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Operation Michael
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Operation Michael was a First World War German military operation that began the Spring Offensive on 21 March 1918. It was launched from the Hindenburg Line, in the vicinity of Saint-Quentin, France.
Its goal was to breakthrough the Allied lines and advance in a north-west direction and seize the Channel ports which supplied the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and drive the BEF into the sea. Just two days into the operation, Ludendorff changed his plan, and pushed for an offensive due west along the whole of the British front north of the somme.
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Encyclopedia
Operation Michael was a First World War German military operation that began the Spring Offensive on 21 March 1918. It was launched from the Hindenburg Line, in the vicinity of Saint-Quentin, France.
Its goal was to breakthrough the Allied lines and advance in a north-west direction and seize the Channel ports which supplied the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and drive the BEF into the sea. Just two days into the operation, Ludendorff changed his plan, and pushed for an offensive due west along the whole of the British front north of the somme. This was designed to separate the French and British Armies and crush the British forces by pushing them into the sea.
It ended at Villers-Bretonneux a little to the east of the key Allied communications centre of Amiens where the Entente managed to halt the German advance. The German advance stalled largely through very heavy casualties, an inability to maintain supply and the arrival of Entente reserves. Since much of the territory involved consisted of the shell-torn wilderness left by the 1916 Battle of the Somme it was known to some as the 1918 Battle of the Somme.
This marked the beginning of the end of the First World War. The arrival in France of large reinforcements from the United States replaced material and men lost by the Entente but the German Army was unable to recover from its losses before these reinforcements deployed. Operation Michael had failed to achieve its objectives, namely in separating the Allied Armies.
The second battle of the Somme started on 21 August.
Background
On 11 November 1917, the German High Command decided to make what they hoped would be a war winning attack on the Western Front the following Spring. Their target was the British Army who they believed were exhausted by the battles in 1917 at Arras, Messines, Passchendaele and Cambrai. At the start of 1918 the German people were close to starvation and growing tired of the war. General Erich Ludendorff, the German commander, realized that he had a small window of opportunity in which to win the war. By mid-February 1918, he had moved nearly 50 Divisions from the east following the Russian surrender at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which gave his forces a numerical advantage on the Western Front. Germany now had between 177 and 190 Divisions in France and Flanders, out of their total of 241. Of these, 110 were in the front line, including 50 which faced the short British front. A further 67 were in reserve, including 31 facing the BEF (British Expeditionary Force (World War I)). However, American soldiers were on their way to Europe. By May 1918 318,000 American soldiers would be in France and another million were to arrive before August. The German authorities knew their only realistic chance of victory was to defeat the Allies before the human and material resources of the United States could be deployed.
They, therefore, set in place plans for the 1918 Spring Offensive or Kaiserschlacht (Kaiser's Battle), a series of attacks that achieved the deepest advances along the Western Front by either side since 1914. There were four German attacks, codenamed Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau, and Blücher-Yorck. Ludendorff's first and main one, (Michael) was on the Somme There were subsequent diversionary attacks against the British at Lys and at Ypres which were planned to confuse his enemy and Blücher against the French in the Champagne region. Although British intelligence knew an operation was being prepared, this far reaching plan was much greater than Allied commanders ever envisaged. Ludendorff's aim was to cut through on the Somme, then wheel north-west to cut the British lines of communication behind the Artois fronts, cutting off the BEF in Flanders. This would draw forces away from the Channel ports that were essential for British supply and then the Germans could attack these ports and other lines of communication. The British army would be surrounded with no means of escape, which would lead to surrender. The thrust of this simple strategy was weakened and unbalanced during planning.
