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U.S. 11th Airborne Division
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The 11th Airborne Division was a United States Army airborne formation, first activated on 25 February 1943, during World War II. The division took part in several training exercises in 1943, including the Knollwood Maneuver. It played a vital part in this exercise, helping demonstrate that American airborne forces could operate successfully at up to divisional strength after the disappointing performance of the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation Husky.
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The 11th Airborne Division was a United States Army airborne formation, first activated on 25 February 1943, during World War II. The division took part in several training exercises in 1943, including the Knollwood Maneuver. It played a vital part in this exercise, helping demonstrate that American airborne forces could operate successfully at up to divisional strength after the disappointing performance of the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation Husky. Held in reserve in the United States, the division did not take part in early Allied airborne operations. In June 1944, it transferred to the Pacific Theater.
On arrival in the Pacific, the division entered a period of intense training and acclimatization. By November it was combat-ready, and was transported to Leyte in the Philippines, seeing action in an infantry–not airborne–role. The 11th left Leyte in January 1945, and then took part in the invasion of Luzon, operating in two formations. The first formation deployed the division's two Glider Infantry Regiments as conventional infantry, securing a beachhead before fighting their way inland. The second formation, the division's single Parachute Infantry Regiment, was held in reserve for several days before conducting the division's first airborne operation, landing on Tagatay Ridge and linking up with the two glider infantry regiments. The re-combined division participated in the Liberation of Manila, the capital of the Philippines. Two companies of paratroopers from the division also conducted the famous Raid at Los Baños, liberating two thousand civilians held in a Japanese internment camp. The division's last World War II combat operation was in Aparri, aiding the advance of combined American and Philippine forces in Northern Luzon, just before hostilities ended.
On 30 August 1945, the division moved to southern Japan, as part of the Occupation of Japan. The division remained in Japan for four years until May 1949, when it returned to the United States. It then became a training formation, while the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment was detached from the division and saw service in the Korean War before returning to the United States. The division was deactivated 30 June 1958 and then reactivated 1 February 1963 as the experimental 11th Air Assault Division (Test), to explore the theory and practicality of helicopter assault tactics. It was finally deactivated on 29 June 1965 with all of its personnel and equipment coming under the command of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
World War II
Formation
Inspired by the pioneering German use of large-scale airborne formations—first during the Battle of France in 1940, and later the Invasion of Crete in 1941—the various Allied powers decided to raise airborne units of their own. One of the resultant five American and two British airborne divisions, the 11th Airborne Division was officially activated on 25 February 1943 at Camp Mackall in North Carolina, under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing. As formed, the division consisted of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment and the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, and with a complement of 8,321 men was around half the strength of a regular American World War II infantry division.
The division initially remained in the United States for training, which in common with all airborne units was extremely arduous to befit their elite status. This included lengthy forced marches, simulated parachute landings from and towers, and practice jumps from transport aircraft; hesitancy in the doorway of an aircraft resulted in an automatic failure for the candidate. The resultant washout rate was accordingly high, but there was never a shortage of candidates; especially in American airborne units the rate of pay was much higher than that of an ordinary infantryman.
While training was ongoing however, a debate was developing in the United States Army over whether the best use of airborne forces was en masse or as small, compact units. On 9 July 1943, the first large-scale Allied airborne operation was carried out by elements of the United States 82nd Airborne Division and the British 1st Airborne Division in support of the Allied invasion of Sicily, codenamed Operation Husky. The 11th's commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Swing, was temporarily seconded to act as airborne advisor to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the operation, and had observed the airborne assault, which went badly. The 82nd Airborne Division had been inserted by parachute and glider, and had suffered high casualties, leading to a perception that it had failed to achieve many of its objectives.
Swing Board
Eisenhower had reviewed the airborne role in Operation Husky, and had concluded that large-scale formations were too difficult to control in combat to be practical. Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, overall commander of US Army ground forces, had similar misgivings: once an airborne supporter, he had been greatly disappointed by their performance in North Africa and more recently Sicily. However, other high-ranking officers believed otherwise, notably General George Marshall. He persuaded Eisenhower to set up a review board and to withhold judgement on the effectiveness of divisional-sized airborne forces until a large-scale maneuver could be tried in December.
