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Surrender of Japan
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The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. On August 10, 1945, after the Soviet Union invaded the Japanese colony of Manchuria (Manchukuo) and the United States dropped the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's leaders at the Supreme War Council (the "Big Six") decided, in principle, to accept the terms the Allies had set down for ending the war in the Potsdam Declaration.
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The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. On August 10, 1945, after the Soviet Union invaded the Japanese colony of Manchuria (Manchukuo) and the United States dropped the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's leaders at the Supreme War Council (the "Big Six") decided, in principle, to accept the terms the Allies had set down for ending the war in the Potsdam Declaration. After several more days of behind-the-scenes negotiations and a failed coup d'état, on August 15 Emperor Hirohito gave a recorded radio address to the nation. In the radio address, called the Gyokuon-hoso (Jewel Voice Broadcast), Hirohito read the Imperial Rescript on Surrender, announcing Japan's surrender to the Japanese populace.
On August 28, occupation of Japan by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers began. The surrender ceremony was held aboard the on September 2, at which officials from the Japanese government signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, officially ending World War II. Allied civilians and servicemen alike celebrated V-J Day, the end of the war. However, some isolated commands and personnel from Japan's far-flung forces throughout Asia and the Pacific islands refused to surrender for months and years after, up into the 1970s.
Impending defeat
By 1945, the war was going very badly for Japan. For two years, the Japanese had suffered an unbroken string of defeats, in the South West Pacific, the Marianas campaign, and the Philippines campaign. In July 1944, following the loss of Saipan, General Hideki Tojo was replaced as prime minister by General Kuniaki Koiso, who declared that the Philippines would be the site of the decisive battle. After the fall of the Philippines, Koiso was in turn replaced by Admiral Kantaro Suzuki. The first half of 1945 saw the Allies capture the nearby islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Okinawa was to be a staging area for the Invasion of Japan itself.
The Allied submarine campaign and the mining of Japanese coastal waters had largely destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet. Japan, which has few natural resources, was dependent on raw materials imported from the Asian mainland and the conquered territory in the Dutch East Indies—particularly oil. The destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet, combined with the strategic bombing of Japanese industry, had wrecked Japan's war economy. Production of coal, iron, steel, rubber and other vital supplies were only a fraction of their pre-war levels.
on 24 July during a series of bombings]]
As a result of the losses it had suffered, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Following a series of raids on the Japanese shipyard at Kure, Japan, the only major warships in fighting order were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battleship, none of which could be adequately fueled. Although 19 destroyers and 38 submarines were still operational, their use would be limited by the lack of fuel.
Faced with the prospect of an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands starting with Kyushu, the War Journal of the Imperial Headquarters concluded:"We can no longer direct the war with any hope of success. The only course left is for Japan's one hundred million people to sacrifice their lives by charging the enemy to make them lose the will to fight."
The Japanese Imperial High Command planned an all-out defense of Kyushu code named Operation Ketsu-Go. This plan was to be a radical departure from the "defense in-depth" plans used in the invasions of Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Instead, everything was staked on the beachhead; more than 3000 kamikazes would be sent to attack the amphibious transports before troops and cargo were disembarked on the beach. If this did not drive the Allies away, they planned to send another 3500 kamikazes along with 5000 suicide boats and the remaining destroyers and submarines—"the last of the Navy's operating fleet"—to the beach. If the Allies had fought through this and landed successfully on Kyushu, only 3000 planes would be left to defend the remaining islands, although Kyushu would be "defended to the last" regardless.
Divisions within the Japanese leadership
Japanese policy-making centered on the Supreme War Council, the so-called "Big Six" — the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Army, Minister of the Navy, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Navy General Staff. At the formation of the Suzuki government in April 1945, the council's membership consisted of:
Legally, the Japanese Army and Navy had the right to nominate (or refuse to nominate) their respective ministers. Thus, they could prevent the formation of undesirable governments, or by resignation bring about the collapse of an existing government.
Emperor Hirohito and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido were also present for Supreme War Council meetings.
