devotion to duty whilst flying, though not in active operations against the enemy"...
, and two British Empire Medal
British Empire Medal
The Medal of the Order of the British Empire for Meritorious Service, usually known as the British Empire Medal , is a British medal awarded for meritorious civil or military service worthy of recognition by the Crown...
s. Fifteen additional commendations for gallantry were awarded by the Australian Naval Board.
Joint Board of Inquiry
A Joint RAN-USN Board of Inquiry was established to investigate the incident, following the passing of special regulations allowing the presence of Australian personnel at a United States inquiry. The Board was in session for over 100 hours between 9 June and 14 July, with 79 witnesses interviewed; 48 USN, 28 RAN, and 3 from other navies.The Board was made up of six officers. The RAN representatives were Rear Admiral David Stevenson
David Stevenson (admiral)
Vice Admiral Sir Hugh David Stevenson AC, KBE, RAN was an officer of the Royal Australian Navy, eventually serving as its Chief.-Early life:...
(no relation to Melbournes Captain Stevenson), Captain Ken Shards, and Captain John Davidson. The USN officers were Captains S.L. Rusk and C.B. Anderson. Presiding over the Board was United States Navy Rear Admiral Jerome King: considered to be an unwise posting as he was the commanding officer of both the forces involved in the SEATO exercise and the fleet unit Evans normally belonged to, and was seen during the Inquiry to be biased against Captain Stevenson and other RAN personnel. King's attitude, performance, and conflict of interest were criticised by the Australians present at the inquiry and the Press, and his handling of the inquiry was seen as detrimental to relations between the two countries.
Despite admissions by members of the USN, given privately to personnel in other navies, that the incident was entirely the fault of Evans, significant attempts were made to reduce the US destroyer's culpability and place at least partial blame for the incident on Melbourne. At the beginning of the inquiry, King banned one of the RAN legal advisors from attending, even as an observer. He regularly intervened for American witnesses, but failed to do so on similar matters for the Australians. Testimony on the collision and the subsequent rescue operation was to be given separately, and although requests by American personnel to give both sets of testimony at the same time in order to return to their duties were regularly granted, the same request made by Stevenson was denied by King. Testimony of members of the RAN had to be given under oath, and witnesses faced intense questioning from King, despite the same conditions not applying to USN personnel. There was also a heavy focus on the adequacy of Melbournes navigational lighting. Mentions of the near miss with USS Larson were interrupted with the instruction that those details could be recounted at a later time, but the matter was never raised by the Board.
The unanimous decision of the Board was that although Evans was partially at fault for the collision, Melbourne had contributed by not taking evasive action sooner, even though doing this would have been a direct contravention of international sea regulations, which stated that in the lead up to a collision, the larger ship was required to maintain course and speed. The report was inconsistent in several areas with the evidence given at the inquiry, including the falsity that Melbournes navigational lights took significant time to come to full brilliance. Several facts were also edited out of the transcripts of the inquiry.
Stevenson
Stevenson was informed on 29 July of the result, although not the details, and was told that a court-martialCourt-martial
A court-martial is a military court. A court-martial is empowered to determine the guilt of members of the armed forces subject to military law, and, if the defendant is found guilty, to decide upon punishment.Most militaries maintain a court-martial system to try cases in which a breach of...
charging him for his role in the incident might be required. Two charges of negligence—for failing to explicitly instruct Evans to change course to avoid collision and for failing to set the carrier's engines to full astern—were laid on 15 August, with the court martial held from 20 to 25 August. Evidence presented during the hearing showed that going full astern would have made no difference to the collision, and on the matter of the failing-to-instruct charge, the presiding Judge Advocate concluded that reasonable warning had been given to the destroyer and asked "What was [Stevenson] supposed to do—turn his guns on them?". Of the evidence and testimony given at the court-martial, nothing suggested that Stevenson had done anything wrong; instead it was claimed that he had done everything reasonable to avoid collision, and had done it correctly.