Tactically the German army adopted an approach that had succeeded on the Eastern Front, particularly at the Battle of Riga. They had developed elite units following Hutier tactics (after Oskar von Hutier) trained to infiltrate the enemy's front line. These stormtroopers (Stoßtruppen). were to lead the infantry attack, operating in groups that advanced quickly by exploiting gaps and weak defenses. The heavily defended areas would be dealt with by follow-up infantry units once they had been cut off from the rest of the British lines. The stormtroopers' tactic was to occupy territory rapidly so as to disrupt communication by attacking enemy headquarters, artillery units and supply depots in the rear. Each Division "creamed off" its best and fittest soldiers into these storm units, from which several new divisions were then formed. This process gave the German army an initial advantage in the attack but meant that the best troops would suffer disproportionately heavy casualties, while the quality of the men in reserve declined.
Such new infantry tactics demanded a corresponding change in artillery tactics. Gone was the massive bombardment of enemy infantry in the forward trenches which took away the element of surprise. Developed by Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, a German artillery officer, the Feuerwalze, was an artillery barrage concentrated on artillery and machine-gun positions, headquarters, telephone exchanges, railways and other important centers of communications. There were three phases to the bombardment: a brief attack on the enemy's command and communications, then destruction of their artillery and lastly an attack upon the enemy front-line infantry defenses. This was a very deep barrage designed to knock out the British ability to respond that lasted only a few hours before the infantry went in so as to retain surprise. Bruchmüller's tactics were made possible by the vast numbers of accurate heavy guns (well supplied with shells) which Germany had deployed all along the western front by 1918. They could launch an offensive at almost any point on the front without giving the Allies notice of their intentions by moving guns and shells to the sector.
The British and German lines before the battle
In early 1918 replying to this kind of attack posed many problems for the BEF. In the British lines morale was at a low point. The slaughter of the 1st Battle of the Somme, the atrocious conditions of Passchendaele and the disappointment of the counter-attack wiping out the early successes at Cambrai had all taken their toll in both manpower and morale. Britain had now been at war for over 3 years. The troops were sick and tired of monotonous rations and boredom in the trenches and sick to death with shell shock, mud and trench foot. The only major German offensive on the Western Front since the second Battle of Ypres in 1915 was against the French at Verdun, giving the British commanders little experience in defense. The successful development of a deep defense system of trench lines by the Germans during 1917 had lead the British to adopt this new and unfamiliar system. 'Defense in depth' required 3 lines: a front line, a battle zone and redoubt line and a rear line (though 'zone' is probably a better description than 'line'). The front line or "outpost zone" (later renamed the "forward zone") was backed up by the "battle zone", where an offensive was to be firmly resisted, and behind this was the "rear zone", where reserves were held ready to counter-attack or seal off penetrations. This reduced the proportion of troops in the front line, which was lightly held by snipers, patrols and machine-gun posts only, and in theory pulled reserves and supply dumps back beyond German artillery range. A British infantry division (with 9 infantry battalions) deployed 3 battalions in the outpost zone, 4 battalions in the battle zone and 2 battalions in the rear zone.
The Germans chose to attack the sector around St Quentin taken over by the British in April following the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in the Spring of 1917. The Prime Minister David Lloyd George had agreed to take over this area at the Boulogne Conference, against military advice, after which the British line was extended. In reality, this 'line', taken over from the French, barely existed, needing many man-hours of construction work to make it easily defendable. Unfortunately, sufficient man power was not available.
Germany had begun construction of the Siegfried Stellung (as they called the Hinderburg Line) in September 1916, during the battle of the Somme. It stretched from the Channel to the Moselle River. Over 300 miles long, designed by Col von Lossberg and built by Belgian and Russian prisoners, its strongest section was the salient at St. Quentin between Arras and Soissons. The line was the ultimate in “defense in depth” trench building. It was one mile deep with barbed wire in 50 foot zig-zag lines, protecting three lines, of trenches, interconnecting tunnels and strong points. In the rear were large concrete “stollen” holding reserves for a counter attack and the artillery was hidden on the reverse slopes of the line. The Germans withdrew to this line (Operation Alberich) over five weeks during which time German High Command ordered a 'scorched earth policy' and the ground abandoned in the retreat was laid waste, wells were poisoned, booby-trapped souvenirs were left behind, and villages such as Bapaume destroyed.