- "Although Suzuki might indeed have seen peace as a distant goal, he had no design to achieve it within any immediate time span or on terms acceptable to the Allies. His own comments at the conference of senior statesmen gave no hint that he favored any early cessation of the war ... Suzuki's selections for the most critical cabinet posts were, with one exception, not advocates of peace either."
Of Suzuki's cabinet, only Mitsumasa Yonai, the incumbent Navy minister, was known to desire an early end to the war. After the war, Suzuki and others from his government and their apologists claimed they were secretly working towards peace, and could not publicly advocate it. They cite the Japanese concept of haragei — "the art of hidden and invisible technique" — to justify the dissonance between their public actions and alleged behind-the-scenes work. However, many historians reject this interpretation:
- "Because of its very ambiguity, the plea of haragei invites the suspicion that in questions of politics and diplomacy a conscious reliance upon this 'art of bluff' may have constituted a purposeful deception predicated upon a desire to play both ends against the middle. While this judgment does not accord with the much-lauded character of Admiral Suzuki, the fact remains that from the moment he became Premier until the day he resigned no one could ever be quite sure of what Suzuki would do or say next."
Japanese leaders had always envisioned a negotiated settlement to the war. Their pre-war planning expected a rapid expansion, consolidation, eventual conflict with the United States and then a settlement in which they were able to retain at least some of the new territory they had conquered. Although by 1945 Japan's leaders were in agreement that the war was going badly, they disagreed over the best means to negotiate an end to it. There were two camps: the so-called "peace" camp, which favored a diplomatic initiative to persuade Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, to mediate a settlement between the US, its allies and Japan; and the hard liners, who favored fighting one last "decisive" battle that would inflict so many casualties on the Allies that they would be willing to offer more lenient terms. Both approaches were based on Japan's experience in the Russo-Japanese War forty years earlier, which consisted of a series of costly but largely indecisive battles, followed by the decisive naval engagement in the Tsushima Strait.
By the end of January 1945, some Japanese officials close to the Emperor were seeking surrender terms which would protect his position. These proposals, sent through both British and American channels were assembled by General Douglas MacArthur into a 40-page dossier and given to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 2, two days before the Yalta Conference. The dossier was reportedly dismissed by Roosevelt out of hand—the proposals all included the condition that Emperor's position would be assured, albeit possibly as a puppet ruler. At this time, however, the allied policy was to accept only an unconditional offer of surrender. Additionally, these proposals were strongly opposed by powerful members of the Japanese government itself and thus cannot be said to represent the true willingness of Japan to surrender at this time.
In February 1945, Prince Fumimaro Konoe gave to Emperor Hirohito a memorandum about his analysis of the situation and told him that if the war continued, the Imperial house might be in greater danger from an internal revolution than from defeat. According to the diary of Grand Chamberlain Hisanori Fujita, the Emperor, looking for a decisive battle (tennozan), replied that it was premature to seek peace, "unless we make one more military gain".
On April 5, the Soviet Union announced that it would not renew the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, which had been signed in 1941 following the Nomonhan Incident. (At the Yalta conference in February 1945, the Western Allies had made substantial concessions to the Soviets in order to secure a promise from them that they would declare war on Japan no more than 6 months after Germany surrendered). Although legally the treaty officially stayed in force until one year after Soviet denouncement (that is, until April 13, 1946) the tone of the Soviet cancellation strongly implied an intent to go to war.
At a series of high level meetings in May, for the first time, the Big Six seriously discussed ending the war—none of them, however, on terms that would have been acceptable to the Allies. Because anyone openly supporting Japanese surrender risked assassination from zealous army officers, the meetings were closed to anyone except the Big Six, the Emperor, and the Privy council—no second or third echelon officers were permitted to attend. At these meetings, only Foreign minister Togo realized the possibility that the Western allies may have already made concessions to the Soviets in order to bring them into the war against Japan. As a result of these meetings, Togo was authorized to approach the Soviet Union, seeking to maintain its neutrality, or more fantastically, to form an alliance.
