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Battle of Vimy Ridge
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The Battle of Vimy Ridge was a military engagement fought as part of the Battle of Arras, in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France, during the First World War. The main combatants were the Canadian Corps against three divisions of the German Sixth Army. The battle was part of the opening phase of the British lead Battle of Arras, a diversionary attack for the French Nivelle Offensive, and took place from 9 April – 12 April, 1917.
The objective of the Canadian Corps was to take control of the German-held high ground along an escarpment at the northernmost end of the Arras offensive.
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Encyclopedia
The Battle of Vimy Ridge was a military engagement fought as part of the Battle of Arras, in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France, during the First World War. The main combatants were the Canadian Corps against three divisions of the German Sixth Army. The battle was part of the opening phase of the British lead Battle of Arras, a diversionary attack for the French Nivelle Offensive, and took place from 9 April – 12 April, 1917.
The objective of the Canadian Corps was to take control of the German-held high ground along an escarpment at the northernmost end of the Arras offensive. This would ensure that the southern flank could advance without suffering German enfilade fire. Supported by a creeping barrage, the Canadian Corps captured most of the ridge during the first day of the attack. The town of Thélus and, after overcoming considerable German resistance, the crest of the ridge fell during the second day. The final objective, a fortified knoll (the Pimple) outside the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, fell to the Canadian Corps on 12 April after which point the German forces retreated to the Oppy–Méricourt line.
The success of the Canadian Corps in capturing the ridge is attributed to a mixture of technical and tactical innovation, meticulous planning, powerful artillery support, extensive training as well as the failure of the German Sixth Army to properly apply the German defensive doctrine. The battle was the first occasion where all four divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force participated in an battle together. The battle thus became a Canadian nationalistic symbol of achievement and sacrifice. A 250-acre (150 ha) portion of the former battleground now serves as a preserved memorial park and site of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial.
Background
Vimy Ridge is a gradually rising escarpment 8 km northeast of Arras on the western edge of the Douai plain. At approximately 7 km in length and culminating at an elevation of 145 m, the ridge provides a natural unobstructed view for tens of kilometres. The ridge had fallen under German control in October 1914 during the Race to the Sea as the Franco-British and German forces continually attempted to outflank each other through northeastern France. The French Tenth Army attempted to dislodge the Germans from the region during the Second Battle of Artois in May 1915 by attacking their positions at Vimy Ridge and Notre Dame de Lorette. The French 1st Moroccan Division managed to briefly capture the height of the ridge but was unable to hold it due to a lack of reinforcements. The French made another attempt during the Third Battle of Artois in September 1915 but only captured the town of Souchez at the western base of the ridge. The Vimy sector calmed following the offensive with the both sides taking a largely live and let live approach. The French suffered approximately 150,000 casualties in their attempts to gain control of Vimy Ridge and surrounding territory.
The British XVII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, relieved the French Tenth Army in the sector in February 1916, permitting the French to expand their operations at Verdun. It was soon discovered that German tunnelling companies had taken advantage of the relative calm on the surface to build an extensive network of tunnels and deep mines from which they would attack French positions by setting off explosive charges underneath their trenches. Royal Engineer Tunnelling Companies were immediately deployed along the front to combat the German mining operations. In response to increased British mining aggression, German artillery and trench mortar fire intensified in early May 1916. On 21 May, 1916, after shelling both forward trenches and divisional artillery positions from no less than 80 out-of-sight batteries on the reverse slope of the ridge, the German infantry attacked the British lines along a 2,000-yard (1,800 m) front in an effort to eject them from positions along the ridge. The Germans successfully captured a number of British-controlled mine craters and tunnels before halting their advance and entrenching their positions. Small counterattacks by units of the 140th and 141st British Brigades took place on 22 May, but did not manage to change the situation. The Canadian Corps relieved the British IV Corps stationed along the western slopes of Vimy Ridge in October 1916.
Assault preparations
Strategic planning
Formal discussions for a spring offensive near Arras began following a conference of corps commanders held at British First Army Headquarters on 21 November 1916. On 5 January, 1917, Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, took command of the Canadian Corps from Lieutenant-General Sir E.A.H. Alderson. In May 1916, Byng had been formally presented with orders outlining Vimy Ridge as the corps' objective for the Arras offensive.
A formal assault plan was adopted by early March 1917. The plan drew heavily on briefings of staff officers sent to learn from the experiences of the French Army. For the first time, all four Canadian divisions were to be assembled to operate in combat as a corps. The Canadian divisions were joined by the British 5th Infantry Division, and reinforced by artillery, engineer and labour units, bringing the Canadian Corps nominal strength to about 170,000 all ranks, of which 97,184 were Canadians.