During the winter of 1917/18 the new British line was established in an arc around St Quentin by many small unit actions among the ruined villages in the area. This line differed from the rest of the British front as the line of trenches was not complete. There were many isolated outposts, gaps in the line and large areas of disputed territory and wasted land. These positions were slowly improved by attempting to implement (despite the manpower shortages) the new 3 zone tactic of ‘defense in depth’. The 1/1st Hertfordshire war diary, along with many other war diaries of battalions in the area, shows that the battalion was engaged in 'working parties' for much of January, February. and March, but whilst most of the redoubts in the battle zone were complete by March 1918, the rear zone was still under construction.
To add to these woes, the British Army had undergone a drastic reorganization to cope with the manpower shortages. A British infantry division was now 9 battalions strong, reduced from 4 to 3 per Brigade. To avoid disrupting the better battalions in the army, territorial battalions bore the brunt of these reorganizations, leaving the regulars much less affected. Given that some battalions, normally 1000 men strong; were down to below 500 men due to battle losses and sickness during the cold winter months, the new defenses were not only difficult to construct but where built they were then undermanned.
The attacking armies were spread along a 43 mile front between Arras, St. Quentin and La Fère. Ludendorff had assembled a force of 74 Divisions, 6600 artillery pieces, 3500 mortars and 326 fighter aircraft, which were split between Below’s 17th Army, Marwitz’s 2nd Army, (part of the Army Group commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht), General Oskar von Hutier Eighteenth Army, (part of the Army Group commanded by Crown Prince Wilhelm) and the 7th army. The main weight of attack was between Arras and a few miles south of St-Quentin. Von Hutier's 18th Army, headquartered at Guise, boasted 27 Divisions. The average strength of a German Division in 1918 stood at 12,300 men, 3000 horses, 48 artillery pieces, 120 mortars, 78 heavy machine guns, 144 light machine guns, and 6–12 trucks.
In the north two German armies would attack either side of the Flesquieres salient, created during the battle of Cambrai. The 18th Army, fresh from the Eastern Front, planned it's attack on each side of St. Quentin, aiming to sever British lines and divide the British and French armies. The two northern armies would then attack the British position around Arras before advancing north west, to cut off the BEF in Flanders. In the south it was intended to reach the Somme, and then hold the line of the river against any French counter attacks. During the planning process the southern advance was extended to include an advance across the Somme. The success of this southern advance would badly unbalance the entire offensive.
This attack fell on two British armies. In the north was General Julian Byng’s 3rd Army, defending the area from Arras south to the Flesquieres salient. To the south was General Hubert Gough’s 5th Army, which held the line down to Barisis and the junction with the French. Byng had commanded the Canadian troops who took Vimmy Ridge and his 3rd Army was at the Battle of Cambai, whilst Gough had commanded the Reserve Army (renamed the 5th in October 1916) which had been present at the bloody fiasco on the 1st day of the Battle of the Somme on July the 1st 1916. His army was the weakest of the two. It consisted of 12 Divisions, 1650 guns, and 119 tanks, and 357 aircraft. An average British division in 1918 consisted of 11,800 men, 3670 horses and mules, 48 artillery pieces, 36 mortars, 64 Vickers heavy machine guns, 144 Lewis light machine guns, 770 carts and wagons, 360 motorcycles and bicycles, 14 trucks and cars, and 21 motorized ambulances.
By mid-March 1918 British intelligence was sure that a German offensive was coming. Allied aircraft had successfully photographed German preparations behind their lines. New supply roads had been constructed and shell craters had been turned into concealed trench mortar batteries. Heavily laden motorized and horse-drawn transports had been seen heading into St. Quentin from the east, and in the distance German officers were observed studying British lines. The British answer was increased nightly bombardment of the German front lines, rear areas, and possible areas of troop assembly.
A few days before the attack, two German deserters wanting to avoid the coming offensive slipped through No Man's Land and surrendered to the 107th Brigade. They spoke of troops, batteries of artillery and trench mortars massing on the German front. They reported 100 mortars directly in front of 36th Division lines for the purpose of cutting their wire and an artillery bombardment, lasting several hours, as a preliminary to an infantry assault. A number of other German prisoners had already been taken which had provided valuable information to 18th Corps Headquarters resulting in scaled up preparations for the offensive. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary describes their activities from 18 to 20 March as being intensive training during daylight hours with specialist training in the evening. During the night of 20 March, troops of the 61st Division launched a raid on German positions and took more prisoners who told them that the offensive would be launched the following morning. The British reacted upon the information gained from the 61st's prisoners but their commanders had completely under-estimated what was awaiting them, the answer was merely to order a bombardment of German lines and likely areas of assembly for attack between 02:30 and 03:00. Before this began, however, the Germans had already started their own barrage.
So the British Command knew that the preparations for Ludendorff's Spring Offensive were now in their final hours with the sector held by 5th Army still unfamiliar, badly organised terrain. It had defences which were not completed and there were too few troops to properly hold the position 'in depth'. The rear zone existed as outline markings only, and the battle zone consisted of battalion "redoubts" that were not mutually supporting (allowing stormtroopers to penetrate between them). In addition Gough’s army, as the newest of the British armies, contained a large number of reorganised divisions. For the British, unused to a discontinuous line and the idea of deep zone defended strongholds, Ludendorff's attack would require heroism in the face of chaos and confusion to avoid disaster.
Michael (21 March to 5 April 1918)
The Battle of St.-Quentin (21–23 March 1918)
Day 1 - 21 March 1918
The artillery bombardment began at 2,00 am with an intensive enemy barrage opened on British positions south west of St Quentin for a depth of 4-6 Kilometres. At 04:35, a heavy German barrage opened up simultaneously along the whole 40 mile front. Trench mortars, mustard gas, chlorine gas, tear gas and smoke canisters were concentrated on the forward trenches, while heavy artillery bombarded rear areas to destroy Allied artillery and supply lines. Troops, horses, transport and guns suffered heavily. Over 1,100,000 shells were fired in five hours, hitting targets over an area of 150 square miles; this was the biggest barrage of the entire war and it hit all areas of British front occupied by 5th Army, most of the front of 3rd Army, and some of the front of 1st Army. In total the British suffered 7,500 casualties during this bombardment alone. The front line was badly damaged and communications were cut with the rear zone which was severely disrupted. Although the British had learned the approximate time and location of the offensive, the weight of the attack and the preliminary bombardment was an unpleasant surprise.
When the infantry assault went in between 6.00am and 9.40am the stormtrooper tactics were a stunning success. Dawn broke to reveal a heavy morning mist. By 05:00 visibility was barely 10 yards in places, and the fog was extremely slow to dissipate throughout the morning. The fog (combined with smoke from the bombardments of both sets of artillery) made visibility poor throughout the day allowing the stormtroopers to penetrate deep into the British positions undetected. Most forward positions were overwhelmed and nearly all of the British front line fell during the morning. British communications were soon in a shambles; telephone wires had been cut by artillery and runners had a difficult time finding their way through the dense fog and heavy shelling. There was chaos as forward positions could not communicate with Battalion and Divisional Headquarters or the artillery.
As the morning progressed, the British lines recoiled in the face of this mighty push. They were driven back piecemeal and at speed, with breakthroughs of successive lines of trenches being reported continuously. The deep barrage had disturbed communications and the artillery but the light shelling of front line positions with mostly gas shells had left relatively undisturbed ground and the advance was gaining momentum. German troops were moving faster than the British Artillery could reel in their range so many barrages landed uselessly behind the enemy's advance. German follow-up units were besieging the now isolated redoubts and the strongholds in the villages as per the plan.
Around midday, a major breakthrough south west of St Qentin, saw German troops in the battle zone and, by 14:30, they were nearly 3 km south of Essigny and the enormity of the attack was plain to General Gough. The 5th Army's 'Forward Zone', the only area where their defenses had been completed before the start of the attack had been captured. Most of the troops in the zone were taken prisoner by the enemy who moved up unseen in the fog. Although several garrisons in the various keeps and redoubts had put up stern resistance, by now they were surrounded. Many of these inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, despite direct attacks on their trenches with flame throwers. The fighting was bitter, bloody and hand-to-hand. These gallant soldiers only surrendered once entirely cut off, out of ammunition and severely reduced by casualties. Many units fought to the last man. Gough, however, was still having problems convincing his own commanders of the gravity of the situation. The 1/1st Hertfordshire Regt (116th Brigade, 39th Division, 7th Corps, 5th Army) were being held in reserve near Gurlu Wood on the 21st. The villages of Rossnoy and Villaret, north of St Qentin, were over run on the front line and the Battalion moved forward to positions near Villers Faucon to support the 16th Division who were retreating under the ferocity of the enemy attack. Their war diary records: “21-3-18. Violent enemy bombardment on the whole of our Corps front. Bn stood to at 6.30AM but did not move off until 4PM when it took up dispositions in the BROWN LINE at St. EMILIE.” which shows the slowness of reactions by the British High Command, though in their favour it should be noted that communications were severely disrupted.
The 3rd Army had seen important breakthroughs by the enemy in the morning along the Cambrai-Bapaume road in the Boursies/Louverval area, and through the weak defenses of 59th Division near Bullecourt.
By the close of the day the Germans had broken through the British first and second lines of defense along a quarter of the entire line attacked. and large parts of the 5th Army were falling back. Static trench warfare had given way to mobile warfare for the first time since 1914. South west of St Quentin the 9th Irish Fusiliers' war diary reported that serious losses had been sustained. In addition to losing the three battalions of the Forward Zone, the three battalions in the Battle Zone were reduced to 250 men each and only the three reserve battalions were at reasonable strength. The fighting strength of the division now numbered less than 3000 men.
Gough had been forced to order a fighting retreat to win time for reinforcements to reach them. It was as the British fell back that troops in the redoubts had been left behind to be mopped up by the following German infantry. The right wing of the 3rd Army also retreated, to avoid being outflanked. The morning fog had delayed the use of aircraft but, by the end of the day, 36 squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps had been in action and reported losing 16 aircraft and crew, while having shot down 14 enemy. The Germans for their part reported respectively 19 and 8. However, the first day of the battle had been very costly for the Germans. They suffered almost 40,000 casualties, slightly more than they inflicted on the BEF. More seriously, the crucial attack in the north had failed to isolate the Flesquieres salient. The German attack was already beginning to head in the wrong direction. but that would have been of little comfort to Gough and his men.
Day 2 - 22 March 1918
On the second day of the offensive British troops continued to fall back, losing their last footholds on the original front line. Several British and German Battalions were destroyed by huge casualties in the vicious fighting over the first two days, never to be recreated. For example, by 8:00 a.m. the 1/4th Battalion of the Yorkshire Regiment was in the Green Line west of St Quentin with the East Yorkshires on their right and the 5th Yorks Battalion in Reserve. Again it was a thick misty morning. Two Divisions in the front were ordered to retire in a flow of men, horses, tanks, guns and limbers as the Green Line became the Front Line. At 6 p.m. the enemy attacked and the Battalion was forced back to a position about 800 yds West of the Green Line.