In keeping with the custom of a new government declaring its purposes, following the May meetings the Army staff produced a document, "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War", which stated that the Japanese people would fight to extinction rather than surrender. This policy was adopted by the Big Six on June 6. (Togo opposed it, while all the other Big Six supported it) Documents submitted by Suzuki at the same meeting made suggestions that, in the diplomatic overtures to the USSR, Japan adopt the following approach:
"It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained neutral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future".
On June 9, the Emperor's confidant, Marquis Koichi Kido, wrote a "Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation", warning that by the end of the year, Japan's ability to wage modern war would be extinguished and the government would be unable to contain civil unrest. "...We cannot be sure we will not share the fate of Germany and be reduced to adverse circumstances under which we will not attain even our supreme object of safeguarding the Imperial Household and preserving the national polity". Kido proposed that the Emperor himself take action, offering to end the war on "very generous terms". Kido proposed that Japan give up occupied European colonies, provided they were granted independence, and that the nation disarm and for a time be "content with minimum defense". With the Emperor's authorization, Kido approached several members of the Supreme Council, the "Big Six". Togo was very supportive. Suzuki and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy minister, were both cautiously supportive; both wondered what the other thought. General Korechika Anami, the Army minister, was ambivalent, insisting that diplomacy must wait until "after the United States has sustained heavy losses in [Ketsu-Go]".
In June, the Emperor lost confidence in the chances of achieving a military victory. The battle of Okinawa was lost, and he learned of the weakness of the Japanese army in China, of the navy, and of the army defending the Home Islands.
"... according to [Prince Higashikuni's] report it was not just the coast defense; the divisions reserved to engage in the decisive battle also did not have sufficient numbers of weapons. I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This confirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war."
On June 22, the Emperor summoned the Big Six to a meeting. Unusually, he spoke first. "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts made to implement them." It was agreed to solicit Soviet aid in ending the war. Other neutral nations, like Switzerland, Sweden, and the Vatican City were known to be willing to play a role in making peace, but they were so small they could not have done more than deliver the Allies' terms of surrender and Japan's acceptance or rejection. The Japanese hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with the Western Allies.
Attempts to deal with the Soviet Union
On June 30, Togo told Naotake Sato, Japan's ambassador in Moscow, to try to establish "firm and lasting relations of friendship". Sato was to discuss the status of Manchuria and "any matter the Russians would like to bring up". Sato finally met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on July 11 but without result. On July 12, Togo directed Sato to tell the Soviets that,
"His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."
The Emperor proposed sending Prince Konoe as a Special Envoy, though he would be unable to reach Moscow before the Potsdam Conference.
Sato advised Togo that in reality, "unconditional surrender or terms closely equivalent thereto" was all that Japan could expect. Moreover Togo's messages were not "clear about the views of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war," questioning whether Togo's initiative was supported by the key elements of Japan's power structure.
On July 17, Togo responded,
"Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ... Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."
In reply, Sato clarified,
"It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the Imperial House]."
On July 21, speaking in the name of the cabinet, Togo repeated,
"With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."
American cryptographers had broken most of Japan's codes, including the Purple code used by the Japanese Foreign Office to encode high-level diplomatic correspondence. As a result, messages between Tokyo and Japan's embassies were provided to Allied policy-makers nearly as quickly as to the intended recipients.
Soviet approach
Security concerns dominated the Soviet dealings concerning the Far East. Chief among these concerns was gaining unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline — Vladivostok in particular — could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin island and the Kurile Islands. Acquiring these territories, thus guarenteeing free access to the Soya Strait, was their primary objective. Secondary objectives were leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, Southern Manchuria Railway, Dairen, and Port Arthur..
To this end, Stalin and Molotov and strung out the negotiations with the Japanese, giving them false hope of a Soviet-mediated peace. At the same time, in their dealings with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, re-affirmed at the Yalta Conference, that the Allies would not accept separate or conditional peace with Japan - the Japanese would be forced to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets opposed any attempt to weaken this requirement, in order to prolong the war. This would give the Soviets time to transfer their troops to the Pacific theatre, and conquer Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and possibly Hokkaido.
