Mission-type tactics
Encyclopedia
Mission-type tactics have (arguably) been a central component of the tactics
of German armed forces
since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by opponents of the development of mission-type tactics. Opponents of implementation mission-type tactics were called Normaltaktiker.
In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative
and a freedom in execution which allows a high-degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.
For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent
of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. In contrast to the mission-type tactics is Command and control
used by U.S. armed forces
. The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent
of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. Clearly taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is often one associated today with elite units and not a whole army.
The obverse of this, is the implicit requirement imposed on superior commanders:
The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent
of whoever issues the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they had received. Mission type tactics assume the possibility of violating other, previously expressed limitations as a step to achieving a mission and is a concept most easily sustained in a decentralised command culture. This is quite alien to any organisation in which, at every level, a subordinate commander is only expected (and, therefore, trained) to follow detailed orders.
This has significant implications for any Army considering the adoption of Auftragstaktik. To clarify, the classic German approach called for every commander to be trained to function effectively at 2 levels of command above his appointment (a platoon
commander would be expected to control Battalion
actions, if need be - and platoon commander was - and is - an NCO
appointment in the German Army).
Some would say that today, such a culture is associated only with elite units and not a whole army. Certainly few armies seem to have mastered the approach. The Wehrmacht
are perhaps the most perfect example - a degree of competence achieved only after rigorous training under Hans von Seeckt
between 1919 and 1935. Ironically, since WW2, only the Israeli Defence Force seem to have come close to matching the Wehrmacht of WW2 in the exercise of command in this style: partly due to a conscious decision on the part of Moshe Dayan
, who fought under British command in WW2, and who attended a British Army Staff training course which - according to his memoirs - disappointed him, to put it mildly.
This style of command originates in a state (Prussia
) which perceived itself as small, surrounded by enemies, and in imminent danger of destruction. The same may perhaps be said of Israel
. The failure of other equally (or more) developed armies to adopt this way of exercising command (the British Army in 1987 announced an intention to adopt 'Mission Command' yet an internal 2004 British Army review of command and control in the Iraq War in 2003 clearly shows that they had achieved the reverse: British orders were substantially more detailed, and subordinates generally more constrained (than 20 years earlier)indicating that there is more to Auftragstaktik than process.
by Napoleon in 1806, the Prussians rethought their military approach and aimed to build a college of military capability, the General Staff
, as a systemic counter to the individual genius that had so soundly beaten them. Napoleon fought a continual battle of manoeuvre or movement and throughout his career (at least until Spain) demonstrated his ability to defeat all comers by the greater flexibility of his formations and deployment. The fact that his troops were mainly conscripts showed that it was his organisation of them that must be superior. The institutionalization of excellence within the Prussian Army was to build this same flexibility as well as the other role of the General Staff Officer, which was to make sure each unit understood and performed their mission.
One of the earliest alleged uses of Auftragstaktik was at the Battle of Königgrätz
in the Austro-Prussian War
. Auftragstaktik is one of the tools often claimed to have given the Prussians their decisive victory. This claim is difficult to accept, since no appreciation of Augtragstaktik had been accepted officially. The Bohemian Campaign could only have been an example of its use if having subordinate commanders that ignore directives from superiors, that march southward when ordered to march east, and treat their senior commanders with barely concealed contempt, can truly be described as a form of "flexible command". Most of the Prussian Commanders, particularly Frederick Charles
of the 1st Prussian Army, had no understanding of Moltke the Elder's strategy. He did not much like those parts he did understand. He was uncooperative when under Moltke's orders and disobeyed them several times. During the battle and without authorisation, he acted on his own initiative and launched a premature attack on the Austrian Army, which nearly ended in disaster. If the Crown Prince Frederick William
had arived only an hour later, the battle might have been decisively lost.
After the First World War, this monitoring, coaching and training role built a level of trust, competency and understanding across the whole 4000 strong German post-war officer corps which made a new level of excellence possible.