Tactical plan
In January 1917, three Canadian Corps officers accompanied other British and Dominion officers attending a series of lectures hosted by the French Army regarding their experiences during the Battle of Verdun. One of the limited Allied successes of 1916 had been the French counter-offensive devised by General Robert Nivelle. Following extensive rehearsal, eight French divisions, assaulting in two waves on a front, with exceedingly strong artillery support, recovered lost ground and inflicted heavy casualties on five German divisions.
Upon their return, the Canadian Corps staff officers produced a tactical analysis of the Verdun battles and delivered a series of corps and divisional-level lectures promoting the primacy of artillery but also stressing the importance of harassing fire and company and platoon flexibility. The assault plan for Vimy Ridge drew heavily on the experiences and tactical analysis of the officers who had attended the Verdun lectures. First Army commander General Henry Horne approved the plan on 5 March 1917.
The plan divided the Canadian Corps advance into four coloured objective lines. The attack would be made on a front of , the centre being opposite the village of Vimy, which lay on the east side of the ridge. The Black Line, the first objective, involved the seizure of the German forward defensive line. The final objective of the northern flank was the Red Line which involved the taking of the highest point on the ridge, the fortified knoll known as the Pimple, the Folie Farm, the Zwischen-Stellung trench and the hamlet of Les Tilleuls. Two additional objectives were planned on the southern flank: the Blue Line encompassing the town of Thélus and the woods outside the town of Vimy, and the Brown Line, which involved the capture of the Zwölfer-Graben trench and the German second line. The infantry would proceed close behind a creeping barrage placed down by light field guns, advancing in timed 100-yard (91 m) increments. The medium and heavy howitzers would establish a series of standing barrages further ahead of the infantry against known defensive systems.
To maintain momentum during the attack, the plan called for units to leap frog over one another as the advance progressed. The first units were to reach the Black Line and push forward to the Red Line. The barrage would pause to enable reserve units to move up and then move forward with the units pushing beyond the Red Line to the Blue Line. Upon securing the Blue Line, the same plan would be repeated for the capture of the Brown Line. If conducted properly, the German forces would have little time to exit the security of their deep dugouts and defend their positions before being overwhelmed by the infantry advance. If the schedule could be maintained, the troops would advance as much as and have the majority of the ridge under control by 1:00 p.m. of the first day.
German defences
The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a statically fixed line was no longer effective and could not be relied upon as a defensive strategy. As a result, the German command began espousing a new defensive doctrine in December 1916 that emphasized fighting an elastic defensive battle in depth rather than rigidly holding successive lines of trenches. The German forces, however, had spent two years constructing fortifications after capturing Vimy Ridge which were designed in accordance with the old doctrine of rigid defence. Little reconstruction based upon the new defence in depth doctrine had been accomplished by April 1917. The geography of the battlefield made application of the defence-in-depth doctrine all the more problematic as the eastern side of the ridge had a steep drop, creating difficulties for any potential counter-attacks.
Three line divisions, with seven infantry regiments between them, were responsible for the immediate defence of the ridge. The established strength of each division was approximately 15,000 men. However, the actual strength of the German forces was significantly less. A full strength German rifle company was by establishment 264 men in 1917. However, at Vimy Ridge each rifle company only contained approximately 150 men. Each German regiment was by design responsible for manning approximately of front including its depth of defence back to the rear area. As a result, when the Canadian Corps attacked each German company initially faced two or more battalions of approximately 1000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept approximately behind the front lines instead of assembling close behind the second line as espoused by the defence-in-depth doctrine.
Artillery
Twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of four hundred eighty 18-pounder field guns, one hundred thirty-eight 4.5-inch howitzers, ninety-six 2-inch trench mortars, twenty-four 9.45-inch mortars, supported by 245 corps level siege guns and heavy mortars, were made available to the Canadian Corps. This firepower gave a density of one heavy gun for every and one field gun for every of Canadian Corps frontage, representing a considerable average increase, including three times the heavy guns, over the distribution of artillery at the Battle of the Somme a year earlier. To support the efforts of the infantry, a 35-page multi-phased fire support plan called Canadian Corps Artillery Instruction No. 1 for the Capture of Vimy Ridge was developed, and subsequently issued by Brigadier-General Edward Morrison. To logistically manage three times the artillery normally allocated to a corps, Royal Artillery staff officer Major Alan Brooke developed coordinated communication and transport plans to work in conjunction with his complex barrage plans.