Potsdam Declaration
On July 26, the United States, Britain, and China released the Potsdam Declaration, announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." For Japan, the terms of the declaration specified:
- the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
- the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
- "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be stripped of her pre-war empire, including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.
- "The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed"
- "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"
On the other hand, the declaration offered that:
- "We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
- "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
- "The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
The only mention of "unconditional surrender" came at the end of the declaration:
- "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Whether the Emperor was of one those who had "misled the people of Japan", or even a war criminal—or potentially part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" was left unstated.
On July 27, the Japanese government considered how to respond to the Declaration. The four military members of the Big Six wanted to reject it, but Togo persuaded the cabinet not to do so until he could get a reaction from the Soviets. In a telegram, Shunichi Kase, Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments—"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points." The next day, Japanese newspapers reported that the Declaration, the text of which had been broadcast and dropped on leaflets into Japan, had been rejected. In an attempt to manage public perception, Prime Minister Suzuki met with the press, and stated,
"I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war".
The meaning of the word mokusatsu, literally "kill with silence", is not precise; it can range from 'ignore' to 'treat with contempt'—which actually described fairly accurately the range of effective reactions within the government. However, Suzuki's statement, particularly its final sentence, leaves little room for misinterpretation and was taken as a rejection by the press, both in Japan and abroad, and no further statement was made in public or through diplomatic channels to alter this understanding.
On July 30, Ambassador Sato wrote that Stalin was probably talking to the Western Allies about his dealings with Japan.
"There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent Russia's participation in the war. ... Your way of looking at things and the actual condition in the Soviet Union may be seen as being completely contradictory."
On August 2, Togo wrote to Sato,
" ... However, it should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."
Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki
August 6 : Hiroshima
On the morning of August 6, confused reports reached Tokyo that the city of Hiroshima in southwest Honshu had been the target of an air raid, which had leveled the city with a "blinding flash and violent blast". Later, U.S. President Harry S. Truman's broadcast was received, announcing the first use of an atomic bomb, and promising
"We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war. It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth..."
At first, some refused to believe the Americans had built an atomic bomb. The Japanese knew enough about the potential process to know how very difficult it was (and the fact that both their Army and Navy had independent atomic-bomb programs had further complicated their own efforts). Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the Americans had made one, they could not have many more. More detailed reports of the unprecedented scale of the destruction at Hiroshima were received, but two days passed before the government met to consider the changed situation.
August 8–9 : Soviet invasion and Nagasaki
At 04:00 on August 9, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the Neutrality Pact, declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. Although these "twin shocks"—the atomic bombing and the Soviet entry—had immediate profound effects on Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, who concurred that the government must end the war at once, the senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace. Hirohito told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."
The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Togo Shigenori said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to propose something — they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances. In the middle of the meeting, shortly after 11:00, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyushu, had been hit by a second atomic bomb. By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Togo, and Admiral Yonai favored Togo's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.
Imperial Intervention, Allied response, and Japanese Reply
The full cabinet met on 14:30 on August 9, and spent most of the day debating surrender. Like the Big Six before then, they split, with neither Togo's position nor Anami's attracting a majority. Anami shared with the other cabinet ministers that, under torture, a captured American B-29 pilot had told his interrogators that the Americans possessed 100 atom bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto would be bombed "in the next few days". (The pilot, Marcus McDilda, was lying. He knew nothing of the Manhattan project, and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear in order to end the torture. The lie, which caused him to be classified as a high-priority prisoner, probably saved him from beheading. In actuality, the United States would have had at third bomb ready for use around August 19, and a fourth in September 1945. The third bomb would probably have been used against Tokyo.) The meeting adjorned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus.
Following this second meeting, Suzuki and Togo met with the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight on the night of August 9-10. Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the consensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, the president of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and its domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged. Finally, around 02:00 (August 10), Suzuki then addressed Emperor Hirohito, asking him to decide between the two positions. Although not recorded, from recollections of the participants, the Emperor's statement was:
"I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...
I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...
There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]
It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...
I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."