When Swing returned to the United States to resume command of the 11th Airborne in mid-September 1943, he had an additional role. McNair ordered him to form a committee–the Swing Board–composed of US air force, parachute and glider infantry and artillery officers to arrange a largescale maneuver that would effectively decide the fate of divisional-sized airborne force. As the 11th Airborne Division was in reserve in the United States, and had not yet been earmarked for combat, the Swing Board chose it as the test formation. The maneuver would also provide the 11th Airborne and its individual units with further airborne training, as had occurred several months previously in a large-scale maneuver by the 101st
and the 82nd Airborne Divisions.
Knollwood Maneuver
The objective for the 11th as the attacking force was to capture Knollwood Army Auxiliary Airfield near Fort Bragg in North Carolina, after which the maneuver was named. The defending forces, composed of a composite combat team from the 17th Airborne Division with a battalion from the 541st Parachute Infantry Regiment attached, were to try to defend the airport and the surrounding area and repel the airborne assault. The entire operation would be observed by Lt. Gen. McNair. His observations and reports to the U.S. War Department, and ultimately Eisenhower, would do much to decide the success or failure of the exercise.
The Knollwood Maneuver took place on the night of 7 December, with the troops of the 11th Airborne Division being delivered to thirteen separate objectives by 200 C-47 Dakota transport aircraft and 234 Waco CG-4A gliders, with eighty-five percent of the airborne troops being delivered to their target without navigational error. The transport aircraft were divided into four groups, each taking off from a different airfield in the Carolinas, with two groups dropping paratroopers and two towing gliders, and between them deployed 4,800 airborne troops in the first wave. These airborne troops then seized the Knollwood Army Auxiliary Airfield from the defending troops and secured the area in which the rest of the division landed, all before daylight. Having secured their initial objectives, the 11th Airborne Division then conducted a coordinated ground attack against a reinforced infantry regiment, as well as several aerial resupply and casualty evacuation missions in coordination with transport aircraft. The exercise was judged to be a great success by those who observed it. McNair reported that the success of the maneuver pleased him, and highlighted the great improvements in airborne training that had occurred in the months between the end of Operation Husky and the Knollwood Maneuver. Due to the success of the units of the 11th Airborne Division during the exercise, the divisional-sized airborne force was deemed to be effective and was allowed by Eisenhower to remain.
Leyte
After its participation in the Knollwood Maneuver ended, the division remained in reserve until January 1944, when it was moved by train from Camp Mackall to Camp Polk in Louisiana. There, the division remained for four weeks, conducting a number of maneuvers and tests to ensure that it was prepared to be transferred overseas and enter combat. In April 1944, the division was moved to Camp Stoneman, California, and then arrived in Milne Bay between 25 May and 11 June. Between June and September the division became acclimatized to its new environment and continued its airborne training. It conducted parachute drops in the New Guinea jungle and around the airfield in Dobodura. Then, on 11 November, the division boarded a convoy of naval transports and was escorted to Leyte in the Philippines, arriving on 18 November. Four days after its arrival, the division was attached to XXIV Corps and committed to combat in Leyte, but only as an infantry division and did not operate in an airborne capacity. It was ordered to relieve the 7th Infantry Division, which was stationed in the area Burauen-La Paz-Bugho, engage and destroy all Japanese forces in its operational area, and protect XXIV Corps rear-area supply dumps and airfields.
Maj. Gen. Swing ordered the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment to guard the rear installations of XXIV Corps, and the 188th GIR to secure the division's rear and conduct aggressive patrols to eliminate any enemy troops in the area. The 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment was assigned the task of attacking and destroying all Japanese formations in the operational area, which it began on 28 November when it relieved the 7th Infantry Division. The regiment then began moving overland, two battalions advancing abreast and the regiment's third battalion in reserve following behind. The regiment advanced slowly, its progress impeded by heavy Japanese resistance, a lack of mapped trails, and heavy rainfall, with more than twenty-three inches (60 cm) of rain falling in Leyte in November alone. As the regiment advanced, resupply became progressively more difficult, with the division resorting to using large numbers of Piper Cub aircraft to drop food and ammunition to the regiment as it advanced. To try to rectify these problems, the division created several solutions, such as dropping platoons of the 187th GIR from Piper Cubs in front of the 511th PIR to reconnoiter for the regiment, and using C-47 transport aircraft to drop artillery pieces to the regiment's location when other forms of transport, such as mule-trains, failed.
