Stanislav Petrov
Encyclopedia
On September 26, 1983 the Nuclear Early Warning System of the Soviet Union
twice reported the launch of American Minuteman ICBMs from bases in the United States
. These missile attack warnings were correctly identified as a false alarm
by Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, an officer of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. This decision may have prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States
and its Western allies. Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had malfunctioned.
Larry McDonald
.
which housed the command center of the Soviet early warning system, code-named Oko. Petrov's responsibilities included observing the satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any impending nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union. If notification was received from the early warning systems that inbound missiles had been detected, the Soviet Union's strategy was an immediate nuclear counter-attack against the United States
(launch on warning
), specified in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction
.
Shortly after midnight, the bunker's computers reported that an intercontinental ballistic missile
was heading toward the Soviet Union from the U.S. Petrov considered the detection a computer error, since a United States first-strike nuclear attack would be likely to involve hundreds of simultaneous missile launches in order to disable any Soviet means for a counterattack. Furthermore, the satellite system's reliability had been questioned in the past. Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm
, though accounts of the event differ as to whether he notified his superiors or not after he concluded that the computer detections were false and that no missile had been launched. Later, the computers identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed towards the Soviet Union. Petrov again suspected that the computer system was malfunctioning, despite having no other source of information to confirm his suspicions. The Soviet Union's land radar
was incapable of detecting missiles beyond the horizon
, and waiting for it to positively identify the threat would limit the Soviet Union's response time to minutes.
Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov declared the system's indications a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarms had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbit
s, an error later corrected by cross-referencing a geostationary satellite.
Petrov later indicated the influences in this decision included: that he was informed a U.S. strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start, that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy, and that ground radars failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay.
, then commander of the Soviet Air Defense's Missile Defense Units, who was the first to hear Petrov's report of the incident (and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s), states that Petrov's "correct actions" were "duly noted." Petrov himself states he was initially praised by Votintsev and was promised a reward, but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper filing of paperwork with the pretext he had not described the incident in the military diary.
The incident became known publicly in the 1990s following the publication of Gen. Votintsev's memoirs. Widespread media reports since then have increased public awareness of Petrov's actions.
There is some confusion as to precisely what Petrov's military role was in this incident. Petrov, as an individual, was not in a position where he could have single-handedly launched any of the Soviet missile arsenal. Instead Petrov's sole duty was to monitor satellite surveillance equipment and report missile attack warnings up the chain of command where, ultimately, the top Soviet leadership would have decided whether to launch a "retaliatory" attack against the West. Whether to launch an attack was not Petrov's decision to make. His role, however, was crucial in the process of making that decision. According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate, formerly with the Center for Defense Information, "The top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would make a decision to retaliate."
Bruce Blair, an expert on Cold War
nuclear strategies, now president of the World Security Institute
in Washington, D.C., says the U.S.–Soviet relationship at that time "had deteriorated to the point where the Soviet Union as a system — not just the Kremlin
, not just Soviet leader Yuri Andropov
, not just the KGB
— but as a system, was geared to expect an attack and to retaliate very quickly to it. It was on hair-trigger alert. It was very nervous and prone to mistakes and accidents. The false alarm that happened on Petrov's watch could not have come at a more dangerous, intense phase in U.S.–Soviet relations." In an interview televised in the United States Blair said, "The Russians saw a U.S. government preparing for a first strike, headed by a President
capable of ordering a first strike." Regarding the incident involving Petrov, he said, "I think that this is the closest we've come to accidental nuclear war."
Oleg Kalugin
, a former KGB chief of foreign counterintelligence who knew Andropov well, says that Andropov's distrust of American leaders was profound. It is conceivable that if Petrov had declared the satellite warnings valid, such an erroneous report could have provoked the Soviet leadership into becoming bellicose. Kalugin says, "The danger was in the Soviet leadership thinking, 'The Americans may attack, so we better attack first.'"
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union , officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , was a constitutionally socialist state that existed in Eurasia between 1922 and 1991....
twice reported the launch of American Minuteman ICBMs from bases in the United States
United States
The United States of America is a federal constitutional republic comprising fifty states and a federal district...
. These missile attack warnings were correctly identified as a false alarm
False alarm
A false alarm, also called a nuisance alarm, is the fake report of an emergency, causing unnecessary panic and/or bringing resources to a place where they are not needed. Over time, repeated false alarms in a certain area may cause occupants to start to ignore all alarms, knowing that each time it...
by Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, an officer of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. This decision may have prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States
United States
The United States of America is a federal constitutional republic comprising fifty states and a federal district...
and its Western allies. Investigation of the satellite warning system later confirmed that the system had malfunctioned.