The reasons for the court-martial given by historians vary. One reason suggested was that it was to appease the USN, which had court-martialled three officers from Evans and had threatened to prevent US ships from operating as part of Australian-led forces if no action was taken against Stevenson. The other view is that the court-martial was used in an attempt to clear Stevenson's name and to allow the RAN to distance itself from the findings of the Joint Board of Inquiry.
The defence submitted that there was "no case to answer", resulting in the dropping of both charges and the verdict of "Honourably Acquitted". Despite the findings, Stevenson's next posting was as chief of staff to a minor flag officer; seen by him as a demotion in all but name. The posting had been decided upon before the court-martial, and was announced while Stevenson was out of the country for the courts-martial of Evanss officers; he did not learn about it until his return to Australia. Following the events, publicly considered to be another scapegoating of a Melbourne commander, Stevenson requested retirement, as he no longer wished to serve under people he no longer respected. This retirement was initially denied, but was later permitted.
McLemore, Ramsey, and Hopson
Commander Albert S. McLemore and Lieutenants Hopson and Ramsey also faced courts-martial for their contributions to the collision. Hopson and Ramsey were charged with dereliction of duty and negligence and had their positions in the promotion list moved down. McLemore was reprimanded for dereliction of duty and hazarding his ship.In 1999, McLemore publicly claimed that the collision was his responsibility, as he had left two inexperienced officers in command of his ship.
Aftermath
A training film, I Relieve You, Sir, was developed by the USN for junior watchkeeping officers. Based around the events of the collision, the film demonstrates the responsibility junior watchkeeping officers hold, and the potential consequences of failing to do their job.Unlike other naval casualties during the Vietnam War
Vietnam War
The Vietnam War was a Cold War-era military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 1 November 1955 to the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. This war followed the First Indochina War and was fought between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and the government of...
, the names of the 74 Evans crew killed are not inscribed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
Vietnam Veterans Memorial
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial is a national memorial in Washington, D.C. It honors U.S. service members of the U.S. armed forces who fought in the Vietnam War, service members who died in service in Vietnam/South East Asia, and those service members who were unaccounted for during the War.Its...
. Despite operating in Vietnamese waters immediately before deployment to Exercise Sea Spirit, and being scheduled to return to activities supporting the war effort after the exercise, it was determined that as Sea Spirit was not directly linked with US operations in Vietnam, and the exercise took place outside the geographical limit for the conflict as defined by the outer edge of Market Time operations, the crew was ineligible for inclusion on 'The Wall'. Vietnam veterans have argued that inclusion on the monument should not be determined by geographic location, and exceptions to this rule have previously been made for soldiers killed as part of the conflict but not in Vietnam itself; for example those involved in operations in Laos
Laos
Laos Lao: ສາທາລະນະລັດ ປະຊາທິປະໄຕ ປະຊາຊົນລາວ Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxaxon Lao, officially the Lao People's Democratic Republic, is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia, bordered by Burma and China to the northwest, Vietnam to the east, Cambodia to the south and Thailand to the west...
, and those dying in transit to or from Vietnam. These exceptions would also apply to those killed in the Melbourne-Evans collision, but an act of Congress specifically permitting the inclusion of their names on the memorial is required. Legislation to this end has been introduced on several occasions, but has so far failed to gather sufficient support.
A memorial to the collision is located in Niobrara, Nebraska
Niobrara, Nebraska
Niobrara is a village in Knox County, Nebraska, United States. The population was 370 at the 2010 census.-Geography:Niobrara is located at ....
. The memorial specifically commemorates the three Sage brothers, all of whom were aboard Evans and were killed in the collision. They were the first group of siblings permitted to serve on the same ship since World War II, a result of the policy introduced when the five Sullivan brothers
Sullivan brothers
The Sullivan brothers were five siblings who were all killed in action during or shortly after the sinking of the light cruiser USS Juneau , the vessel on which they all served, on November 13, 1942, in World War II....
were killed following the sinking of .
External links
- Veterans Review Board (Australia) – Collision between USS Frank E Evans and HMAS Melbourne
- From scapegoat to hero: Australian naval skipper vindicated after 30 years – Transcript of an ABC 7.30 Report story on the 30th anniversary of the collision, aired 6 February 1999
- The Sage Brothers – nebraskahistory.org