Naval gunfire support
Naval gunfire support is a US term for the use of
naval artillery to provide fire support support for
amphibious assault and other troops operating within their range.
Modern naval gunfire support is one of the three main components of
amphibious warfare assault operations support, along with aircraft and ship-launched
missiles.
Ship cannon have been used against shore defences since the early days like a sea battle but with the fortresses as stationary ships.
Encyclopedia
Naval gunfire support is a US term for the use of
naval artillery to provide fire support support for
amphibious assault and other troops operating within their range.
Modern naval gunfire support is one of the three main components of
amphibious warfare assault operations support, along with aircraft and ship-launched
missiles.
Ship cannon have been used against shore defences since the early days like a sea battle but with the fortresses as stationary ships.
First World War
In the
First World War,
monitors based in the
English Channel were used by the Royal Navy as artillery. They could fire several miles inland against German positions.
World War II
The practice reached its zenith during World War II, when the availabilty of man-portable
radio systems and sophisticated relay networks allowed forward observers to transmit targeting information and provide almost instant accuracy reports — once troops had landed.
Battleships,
cruisers and
destroyers would pound shore installations, sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing fortifications and attriting defending forces. Obsolete battleships unfit for combat against other ships were often used as floating gun platforms expressly for this purpose. However, given the relatively primitive nature of the fire control computers and radar of the era combined with the high velocity of naval gunfire, accuracy was poor until troops actually hit the beach and were able to radio back reports to the ship — usually after great numbers of them had died.
The solution was to engage in longer and longer bombardment periods — up to two weeks, in some cases— saturating target areas with fire until a lucky few shells had destroyed the intended targets. This had the unfortunate effect of "telegraphing the punch", alerting an enemy that he was about to be attacked. In the
Pacific War, this mattered little, as the antagonists were usually expecting their island strongholds to be invaded at some point and had already committed whatever combat resources were available. Bombardment periods were usually shorter in the European theater, where surprise was more often valued and ships' guns were responding to the movements of mobile defenders, not whittling away at static fortifications.
Naval gunfire can reach as far as 10 miles inland, and was often used to supplement land-based artillery. The heavy-caliber guns of some eighteen battleships and cruisers were used to stop German
Panzer counterattack at
Salerno. Naval gunfire was also used to help curb German operations in
Normandy, although the surprise nature of the attack precluded the drawn-out bombardment which could have reduced the
Atlantic Wall defences sufficiently a process that fell to
specialist armoured vehicles instead.
Vietnam era
Task Unit 70.8.9, the Naval Gunfire Support Unit, was made up of
destroyers, armed with 5"/38 or 5"/54 guns, and continuously patrolled the coast of
South Vietnam to provide NGFS at short notice. If greater firepower was required then larger gunned
cruisers were called in for reinforcements. NGFS was controlled by the
United States Marines First Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company who provided spotters, usually airborne in light aircraft but sometimes on foot, in all military regions.
Modern Era
Naval Gunfire is still used for many of its traditional purposes. In the
United States Marine Corps, artillery units have a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer in each
battalion to maintain close contact between the branches for amphibious operations. Additionally, the United States Marine Corps maintains three active and two reserve ANGLICO units. ANGLICO members are temporarily assigned to combat units of the United States and foreign nations that lack inherent fire support capability, such as naval gunfire. The navies of the world have almost universally moved away from the largest caliber guns of the early and middle of the 20th century because the the battleships and large cruisers that carried them have been scrapped. The aircraft carrier and missile proving more cost effective.
Naval guns used on modern ships tend to be smaller caliber weapons but with more advanced targeting systems. It is unlikely that the large caliber guns will make a return and much of the traditional role of Naval Gunfire has been taken over by naval air power. The US Marine Corps, in year after year of Congressional testimony, bemoans the lack of an effective gunfire capability. While several modern-day shore bombardment platforms have been proposed over the years, Congress has yet to accept the need for the all-weather, 24 by 7 sustained fires that only the large calibre platforms have historically been able to provide. A recall of the
Iowa class battleships has really come down to the expense of paying and sustaining the large crews of thousands of sailors and Marines needed to keep them afloat as opposed to the direct cost of the ships themselves. In the United States, if the
Iowa class battleships could have been manned by reduced size crews in the hundreds, many experts say that the Iowa class would never have been deactivated at the end of the first
Gulf War.
Continued naval gunfire support training
Despite with the reduction in calibre size to 5 inch guns, even ground-based
NATO forces' artillery forward observers and forward air controllers are taught the rudiments of calling in and adjusting naval gunfire. With the exception of a few procedures the contolling principles are quite similar in both land and naval bombardment. While the ground-based FO starts his adjustment mission by saying, "Adjust Fire," the naval gunfire spotter says, "Fire Mission," from that point on the procedures are almost identical.
See also