According to General Sumihisa Ikeda and Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina, Privy Council President Hiranuma Kiichiro then turned to the Emperor and asked him: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?"
Once the Emperor had left, Suzuki pushed the cabinet to accept the Emperor's will, which it did. Early that morning (August 10), the Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the Allies (by way of the Swiss government), announcing that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration but would not accept any peace conditions that would "prejudice the prerogatives" of the Emperor. That effectively meant no change in Japan's form of government — that the Emperor of Japan would remain a position of real power within the government.
August 12
The Allied response was written by James F. Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments, although the Soviets agreed only reluctantly. President Truman also ordered military operations (including the B-29 bombings) to continue until official word of Japanese surrender was received. However, news correspondents incorrectly interpreted a comment by Carl Andrew Spaatz that the B-29s were not flying on August 11 (because of bad weather) as a statement that a cease fire was in effect. In order to avoid giving the Japanese the impression that the Allies had abandoned peace efforts and resumed bombing, Truman ordered a halt to further bombings.
The Allied transmitted their response to the qualified acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 12. On the status of the Emperor it said,
"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ...The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.
At the following cabinet meeting, Suzuki argued that they must reject this and insist on an explicit guarantee for the Imperial system. Anami returned to his position that there be no occupation of Japan. Afterwards, Togo told Suzuki that there was no hope of getting better terms, and Kido conveyed the Emperor's will that Japan surrender. In a meeting with the Emperor, Yonai spoke of his concerns about growing civil unrest,
"I think the term is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, divine gifts. This way we don't have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances."
That day, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The Emperor simply replied "of course."
August 13–14
The Big Six and the cabinet spent August 13 debating their response to the Allied message, but remained deadlocked. At the suggestion of American Psychological operations experts, B-29s spent the day dropping leaflets over Japan, describing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response. Meanwhile, the Allies grew doubtful, waiting for the Japanese to respond. The Japanese had been instructed to reply with an unqualified acceptance in the clear, but had replied in code, which was taken as a qualified response. The Allies also detected increase diplomatic and military traffic, which was taken as evidence that the Japanese were preparing a "all-out banzai attack." President Truman ordered a resumption of military operations.
The leaflets had a profound affect on Japanese decision-making process. As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup. The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshall Shunroku Hata did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor requested that his military leaders cooperate with him in ending the war.
At conference with cabinet and other councillors, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu again made their case for continuing to fight, after which the Emperor said,
"I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead."
The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material pertaining to matters related to war crimes and the war responsibility of the nation's highest leaders. Immediately after the conference, the Foreign ministry transmitted orders to their embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied surrender. These orders were picked up and received in Washington at 02:49, August 14.
The text of the Imperial rescript was finalized by 19:00, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and brought to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with help from an NHK recording crew, recorded gramophone record of himself reading the Imperial rescript of Surrender. The record was given to court chamberlain Yoshihiro Tokugawa, who hid the record in a locker in the empress's secretary's office.
As the days passed following the Allied reply of August 12, the American high command grew progressively more pessimistic about the prospects for peace. Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity "so as to impress Japanese officials that we mean business and are serious in getting them to accept our peace proposals without delay." The United States Third Fleet began shelling the Japanese coast. In largest bombing raid of the Pacific War, more than 400 B-29s attack Japan during the day of August 14, and more than 300 that night. In the longest bombing mission of the war, B-29s from the 315 Bombardment Wing flew 3,800 miles to destroy the Nippon Oil Company refinery at Tsuchizaki on the northern tip of Honshu. This was the last operational refinery in the Japan home islands and produced 67% of their oil. Although after the war, the bombing raids were justified on the basis that they were already in progress when word of the Japanese surrender was received, this is only partially true.
Attempted military coup d’état (August 12–15)
Late on the night of August 12, 1945, Major Kenji Hatanaka, along with Lieutenant Colonels Masataka Ida, Masahiko Takeshita (Anami's brother-in-law), and Inaba Masao, and Colonel Okitsugu Arao, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, spoke to War Minister Korechika Anami (the army minister and "most powerful figure in Japan besides the Emperor himself"), hoping for his support, and asking him to do whatever he could to prevent acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. General Anami refused to say whether he would help the young officers in treason. As much as they needed his support, Hatanaka and the other rebels decided they had no choice but to continue planning and to attempt a coup d’état on their own. Hatanaka spent much of August 13 and the morning of August 14 gathering allies, seeking support from the higher-ups in the Ministry, and perfecting his plot.