On 6 December, the Japanese attempted to disrupt the operations of the 11th Airborne Division and other American units on Leyte by conducting two small-scale airborne operations. The first raid attempted to deploy a small number of Japanese airborne troops to occupy several key American-held airfields at Tacloban and Dulag, but failed when the three aircraft used in the operation were either shot-down, crash-landed or were destroyed on the ground along with their passengers. The second, larger, raid was conducted by between twenty-nine and thirty-nine transport aircraft supported by fighters; despite heavy losses, the Japanese managed to drop a number of airborne troops in the area around Burauen airfield, where the headquarters of 11th Airborne Division were located. Five L-5 Sentinel reconnaissance aircraft and one C-47 transport were destroyed by Japanese troops, but the raiders were eliminated by an ad hoc combat group composed of artillerymen, engineers and support troops led by Maj. Gen. Swing.
Meanwhile, the 511th PIR continued its advance on 7 December, being reinforced by 2nd Battalion, 187th GIR. Its progress was slow but steady, and on 17 December it broke through Japanese lines and arrived at the western shoreline of Leyte, linking up with elements of the 32nd Infantry Division. It was during this period of fighting that Private Elmer E. Fryar earned a posthumous Medal of Honor when he helped to repel a Japanese counterattack, personally killing twenty-seven Japanese soldiers, before being mortally wounded by a sniper. The regiment was then ordered to set up temporary defensive positions against possible Japanese attacks before being relieved on 25 December by 1st Batt., 187th GIR and 2nd Batt., 188th GIR. These two battalions then proceeded to combat further Japanese resistance, incurring considerable casualties against a heavily dug-in enemy. The entire regiment was reassembled at its original base-camp in Leyte on 15 January 1945, and on 22 January, the division was alerted that it would take part in an operation in Luzon.
Luzon
Shortly after its operations in Leyte ended, the division was notified that it was destined for combat in Luzon, to the north of Leyte. There, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment would make its first combat jump, with the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment and the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment making an amphibious assault to secure a beach-head for reinforcements. On 27 January, the 187th and 188th GIR set sail for Luzon, while the 511th flew by C-46 Commando transport aircraft from Leyte to Mindoro. Then, at dawn on 31 January, the two Glider regiments landed in naval landing craft near Nasugbu in southern Luzon; after a short naval barrage and strafing by A-20 Havoc light bombers and P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft, they secured a beach-head against light Japanese resistance. The 188th rapidly advanced and secured Nasugbu, with its 1st Battalion advancing up Highway 17, a major highway in Luzon, to deny the Japanese forces any chance to set up defenses. Simultaneously, the regiment's 2nd Battalion advanced south and secured the right flank of the division after crossing the River Lian. By 10:30 am the 188th had advanced deep into southern Luzon, allowing the 187th to come ashore and relieve those units of the 188th that had secured the right flank of the division. By 2:30 pm, the 188th had reached the River Palico and secured a vital bridge over the river before it could be destroyed by Japanese sappers. It then continued its advance by following Highway 17 to Tumalin, where it encountered heavier Japanese resistance.
The 188th continued to advance against increasing Japanese resistance until midnight, when the 187th took over the lead; the 188th then followed the 187th, the two units resting briefly before coming to the Japanese main line of resistance. This consisted of a series of trenches, linked to a number of bunkers and fortified caves manned by several hundred infantry and numerous artillery pieces. At 09:00, the 188th launched an attack on the Japanese line and managed to break through by midday, spending the rest of 1 February mopping up resistance in the area. On the morning of 2 February, another attack was launched, breaking a second Japanese line of defense and pursuing the retreating Japanese troops. By midnight, the 188th had breached a third Japanese line, and the divisional reconnaissance platoon had reached an area near Tagaytay Ridge where the 511th PIR was scheduled to conduct its airborne operation.
The airborne operation was scheduled for 2 February, but was rescheduled for 3 February due to continued Japanese resistance slowing the progress of the two Glider regiments. Maj. Gen. Swing only wanted the operation to go ahead if the Glider regiments were in range to provide assistance to the 511th if Japanese resistance was heavier than expected. Due to there only being forty-eight C-47 Dakota transport aircraft available, the regiment was forced to conduct the airborne operation in three lifts. The regimental staff, the regiment's 2nd Battalion and half of its 3rd Battalion would be dropped first. The rest of the regiment would be dropped second, and then the 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion would be dropped in the third lift.
