Alternative possibilities
Encyclopedia
Alternative possibilities for action
are one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will
and for moral responsibility
. The other is to the ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances
.
defined what he called "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities" or PAP.
Frankfurt's thought experiments are attacks on the PAP principle. His basic claim is as follows:
Frankfurt posits a counterfactual demon who can intervene in an agent's decisions if the agent is about to do something different from what the demon wants the agent to do. Frankfurt's demon will block any alternative possibilities, but leave the agent to "freely choose" to do the one possibility desired by the demon. Frankfurt claims the existence of the hypothetical control mechanisms blocking alternative possibilities are irrelevant to the agent's free choice. This is true when the agent's choice agrees with the demon, but obviously false should the agent disagree. In that case, the demon would have to block the agent's will and the agent would surely notice.
Frankfurt changed the debate on free will and moral responsibility with his hypothetical intervening demon. Recent philosophical literature contains many articles with "Frankfurt-type cases," examples of Frankfurt's attempt to defend moral responsibility in the absence of alternative possibilities. For example, John Martin Fischer
's Semi-compatibilism assumes with Frankfurt that we can have moral responsibility, even if determinism
(and/or indeterminism
) is incompatible with free will.
The literature also has many logical counterexamples attacking Frankfurt's claims, for example from Robert Kane
, David Widerker, and Carl Ginet
.
is best known for the view of "semi-compatibilism" - the idea that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism
, whether free will
is or is not compatible with determinism. He says that alternative possibilities for action are not required for moral responsibility
in his semi-compatibilism.
assumes that if there were alternative possibilities for action they would all have equal probabilities. He further assumes, in his "Mind argument" (a version of the standard argument against free will
), that the random possibilities are the direct cause of action. He shows this by imagining instant replays of the universe in exactly the same circumstances
.
Freedom of action
Freedom of action in philosophy has been distinguished from freedom of the will at least since the work of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, who claimed that human freedom was the lack of external coercion and not the supposed "free will," which they took to be a will that could act independently of...
are one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will
Libertarianism (metaphysics)
Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism, which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics. In particular, libertarianism, which is an incompatibilist position, argues that free will is logically incompatible with a...
and for moral responsibility
Moral responsibility
Moral responsibility usually refers to the idea that a person has moral obligations in certain situations. Disobeying moral obligations, then, becomes grounds for justified punishment. Deciding what justifies punishment, if anything, is a principle concern of ethics.People who have moral...
. The other is to the ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances
Do otherwise in the same circumstances
The ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will and for moral responsibility...
.
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities
In 1969 Harry FrankfurtHarry Frankfurt
Harry Gordon Frankfurt is an American philosopher. He is professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University and has previously taught at Yale University and Rockefeller University. He obtained his B.A. in 1949 and Ph.D. in 1954 from...
defined what he called "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities" or PAP.
"a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise."
Frankfurt's thought experiments are attacks on the PAP principle. His basic claim is as follows:
"The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle's plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing the relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus."
Frankfurt posits a counterfactual demon who can intervene in an agent's decisions if the agent is about to do something different from what the demon wants the agent to do. Frankfurt's demon will block any alternative possibilities, but leave the agent to "freely choose" to do the one possibility desired by the demon. Frankfurt claims the existence of the hypothetical control mechanisms blocking alternative possibilities are irrelevant to the agent's free choice. This is true when the agent's choice agrees with the demon, but obviously false should the agent disagree. In that case, the demon would have to block the agent's will and the agent would surely notice.
Frankfurt changed the debate on free will and moral responsibility with his hypothetical intervening demon. Recent philosophical literature contains many articles with "Frankfurt-type cases," examples of Frankfurt's attempt to defend moral responsibility in the absence of alternative possibilities. For example, John Martin Fischer
John Martin Fischer
John Martin Fischer is currently a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of California Riverside. In June 2011, Professor Fischer was elected Vice-President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association...