Excellence in this case is derived in part from the tradition of Gerhard von Scharnhorst
, Carl von Clausewitz
and Helmuth von Moltke
and was based upon the premise that hard-and-fast rules had no place in the environment of war, which was the realm of human emotion, friction, chance and uncertainty. Moltke is considered one of the principal advocates of independent thinking and acting among his subordinates:
Under the Auftragstaktik system the selection of combat formations, as well as their route and rate of advance, was based upon a unit's mission, the terrain and the enemy's disposition, something Napoleon was renowned for doing. Building a high level of trust, competency and understanding is crucial for the success of such a doctrine. The freedoms this might imply have challenged many armies' views of military discipline, including the Prussian army's.
between the different branches of the Army. It was therefore not unusual to find an armor commander with experience of artillery and infantry command. Similarly, NCOs with cross-branch tactical experience ensured that these combined-arms teams did operate in an integrated fashion. The German High Command (OKH
) ran multiple exercises, or war games, in the 1930s, starting with small operations and in later years involving very large formations and major movements to ensure doctrinal coherence and the opportunity to revise and learn. The General Staff played a vital role in assuring the quality of these exercises and in ensuring lessons were learnt and much of the philosophy was incorporated in their 1933 Field Manual Truppenführung
.
stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising to some, Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent
of the commander is maintained.
Interestingly there are cases cited where in combat the operational orders were a copy of orders that had been issued for an earlier operation or training exercise. It is claimed that almost the only thing that was changed were the names of locations and units. This strongly suggests that long experience of operations had allowed senior commanders to be quite abstract in their orders, issued without great fear of being misunderstood. It also suggests that sequences of moves on quite a large scale were already familiar to the forces involved which probably made their execution better.
A key aspect of Mission-type tactics is forward control. In order to understand what is happening at the point of action and to be able to take decisions quickly, the operational commander needs to be able to observe results. The decision to deviate from original plans in pursuit of the mission must be made here for 'friction' to be overcome and momentum to be sustained. The impact of the application of personal influence was thought to be critical and only possible because of the bench-strength provided by General Staff officers managing in the formations' rear. This aspect is also responsible for the high casualty rate amongst commanders even in successful operations (5% of all dead). Heinz Guderian
ensured that all German tanks had radio receivers in order to make his command effective.
The domination of the battlefield, combined with the difficulty of discerning the pattern of the attacker's assault which uses integrated command of combined arms teams, means that conventional force strategies are rendered ineffective as the "Front seemed to disappear".
Recent research has shown that, apart from the well known processes of "Fire, Move and Communicate", the key success factor in US Marine Corps.
operations was "the recognition that the situation was not that which was expected" - it has been remarked that this is possibly FUBAR
as an operational principle.
Military tactics
Military tactics, the science and art of organizing an army or an air force, are the techniques for using weapons or military units in combination for engaging and defeating an enemy in battle. Changes in philosophy and technology over time have been reflected in changes to military tactics. In...
of German armed forces
German Army
The German Army is the land component of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. Following the disbanding of the Wehrmacht after World War II, it was re-established in 1955 as the Bundesheer, part of the newly formed West German Bundeswehr along with the Navy and the Air Force...
since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by opponents of the development of mission-type tactics. Opponents of implementation mission-type tactics were called Normaltaktiker.
In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative
Initiative
In political science, an initiative is a means by which a petition signed by a certain minimum number of registered voters can force a public vote...
and a freedom in execution which allows a high-degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.
For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent
Intent (military)
Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. In contrast to the mission-type tactics is Command and control
Command and Control (military)
Command and control, or C2, in a military organization can be defined as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission...
used by U.S. armed forces
United States Army
The United States Army is the main branch of the United States Armed Forces responsible for land-based military operations. It is the largest and oldest established branch of the U.S. military, and is one of seven U.S. uniformed services...
. The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent
Intent (military)
Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. Clearly taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is often one associated today with elite units and not a whole army.
Etymology
In translation to English, the German word (which is not, nor ever has been, part of the official German Military lexicon) loses some of its impact. It does not describe a set of tactics per se; it is certainly not limited to the tactical level of operations, nor is it a method of leadership, but it does encapsulate a style of Command - in English (perhaps): Tactics focussed on accomplishing the task/mission as opposed to Befehlstaktik, i.e. Tactics focussed on executing a set of orders. Direct orders are an exception in the German armed forces, while "tasks" are the standard instrument of leadership from high command down to squad level.Characteristics
For mission-focussed command to succeed, it is crucial that subordinate leaders:- understand the intentIntent (military)Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
of their orders, - are given proper guidance and
- are trained to act independently.
The obverse of this, is the implicit requirement imposed on superior commanders:
- to give their subordinates no more orders than are essential (every order given is regarded as an additional constraint upon its recipient), and:
- to be extremely rigorous, absolutely clear, and very succinct in the expression of their commands.
The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent
Intent (military)
Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
of whoever issues the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violate other guidance or orders they had received. Mission type tactics assume the possibility of violating other, previously expressed limitations as a step to achieving a mission and is a concept most easily sustained in a decentralised command culture. This is quite alien to any organisation in which, at every level, a subordinate commander is only expected (and, therefore, trained) to follow detailed orders.
This has significant implications for any Army considering the adoption of Auftragstaktik. To clarify, the classic German approach called for every commander to be trained to function effectively at 2 levels of command above his appointment (a platoon
Platoon
A platoon is a military unit typically composed of two to four sections or squads and containing 16 to 50 soldiers. Platoons are organized into a company, which typically consists of three, four or five platoons. A platoon is typically the smallest military unit led by a commissioned officer—the...
commander would be expected to control Battalion
Battalion
A battalion is a military unit of around 300–1,200 soldiers usually consisting of between two and seven companies and typically commanded by either a Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel...
actions, if need be - and platoon commander was - and is - an NCO
Non-commissioned officer
A non-commissioned officer , called a sub-officer in some countries, is a military officer who has not been given a commission...
appointment in the German Army).
Some would say that today, such a culture is associated only with elite units and not a whole army. Certainly few armies seem to have mastered the approach. The Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht
The Wehrmacht – from , to defend and , the might/power) were the unified armed forces of Nazi Germany from 1935 to 1945. It consisted of the Heer , the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe .-Origin and use of the term:...
are perhaps the most perfect example - a degree of competence achieved only after rigorous training under Hans von Seeckt
Hans von Seeckt
Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt was a German military officer noted for his organization of the German Army during the Weimar Republic.-Early life:...
between 1919 and 1935. Ironically, since WW2, only the Israeli Defence Force seem to have come close to matching the Wehrmacht of WW2 in the exercise of command in this style: partly due to a conscious decision on the part of Moshe Dayan
Moshe Dayan
Moshe Dayan was an Israeli military leader and politician. The fourth Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces , he became a fighting symbol to the world of the new State of Israel...
, who fought under British command in WW2, and who attended a British Army Staff training course which - according to his memoirs - disappointed him, to put it mildly.
This style of command originates in a state (Prussia
Prussia
Prussia was a German kingdom and historic state originating out of the Duchy of Prussia and the Margraviate of Brandenburg. For centuries, the House of Hohenzollern ruled Prussia, successfully expanding its size by way of an unusually well-organized and effective army. Prussia shaped the history...
) which perceived itself as small, surrounded by enemies, and in imminent danger of destruction. The same may perhaps be said of Israel
Israel
The State of Israel is a parliamentary republic located in the Middle East, along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea...
. The failure of other equally (or more) developed armies to adopt this way of exercising command (the British Army in 1987 announced an intention to adopt 'Mission Command' yet an internal 2004 British Army review of command and control in the Iraq War in 2003 clearly shows that they had achieved the reverse: British orders were substantially more detailed, and subordinates generally more constrained (than 20 years earlier)indicating that there is more to Auftragstaktik than process.