At 03:00 on 3 February, the troops of the first lift entered their transport planes, and at 07:00 the first transports took off, protected by an escort of P-61 Black Widow night fighters, flying over Mindoro and eventually following Highway 17 all the way to Tagaytay Ridge. The ridge itself was an open space some two thousand yards (1,829 m) long and four thousand yards (3,657 m) wide, plowed in places, and had been mostly cleared of Japanese troops by local Filipino guerrillas. At 08:15 the first echelon of the first lift, approximately 345 men, successfully dropped onto the drop zone, although the second echelon, consisting of approximately 570 men, were dropped prematurely and consequently landed about eight thousand yards (7,315 m) east of the drop zone. The second lift also encountered problems with accuracy, with some 425 men dropping correctly but another 1,325 dropping early due to pilot error and poor jump discipline. Despite these problems, however, the entire regiment was assembled within five hours of the first lift landing in the drop zone. After fighting against minor Japanese resistance, by 15:00 the 511th had made contact with the 188th and 187th, and the entire division was once again assembled as a single formation. After clearing the ridge of any remaining Japanese defenders, the division began to advance towards Manila, reaching the Paranaque River by 21:00 on 3 February and encountering the beginning of the Genko Line, a major Japanese defensive belt that stretched along the southern edge of Manila. This defensive belt consisted of approximately 1,200 blockhouses between two and three stories deep, many of which had naval guns or large-caliber mortars embedded within them, as well as entrenched large-caliber anti-aircraft weapons, machine-gun nests and booby-traps consisted of rigged naval bombs. The entire line was manned by some 6,000 Japanese soldiers.
The division was ordered to breach the Genko Line and drive into Manila, linking up with other American forces attacking the city from the north. All three of the divisions regiments were committed, and they began their advance on 5 February, managing to break through the defensive line despite fierce resistance by Japanese units manning it. The 511th had led the assault and broken through the Genko Line, but was soon replaced as the division's spearhead by the 188th; the glider regiment advanced westwards towards Manila in the face of heavy opposition as the 511th attempted to move into the city from the north. By 11 February, the division had penetrated as far as Nichols Field, an airfield forming the center of the Genko Line, heavily fortified with a number of entrenched naval guns and a series of bunkers. After a short artillery bombardment on the morning of 12 February, 2nd Battalion of the 187th attacked the north-west corner of the airfield while the 1st Battalion of the regiment and the entire 188th attacked from the south and south-eastern corners. This pincer movement succeeded in securing the airfield despite a local counter-attack, and by nightfall, the airfield was secured. The following day, the division advance across the airfield and towards Fort McKinley, the headquarters of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, commander of the Japanese defenders on Luzon. It was during this advance that Private First Class Manuel Perez Jr. neutralized several Japanese bunkers which were impeding the advance of the division, capturing one single-handedly and personally killing eighteen Japanese soldiers during his actions. PFC Perez was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. On 17 February the division launched its assault on the Fort against fierce resistance, taking heavy casualties as it drew nearer to the Fort, particularly when the Japanese detonated a quantity of naval depth charges buried under a set of lawns near the Fort. The Fort was penetrated by the 511th, however and by 18 February the area had been cleared of its defenders. On 15 February, the 1st Battalion of the 187th, alongside other American units, had also launched an attack on Mabato Point, an extremely heavily fortified position featuring the same entrenched bunkers and defensive positions seen in the Genko Line. It took six days of hard fighting against heavy Japanese resistance before the area was cleared, the airborne troops being aided by multiple airstrikes and the frequent use of napalm and heavy artillery. Sporadic resistance continued until 3 March, when all organized Japanese resistance in the area ended.
Raid at Los Baños
The next operation that the division was involved in concerned the liberation of a large number of civilian prisoners detained by the Japanese on Luzon. The majority of these prisoners were located in internment camps scattered throughout Luzon, the largest being at Los Baños. The Los Baños camp was located on the campus of the Agricultural College of the Philippines, some forty miles (64 km) south-east of Manila. When American forces had first landed on Luzon, General Douglas MacArthur had become concerned with the plight of the interned civilians and had assigned the duty of rescuing the civilians held at Los Baños to the division on 3 February, but heavy Japanese resistance and the division encountering the Genko Line meant that it was unable to devote any resources to raiding the camp at the time. All that could be done during February was to gather as much information about the internment camp as the division could get, primarily through liaising with the guerilla groups which operated in Southern Luzon and in the area around Los Baños. As information about the camp was received and analyzed, Maj. Gen. Swing and his command staff were briefed daily by the liaison officer working with the guerilla groups, Major Vanderpool.
