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Animal rights, also known as animal liberation, is the idea that the interests of nonhuman animals, such as the interest in avoiding suffering, should be afforded the same consideration as the interests of human beings. Although animal rights advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, they argue, broadly speaking, that animals should no longer be regarded as property, or used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment, but should instead be regarded as legal persons and members of the moral community.
The idea of awarding rights to animals has the support of legal scholars such as Alan Dershowitz and Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School.
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The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.
A man can live and be healthy without killing animals for food; therefore, if he eats meat, he participates in taking animal life merely for the sake of his appetite. And to act so is immoral.
It is my view that the vegetarian manner of living by its purely physical effect on the human temperament would most beneficially influence the lot of mankind.
We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form.
You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughter-house is concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity, expensive races, -- race living at the expense of race.
Encyclopedia
Animal rights, also known as animal liberation, is the idea that the interests of nonhuman animals, such as the interest in avoiding suffering, should be afforded the same consideration as the interests of human beings. Although animal rights advocates approach the issue from different philosophical positions, they argue, broadly speaking, that animals should no longer be regarded as property, or used as food, clothing, research subjects, or entertainment, but should instead be regarded as legal persons and members of the moral community.
The idea of awarding rights to animals has the support of legal scholars such as Alan Dershowitz and Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School. Steven Wise, also of Harvard Law School, argues that the first serious judicial challenges to what he calls the "legal thinghood" of animals may only be a few years away. Animal law courses are now taught in 97 out of 180 law schools in the United States, and animal rights is routinely taught in universities as part of applied ethics or philosophy courses. Robert Garner of the University of Leicester calls it the "new morality."
Critics argue that animals are unable to enter into a social contract or make moral choices, and therefore cannot be regarded as possessors of rights, a position summed up by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only human beings have duties and that "[the] corollary is inescapable: we alone have rights." An argument that often runs parallel to this is that there is nothing inherently wrong with using animals as resources for human purposes, though there is an obligation to ensure they do not suffer unnecessarily, a view known as the animal welfare position.
History of animal rights
Main philosophical approaches
OverviewThere are two main philosophical approaches to the issue of animal rights: a utilitarian approach and a rights-based one. The former is exemplifed by Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton, and the latter by Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University.
Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (called consequentialism, teleological ethics, or utilitarianism, which is Singer's position), and those who judge acts to be right or wrong in themselves, almost regardless of consequences (called deontological ethics, of which Regan is an adherent). A consequentialist might argue, for example, that lying is wrong if the lie will make someone unhappy. A deontologist would argue that lying is wrong in principle.
Within the animal rights debate, Singer does not believe there are such things as natural rights and that animals have them, although he uses the language of rights as shorthand for how we ought to treat individuals. Instead, he argues that, when we weigh the consequences of an act in order to judge whether it is right or wrong, the interests of animals, primarily their interest in avoiding suffering, ought to be given equal consideration to the similar interests of human beings. That is, where the suffering of one individual, human or non-human, is equivalent to that of any other, there is no moral reason to award more weight to either one of them.
Regan's philosophy, on the other hand, is not driven by the weighing of consequences. He believes that animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," who have moral rights for that reason, and that moral rights ought not to be ignored.
Utilitarian approach: Peter Singer
Animal sufferingSinger writes that commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. Bernard Rollin, a philosopher and professor of animal sciences, writes that Descartes' influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.
Singer writes that scientific publications have made it clear over the last two decades that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as human beings, or to remember the suffering as vividly.
The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arises primarily because animals have no language, leading scientists to argue that it is impossible to know when an animal is suffering. This situation may change as increasing numbers of chimps are taught sign language, although skeptics question whether their use of it portrays real understanding. Singer writes that, following the argument that language is needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when human beings are in pain. All we can do is observe pain behavior, he writes, and make a calculated guess based on it. As Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, if someone is screaming, clutching a part of their body, moaning quietly, or apparently unable to function, especially when followed by an event that we believe would cause pain in ourselves, that is in large measure what it means to be in pain. Singer argues that there is no reason to suppose animal pain behavior would have a different meaning.
Equality a prescription, not a fact
Singer argues that equality between human beings is not based on anything factual, but is simply a prescription. Human beings do, in fact, differ in many ways. If the equality of the sexes were based on the idea, for example, that men and women are in principle capable of being equally intelligent, but this was later found to be false, it would mean we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration. But in fact, equality of consideration is based on a prescription, not a description. It is, Singer writes, a moral idea, not an assertion of fact.
He quotes President Thomas Jefferson, the principal author in 1776 of the American Declaration of Independence: "Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or persons of others."
Rights-based approach: Tom Regan
Tom Regan argues in The Case for Animal Rights and Empty Cages that non-human animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life," and such are bearers of rights. He argues that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some non-human animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal case humans (such as infants) and at least some non-humans must have the status of "moral patients." A moral patient lacks the prerequisites that would enable them to decide what is right and wrong. They are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Ony moral agents are able to engage in moral action.
Animals for Regan have "inherent value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end. This is also called the "direct duty" view. His theory does not extend to all sentient animals but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life. He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify in this regard.
While Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, at least in some hypothetical scenarios, animals could be legitimately used for further (human or non-human) ends, Regan believes we ought to treat animals as we would persons, and he applies the strict Kantian ideal (which Kant himself applied only to human beings) that they ought never to be sacrificed as mere means to ends, and must be treated as ends in themselves.
Criticism
Carl Cohen
Critics such as Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Medical School, oppose the granting of personhood to animals, arguing that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked."
Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human being could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one," but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.
Posner–Singer debate
A debate between Singer and Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is listed online. In it, Posner first argues that, instead of starting his argument with the idea that consideration of pain for all animals is equal, his moral intuition tells him that humans prefer their own. If a dog threatened a human infant, and if it required causing more pain to the dog to get it to stop than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we, as human beings, favor the child. It would be "monstrous to spare the dog," Posner argues.
Singer challenges Posner's moral intuition by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and those of different races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts are determined about the differences, or lack thereof, between humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarian," in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarian." He argues:
Roger Scruton
The British philosopher Roger Scruton argues that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he writes, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regards the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview," because the idea of rights and responsibilities are, he argues, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.
He accuses animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific," anthropomorphism, attributing traits to animals that are, he says, Beatrix Potter-like, where "only man is vile." It is in this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when in fact they care only about themselves. It is, he argues, a fantasy, a world of escape.
Great apesDue to the close genetic relationship between humans and great apes, some animal rights groups have been advocating for conferring upon the great apes some basic human rights. In response, the Spanish parliament recently agreed to grant limited rights to great apes. The proposed laws make it illegal to kill apes, except for self defense. In addition, torture, including torturous medical experiments, and arbitrary imprisonment, including for circuses or films, would be forbidden.
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