's Semi-compatibilism assumes with Frankfurt that we can have moral responsibility, even if determinism
Determinism
Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen. There are many versions of this thesis. Each of them rests upon various alleged connections, and interdependencies of things and...
(and/or indeterminism
Indeterminism
Indeterminism is the concept that events are not caused, or not caused deterministically by prior events. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance...
) is incompatible with free will.
The literature also has many logical counterexamples attacking Frankfurt's claims, for example from Robert Kane
Robert Kane
Robert Kane may refer to:* Bob Kane , born as Robert Kahn; co-creator of Batman* Robert Kane , Irish chemist* Robert Kane , president of the United States Olympic Committee...
, David Widerker, and Carl Ginet
Carl Ginet
Carl Ginet is an American philosopher and Professor Emeritus at Cornell University. His work is primarily in action theory, moral responsibility, free will, and epistemology....
.
Semi-compatibilism
John Martin FischerJohn Martin Fischer
John Martin Fischer is currently a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of California Riverside. In June 2011, Professor Fischer was elected Vice-President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association...
is best known for the view of "semi-compatibilism" - the idea that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism
Determinism
Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen. There are many versions of this thesis. Each of them rests upon various alleged connections, and interdependencies of things and...
, whether free will
Free will
"To make my own decisions whether I am successful or not due to uncontrollable forces" -Troy MorrisonA pragmatic definition of free willFree will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long...
is or is not compatible with determinism. He says that alternative possibilities for action are not required for moral responsibility
Moral responsibility
Moral responsibility usually refers to the idea that a person has moral obligations in certain situations. Disobeying moral obligations, then, becomes grounds for justified punishment. Deciding what justifies punishment, if anything, is a principle concern of ethics.People who have moral...
in his semi-compatibilism.
"we have sought to defend the idea that the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility. Thus, we have attempted to remove what is probably the most significant objection to the compatibility of causal determinism"
Peter van Inwagen
Peter van InwagenPeter van Inwagen
Peter van Inwagen is an American analytic philosopher and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He previously taught at Syracuse University and earned his PhD from the University of Rochester under the direction of Richard Taylor and Keith Lehrer...
assumes that if there were alternative possibilities for action they would all have equal probabilities. He further assumes, in his "Mind argument" (a version of the standard argument against free will
Standard argument against free will
The dilemma of determinism is the claim that if determinism is true, our actions are controlled by preceding events and thus we are not free; and that if indeterminism is true, our actions are random and we are likewise not free; and that as determinism and indeterminism exhaust the logical...
), that the random possibilities are the direct cause of action. He shows this by imagining instant replays of the universe in exactly the same circumstances
Do otherwise in the same circumstances
The ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will and for moral responsibility...
.
"Now let us suppose that God a thousand times caused the universe to revert to exactly the state it was in at t1 (and let us suppose that we are somehow suitably placed, metaphysically speaking, to observe the whole sequence of "replays"). What would have happened? What should we expect to observe? Well, again, we can't say what would have happened, but we can say what would probably have happened: sometimes Alice would have lied and sometimes she would have told the truth. As the number of "replays" increases, we observers shall — almost certainly — observe the ratio of the outcome "truth" to the outcome "lie" settling down to, converging on, some value. We may, for example, observe that, after a fairly large number of replays, Alice lies in thirty percent of the replays and tells the truth in seventy percent of them — and that the figures 'thirty percent' and 'seventy percent' become more and more accurate as the number of replays increases. But let us imagine the simplest case: we observe that Alice tells the truth in about half the replays and lies in about half the replays. If, after one hundred replays, Alice has told the truth fifty-three times and has lied forty-eight times, we'd begin strongly to suspect that the figures after a thousand replays would look something like this: Alice has told the truth four hundred and ninety-three times and has lied five hundred and eight times. Let us suppose that these are indeed the figures after a thousand [1001] replays. Is it not true that as we watch the number of replays increase we shall become convinced that what will happen in the next replay is a matter of chance."