As Vanderpool liaised with the guerrillas, and several civilians who were able to escape from the camp, he was able to learn that the camp was surrounded by two barbed-wire fences approximately six feet tall, and several guard towers and bunkers guarded the perimeter, each containing at least two guards. Prisoners left each morning under armed guard to gather food supplies and firewood from a nearby town. After several days, Vanderpool managed to learn about the civilian population of the camp, finding that the population consisted of American civilians in three distinct groups. The first consisted of Protestant missionaries and their families, the second of Roman Catholic nuns and priests, and the third was composed of professional workers, such as doctors and engineers, and their families, including several hundred women and children. All appeared to be in good health, although many had become weak from food rationing. On 20 February, Maj. Gen. Swing decided he had sufficient troops to mount a raid on Los Baños, and a four-phase plan was devised by Major Vanderpool and the divisional staff officers. First, the divisional reconnaissance platoon would travel across a nearby lake and move to the outskirts of the camp, securing a large adjacent field. Second, the field would act as a drop zone for a company of paratroopers. They would then eliminate Japanese resistance and organize an evacuation of the internees. Third, fifty-four amphibious Amtracs would transport two companies of paratroopers to the lake shore. The paratroopers would secure a beachhead while a convoy of Amtracs and a guard detachment continued to the camp to evacuate the internees and the company of paratroopers holding the camp. Fourth, a task force consisting of a reinforced infantry battalion, two battalions of heavy artillery and a tank destroyer battalion would travel down Highway 1, the highway that led to Los Baños, to thwart any Japanese attempt to recapture the internees.
The operation began on the night of 21 February, when the divisional reconnaissance platoon made their way to the shore of the lake and collected ten canoes, assisted by a group of guerrillas. Despite navigational difficulties, the platoon landed near Los Baños at 02:00 on the morning of 22 February and hid in the jungle near the camp after securing the field to be used by the paratroopers. During the afternoon, B Company of the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment was transferred to the airfield from which the company would be deployed, while the rest of the battalion rendezvoused with the Amtracs which would transport them to the camp. Then, at 07:00 on the morning of 23 February, B Company took off in ten C-47 Dakota transport aircraft; shortly after the aircraft arrived over the Drop Zone which the reconnaissance platoon had cleared previously, and the airborne troops deployed from the C-47s and landed on the field. As the first paratroopers landed in the field, the reconnaissance platoon and its supporting guerilla group opened fire on the guard towers and pillboxes which surrounded the internment camp, used Bazooka rounds to penetrate the concrete pillboxes, then entered the camp and engaged the rest of the Japanese garrison. The paratroopers soon entered the battle, and by 07:30 the Japanese guards had been eliminated and the internees were being rounded up and readied for evacuation. During this time the Amtracs had landed the two other companies of the 511th, who had secured a beachhead, and a convoy of Amtracs soon reached the camp without incident. The internees were loaded onto the Amtracs, priority being given to the women, children and wounded, with some of the able-bodied men walking alongside the Amtracs as they returned to the beach. The first convoy of Amtracs left at approximately 10:00, with B Company, the reconnaissance platoon and the guerrillas being used as a rearguard. By 11:30 all of the civilians had been evacuated, and by 13:00 the Amtrac convoy returned for the rearguard, with the last paratroopers leaving the beach at approximately 15:00. The taskforce that had been deployed to protect the airborne troops as they rescued the internees met heavy Japanese resistance, but despite suffering several casualties was able to block Japanese forces advancing on the camp during the evacuation process, before retreating back to American lines. The evacuation had been a complete success, and some 2,147 civilian prisoners had been liberated by the airborne troops during the operation.
