The Market for Lemons
Encyclopedia
"The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism" is a 1970 paper by the economist George Akerlof
. It discusses information asymmetry, which occurs when the seller knows more about a product than the buyer. A lemon is an American slang term for a car that is found to be defective only after it has been bought. Akerlof, Michael Spence
, and Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
in 2001 for their research related to asymmetric information. Akerlof's paper uses the market
for used car
s as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. It concludes that owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. This is sometimes summarized as "the bad driving out the good" in the market.
for used car
s as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. A used car is one in which ownership is transferred from one person to another, after a period of use by its first owner and its inevitable wear and tear. There are good used cars ("cherries") and defective used cars ("lemons"), normally as a consequence of several not-always-traceable variables such as the owner's driving style, quality and frequency of maintenance and accident history. Because many important mechanical parts and other elements are hidden from view and not easily accessible for inspection, the buyer of a car does not know beforehand whether it is a cherry or a lemon. So the buyer's best guess for a given car is that the car is of average quality; accordingly, he/she will be willing to pay for it only the price of a car of known average quality. This means that the owner of a carefully maintained, never-abused, good used car will be unable to get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile.
Therefore, owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. The withdrawal of good cars reduces the average quality of cars on the market, causing buyers to revise downward their expectations for any given car. This, in turn, motivates the owners of moderately good cars not to sell, and so on. The result is that a market in which there is asymmetrical information with respect to quality shows characteristics similar to those described by Gresham's Law
: the bad drives out the good (although Gresham's Law applies to a different situation).
"Lemon market" effects have also been noted in other markets, such as used computers . There are also parallels in the insurance market, where, unless those least likely to need insurance (i.e., those least likely to get in accidents) are forced to buy insurance, it is those most likely to need insurance compensation who tend most to buy insurance.
of
for a car that is of quality 
. There are also a large number of sellers who are prepared to sell a car of quality 
for the price 
. If quality were observable, the price of used cars would therefore be somewhere between 
and 
, and the cars would be sold and everyone would be perfectly happy. If the quality of cars is not observable by the buyers, then it seems reasonable for them to estimate the quality of a car offered to market using the average quality of all cars.
Based on this estimation, the willingness to pay for any given car will therefore be
, where 
is the average quality of all the cars. Now, assume that the equilibrium price in the market is some price, 
, where 
. At this price, all the owners of cars with quality less than p will want to offer their cars for sale. Since again, quality is uniformly distributed over the interval from 0 to this p, the average quality of the cars offered for sale at p will be worth only p/2. We know however that for an expected quality worth p/2, buyers will only be willing to pay (3/2)(p/2) = 
. Therefore we can conclude that no cars will be sold at p. Because p is any arbitrary positive price, it is shown that no cars will be sold at any positive price at all. The market for used cars collapses when there is asymmetric information.
As a consequence of the mechanism described in this paper, markets may fail to exist altogether in certain situations involving quality uncertainty. Examples given in Akerlof's paper include the market for used cars, the death of formal credit markets in developing countries, and the difficulties that the elderly encounter in buying health insurance. However, not all players in a given market will follow the same rules or have the same aptitude of assessing quality. So there will always be a distinct advantage for some vendors to offer low-quality goods to the less-informed segment of a market that, on the whole, appears to be of reasonable quality and have reasonable guarantees of certainty. This is part of the basis for the idiom, buyer beware.
There is no reciprocal danger of a market for a good product collapsing in this manner when the asymmetry is in favour of the buyer, that is to say, when the buyers can assess more accurately the quality of the products than the sellers. In this case, regular market forces of supply and demand will prevail, the sellers will get the highest price paid, and the trend will be to weed out products with prices in excess of their quality.
This is likely the basis for the idiom that an informed consumer
is a better consumer. An example of this might be the subjective quality of fine food and wine. Individual consumers know best what they prefer to eat, and quality is almost always assessed in fine establishments by smell and taste before they pay. That is, if a customer in a fine establishment orders a lobster and the meat is not fresh, he can send the lobster back to the kitchen and refuse to pay for it. However, a definition of 'highest quality' for food eludes providers. Thus, a large variety of better quality and higher priced restaurants are supported.
Both the American Economic Review
and the Review of Economic Studies
rejected the paper for "triviality," while the reviewers for Journal of Political Economy
rejected it as incorrect, arguing that if this paper was correct, then no goods could be traded. Only on the 4th attempt did the paper get published in Quarterly Journal of Economics
. Today, the paper is one of the most-cited papers in modern economic theory (more than 8,530 citations in academic papers as of May 2011), and has profoundly influenced economic thinking in virtually every field of economics, from industrial organisation and public finance to macroeconomics and contract theory.
