Winds Code
Encyclopedia
The “Winds Code” is a confused military intelligence
episode relating to the Attack on Pearl Harbor
, especially the advance-knowledge debate
.
The Winds Code was an instruction from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington on November 19, 1941. In case of an emergency leading to the interruption of regular communication channels, a coded message would be inserted into the daily Japanese international news broadcast. Concealed within the meteorological reports, and repeated twice, would be either “East wind rain” (“Higashi no kaze ame”), “West wind clear” (“Nishi no kaze hare”) or “North wind cloudy” (“Kitano kaze kumori”), the first indicating an imminent major breach with the United States, the second a break with the British (including the invasion of Thailand), the third a break with the Soviet Union.
This signal was intercepted and broken by US Intelligence (by cryptographer Commander Laurance Safford
based in Washington) and, naturally, a close monitoring of the Japanese daily shortwave broadcast was instituted for the codes, dubbed the Winds Code by the Americans.
That much is clear; the problem is whether the code was ever transmitted or not. Amid all the other indicators of approaching conflict, it seems that the message was never sent, or at least never recorded at any higher level in the US command structure.
Ralph Briggs, a USN radioman, stated he logged “Higashi no kaze ame” (East wind rain) on the morning of December 4; this was transmitted to the Fleet Intelligence Office at Pearl through the secure TWX line. Briggs was subsequently given a four day pass as a reward (and was away in Cleveland on the 7th). At the FIO, Commander Laurance Safford
states he reported this message to his superiors in Washington. At this point there is no further record of the message.
Some eight other Army and Navy officers testified that they, too, had seen a winds execute message. But two of the men completely reversed their original testimony and the others turned out to have only vague recollections.
None of the official inquiries took Safford′s statement as fact, the most generous reporting that he was “misled” and that his memory was faulty.
It has been claimed that in the week after the attack there was significant document ‘loss’ at the Office of Naval Intelligence
in Washington.
Following the end of the War, Japanese officials advised General MacArthur that no Winds signal was ever sent relating to the United States. This is supported by the testimony of Commander Joseph Rochefort
(based in Naval HQ in Pearl Harbor).
As events transpired, the Japanese had no need for a news broadcast code. Ordinary commercial communications were available to Japan right up to the December 7 attack.
Military intelligence
Military intelligence is a military discipline that exploits a number of information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to commanders in support of their decisions....
episode relating to the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Attack on Pearl Harbor
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941...
, especially the advance-knowledge debate
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is the idea that the American officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor...
.
The Winds Code was an instruction from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington on November 19, 1941. In case of an emergency leading to the interruption of regular communication channels, a coded message would be inserted into the daily Japanese international news broadcast. Concealed within the meteorological reports, and repeated twice, would be either “East wind rain” (“Higashi no kaze ame”), “West wind clear” (“Nishi no kaze hare”) or “North wind cloudy” (“Kitano kaze kumori”), the first indicating an imminent major breach with the United States, the second a break with the British (including the invasion of Thailand), the third a break with the Soviet Union.
This signal was intercepted and broken by US Intelligence (by cryptographer Commander Laurance Safford
Laurance Safford
Captain Laurance F. Safford was a U.S. Navy cryptologist. He established the Naval cryptologic organization after World War I, and headed the effort more or less constantly until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His identification with the Naval effort was so close that he was...
based in Washington) and, naturally, a close monitoring of the Japanese daily shortwave broadcast was instituted for the codes, dubbed the Winds Code by the Americans.
That much is clear; the problem is whether the code was ever transmitted or not. Amid all the other indicators of approaching conflict, it seems that the message was never sent, or at least never recorded at any higher level in the US command structure.
Ralph Briggs, a USN radioman, stated he logged “Higashi no kaze ame” (East wind rain) on the morning of December 4; this was transmitted to the Fleet Intelligence Office at Pearl through the secure TWX line. Briggs was subsequently given a four day pass as a reward (and was away in Cleveland on the 7th). At the FIO, Commander Laurance Safford
Laurance Safford
Captain Laurance F. Safford was a U.S. Navy cryptologist. He established the Naval cryptologic organization after World War I, and headed the effort more or less constantly until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His identification with the Naval effort was so close that he was...
states he reported this message to his superiors in Washington. At this point there is no further record of the message.
Some eight other Army and Navy officers testified that they, too, had seen a winds execute message. But two of the men completely reversed their original testimony and the others turned out to have only vague recollections.
None of the official inquiries took Safford′s statement as fact, the most generous reporting that he was “misled” and that his memory was faulty.
It has been claimed that in the week after the attack there was significant document ‘loss’ at the Office of Naval Intelligence
Office of Naval Intelligence
The Office of Naval Intelligence was established in the United States Navy in 1882. ONI was established to "seek out and report" on the advancements in other nations' navies. Its headquarters are at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland...
in Washington.
Following the end of the War, Japanese officials advised General MacArthur that no Winds signal was ever sent relating to the United States. This is supported by the testimony of Commander Joseph Rochefort
Joseph Rochefort
Joseph John Rochefort was an American Naval officer and cryptanalyst. His contributions and those of his team were pivotal to victory in the Pacific War....
(based in Naval HQ in Pearl Harbor).
As events transpired, the Japanese had no need for a news broadcast code. Ordinary commercial communications were available to Japan right up to the December 7 attack.