Southern Luzon and Aparri
On the same day that the Los Baños internees were freed, the 11th Airborne Division was assigned a new mission by the headquarters of Sixth United States Army; it was to engage and destroy all Japanese formations in southern Luzon south of Manila. On 24 February, the division advanced due south with the 187th GIR and the 511th PIR moving abreast. The 188th GIR was detached from the main advance and given a separate task by Maj. Gen. Swing; it was to eliminate all Japanese units still operating in the Pico de Loro hills along the southern shore of Manila Bay. The Japanese forces belonged to the Shimbu Group–one of three groups of the Fourteenth Area Army under General Tomoyuki Yamashita–with a group strength of about 80,000 personnel. The division spent the rest of February, and all of March and April, engaging and destroying the forces of Shimbu Group, often acting in conjunction with Filipino guerillas and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. The fighting was extremely difficult for the advancing division, as the terrain was mountainous and many Japanese units had decided to fight to the death rather than surrender. All organized Japanese resistance in southern Luzon ended on 1 May when the division captured Mount Malepunyo, near the city of Lipa; the division was then moved to a new base centered around the Japanese airstrip on the outskirts of Lipa. The 127th Engineering Battalion lengthened the runway of the airfield to accommodate C-47 transport aircraft; when this was completed the combat troops of the division participated in several refresher training courses.
The division's last combat World War II operation, and also its last airborne operation, took place on 23 June, in the province of Aparri in northern Luzon. By this period of the conflict, the only Japanese forces remaining on Luzon were positioned to the far north and belonged to Shobu Group, the last of General Yamashita's three groups. Shobu Group, numbering approximately 52,000 troops, proved to be the most tenacious Japanese group, forcing Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth United States Army, to commit four infantry divisions, an armored task force, and a large band of guerillas. However, while these forces pinned down Shobu Group, the 37th Infantry Division began advancing northwards, defeating a weaker Japanese formation and encircling Shobu Group. In order to ensure that the 37th was successful in its drive, Krueger called for an airborne force to land near Aparri and advance southwards, linking up with the 37th and eliminating all remaining Japanese resistance in northern Luzon.
Krueger's plan called for the 11th Airborne Division to assemble and then drop a battalion-sized combat team on Camalaniugan Airfield, approximately ten miles (16 km) south of Aparri. It would then advance southwards, eliminating all Japanese resistance, until it linked up with the leading elements of the 37th Infantry Division. To fulfill this task, Maj. Gen. Swing formed a special unit–Gypsy Task Force–comprising the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, G and I Companies of the regiment's 2nd Battalion, an artillery battery from the 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and a platoon of engineers and miscellaneous signal and medical detachments. Gypsy Task Force would be transported by fifty-four C-47 Dakota and thirteen C-46 Commando aircraft, as well as six Waco CG-4A Gliders which would be used to land jeeps and supplies for the task force. On 21 June, a detachment of pathfinders from the division had flown to the area and secured the airfield which was designated as the drop-zone for the task force. Then, on 23 June, the troops of Gypsy Task Force were loaded onto the transport aircraft, which took off at 06:00, alongside a fighter escort, and at 09:00, the pathfinder detachment set off colored smoke to mark the drop-zone. The paratroopers then began to jump from the aircraft and land on the airfield, suffering several casualties from fierce winds and the uneven ground around the airfield, which killed two men and injured seventy. However, despite these casualties, the task force was rapidly assembled and began its advance southwards, encountering heavy Japanese resistance and having to rely on the use of flamethrowers to eliminate Japanese bunkers and fortifications. After three days of fighting, the task force encountered the lead elements of the 37th Infantry Division, finishing the encirclement of the remaining Japanese forces in Luzon and having eliminated a significant part of Shobu Group. Task Force Gypsy had therefore completed the mission assigned to it, and completed the last combat operation that the 11th Airborne Division was to participate in.