) that protects citizens of all states. There are also state laws regarding "lemons" which vary by state and may not necessarily cover used or leased vehicles. The rights afforded to consumers by "lemon laws" may exceed the warranties expressed in purchase contracts. These state laws provide remedies to consumers for automobiles that repeatedly fail to meet certain standards of quality and performance. "Lemon law" is the common nickname for these laws, but each state has different names for the laws and acts, which may also cover more than just automobiles. In California and federal law, "Lemon Laws" cover anything mechanical.
The federal "lemon law" also provides the warrantor may be obligated to pay your attorney fees if you prevail in a lemon law suit, as do most state lemon laws. If a car has to be repaired for the same defect four or more times and the problem is still occurring, the car may be deemed to be "a lemon." The defect must substantially hinder the vehicle's use, value or safety. Purchasers who knowingly purchase a car in "as is" condition accept the defects and void their rights under the "lemon law".
Libertarians like William L. Anderson
oppose the regulatory approach proposed by the authors of the paper, observing that some used-car markets haven't broken down even without lemon legislation and that the lemon problem creates entrepreneurial opportunities for alternative marketplaces or customers' knowledgeable friends.
In any case, the "used car" scenario is clearly intended as an allegory
, meant to clearly illustrate an idea; and not as a literal statement concerning the actual business of car sales or any real-life individuals and companies engaged in such a business.
George Akerlof
George Arthur Akerlof is an American economist and Koshland Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics George Arthur Akerlof (born June 17, 1940) is an American economist and Koshland Professor of Economics at the University of...
. It discusses information asymmetry, which occurs when the seller knows more about a product than the buyer. A lemon is an American slang term for a car that is found to be defective only after it has been bought. Akerlof, Michael Spence
Michael Spence
Andrew Michael Spence is an American economist and recipient of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, along with George A. Akerlof and Joseph E. Stiglitz, for their work on the dynamics of information flows and market development. He conducted this research while at Harvard University...
, and Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, commonly referred to as the Nobel Prize in Economics, but officially the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel , is an award for outstanding contributions to the field of economics, generally regarded as one of the...
in 2001 for their research related to asymmetric information. Akerlof's paper uses the market
Market
A market is one of many varieties of systems, institutions, procedures, social relations and infrastructures whereby parties engage in exchange. While parties may exchange goods and services by barter, most markets rely on sellers offering their goods or services in exchange for money from buyers...
for used car
Automobile
An automobile, autocar, motor car or car is a wheeled motor vehicle used for transporting passengers, which also carries its own engine or motor...
s as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. It concludes that owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. This is sometimes summarized as "the bad driving out the good" in the market.
The Used Cars uncertainty problem
Akerlof's paper uses the marketMarket
A market is one of many varieties of systems, institutions, procedures, social relations and infrastructures whereby parties engage in exchange. While parties may exchange goods and services by barter, most markets rely on sellers offering their goods or services in exchange for money from buyers...
for used car
Automobile
An automobile, autocar, motor car or car is a wheeled motor vehicle used for transporting passengers, which also carries its own engine or motor...
s as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. A used car is one in which ownership is transferred from one person to another, after a period of use by its first owner and its inevitable wear and tear. There are good used cars ("cherries") and defective used cars ("lemons"), normally as a consequence of several not-always-traceable variables such as the owner's driving style, quality and frequency of maintenance and accident history. Because many important mechanical parts and other elements are hidden from view and not easily accessible for inspection, the buyer of a car does not know beforehand whether it is a cherry or a lemon. So the buyer's best guess for a given car is that the car is of average quality; accordingly, he/she will be willing to pay for it only the price of a car of known average quality. This means that the owner of a carefully maintained, never-abused, good used car will be unable to get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile.
Therefore, owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. The withdrawal of good cars reduces the average quality of cars on the market, causing buyers to revise downward their expectations for any given car. This, in turn, motivates the owners of moderately good cars not to sell, and so on. The result is that a market in which there is asymmetrical information with respect to quality shows characteristics similar to those described by Gresham's Law
Gresham's Law
Gresham's law is an economic principle that states: "When a government compulsorily overvalues one type of money and undervalues another, the undervalued money will leave the country or disappear from circulation into hoards, while the overvalued money will flood into circulation." It is commonly...
: the bad drives out the good (although Gresham's Law applies to a different situation).
"Lemon market" effects have also been noted in other markets, such as used computers . There are also parallels in the insurance market, where, unless those least likely to need insurance (i.e., those least likely to get in accidents) are forced to buy insurance, it is those most likely to need insurance compensation who tend most to buy insurance.