Background
The incident occurred at a time of severely strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only three weeks earlier, the Soviet military had shot down a South Korean passenger jet, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, that had entered into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 people on board. Many Americans were killed, including U.S. congressmanUnited States Congress
The United States Congress is the bicameral legislature of the federal government of the United States, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Congress meets in the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C....
Larry McDonald
Larry McDonald
Lawrence Patton McDonald, M.D. was an American politician and a member of the United States House of Representatives, representing the seventh congressional district of Georgia as a Democrat...
.
1983 incident
On 26 September 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defence Forces, was the officer on duty at the Serpukhov-15 bunker near MoscowMoscow
Moscow is the capital, the most populous city, and the most populous federal subject of Russia. The city is a major political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation centre of Russia and the continent...
which housed the command center of the Soviet early warning system, code-named Oko. Petrov's responsibilities included observing the satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any impending nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union. If notification was received from the early warning systems that inbound missiles had been detected, the Soviet Union's strategy was an immediate nuclear counter-attack against the United States
United States
The United States of America is a federal constitutional republic comprising fifty states and a federal district...
(launch on warning
Launch on warning
Launch on warning is a strategy of nuclear weapon retaliation that gained recognition during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles , launch on warning became an integral part of mutually assured destruction theory...
), specified in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction
Mutual assured destruction
Mutual Assured Destruction, or mutually assured destruction , is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of high-yield weapons of mass destruction by two opposing sides would effectively result in the complete, utter and irrevocable annihilation of...
.
Shortly after midnight, the bunker's computers reported that an intercontinental ballistic missile
Intercontinental ballistic missile
An intercontinental ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a long range typically designed for nuclear weapons delivery...
was heading toward the Soviet Union from the U.S. Petrov considered the detection a computer error, since a United States first-strike nuclear attack would be likely to involve hundreds of simultaneous missile launches in order to disable any Soviet means for a counterattack. Furthermore, the satellite system's reliability had been questioned in the past. Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm
False alarm
A false alarm, also called a nuisance alarm, is the fake report of an emergency, causing unnecessary panic and/or bringing resources to a place where they are not needed. Over time, repeated false alarms in a certain area may cause occupants to start to ignore all alarms, knowing that each time it...
, though accounts of the event differ as to whether he notified his superiors or not after he concluded that the computer detections were false and that no missile had been launched. Later, the computers identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed towards the Soviet Union. Petrov again suspected that the computer system was malfunctioning, despite having no other source of information to confirm his suspicions. The Soviet Union's land radar
Radar
Radar is an object-detection system which uses radio waves to determine the range, altitude, direction, or speed of objects. It can be used to detect aircraft, ships, spacecraft, guided missiles, motor vehicles, weather formations, and terrain. The radar dish or antenna transmits pulses of radio...
was incapable of detecting missiles beyond the horizon
Horizon
The horizon is the apparent line that separates earth from sky, the line that divides all visible directions into two categories: those that intersect the Earth's surface, and those that do not. At many locations, the true horizon is obscured by trees, buildings, mountains, etc., and the resulting...
, and waiting for it to positively identify the threat would limit the Soviet Union's response time to minutes.
Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov declared the system's indications a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarms had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbit
Molniya orbit
Molniya orbit is a type of highly elliptical orbit with an inclination of 63.4 degrees, an argument of perigee of -90 degree and an orbital period of one half of a sidereal day...
s, an error later corrected by cross-referencing a geostationary satellite.
Petrov later indicated the influences in this decision included: that he was informed a U.S. strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start, that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy, and that ground radars failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay.
Aftermath
Petrov underwent intense questioning by his superiors about his actions. Initially, he was praised for his decision. Gen. Yury VotintsevYury Votintsev
General Yuriy Vsyevolodich Votintsev is a retired commander of the Soviet Air Defense's Missile Defense Units...
, then commander of the Soviet Air Defense's Missile Defense Units, who was the first to hear Petrov's report of the incident (and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s), states that Petrov's "correct actions" were "duly noted." Petrov himself states he was initially praised by Votintsev and was promised a reward, but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper filing of paperwork with the pretext he had not described the incident in the military diary.
The incident became known publicly in the 1990s following the publication of Gen. Votintsev's memoirs. Widespread media reports since then have increased public awareness of Petrov's actions.
