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Saratoga campaign
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The Saratoga campaign was a series of battles in 1777 during the American Revolutionary War for control of the Hudson River.
The campaign ended in the climactic Battles of Saratoga which resulted in the capture of the British Army under John Burgoyne. The American victory inspired France to enter the conflict on behalf of the Americans, providing money, soldiers and naval support.
he year's campaigns were winding down in the autumn of 1776, the British began to plan operations for the next year.
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The Saratoga campaign was a series of battles in 1777 during the American Revolutionary War for control of the Hudson River.
The campaign ended in the climactic Battles of Saratoga which resulted in the capture of the British Army under John Burgoyne. The American victory inspired France to enter the conflict on behalf of the Americans, providing money, soldiers and naval support.
British strategy
As the year's campaigns were winding down in the autumn of 1776, the British began to plan operations for the next year. (European armies at the time were typically inactive during the winter months). There were two main armies in North America to work with: Sir Guy Carleton's army in Canada, which had successfully driven back the American invasion of 1775, and General William Howe's Army, which had driven George Washington's Army from New York City in the 1776 campaign.
Howe's plan to attack Philadelphia
On November 30, 1776, Howe—the British commander-in-chief in North America—wrote to Lord Germain in England, outlining an ambitious plan for the 1777 campaign. Howe said that if Germain would send him substantial reinforcements, Howe could launch various offensives, including sending 10,000 men up the Hudson River to take Albany, New York. Then, in the autumn, Howe could gather his troops and capture the rebel capital of Philadelphia. Howe soon changed his mind after writing this letter: any reinforcements would probably arrive too late, and the retreat of the Continental Army over the winter of 1776 made Philadelphia an increasingly vulnerable target. Therefore, Howe decided that in the 1777 campaign, Philadelphia should be captured before diverting any troops to Albany. Howe sent Germain this revised plan, which Germain received on February 23, 1777.
Burgoyne's plan to capture Albany
Meanwhile, General Burgoyne was in London trying to get appointed to an independent command in North America. He brought up a plan that had been discussed by various British generals since 1775: an attempt to divide the American colonies by an invasion from the province of Quebec. This had already been attempted by General Carleton in 1776, although he had stopped short of a full scale invasion. Carleton had been heavily criticized in London for not taking more advantage of the American retreat from Canada, and he was out of favor with Germain, which meant that Burgoyne was in a good position to get command of the 1777 Canadian campaign.
When asked to submit a plan, Burgoyne outlined the strategy in a paper entitled "Thoughts for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada", and submitted it to Lord Germain on February 28, 1777. The plan was approved with modifications. Burgoyne won appointment as leader of the expedition, beating out General Henry Clinton, who was also in Britain trying to get an independent command of his own. (As consolation, Clinton was given a knighthood, but otherwise he had to continue serving as General Howe's second-in-command.) Burgoyne was so confident of his success that he bet a friend 50 guineas that he would return victorious within one year.
Burgoyne's invasion from Canada had two components: he would lead the main force of about 10,000 men along Lake Champlain towards Albany while a second column of about 2,000 men, led by Barry St. Leger, would move down the Mohawk River valley in a strategic diversion. Both expeditions would converge upon Albany, where they would link up with troops from Howe's army.
This last point proved to be the most controversial part of the campaign: Germain approved Burgoyne's plan after having received Howe's letter which stated that Howe would not be able to support the northern Army until late in the year, after the capture of Philadelphia. Whether Germain told Burgoyne, who was still in London at that time, about Howe's revised plans is unclear, while some sources claim he did others state that Burgoyne was not notified of the changes until the campaign was well underway . Whether Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne had the same expectations about the degree to which Howe was supposed to support the invasion from Canada is also unclear. Some have argued that Howe failed to follow instructions and essentially abandoned Burgoyne's Army; others suggest that Burgoyne failed on his own and then tried to shift the blame to Howe and Clinton. What is clear is that Germain either left his generals with too much latitude, or without a clearly defined overall strategy.
Burgoyne returned to Quebec on May 6, 1777, bearing a letter from Lord Germain which introduced the plan but lacked some details. This produced another of the conflicts of command that plagued the British throughout the war. Nominally, Lieutenant General Burgoyne outranked Major General Carleton, but Carleton was still the governor of Canada. Carleton refused Burgoyne's request for enough Canadian troops to garrison Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga. He also required Burgoyne to leave some of his regular forces as a Canadian garrison. By June, all was ready, and the troops began moving.