Another example of the severity of the retreat is given in the war diary of the 1/1st Hertfordshire Regt. The Battalion were heavily engaged in fighting at St.Emilie, which at the start of the offensive had been more than 5 km west of the front line, “22-3-18. Enemy violently bombarded and assaulted our positions forcing our Bn to retire to the GREEN LINE. Bn spent the night at HAMEL.” There was much confused fighting during this retreat and the regiment suffered severe casualties, including 4 officers (Major John Bolle Tyndale GOUGH, Captain Thomas Pilling GIBBONS, Lt Donovan PERRY and Lt Charles Leonard KING - all killed in action).
The thick fog did not burn off until early afternoon. The second day was a collection of many separate, often isolated engagements as the Germans pressed forward and the British held their posts, often not knowing who was to either side of them due the "fog of war" . Brigades and Battalions did not count for much that day. It was a day of stubborn and often heroic actions by platoons, sections and even individuals isolated from their comrades by the fragmented nature of the battle and lack of visibility. The situation had become dire for the 5th Army by this time and everywhere the retreat was turning into a rout.
The biggest danger on 22 March was that the two British armies might become separated. Byng was perhaps too keen to hang on to the Flesquieres salient, which his army had won at such cost, and Haig had to order him to keep in contact with Gough’s army, even if that required a bigger retreat than the fighting would otherwise justify. The day also saw the first French troops enter the battle, on the south of the line.
The biggest retreat was made by 18th Corps, whose commander, General Ivor Maxse, seems to have misinterpreted the order from Gough for a fighting retreat as meaning he could fall back all the way to the Somme. The Germans brought heavy artillery into Artemps under the cover of the morning mist which duly forced the remaining battalions of the 109th brigade to retreat to join the 108th Brigade at Happencourt. The result of the misunderstanding between Gough and Maxse was that General Nugent's commanders chose Sommette on the south bank of the Canal de St. Quentin (where there was heavy fighting) to form a new line of defence. This required the Division to cross the Canal at Dury. This decision to withdraw during daylight, over a distance of almost 9 miles, meant heavy fighting and numerous casualties. It was latter considered to have been foolhardy and an unnecessary surrender of a vital position and was untypical of the fight being put up else where.
During the retreat the Engineers blew all the bridges across the Canal between Ham and Ollézy, however the railway bridge at Pithon suffered only minor damage and the Germans were soon crossing in great numbers. Within 48 hours, the Germans had penetrated up to 10 miles behind the British lines.
Day 3 - 23 March 1918
Early on the morning of Saturday 23 March, German troops succeeded in forcing a breakthrough of the line in the 14th Division's sector on the Canal at Jussy. The 54th Brigade History records "the weather still favoured the Germans. Fog was thick over the rivers, canals and little valleys, so that he could bring up fresh masses of troops unseen". In the confusion, Brigade HQ tried to establish what was happening around Jussy and by late morning British were in full retreat once again in front of German troops who had crossed the Crozat Canal at many points. All lines of defence had now been overcome and there was nothing left to stop the German advance. Bitter fighting over open country ensued. There was little rest for British troops; who were either fighting, beating a retreat or doing both. During that day Aubigny, Brouchy, Cugny and Eaucourt fell.
By now the remnants of the 1/1st Hertfordshire Battalion were beating a retreat across the southernmost edges of the 1916 Somme battle field and by the morning of the 24th there were only eight officers left in command. The war diary reads: ”23-3-18. Before dawn the Bn marched to BUSSU & dug in hastily on the east side of the village. When both flanks became exposed the Bn retired to a line of trenches covering the PERONNE-NURLU road. After covering the 4/5th Black Watch Regt on the left the Bn withdrew to the ST. DENNIS line which was very stubbornly defended. The Bn then retired with difficulty to the line protecting the PERONNE-CLERY road with the remainder of the 116th Inf. Bde. to cover the retreat of the 117th and 118th Inf. Bdes. When this had been successfully accomplished under very harassing machine gun fire from the enemy, the Bn conformed to the general retirement on CLERY village where it concentrated. The remnants of the Bn then defended a line of trenches between the village and running down to the River SOMME.” Lt John Eric BROAD was killed during the action
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