Shortly after the conference on the night of August 13-14 at which the surrender was finally decided, a group of senior army officers including Anami gathered in a nearby room. All those present were concerned about the possibility of a coup d’état to prevent the surrender—some of those present may have even been considering launching one. After a silence, general Torashiro Kawabe proposed that all senior officers present sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender—"The Army will act in accordinance with the Imperial Decision to the last." It was signed by all the high ranking officers present, including Anami, Hajime Sugiyama, Yoshijiro Umezu, Kenji Doihara, Torashiro Kawabe, Masakazu Kawabe, and Tadaichi Wakamatsu. "This written accord by the most senior officers in the Army, in addition to Anami's announcement, acted as a formidable firebreak against any attempt to incite a coup d’état in Tokyo."
Around 21:30 on August 14, Hatanaka's rebels set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. However, Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Jiro Shiizaki, convinced the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, Colonel Haga Toyojiro, of their cause, by telling him (untruthfully) that the Anami, Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order.
Originally, Hatanaka hoped that by simply occupying the palace, by simply showing the beginnings of a rebellion, the rest of the Army would be inspired and would rise up against the move to surrender. This philosophy guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. At about the same time, General Anami committed seppuku, leaving a message that, "I—with my death—humbly apologize to the Emperor for the great crime." Whether the crime involved losing the war, or the coup, remains unclear.
At some time after 01:00, Hatanaka and his men surrounded the palace. Hatanaka, Lt. Col. Shiizaki and Captain Shigetaro Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. General Takeshi Mori to ask him to join the coup. Mori was in a meeting with his brother-in-law, Michinori Shiraishi. Mori's cooperation, as commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, was crucial to the coup. When Mori refused to side with Hatanaka, Hatanaka killed him, fearing Mori would order the Guards to stop the rebellion. Uehara killed Shiraishi. These were the only two murders of the night. Hatanaka then used General Mori's official stamp to authorize Imperial Guards Division Strategic Order No. 584, a false set of orders created by his co-conspirators, which would greatly increase the strength of the forces occupying the Imperial Palace and Imperial Household Ministry, and "protecting" the Emperor.
The palace police were disarmed and all the entrances blocked. Over the course of the night, Hatanaka's rebels captured and detained eighteen people, including Ministry staff, and NHK workers sent to record the surrender speech.
The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for Imperial House Minister Sotaro Ishiwatari, Lord of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido, and the recordings of the surrender speech. The two men were hiding in the "bank vault", a large chamber underneath the Imperial Palace The search was made more difficult by a blackout, caused by Allied bombings, and by the archaic organization and layout of the Imperial House Ministry. Many of the rooms' names were unrecognizable to the rebels. The rebels did find the chamberlain Tokugawa. Though Hatanaka threatened to disembowel him with a samurai sword, Tokugawa lied and told them he did not know where the recordings or men were. During their search, the rebels cut nearly all of the telephone wires, severing communications between their prisoners on the palace grounds and the outside world.
At about the same time, in Yokohama, another group of Hatanaka's rebels led by Captain Takeo Sasaki went to Prime Minister Suzuki's office, intent on killing him. When they found it empty, they machine gunned the office and set the building on fire, then left to go to his home. Hisatsune Sakomizu warned Suzuki, and he escaped minutes before the would-be assassins arrived. After setting fire to Suzuki's home, they went to the estate of Kiichiro Hiranuma in order to assassinate him. Hiranuma escaped through a side gate, and the rebels burned his house as well. Suzuki spent the rest of August under police protection, spending each night in a different bed.
Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed by lieutenant colonel Masataka Ida that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to stop him, and that he should simply give up. Finally, seeing his plan crumbling to pieces around him, Hatanaka tried to plead with Tatsuhiko Takashima, Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, to be given at least ten minutes on the air on NHK radio. He wanted to explain to the people of Japan what he was trying to accomplish and why. He was refused. Colonel Haga, commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, discovered that the Army was not, in fact, in support of this rebellion, and he ordered Hatanaka to leave the palace grounds.
Just before 05:00, as his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to NHK studios, and, brandishing a pistol, tried desperately to get some airtime to explain his actions. A little over an hour later, after receiving a phone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally gave up. He gathered his officers and walked out of the NHK studio.
At dawn, Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded. He went there, and confronted the rebellious officers, berating them for acting contrary to the spirit of the Japanese army. He convinced them to return to their barracks.
By 08:00, the rebellion was entirely dismantled, having succeeded in holding the palace grounds for much of the night but ultimately failing to find the recordings.
Hatanaka, on a motorcycle, and Lt. Col. Shiizaki on horseback, rode through the streets, tossing leaflets that explained their motives and their actions. Within an hour before the Emperor's broadcast, sometime around 11:00, August 15, Major Hatanaka placed his pistol to his forehead, and shot himself. Shiizaki stabbed himself with a dagger, and then shot himself. In Hatanaka's pocket was found his death poem: "I have nothing to regret now that the dark clouds have disappeared from the reign of the Emperor."
Surrender
Broadcast of the Imperial rescript on surrender
At 12:00 noon Japan standard time on August 15, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, the Gyokuon-hoso (Imperial Rescript on Surrender), was broadcast:
"... Despite the best that has been done by everyone — the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people — the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.
The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable."
The low quality of the recording, combined with the archaic Japanese dialect used by the Emperor in the rescript, made the recording very difficult to understand for most listeners.
Japan's forces were still at war against the Soviets and Chinese, so managing their cease-fire and surrender was difficult.
The Soviet Union continued to fight until early September, taking the Kuril Islands.
Occupation and surrender ceremony
Allied civilians and servicemen alike rejoiced at the news of the end of the war. Alfred Eisenstaedt took a famous picture, V–J day in Times Square, of an American sailor kissing a woman in Times Square. In Australia, a similarly joyful photograph of the Dancing Man was taken. August 14 and 15 are celebrated as VJ Day in many Allied countries.
On August 28, the occupation of Japan began, led by by Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Douglas MacArthur. Investigations into Japanese war crimes began quickly. Legal procedures for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East were issued on January 19, 1946.
The formal surrender occurred on September 2, when representatives from the Empire of Japan signed Japanese Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo Bay aboard the . Japanese forces in South East Asia followed suit on September 12, 1945 in Singapore. Flying on the Missouri that day were two American flags — the one that flew over Pearl Harbor on the day it was attacked, and the one flown on the USS Powhatan by Matthew C. Perry in 1853 when forced the Japanese to open the country to foreigners.
Further surrenders and continued Japanese military resistance
Following the signing of the instrument of surrender many further surrender ceremonies took place across Japan's remaining holdings in the Pacific. It was not until 1947 that all prisoners held by the Western allies were repatriated. As late as April 1949, China still held more than 60,000 Japanse prisoners. Some, such as Shozo Tominaga, were not repatriated until the late 1950s.
The logistical demands of the surrender were formidable. After Japan's capitulation, over 5,400,000 Japanese soldiers and 1,800,000 Japanese sailors were taken prisoner by the Allies.. The damage done to Japan's infrastructure, combined with a severe famine in 1946, further complicated the Allied efforts to feed the Japanese POWs and civilians.
Some Japanese holdouts, especially on small Pacific Islands, refused to surrender at all (believing the declaration to be propaganda or considering the act too much against their code). Some may never have heard of it. Teruo Nakamura, the last known survivor, emerged from his hidden retreat in Indonesia in December 1974, while two other Japanese soldiers, who had joined communist guerillas at the end of the war, fought in southern Thailand until 1991.
Footnotes
Texts
- Ford, Daniel, . Air&Space Smithsonian, September 1995: 74-81*
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