Campaign
Burgoyne's expedition begins
Burgoyne began his assault on Albany in June 1777. He planned to go south through the lakes and Hudson River valley towards Albany. By June 13, he had assembled his forces at St. Johns.
He expected no repeat of last season's delay at Valcour Island since he had an overpowering naval force. Besides last year's five sailing ships, a sixth had been built and three had been captured from Benedict Arnold after the Battle of Valcour Island. Besides these, he had 28 armed barges or gun boats and a large fleet of canoes and bateaux (flat-bottomed boats) for transportation.
His army had about 7,800 men and over 130 artillery pieces ranging from light mortars to 24 pound (11 kg) pieces. His regulars were organized into two divisions. Major General William Phillips led the 3,700 British Regulars on the right, while Major General Riedesel's 3,000 Brunswickers held the left. His regular troops started out in good condition but were poorly equipped for wilderness fighting.
Fort Ticonderoga
Moving down Lake Champlain, Burgoyne's combination of naval, artillery, and infantry forces seemed sufficient to overwhelm any American defense. American General Philip Schuyler had agreed that Fort Ticonderoga probably could not be held against this force. But he ordered General Arthur St. Clair to make the first American defense there and to hold out as long as possible before withdrawing. On June 24, Burgoyne took Crown Point without opposition. He strengthened its defenses and began construction of a magazine, or supply depot, to support his attack on Fort Ticonderoga.
Burgoyne and Schuyler both expected the taking of Ticonderoga to be a major operation. But the British found a way to get artillery onto the hilltop known as Sugar Loaf overlooking the Fort. St. Clair managed to withdraw at night, and Burgoyne's men occupied the main fortification and the Mt. Independence works on July 6. Although a later investigation cleared both Schuyler and St. Clair of any wrongdoing in this surrender, it did cause the Continental Congress to replace Schuyler with General Horatio Gates as commander in the Northern Department of the Continental Army.
Battles of Hubbardton and Fort Ann
After losing Ticonderoga, St. Clair's force withdrew. Burgoyne sent forces out from his main body to pursue them. They caught up with elements of the retreating Americans at least three times. The major incident was the Battle of Hubbardton, while others occurred at Fort Anne and Skenesboro. In aggregate, these actions cost the Americans about 50% more losses as those of the British forces. Still, St. Clair brought most of his men out safely to join with General Schuyler at Fort Edward, and the Americans proved they were still capable of standing up to the British regulars. Burgoyne's advance seized Fort Ann on July 7, while his main force landed at Skenesboro on July 8.
The campaign so far had been mainly a British success, but now things began to go wrong. Burgoyne had taken some losses, and even if the 220 men killed or wounded were minor for his accomplishments, they weakened the invasion. He had left 400 men to garrison the magazine at Crown Point and another 900 to defend Ticonderoga. He could have returned to Fort Ticonderoga and then sailed to the south end of Lake George, but this might appear to be a withdrawal. He made the fatal mistake of deciding to proceed overland to Fort Edward. He thought he would need his artillery and supply train to keep enough firepower to avoid a repeat of the kind of losses taken at Bunker Hill.
Schuyler and St. Clair meanwhile decided to make this passage as difficult as possible. Their main weapon in this phase of the campaign was the axe; it was much easier to fell large trees in the enemy's path than to remove them after they are down, so this would draw out the march, tire the troops and use up supplies. When Benedict Arnold joined them on July 24, he gratefully supported their plan before being sent west to stop St. Leger at Stanwix. The tactic worked well because Burgoyne had to build a road through the wilderness for his guns. His progress was reduced to about one mile (1.5 km) per day. He occupied Fort Edward on July 29 with no major battles. Schuyler had withdrawn to Stillwater, New York, and the Americans were prepared to repeat the tactic of delay from Fort Edward to Saratoga.
Battles of Fort Stanwix and Oriskany
Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger sailed up the St. Lawrence and crossed Lake Ontario to arrive at Oswego without incident. He had about 300 regulars, supported by 650 Canadian and Tory militia, and they were joined by 1,000 Indians led by John Butler and the Iroquois war chiefs Sayenqueraghta and Cornplanter. Leaving Oswego on July 25 they marched to lay siege to Fort Stanwix on the Mohawk River. About 800 Revolutionary militiamen and their Indian allies marched to relieve the siege, but they were ambushed and scattered by British and Indians on August 6 at the Battle of Oriskany. Iroquois warriors fought on both sides of the battle, marking the beginning of a civil war within the Six Nations.