Origins
After the heavy defeat of the Prussians in the Battle of Jena-AuerstedtBattle of Jena-Auerstedt
The twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt were fought on 14 October 1806 on the plateau west of the river Saale in today's Germany, between the forces of Napoleon I of France and Frederick William III of Prussia...
by Napoleon in 1806, the Prussians rethought their military approach and aimed to build a college of military capability, the General Staff
German General Staff
The German General Staff was an institution whose rise and development gave the German armed forces a decided advantage over its adversaries. The Staff amounted to its best "weapon" for nearly a century and a half....
, as a systemic counter to the individual genius that had so soundly beaten them. Napoleon fought a continual battle of manoeuvre or movement and throughout his career (at least until Spain) demonstrated his ability to defeat all comers by the greater flexibility of his formations and deployment. The fact that his troops were mainly conscripts showed that it was his organisation of them that must be superior. The institutionalization of excellence within the Prussian Army was to build this same flexibility as well as the other role of the General Staff Officer, which was to make sure each unit understood and performed their mission.
One of the earliest alleged uses of Auftragstaktik was at the Battle of Königgrätz
Battle of Königgrätz
The Battle of Königgrätz , also known as the Battle of Sadowa, Sadová, or Hradec Králové, was the decisive battle of the Austro-Prussian War, in which the Kingdom of Prussia defeated the Austrian Empire...
in the Austro-Prussian War
Austro-Prussian War
The Austro-Prussian War was a war fought in 1866 between the German Confederation under the leadership of the Austrian Empire and its German allies on one side and the Kingdom of Prussia with its German allies and Italy on the...
. Auftragstaktik is one of the tools often claimed to have given the Prussians their decisive victory. This claim is difficult to accept, since no appreciation of Augtragstaktik had been accepted officially. The Bohemian Campaign could only have been an example of its use if having subordinate commanders that ignore directives from superiors, that march southward when ordered to march east, and treat their senior commanders with barely concealed contempt, can truly be described as a form of "flexible command". Most of the Prussian Commanders, particularly Frederick Charles
Frederick Charles
Frederick Charles may refer to:*Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia *Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse *Friedrich Karl von Schönborn , Bishop of Würzburg*Fred Charles, Canadian politician...
of the 1st Prussian Army, had no understanding of Moltke the Elder's strategy. He did not much like those parts he did understand. He was uncooperative when under Moltke's orders and disobeyed them several times. During the battle and without authorisation, he acted on his own initiative and launched a premature attack on the Austrian Army, which nearly ended in disaster. If the Crown Prince Frederick William
Frederick III, German Emperor
Frederick III was German Emperor and King of Prussia for 99 days in 1888, the Year of the Three Emperors. Friedrich Wilhelm Nikolaus Karl known informally as Fritz, was the only son of Emperor William I and was raised in his family's tradition of military service...
had arived only an hour later, the battle might have been decisively lost.
After the First World War, this monitoring, coaching and training role built a level of trust, competency and understanding across the whole 4000 strong German post-war officer corps which made a new level of excellence possible.
Excellence in this case is derived in part from the tradition of Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Gerhard Johann David Waitz von Scharnhorst was a general in Prussian service, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, noted for both his writings, his reforms of the Prussian army, and his leadership during the Napoleonic Wars....
, Carl von Clausewitz
Carl von Clausewitz
Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier and German military theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war...
and Helmuth von Moltke
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was a German Field Marshal. The chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years, he is regarded as one of the great strategists of the latter 19th century, and the creator of a new, more modern method of directing armies in the field...
and was based upon the premise that hard-and-fast rules had no place in the environment of war, which was the realm of human emotion, friction, chance and uncertainty. Moltke is considered one of the principal advocates of independent thinking and acting among his subordinates:
“Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.”
Under the Auftragstaktik system the selection of combat formations, as well as their route and rate of advance, was based upon a unit's mission, the terrain and the enemy's disposition, something Napoleon was renowned for doing. Building a high level of trust, competency and understanding is crucial for the success of such a doctrine. The freedoms this might imply have challenged many armies' views of military discipline, including the Prussian army's.
Training
The force flexibility that underlies this command style poses particular challenges once this new, task-oriented formation is created. The creation of combined-arms forces poses particular challenges to command, especially if they are attached during a battle. To this end (in and before WW2) the German General Staff cross-posted officers and NCOsNon-commissioned officer
A non-commissioned officer , called a sub-officer in some countries, is a military officer who has not been given a commission...
between the different branches of the Army. It was therefore not unusual to find an armor commander with experience of artillery and infantry command. Similarly, NCOs with cross-branch tactical experience ensured that these combined-arms teams did operate in an integrated fashion. The German High Command (OKH
Oberkommando des Heeres
The Oberkommando des Heeres was Nazi Germany's High Command of the Army from 1936 to 1945. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht commanded OKH only in theory...
) ran multiple exercises, or war games, in the 1930s, starting with small operations and in later years involving very large formations and major movements to ensure doctrinal coherence and the opportunity to revise and learn. The General Staff played a vital role in assuring the quality of these exercises and in ensuring lessons were learnt and much of the philosophy was incorporated in their 1933 Field Manual Truppenführung
Truppenführung
was a German Army field manual published in 2 parts as : Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934.The original German text, which is notable for its clarity, was prepared by a group led by Colonel General Ludwig Beck who was later executed by the Nazi administration for his part in the...
.
Doctrine
Auftragstaktik can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von ClausewitzCarl von Clausewitz
Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier and German military theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war...
stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising to some, Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent
Intent (military)
Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
of the commander is maintained.
Interestingly there are cases cited where in combat the operational orders were a copy of orders that had been issued for an earlier operation or training exercise. It is claimed that almost the only thing that was changed were the names of locations and units. This strongly suggests that long experience of operations had allowed senior commanders to be quite abstract in their orders, issued without great fear of being misunderstood. It also suggests that sequences of moves on quite a large scale were already familiar to the forces involved which probably made their execution better.
The Information Age
"The paradox of war in the Information AgeInformation AgeThe Information Age, also commonly known as the Computer Age or Digital Age, is an idea that the current age will be characterized by the ability of individuals to transfer information freely, and to have instant access to knowledge that would have been difficult or impossible to find previously...
is one of managing massive amounts of information and resisting the temptation to overcontrol it. The competitive advantage is nullified when you try to run decisions up and down the chain of command. All platoons and tank crews have real-time information on what is going on around them, the location of the enemy, and the nature and targeting of the enemy's weapons system. Once the commander's intentIntent (military)Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
is understood, decisions must be devolved to the lowest possible level to allow these front line soldiers to exploit the opportunities that develop". — General Gordon R. SullivanGordon R. SullivanGeneral Gordon Russell Sullivan is a retired Army general officer, who served as the 32nd Chief of Staff of the United States Army and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.-Background and education:...
, quoted in Delivering Results by David Ulrich.
Effectiveness
Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that "The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders." They recognized that "initiative, flexibility and mobility" were the essential aspects of German tactics.A key aspect of Mission-type tactics is forward control. In order to understand what is happening at the point of action and to be able to take decisions quickly, the operational commander needs to be able to observe results. The decision to deviate from original plans in pursuit of the mission must be made here for 'friction' to be overcome and momentum to be sustained. The impact of the application of personal influence was thought to be critical and only possible because of the bench-strength provided by General Staff officers managing in the formations' rear. This aspect is also responsible for the high casualty rate amongst commanders even in successful operations (5% of all dead). Heinz Guderian
Heinz Guderian
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was a German general during World War II. He was a pioneer in the development of armored warfare, and was the leading proponent of tanks and mechanization in the Wehrmacht . Germany's panzer forces were raised and organized under his direction as Chief of Mobile Forces...
ensured that all German tanks had radio receivers in order to make his command effective.
The domination of the battlefield, combined with the difficulty of discerning the pattern of the attacker's assault which uses integrated command of combined arms teams, means that conventional force strategies are rendered ineffective as the "Front seemed to disappear".