The artillery along the Canadian Corps front remained extremely active largely due to their 1.6 million shell allotment. The higher quality of the shells, in comparison to earlier points in the war, also ensured fewer duds. The effectiveness of the artillery was further improved by the introduction of the instantaneous No. 106 fuse. This fuse reliably burst with the slightest of contact, unlike past timed fuses, making it especially effective at cutting barbed wire before the advance. To ensure that men at observation points could communicate, particularly with the artillery, over of cable was laid at a depth of for telegraph and field telephones. To aid artillery operations during the battle, coordinated counter-battery initiatives before the battle were also conducted. Utilizing flash spotting, sound ranging and aerial reconnaissance from No. 16 Squadron and No. 1 & 2 Balloon Company of the Royal Flying Corps in the week before the battle, the counter-battery artillery under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew McNaughton fired 125,900 shells, harassing an estimated 83% of the enemy gun positions.
Training
In February 1917, the British General Staff released a training pamphlet entitled SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, espousing the return to the pre-war emphasis on fire and movement tactics in which the platoon was considered a self contained tactical unit.
The short pamphlet noted the importance of dedicated hand-grenade, rifle grenade and machine gun sections in suppressing enemy stongpoints with an appropriate level of fire to permit other military units to advance. Further incorporating what had been learned at the Verdun lectures, the Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigour. The tactical doctrine for small units was instilled by assigning objectives down to the platoon-level. Assaulting infantry battalions used hilled areas behind the lines as full-scale model representations of the battlefield. The infantry were trained in platoon-level tactics, taped lines were utilized to represent enemy trench lines and officers on horseback carried flags to represent the advancing front of the artillery barrage.
Recognizing that the men in leadership positions were likely to be wounded or killed, soldiers learned the jobs of those beside and above them. At the British First Army headquarters, a large-scale plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and used to show commissioned and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system. In addition, upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield. The objective was to give each platoon a complete picture of the battle plan and a specific task within it, with the intent of reducing the command and control problems that plagued First World War combat.
Underground operations
The Arras-Vimy sector was conducive to tunnel excavation owing to the soft, porous yet extremely stable nature of the chalk underground. As a result, pronounced underground warfare had been an active feature of the Vimy sector since 1915. No less than 19 distinct crater groups existed along the Canadian front by 1917. Each group often containing a number of large craters all of which were the result of explosions caused by underground mine warfare. Since their arrival in 1916, British Royal Engineer tunnelling companies had been actively engaged in offensive mining against German miners.
In preparation for the assault, British tunnelling companies created extensive underground networks and fortifications. Twelve subways, up to in length, were excavated at a depth of and utilized to connect reserve lines to front lines, permitting soldiers to advance to the front quickly, securely and unseen. Often incorporated into subways were concealed light rail lines, hospitals, command posts, water reservoirs, ammunition stores, mortar and machine gun posts, and communication centres. Many subways were also lit by electricity provided by generators. To protect some advancing troops from German machine gun fire as they crossed no man's land, eight specialized mine charges were laid at the end of the subways. These specialized mine charges were designed to allow troops to more quickly and safely enter an enemy trench system by creating an elongated trench-depth crater that spanned the entire length of no man's land. In an effort to destroy some German fortified points before the assault the British tunnelling companies secretly laid 13 large explosive charges directly under German positions. Of the explosive charges laid three mines were fired before the assault, another three mines and two specialized charges were fired at the start of the attack.
Trench raiding
For more details on this topic, see Trench raiding
Trench raiding involved making small scale surprise attacks on enemy positions, often in the middle of the night for reasons of stealth. It had originally been employed as a strategy to harass the enemy and gain intelligence but soon developed into a training and leadership building mechanism. The size of a raid would normally be anything from a few men to an entire company, or more, depending on the size of the mission. The four months before the April attack saw the Canadian Corps execute no less than 55 separate trench raids. Competition between units even developed with units competing for the honour of greatest number of prisoners captured or most destruction wrought.
The policy of aggressive trench raiding was not without its cost. On March 1, 1917, a month before the assault, an ambitious brigade-sized trench raid by the 4th Canadian Division backed by poison gas deployment failed, resulting in 637 casualties including two battalion commanders and a number of company commanders killed. This experience did not lessen the extent to which trench raiding were employed by the Canadian Corps with raids continuing up until the night before the attack.
Battle in the air
In support of the spring offensive, the Royal Flying Corps launched a determined effort to gain air superiority over the battlefield. Considered essential and necessary to continue unimpeded were activities such as artillery spotting and photography of opposing trench systems, troop movements and gun emplacements. The Royal Flying Corps deployed 25 squadrons totalling 365 aircraft along the Arras sector, outnumbering the enemy by no less than 2-to-1. Byng was given use of No. 2 Squadron, No. 8 (Naval) Squadron, No. 25 Squadron, No. 40 Squadron and No. 43 Squadron, with No. 16 Squadron permanently attached to the Canadian Corps and employed exclusively for observation and artillery support.
Forced to fly at slower speeds and at lower altitudes, conducting aerial reconnaissance was often a hazardous task. The task was made all the more dangerous with the arrival of additional German flying squadrons, including Manfred von Richthofen's highly experienced and well equipped Jasta 11, which led to sharp increase in Royal Flying Corps casualties. Although significantly outnumbering the enemy, the Royal Flying Corps lost 131 aircraft during the first week of April alone. Despite the losses suffered by the Royal Flying Corps, the Imperial German Army Air Service failed to prevent the Royal Flying Corps from carrying out its prime objective, namely the continued support of the army throughout the Arras offensive with up-to-date aerial photographs and reconnaissance information.
The Battle
Belligerents
German Sixth Army commander General Ludwig von Falkenhausen had 20 divisions (plus reserves) responsible for the Cambrai–Lille sector. Vimy Ridge itself was principally defended by the ad hoc Gruppe Vimy, formation based under I Bavarian Corps commander General der Infanterie Karl ritter von Fasbender. However, a division of Gruppe Souchez, under VIII Reserve Corps General Georg Karl Wichura, was also involved in the front-line defence along the northernmost portion of the ridge. Three divisions were ultimately responsible for manning the front line defences opposite the Canadian Corps. The 16th Bavarian Infantry Division was located opposite the town of Souchez and responsible for the defence of the northernmost section of the ridge. The division had been created in January 1917 from existing Bavarian formations and had so far only opposed the Canadian Corps. The 79th Reserve Division was responsible for the defence of vast central section including the highest point of the ridge, Hill 145. The 79th Reserve Division had fought for two years on the Eastern Front and was transferred to the Vimy sector at the end of February 1917. The 1st Bavarian Reserve Division had been in the Arras area since October 1914 and were holding the towns of Thélus, Bailleul and the southern slope of the ridge.
Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng had four attacking divisions, one division of reserves and numerous support units under his command. He was supported to the north by the 24th British Division of I Corps which advanced north of the Souchez river and by the advancing XVII Corps to the south. The 4th Canadian Division was responsible for the northern portion of the advance which included the capture of the highest point of the ridge followed by the heavily defended knoll known as the Pimple just north of the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle. The 3rd Canadian Division was responsible for the narrow central section of the ridge, including the capture of La Folie Farm. The 2nd Canadian Division, which later included an additional brigade from the 5th British Division was directly south of 3rd Canadian Division and entrusted with the capture of the town of Thélus. The 1st Canadian Division was responsible for the broad southern sector of the corps advance and expected to make the greatest advance in terms distance. Byng also planned for a healthy reserve for contingencies that included the relief of forward troops, help in consolidating positions and aiding the 4th Canadian Division with the capture of the Pimple. As a result, the 9th Canadian Brigade, 15th British Brigade and 95th British Brigade were kept in corps level reserve.
Preliminary attack
By March 1917, the German forces were aware that a major attack was imminent. General der Infanterie Ernst von Bachmeister, commanding the German 79th Reserve Division, reported that he believed the Canadian Corps was moving into an echelon formation and were preparing for a major attack, but his superiors ignored his concerns. The preliminary phase of the artillery bombardment began on 20 March, 1917, with a systematic two week bombardment of German batteries, trenches and strongpoints. Particular attention was paid to eliminating enemy barbed wire, a task made easier with the introduction of the No. 106 instantaneous fuse. In addition, only half of the available artillery was committed at any one point in time with the intensity of the barrage expressly varied as to confuse the enemy and preserve some level of secrecy. Phase two lasted the entire week beginning 2 April 1917 and employed the entire artillery arsenal at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, massing the equivalent of one heavy gun for every and one field gun for every .