On August 10, Benedict Arnold had left Stillwater, New York, with 800 men of the Continental Army from Schuyler's Northern Department. He expected to use local militia from the neighborhood of Fort Dayton, which he reached on August 21. Arnold could only raise about 100 militia, so he resorted to subterfuge. He sent agents and staged the escape of a captive, who informed St. Leger that Arnold was coming with a large force.
On this news, Joseph Brant and the rest of St. Leger's Indians withdrew. They took most of his remaining supplies with them, and the expedition was forced to head back through Oswego to Canada. Arnold sent a detachment after them, and turned the rest of his force east to support the American forces at the Battle of Saratoga. St. Leger's expedition retreated through Canada and arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on September 27 to support Burgoyne.
Battle of Bennington
The delaying tactics established by Schuyler, St. Clair, and Arnold had succeeded in several ways. British General Burgoyne was not ready to force the issue and had to leave more men in his rear to secure his lines of communication. His Indian allies became impatient and began more raids on frontier families and settlements. These increased rather than reduced American resistance. The death of Tory settler Jane McCrea served as a catalyst for rebel support in the area. Each day that went by, the Americans gained strength as militia units and even individuals arrived. Schuyler sent Benedict Arnold west to relieve Fort Stanwix and used the time to have Thaddeus Kosciusko build defenses on the Bemis Heights between Saratoga and Albany to block Burgoyne from his objective.
The death of Jane McCrea and the Battle of Bennington had another important effect. Burgoyne blamed his Indian and Canadian allies for her death, and even after the Indians had lost 80 of their numbers at Bennington, Burgoyne had shown no gratitude toward them. The Indians began to leave the British side. As such, Charles Langlade and Saint Luc de La Corne, their Canadian leader, had no choice but to leave with them. Burgoyne was left with no protection in the woods against the American rangers. After the war Burgoyne blamed La Corne for deserting him. La Corne replied to him that he never respected the Indians. In the British Parliament, Lord Germain was on La Corne's side. Both Langlade and La Corne had been major contributors to prior victories in the region (Braddock's defeat 1755, Fort Williams-Henry 1757, Oswego 1756).
Burgoyne was running low on supplies, most specifically horses to work on his road and light armaments. Fearing future problems, he decided to send out detachments to forage for supplies. Since the Hessian dragoons suffered most from a lack of horses, he sent Colonel Friedrich Baum's regiment into western Massachusetts and New Hampshire, along with the Brunswick dragoons, and gave his main body a few days of rest. The detachment never returned, and the reinforcements he sent after them came back ravaged from the Battle of Bennington, fought on August 16, which deprived Burgoyne of nearly 1,000 men and the much-needed supplies.
While the tactic of delay worked well in the field, the result in the Continental Congress was a different matter. General Horatio Gates was in Philadelphia when Congress discussed their shock at the fall of Ticonderoga, and Gates was more than willing to help assign the blame to reluctant generals. Some in the Congress had already been impatient with General George Washington, wanting a large, direct confrontation that might eliminate occupation forces but which Washington feared would probably lose the war. John Adams, the head of the War Committee, praised Gates and remarked that "we shall never hold a post until we shoot a general." Over the objections of the New York delegation, Congress sent Gates to take command of the Northern Department.
Battles of Saratoga
The "Battle of Saratoga" entered American history as a single event. Actually, it was a month long series of maneuvers punctuated by two battles. General Burgoyne had paused in Saratoga, New York, to await word of Howe's and St. Leger's forces and rest after his difficult passage through the wilderness. Facing supply problems and realizing that no help was coming, he had to take the offensive. He crossed to the west bank of the Hudson by a pontoon bridge about eight miles (13 km) south of Saratoga and two miles (3 km) north of the heights being fortified by the Americans.
General Gates arrived at the developing works on the Bemis Heights and took command on 19 August. He was cold and arrogant in manner, and he refused to give Schuyler any subordinate command, so Schuyler resigned the next day. Gates did endorse Schuyler and Arnold's general plan, and Kosciuko continued his work on the fortifications.
Benedict Arnold returned on August 24 and was surprised to find Gates in command. Their disagreements started almost immediately. Arnold wanted to use the fortification as a redoubt, sallying out to attack from the cover of woods—a tactic that favored the Americans—and falling back to the fort as needed. While Gates had some cannons from the French, General Burgoyne's firepower greatly outclassed the Americans, and the British and Hessian forces were adept at siegecraft.
Except for cannon, the forces were relatively balanced. Burgoyne was down to about 7,000 men, while Gates had the Continental Army reinforcements sent by Washington and arriving militia to total about 8,000 men. Gates put Arnold in command of his left division, farthest from the river. The right wing, under General Benjamin Lincoln, was held by militia and artillery that overlooked the river road. Gates himself commanded the center with the strongest Continental regiments.
Gates gave Arnold permission to send out reconnaissance. When Burgoyne finally moved on the American positions on September 19, Arnold precipitated the Battle of Freeman's Farm which stopped that advance. But when Arnold attempted to lead Enoch Poor's brigade in support of the attack, Gates ordered him back to headquarters, and the battle was not decisive. Burgoyne fell back and started his own fortifications behind a ravine about 3 miles (5 km) north of Bemis Heights.
After this battle, Gates took some of Arnold's regiments away to reinforce the center. Arnold offered his resignation but was stopped by a memorial signed by every line officer except General Lincoln. However, Gates removed him from command, so he was now attached to headquarters with no assignment. Lincoln's men, supported by militia, made an attack at Fort Ticonderoga, while American sharpshooters continued to harass the British positions.
Militia units continued to arrive as the American force swelled to over 10,000 men. With his supply lines threatened and his position becoming desperate, Burgoyne launched his next attack on October 7. With messengers riding in and out of headquarters and the sound of gunfire from Daniel Morgan and Henry Dearborn's regiments, Arnold paced at headquarters, ignored by Gates. Finally, he mounted and galloped towards the fight, with no orders. Gates sent a rider to order him back, but he never caught Arnold, who took charge in the Battle of Bemis Heights and drove the British back to their starting positions. Afterwards, it was General Gates who became known as the "Hero of Saratoga."
Surrender and the Convention Army
On October 8, Burgoyne withdrew to Saratoga. He and General Gates took a week to negotiate the terms of surrender. Burgoyne's Indian allies faded into the woods, and several loyalist units made it back to Canada. Gates was generous in the terms, which were called the "Saratoga Convention". Burgoyne was allowed to keep his colors, and his men marched out of their camp on October 17, 1777, to surrender their arms. The convention called for the return of his army to England.
But after the surrendered army marched to Massachusetts, the Congress decided not to honor the terms. The army was kept for some time in sparse camps throughout New England. Although individual officers were exchanged, most of the "Convention Army" was marched south to Virginia and remained prisoners for several years.
As Canadian and surviving British forces withdrew, the Americans regained Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point without incident.
Aftermath
The effect of Burgoyne's surrender was enormous. Revolutionary confidence and determination, suffering from Howe's successful occupation of Philadelphia, was renewed. Even more importantly, the victory encouraged France to enter the war against Britain. Spain and the Netherlands soon did the same. The loss also further weakened the current British government under Lord North. For the British, the war had now become much more complicated.
Assessment
The British blamed lack of coordination for the defeat. Lord George Germain was accused on failing to coordinate Burgoyne's offensive with the activities of General Howe's army. Instead of working towards a common objective, the two British armies pursued independent campaigns in 1777, with Howe conducting his Philadelphia campaign instead.
Further reading
- Bird, Harrison. March to Saratoga: General Burgoyne and the American Campaign, 1777. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Chidsey, Donald Barr. The War in the North: An Informal History of the American Revolution in and near Canada. New York: Crown, 1967.
- Elting, John R. The Battles of Saratoga. Phillip Freneau Press, 1977. ISBN 0-912480-13-0.
- Glover, Michael. General Burgoyne in Canada and America: Scapegoat for a System. London: Atheneum Publishers, 1976. ISBN 0-86033-013-3.
- Graymont, Barbara. The Iroquois in the American Revolution. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1972. ISBN 0-8156-0083-6; ISBN 0815601166 (paperback).
- Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. ISBN 0-300-04778-9. 1992 paperback: ISBN 0-300-05261-8.
- Murray, Stuart. The Honor of Command: General Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign. Images from the Past, 1998. ISBN 1-884592-03-1.
- Nickerson, Hoffman. The Turning Point of the Revolution: Burgoyne in America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928.
- Taylor, Alan. The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution. Knopf, 2006. ISBN 0-679-45471-3.
- Watt, Gavin. Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777. Dundurn, 2002. ISBN 1-55002-376-4.
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