Statistical abstract of the problem
Suppose we can use some number, q to index the quality of used cars, where q is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. The average quality of a used car which could be supplied to the market is therefore 1/2. There are a large number of buyers looking for cars who are prepared to pay their reservation priceReservation price
In microeconomics, the reservation price is the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for goods or a service; or; the smallest price at which a seller is willing to sell a good or service...
of
for a car that is of quality . There are also a large number of sellers who are prepared to sell a car of quality for the price . If quality were observable, the price of used cars would therefore be somewhere between and , and the cars would be sold and everyone would be perfectly happy. If the quality of cars is not observable by the buyers, then it seems reasonable for them to estimate the quality of a car offered to market using the average quality of all cars.Based on this estimation, the willingness to pay for any given car will therefore be
, where is the average quality of all the cars. Now, assume that the equilibrium price in the market is some price, , where . At this price, all the owners of cars with quality less than p will want to offer their cars for sale. Since again, quality is uniformly distributed over the interval from 0 to this p, the average quality of the cars offered for sale at p will be worth only p/2. We know however that for an expected quality worth p/2, buyers will only be willing to pay (3/2)(p/2) = . Therefore we can conclude that no cars will be sold at p. Because p is any arbitrary positive price, it is shown that no cars will be sold at any positive price at all. The market for used cars collapses when there is asymmetric information.Asymmetric information
The paper by Akerlof describes how the interaction between quality heterogeneity and asymmetric information can lead to the disappearance of a market where guarantees are indefinite. In this model, as quality is undistinguishable beforehand by the buyer (due to the asymmetry of information), incentives exist for the seller to pass off low-quality goods as higher-quality ones. The buyer, however, takes this incentive into consideration, and takes the quality of the goods to be uncertain. Only the average quality of the goods will be considered, which in turn will have the side effect that goods that are above average in terms of quality will be driven out of the market. This mechanism is repeated until a no-trade equilibrium is reached.As a consequence of the mechanism described in this paper, markets may fail to exist altogether in certain situations involving quality uncertainty. Examples given in Akerlof's paper include the market for used cars, the death of formal credit markets in developing countries, and the difficulties that the elderly encounter in buying health insurance. However, not all players in a given market will follow the same rules or have the same aptitude of assessing quality. So there will always be a distinct advantage for some vendors to offer low-quality goods to the less-informed segment of a market that, on the whole, appears to be of reasonable quality and have reasonable guarantees of certainty. This is part of the basis for the idiom, buyer beware.
There is no reciprocal danger of a market for a good product collapsing in this manner when the asymmetry is in favour of the buyer, that is to say, when the buyers can assess more accurately the quality of the products than the sellers. In this case, regular market forces of supply and demand will prevail, the sellers will get the highest price paid, and the trend will be to weed out products with prices in excess of their quality.
This is likely the basis for the idiom that an informed consumer
Informed consumer
The concept of the informed consumer is a fundamental one in the law of the European Union. Since the general Resolution of 1975, one of the primary objectives of the European Community, and then the European Union, has been the provision of information to consumers...
is a better consumer. An example of this might be the subjective quality of fine food and wine. Individual consumers know best what they prefer to eat, and quality is almost always assessed in fine establishments by smell and taste before they pay. That is, if a customer in a fine establishment orders a lobster and the meat is not fresh, he can send the lobster back to the kitchen and refuse to pay for it. However, a definition of 'highest quality' for food eludes providers. Thus, a large variety of better quality and higher priced restaurants are supported.
Critical reception
George E. Hoffer and Michael D. Pratt state that the “economic literature is divided on whether a lemons market actually exists in used vehicles." The authors’ research supports the hypothesis that “known defects provisions,” used by US states (e.g., Wisconsin) to regulate used car sales have been ineffectual, because the quality of used vehicles sold in these states is not significantly better than the vehicles in neighboring states without such consumer protection legislation.Both the American Economic Review
American Economic Review
The American Economic Review is a peer-reviewed academic journal of economics publishing seven issues annually by the American Economic Association. First published in 1911, it is considered one of the most prestigious journals in the field. The current editor-in-chief is Penny Goldberg . The...
and the Review of Economic Studies
Review of Economic Studies
The Review of Economic Studies is a peer-reviewed academic journal in economics. It was established in 1933 and is published by Wiley-Blackwell. It is the eighth-ranked economics journal in overall impact according to the ranking of Kalaitzidakis et al...
rejected the paper for "triviality," while the reviewers for Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Political Economy
The Journal of Political Economy is an academic journal run by economists at the University of Chicago and published every two months by the University of Chicago Press. The journal publishes articles in both theoretical economics and empirical economics...
rejected it as incorrect, arguing that if this paper was correct, then no goods could be traded. Only on the 4th attempt did the paper get published in Quarterly Journal of Economics
Quarterly Journal of Economics
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, or QJE, is a peer-reviewed academic journal published by the Oxford University Press and edited at Harvard University's Department of Economics. Its current editors are Robert J. Barro, Elhanan Helpman and Lawrence F. Katz...