The German soldiers came to refer to the week before the attack as 'the week of suffering'. In many cases, the German trenches were completely demolished and morale suffered from the stress of remaining at the ready for eleven straight days. Compounding German difficulties was the inability of ration parties to bring food supplies to the front lines. On 3 April, General von Falkenhausen ordered his reserve divisions to prepare to relieve front-line divisions over the course of a long drawn-out defensive battle, in a manner similar to the Battle of the Somme. However, the divisions were kept from the battlefield to avoid being shelled.
Main assault
The attack was to begin at 5:30 a.m. on Easter Monday, 9 April, 1917. During the late hours of 8 April and early morning of 9 April the men of the leading and supporting wave of the attack were moved into their forward assembly positions. The weather was cold and later changed to sleet and snow. Although physically discomforting for everyone, the northwesterly storm provided some advantage to the assaulting troops by blowing snow in the faces of the defending troops. Light Canadian and British artillery bombardments had continued throughout the prior night but stopped in the few minutes before the attack, as the artillery re-calibrated their guns in preparation for the synchronized barrage. At exactly 5:30 a.m., every artillery piece at the disposal of the Canadian Corps began firing. Thirty seconds later, the mine charges laid under no man's land and the German trench line were fired, destroying a number of German strongpoints and creating secure communication trenches directly across no man's land. Light field guns laid down a barrage which advanced in predetermined increments, often every three minutes, while medium and heavy howitzers established a series of standing barrages further ahead, against known defensive systems.
The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions reported reaching and capturing their first objective, the Black Line, by 6:25 a.m. The 4th Canadian Division encountered a great deal of trouble during its advance and was unable to complete its first objective until some hours later. After a planned pause, during which time the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions consolidated their positions, the advance resumed. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., the 1st Canadian Division had taken the left half of its second objective, the Red Line, and moved the 1st Canadian Brigade forward to mount an attack on the remainder. The 2nd Canadian Division reported reaching the Red Line and capturing the town of Les Tilleuls at approximately the same time. Units at the southern end of the 3rd Canadian Division's front reached the Red Line at the western edge of the Bois de la Folie, at around 7:30 a.m. However, by 9:00 a.m. the division had learned of its exposed left flank, as the 4th Canadian Division had not yet captured Hill 145. The 3rd Canadian Division was thus called upon to establish a divisional defensive flank to its north. It was not until 11:00 a.m. that Von Bachmeister first ordered the German 79th Reserve Division to counter-attack, by which time only the 4th Canadian Division had not reached its objective.
The advance of the 4th Canadian Division had collapsed almost immediately after exiting their trenches, the commanding officer of one assaulting battalion having apparently requested that the artillery leave a portion of German trench undamaged. Machine-gun nests in the undamaged sections of the German line pinned down, wounded or killed much of the 4th Canadian Division's right flank. The progress on the left flank was eventually impeded by harassing fire from the Pimple which was made worse when the creeping barrage began getting too far ahead of the advancing troops. Canadian reserve units from the 4th Canadian Division were called forward and the 85th (Nova Scotia Highlanders) Battalion finally captured the south-western portion of Hill 145 in the late afternoon.
Three fresh brigades were moved up to the Red Line by 9:30 a.m., 10 April to support the advance of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Division, whereupon they were to leap frog existing units occupying the Red line and advance to the Blue Line. The fresh units included two sections of tanks and the 13th British Brigade, called up from reserve, who were to support the advance on the 2nd Canadian Division. By approximately 11:00 a.m., the Blue Line, including Hill 135 and the town of Thélus, had been captured. To permit the troops time to consolidate the Blue Line, the advance halted and the barrage remained stationary for 90 minutes while machine-guns were brought forward. Shortly before 1 p.m., the advance recommenced with both the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions reporting their final objective, the Brown Line, secure around 2:00 p.m. Fresh troops from the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade finally forced the remaining German troops from the northern half of Hill 145 at around 3:15 p.m. By nightfall of 10 April, the only objective not yet achieved was the capture of the Pimple.
The mission to capture the Pimple, just outside the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, was set for 12 April after having been delayed by the difficulties faced by the 4th Canadian Division. The night before the attack, artillery harassed enemy positions while a gas section of Royal Engineers, employing Livens projectors, fired more than 40 drums of gas directly into the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle to cause confusion. Supported by a significant amount of artillery and the 24th British Division of I Corps to the north, the 10th Canadian Brigade attacked at 5:00 a.m. on 12 April. Fighting against hastily entrained German troops and aided, once again, by westerly blowing wind and snow, the 10th Canadian Brigade captured the entirety of the Pimple by 6:00 p.m.