Recent research has shown that, apart from the well known processes of "Fire, Move and Communicate", the key success factor in US Marine Corps.
United States Marine Corps
The United States Marine Corps is a branch of the United States Armed Forces responsible for providing power projection from the sea, using the mobility of the United States Navy to deliver combined-arms task forces rapidly. It is one of seven uniformed services of the United States...
operations was "the recognition that the situation was not that which was expected" - it has been remarked that this is possibly FUBAR
FUBAR
FUBAR is an acronym that commonly means "fucked up beyond all recognition/any repair/all reason".-Etymology and history:The Oxford English Dictionary lists Yank, the Army Weekly magazine as its earliest citation: "The FUBAR Squadron.....
as an operational principle.
See also
- VernichtungsgedankeVernichtungsgedankeVernichtungsgedanke, literally meaning "concept of annihilation" in German and generally taken to mean "the concept of fast annihilation of enemy forces" is a tactical doctrine dating back to Frederick the Great. It emphasizes rapid, fluid movement to unbalance an enemy, allowing the attacker to...
: "the concept of annihilation", one of Blitzkrieg's predecessors - BlitzkriegBlitzkriegFor other uses of the word, see: Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg is an anglicized word describing all-motorised force concentration of tanks, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and air power, concentrating overwhelming force at high speed to break through enemy lines, and, once the lines are broken,...
, lightning war style attributed to the German Army in World War II - War of manoeuvre, the doctrine behind Blitzkrieg, also known as Bewegungskrieg.
- Attrition warfareAttrition warfareAttrition warfare is a military strategy in which a belligerent side attempts to win a war by wearing down its enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and matériel....
, the strategic concept that victory can be assured by wearing the enemy down - Befehlstaktik, (lit. detailed-order tactics), control by detailed order or command push.
- Command and obedience in the BundeswehrCommand and obedience in the BundeswehrThe principle of command and obedience in the Bundeswehr , along with the concept of "citizens in uniform" , was central to the 1953 idea of "leadership development and civic education"...
- Distributed operationsDistributed operationsDistributed Operations is a new war-fighting concept being adopted by the United States Marine Corps and is being developed by their Warfighting Laboratory as a response to the changing environment of the Global War on Terror...
- Intent (Military)Intent (military)Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative , self-synchronisation Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),...
External links and further reading
- Generals Balck And Von Melletnhin On Tactics: Implications For NATO Military Doctrine an 1980 paper where the concept of the auftragstaktik is explained and demonstrated.
- Aufstragtaktik article by Major General Widder (German Army) which gives overview and latest views.
- Manuel de LandaManuel de LandaManuel De Landa, , is a writer, artist and philosopher who has lived in New York since 1975. He is presently the Gilles Deleuze Chair of Contemporary Philosophy and Science at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland; a lecturer at the Canisius College in Buffalo, New York; a lecturer...
, War in the Age of Intelligent MachinesWar in the Age of Intelligent MachinesWar in the Age of Intelligent Machines is a book by Manuel de Landa that traces the history of warfare and of technology. It is influenced in part by Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish , and also reinterprets the concepts of war machines and the machinic phylum, introduced in Deleuze and...
, 1991. - von Luck, HansHans von LuckHans-Ulrich von Luck und Witten , usually shortened to Hans von Luck, was a Colonel in the German Armored Forces during World War II. He served with the 7th Panzer Division and 21st Panzer Division, seeing action in Poland, France, North Africa, Italy and Russia...
. Panzer Commander. Cassell Military, 1991. Available online, accessed 4 October 2005. - Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations . "Parameters", US Army War College Quarterly. Autumn 1999, Vol. XXIX, No. 3. David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris. Available online, accessed 11 November 2005.
- Gerhard Muhm: German Tactics in the Italian Campaign.
- Gerhard Muhm, La tattica tedesca nella campagna d'Italia, in Linea gotica avamposto dei Balcani, a cura di Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993..