. Today, the paper is one of the most-cited papers in modern economic theory (more than 8,530 citations in academic papers as of May 2011), and has profoundly influenced economic thinking in virtually every field of economics, from industrial organisation and public finance to macroeconomics and contract theory.
Criteria
A lemon market will be produced by the following:- Asymmetry of information, in which no buyers can accurately assess the value of a product through examination before sale is made and all sellers can more accurately assess the value of a product prior to sale
- An incentive exists for the seller to pass off a low quality product as a higher quality one
- Sellers have no credible disclosure technology (sellers with a great car have no way to disclose this credibly to buyers)
- Either a continuum of seller qualities exists or the average seller type is sufficiently low (buyers are sufficiently pessimistic about the seller's quality)
- Deficiency of effective public quality assurances (by reputation or regulation and/or of effective guarantees/warranties)
Impact on markets
The article draws some conclusions about the cost of dishonesty in markets in general:Laws in the United States
Five years after Akerlof's paper was published, The United States enacted a federal "lemon law" (the Magnuson-Moss Warranty ActMagnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a United States federal law, . Enacted in 1975, it is the federal statute that governs warranties on consumer products. The Act was sponsored by Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington and U.S. Rep John E...
) that protects citizens of all states. There are also state laws regarding "lemons" which vary by state and may not necessarily cover used or leased vehicles. The rights afforded to consumers by "lemon laws" may exceed the warranties expressed in purchase contracts. These state laws provide remedies to consumers for automobiles that repeatedly fail to meet certain standards of quality and performance. "Lemon law" is the common nickname for these laws, but each state has different names for the laws and acts, which may also cover more than just automobiles. In California and federal law, "Lemon Laws" cover anything mechanical.
The federal "lemon law" also provides the warrantor may be obligated to pay your attorney fees if you prevail in a lemon law suit, as do most state lemon laws. If a car has to be repaired for the same defect four or more times and the problem is still occurring, the car may be deemed to be "a lemon." The defect must substantially hinder the vehicle's use, value or safety. Purchasers who knowingly purchase a car in "as is" condition accept the defects and void their rights under the "lemon law".
Criticism
Criticism for this theory stems from the fact that it ignores the fact that consumers themselves can seek ways to assure the quality of a car and that a used-car salesman may work to maintain his reputation rather than pass off a "lemon". The issue of reputation, however, would not apply to private individual sellers who do not intend to sell another car in the near future.Libertarians like William L. Anderson
William L. Anderson
William L. Anderson is an author and an associate professor of economics at Frostburg State University in Maryland. He is also an adjunct scholar with the Mackinac Center for Public Policy as well as for the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Alabama....
oppose the regulatory approach proposed by the authors of the paper, observing that some used-car markets haven't broken down even without lemon legislation and that the lemon problem creates entrepreneurial opportunities for alternative marketplaces or customers' knowledgeable friends.
In any case, the "used car" scenario is clearly intended as an allegory
Allegory
Allegory is a demonstrative form of representation explaining meaning other than the words that are spoken. Allegory communicates its message by means of symbolic figures, actions or symbolic representation...
, meant to clearly illustrate an idea; and not as a literal statement concerning the actual business of car sales or any real-life individuals and companies engaged in such a business.
See also
- Highest quality is lowest costHighest quality is lowest cost"Highest quality is lowest cost" is a Japanese manufacturing aphorism based on the premise that the highest quality manufacturer will earn a reputation that makes buyers prefer, price being reasonably similar, to buy its goods...
- Adverse selectionAdverse selectionAdverse selection, anti-selection, or negative selection is a term used in economics, insurance, statistics, and risk management. It refers to a market process in which "bad" results occur when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information : the "bad" products or services are more likely to be...
- Death spiral (insurance)Death spiral (insurance)Death spiral is a term used to describe an insurance plan whose costs are rapidly increasing as a result of changes in the covered population. It is the result of adverse selection in insurance policies where lower risk policy holders choose to change policies or be uninsured...
- Tragedy of the commonsTragedy of the commonsThe tragedy of the commons is a dilemma arising from the situation in which multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally consulting their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource, even when it is clear that it is not in anyone's long-term interest for this...