Aftermath
By nightfall 12 April 1917 the Canadian Corps was in firm control of the ridge. The corps had suffered 10,602 casualties; 3,598 killed and 7,004 wounded. The German Sixth Army suffered an unknown number of casualties with an approximate 4,000 men becoming prisoners of war. Four Victoria Crosses, the highest military decoration awarded to British and Commonwealth forces for valour, were awarded to members of the Canadian Corps for their actions during the battle;
At least two Orders Pour le Mérite, the Kingdom of Prussia's highest military order, were awarded to German commanders for their actions during the battle;
- Wilhelh Von Goerne commander of the 261st Prussian Reserve Infantry Regiment, of the German 79th Reserve Division.
- Georg Karl Wichura commander of the VIII Reserve Corps and Gruppe Souchez.
Following the defeat, the Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, ordered the Oberste Heeresleitung to conduct a court of enquiry into the defensive collapse of the Arras sector. The court concluded that the Sixth Army headquarters had disregarded frontline commander reports, noting a possible imminent attack, and as a result, reserve units were kept too far back to execute a timely and effective counterattack. The court also concluded that Sixth Army commander General Ludwig von Falkenhausen had failed to properly apply an elastic defence as espoused by German defensive doctrine of the time. Instead, the defensive system had been based around a series of unmoving strong-points and static lines of resistance, which were ultimately isolated and destroyed by artillery.
Von Falkenhausen was ultimately transferred to Belgium where he served as Governor General until the end of the war. The Germans did not, however, see the Canadian Corps' capture of Vimy Ridge as a loss. Contemporary German sources viewed the action, at worst, as a draw, given the fact that no full-scale breakthrough occurred following the attack. The Germans did not attempt to recapture the ridge, including during the Spring Offensive, and it remained under British control until the end of the war.
The loss of Vimy Ridge forced the Germans to reassess their defensive strategy in the area. Instead of mounting a counterattack, they pursued a scorched earth policy, and retreated to the Oppy-Méricourt line. The complete failure of the French Nivelle Offensive in the week after the Arras offensive placed pressure on Field Marshal Douglas Haig to keep the Germans occupied in the Arras sector in order to minimize French losses. The Canadian Corps participated in a number of these actions including the Battle of Arleux and the Third Battle of the Scarpe in late April and early May 1917.
Commemoration
Influence on Canada
The significance of the Battle of Vimy Ridge is most strongly felt in Canada. Elsewhere the battle is principally noted as simply being part of the much larger British offensive known as the Battle of Arras. The battle was not considered the greatest achievement of the Canadian Corps in terms of strategic importance or results obtained. The battle was rather the first instance where the Canadian Corps fought as a cohesive unit made up of components that were drawn from all parts of the geographically large country. The image of national unity and achievement is what initially gave the battle importance for Canada.
The historical reality of the battle have been re-worked and reinterpreted in a conscious attempt to give purpose and meaning to an event which came to symbolize Canada's coming-of-age as a nation. The idea that Canada achieved nationhood as a direct result of the experiences of the First World War is an opinion widely held in military histories of Canada and also regularly appears in general histories. Often this belief is specifically anchored on the Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge. In this sense, a single event, the battle, has come to represent a concentration of the entire Canadian First World War experience and as such has become a powerful national symbol.
Vimy Memorial
The Canadian National Vimy Memorial, the largest of Canada's war monuments, is set on the highest point of Vimy Ridge. In 1922 France granted use of the land, in perpetuity, for the purpose of a battlefield park and memorial in recognition of Canada's war efforts. A portion of the former battlefield is preserved as part of the memorial park which surrounds the monument. The memorial commemorates Canadian soldiers who lost their lives during the First World War, including the 11,285 soldiers who were noted as missing or presumed dead in France and have no known resting place. The grounds of the site are still honeycombed with wartime tunnels, trenches, craters and unexploded munitions, and is largely closed off for public safety. However, a section of preserved trenches and a portion of a tunnel have been made accessable to site visitors.
The memorial took eleven years and $1.5 million to build and was unveiled on 26 July 1936 by King Edward VIII, in the presence of President Albert Lebrun of France and 50,000 or more Canadian and French veterans and their families. On 9 April 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle, the monument was rededicated following a multi-year restoration project which included general cleaning and the re-carving of inscribed names. Over 25,000 people, including 5,000 Canadian students, attended the rededication ceremony. The memorial site is maintained by Veterans Affairs Canada.
External links
- Battle info, video footage and photos.
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