Post-World War II
Occupation of Japan
Prior to the detonation of two nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General MacArthur intended to use the 11th Airborne Division in the invasion of Japan. Plans for the invasion called for the division to remain as Sixth Army's operational reserve, to be committed if required. However, with the end of hostilities in the Pacific Theater shortly after the atomic bombings, the division was instead selected by General MacArthur to lead the American forces selected to participate in the occupation of Japan, the divisional staff receiving orders to this effect on 11 August 1945. The division began its participation in the occupation by being transported to Okinawa on 12 August, an operation which involved using 99 B-24 Liberator bombers, 350 C-46 Commando and 150 C-47 Dakota transport aircraft to airlift 11,100 men, 120 vehicles and approximately 1.16 million pounds (530,000 kg) of equipment. Once the division had arrived on Okinawa, it waited for several weeks before receiving its next orders. On 28 August, the division was ordered to land at Atsugi Airfield outside of Yokohama, secure the surrounding area, remove all Japanese civilians and military personnel to a perimeter of three miles (5 km), and finally occupy Yokohama. To facilitate this order a large number of C-54 Skymaster transport aircraft were gathered together to transport the troops of the division, with the first C-54 landing at the airfield in Atsugi at 06:00 on 30 August; this aircraft carried Swing and his divisional staff, thereby signalling the beginning of the division's participation in the occupation of the country. The division was finally assembled around Atsugi by 7 September, and by 13 September, the 11th had been joined by the 27th Infantry Division, which was also to take part in the military occupation and had been airlifted into Japan at the same time as the 11th. The division then took up its occupation duties around Japan, first remaining in Yokohama but later moving to northern Japan and setting up camps along the coast of Honshu and on the island of Hokkaido. The division would remain in Japan as an occupying force for four years, until May 1949 when it was relieved of its occupation duties and returned to the United States.
Training and first deactivation
When its tour of duty as an occupying force in Japan came to an end, the division returned to the United States and was transferred to Camp Campbell in Kentucky. The division then became a training formation, with several of its subordinate units deactivated, including the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment. Training continued until the outbreak of the Korean War, when the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, renamed the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment and the 674th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion were detached from the division and formed as a separate RCT (Regimental Combat Team) for service in Korea.
The 187th RCT saw service in Korea, fighting for two years in the conflict and conducting two airborne operations, as well as fighting as a conventional infantry unit. As the 187th was fighting in Korea, the rest of the division continued to act as a training formation, processing and training approximately thirteen thousand recalled reservists between September and December 1950 alone.
The 187th RCT remained in Korea until 1 October 1953, and was then transferred to Japan for two years, when the formation was replaced in Japan by the 508th RCT. The 187th returned to the United States on 17 July 1955 as a unit independent of the 11th Airborne Division. The 11th was then transported to Germany in early 1956 to replace the 5th Infantry Division stationed in Augsburg and Munich, Germany. This transfer took place as part of Operation Gyroscope, where one division would replace another as part of a rotation scheme. As the division was enroute to Germany, the 187th RCT was relocated to Fort Campbell, taking over the camps that the 11th had recently vacated, and began an intensive training regime, conducting several training exercises, before being temporarily deactivated on 19 June 1956 for budgetary reasons.
The 187th was reactivated less than a year later on 1 March 1957 as two separate formations, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, and 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry. These two formations were then transferred to Augsburg, Germany to serve with the 11th Airborne Division, where they were reintegrated into their parent formation. The 11th Airborne Division was then deactivated in Augsburg on 1 July 1958, with the 1st and 2nd Airborne Battle Groups being attached to the 24th Infantry Division.
Reactivation and final deactivation
In the early 1960s, the United States Army began to explore alternative ways in which it could conduct future conflicts, and one of the many ideas thought up by planners in the United States Department of Defense was the concept of helicopter assault tactics. In order to investigate this concept and evaluate its effectiveness, the 11th Airborne Division was reformed on 1 February 1963 as a test-bed formation for testing air assault tactics, being renamed as the 11th Air Assault Division (Test).
To effectively test the air assault concept, the 11th was to be a "light" division, capable of rapid movement through the use of air force or army aircraft, thereby completely recreating the organizational structure that the 11th Airborne Division had possessed when it had been deactivated. The original combat units that the 11th Airborne Division had under its command, the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, and the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment were also reformed under the new division.
For the next two years, the 11th Air Assault Division would develop and refine air assault tactics, as well as the equipment that an Air Assault division would require to be an effective formation. The 187th and 188th tested helicopters to assess their ability to be utilized as a combat aircraft in various exercises, ranging from command and control maneuvers to scouting and screening and aerial resupply. After two years of testing, however, the division was inactivated for the final time on 29 June 1965, with the division's personnel and equipment being transferred to the newly formed 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The colors of the 1st Cavalry Division, at that time assigned to Korea, were transferred to Fort Benning, while those of the 2nd Infantry Division were simultaneously moved to Korea. The assets of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 11th Air Assault Division were merged to form the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Footnotes
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