There is some confusion as to precisely what Petrov's military role was in this incident. Petrov, as an individual, was not in a position where he could have single-handedly launched any of the Soviet missile arsenal. Instead Petrov's sole duty was to monitor satellite surveillance equipment and report missile attack warnings up the chain of command where, ultimately, the top Soviet leadership would have decided whether to launch a "retaliatory" attack against the West. Whether to launch an attack was not Petrov's decision to make. His role, however, was crucial in the process of making that decision. According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate, formerly with the Center for Defense Information, "The top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would make a decision to retaliate."
Analysts' views
Some Cold War analysts question whether the Soviet Union's standard protocol requiring multiple-source warnings would have been strictly followed in the case of the missile attack warning involving Petrov.Bruce Blair, an expert on Cold War
Cold War
The Cold War was the continuing state from roughly 1946 to 1991 of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition between the Communist World—primarily the Soviet Union and its satellite states and allies—and the powers of the Western world, primarily the United States...
nuclear strategies, now president of the World Security Institute
World Security Institute
The World Security Institute is an American think tank committed to independent research and journalism on global affairs. Based in Washington, DC, it emerged from the Center for Defense Information, which now exists in a research capacity as a component of the larger organization.The Institute's...
in Washington, D.C., says the U.S.–Soviet relationship at that time "had deteriorated to the point where the Soviet Union as a system — not just the Kremlin
Kremlin
A kremlin , same root as in kremen is a major fortified central complex found in historic Russian cities. This word is often used to refer to the best-known one, the Moscow Kremlin, or metonymically to the government that is based there...
, not just Soviet leader Yuri Andropov
Yuri Andropov
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was a Soviet politician and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 12 November 1982 until his death fifteen months later.-Early life:...
, not just the KGB
KGB
The KGB was the commonly used acronym for the . It was the national security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 until 1991, and was the premier internal security, intelligence, and secret police organization during that time.The State Security Agency of the Republic of Belarus currently uses the...
— but as a system, was geared to expect an attack and to retaliate very quickly to it. It was on hair-trigger alert. It was very nervous and prone to mistakes and accidents. The false alarm that happened on Petrov's watch could not have come at a more dangerous, intense phase in U.S.–Soviet relations." In an interview televised in the United States Blair said, "The Russians saw a U.S. government preparing for a first strike, headed by a President
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Wilson Reagan was the 40th President of the United States , the 33rd Governor of California and, prior to that, a radio, film and television actor....
capable of ordering a first strike." Regarding the incident involving Petrov, he said, "I think that this is the closest we've come to accidental nuclear war."
Oleg Kalugin
Oleg Kalugin
Oleg Danilovich Kalugin , is a former KGB general. He was a longtime head of KGB operations in the United States and later a critic of the agency.-Early life and the KGB career:...
, a former KGB chief of foreign counterintelligence who knew Andropov well, says that Andropov's distrust of American leaders was profound. It is conceivable that if Petrov had declared the satellite warnings valid, such an erroneous report could have provoked the Soviet leadership into becoming bellicose. Kalugin says, "The danger was in the Soviet leadership thinking, 'The Americans may attack, so we better attack first.'"
See also
- Vasiliy Arkhipov, for another nuclear war-averting incident during the Cuban Missile CrisisCuban Missile CrisisThe Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation among the Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States in October 1962, during the Cold War...
- Able Archer 83Able Archer 83Able Archer 83 was a ten-day NATO command post exercise starting on November 2, 1983 that spanned Western Europe, centred on the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Headquarters situated at Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons. Able Archer exercises simulated a period of conflict...
- NATO military exercise involving nuclear weapons that formed the backdrop for the nuclear war scare involving Petrov in November 1983 - Norwegian rocket incidentNorwegian rocket incidentThe Norwegian rocket incident refers to a few minutes of post-Cold War nuclear tension that took place on January 25, 1995, more than four years after the end of the Cold War...
- World War IIIWorld War IIIWorld War III denotes a successor to World War II that would be on a global scale, with common speculation that it would be likely nuclear and devastating in nature....
- Situations resulting in close encounters of a third world war.
External links
- BrightStarSound.com a tribute website, multiple pages with photos and reprints of various articles about Petrov
- Nuclear War: Minuteman
- The Nuclear War that Almost Happened in 1983 (posted 9-5-03)
- Armageddon Almost Not Averted
- World Citizen Award
- Wired.com Sept. 26, 1983: The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing