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Mechanized infantry
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Mechanized infantry (or "mech infantry") are infantry equipped with armored personnel carriers (APCs), or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) for transport and combat (see also mechanized force).
Mechanized infantry are distinguished from motorized infantry, who are transported to battle by trucks or motor vehicles, in that their vehicles provide a degree of protection from hostile fire, as opposed to "soft-skinned" wheeled vehicles (trucks or jeeps).
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Encyclopedia
Mechanized infantry (or "mech infantry") are infantry equipped with armored personnel carriers (APCs), or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) for transport and combat (see also mechanized force).
Mechanized infantry are distinguished from motorized infantry, who are transported to battle by trucks or motor vehicles, in that their vehicles provide a degree of protection from hostile fire, as opposed to "soft-skinned" wheeled vehicles (trucks or jeeps). Most APCs and IFVs are fully tracked, or are all-wheel drive vehicles (6×6 or 8×8), for mobility across rough ground. The support weapons for mechanized infantry are also provided with motorized transport, or are built directly into combat vehicles, in order to keep pace with the mechanized infantry in combat. For units equipped with most types of APC or any type of IFV, fire support weapons such as machine guns, autocannons, small-bore direct-fire howitzers, and even anti-tank guided missiles are often mounted directly on the infantry's own transport vehicles.
Compared with "light" (foot) infantry or motorized infantry, mechanized infantry can maintain rapid tactical movement and (if mounted in IFVs) possess more integral firepower. They require more combat supplies (ammunition, spares and especially fuel) and a comparatively large proportion of their manpower is required to crew and maintain the vehicles. For example, most APCs mount a section of seven or eight infantrymen but have a crew of two. Most IFVs carry only six or seven infantry but require a crew of three. To be effective in the field, mechanized units also require large numbers of fitters and mechanics with specialised recovery vehicles.
History
Arguably, the first Mechanized infantry were 36 two-man infantry squads carried forward by Mark V* tanks at the Battle of Amiens in 1918. In a battle of such scale, their contribution went unnoticed.
Towards the end of World War I, all the armies involved were faced with the problem of maintaining the momentum of an attack. Tanks, artillery or infiltration tactics could all be used to break through an enemy defense, but almost all the offensives launched in 1918 ground to a halt after a few days. Pursuing infantry quickly became exhausted, and artillery, supplies and fresh formations could not be brought forward over the battlefields quickly enough to maintain the pressure on the regrouping enemy.
It was widely acknowledged that cavalry were too vulnerable to be used on most European battlefields, although many armies continued to deploy them. Motorised Infantry could maintain rapid movement, but their trucks required either a good road network, or firm open terrain (such as desert). They were unable to traverse a battlefield obstructed by craters, barbed wire and trenches. Tracked or all-wheel drive vehicles were to be the solution.
Following the war, development of mechanized forces was largely theoretical for some decades, until many nations began rearming in the 1930s. The British Army had established an Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927 but failed to pursue this line due to budget constraints and the prior need to garrison the frontiers of the Empire.
Practical soldiers such as Heinz Guderian in Germany and Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Soviet Union recognised that tank units required close support from infantry and other arms, and that these supporting arms needed to maintain the same pace as the tanks. As the Germans rearmed in the 1930s, they equipped some infantry units in their new Panzer (armoured) divisions with the Half-track SdKfz 251, which could keep up with tanks on almost any terrain. The French Army also created Light Mechanized (Légère Méchanique) divisions in which some of the infantry units possessed small tracked carriers. Together with the motorisation of the other infantry and support units, this gave both armies highly mobile armoured formations. The German doctrine was to use these to exploit breakthroughs in Blitzkrieg offensives, the French envisaged them being used to shift reserves rapidly in a defensive battle.
World War II
From the outset of World War II, German mechanized infantry had a disproportionately large number of successful operations. As World War II progressed, the Germans integrated tanks or assault guns with mechanized infantry as combined arms Panzergrenadier Divisions, providing mobile anti-tank defense and close-up direct fire support for the infantry.
Because the German half track APC was more expensive and time-consuming to manufacture than a truck, it should be noted that barely a quarter or a third of the infantry in Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions was mechanized, except in a few favoured formations. However, most German reconnaissance units in these formations were also primarily mechanised infantry, while the Allies generally used armoured cars or light tanks for reconnaissance purposes.
Allied armored divisions and some armored brigades also included a mechanized infantry element for combined arms support. For example in the British and Commonwealth armies, "Type A" armoured brigades, which were intended for independent operations, had a "motor infantry" battalion mounted in Bren carriers or later in Lend-Lease halftracks. ("Type B" brigades lacked a motor infantry component and were subordinated to infantry formations.) All Armored Divisions of the United States Army had three battalions of "Armored Infantry" fully mounted in M2 and M3 halftracks.
The Canadian Army and subsequently the British Army also, used expedients such as the Kangaroo APC, usually for specific operations rather than to create permanent mechanised infantry formations. The first such operation was Operation Totalize in the Battle of Normandy which, although it failed to achieve its ultimate objectives, nevertheless showed that mechanized infantry could incur far fewer casualties than dismounted troops in set-piece operations.
The Soviet army began the war while still in the process of reorganising its armoured and mechanized formations, most of which were destroyed during the first months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. About a year later, the Soviets recreated division-sized mechanized infantry units termed Mechanized Corps, usually consisting of one tank brigade and three mechanized infantry brigades, with motorised supporting arms. They were generally used in the exploitation phase of offensives, as part of the pre-war Soviet concept of Deep operations. The Soviet Army also created several Cavalry mechanized groups in which tank, mechanized infantry and horsed cavalry were mixed. These also were used in the exploitation and pursuit phases of offensives.
The New Zealand Army ultimately fielded a division of roughly similar composition to a Soviet Mechanized Corps, which fought in the Italian Campaign, although it had little scope for mobile operations until near the end of the war.
The Cold War
In the post-war era, the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Red Army and NATO further developed the equipment and doctrine for mechanized infantry. With the exception of airborne formations, the Red Army mechanized all its infantry formations, initially mainly in wheeled APCs, some of which lacked overhead protection and were therefore vulnerable to several threats, for instance airbursting artillery shells. This nevertheless gave the Soviet Army greater strategic flexibility, given the large land area and long borders of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact
The American Army established the basic configuration of the tracked APC with the M75 and M59 before adopting the lighter M113 Armored Personnel Carrier which could be carried by C-130 Hercules and other transport aircraft. The vehicle gave infantry the same mobility as tanks though with not as effective armor protection (but with nuclear, biological, and chemical protection).
In Vietnam, it was often fitted with extra armament and firing ports and used as an ad-hoc Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Early operations by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam using the vehicle showed that troops were far more effective while mounted in the vehicles than when they dismounted. American doctrine subsequently emphasised mounted tactics. The Americans ultimately deployed a mechanized brigade and ten mechanized battalions to Vietnam.
Even more important for future developments was the Soviet BMP-1, which was the first true Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Its introduction prompted the development of similar vehicles in Western armies, such as the West German Marder and American M2 Bradley. Unlike the APC which was intended merely to transport the infantry from place to place under armoured protection, the IFV possessed firepower which could support the infantry in attack or defence. Many IFVs were equipped with firing ports from which their infantry could fire their weapons from inside, becoming an integral part of the IFV's fire power.
Soviet organization led to different tactics between the "light" and "heavy" varieties of mechanized infantry. In the Soviet Army, a first-line "Motor Rifle" division from the 1970s onwards usually had two regiments equipped with the wheeled BTR-60 APC and one with the tracked BMP-1 IFV. The "light" regiments were intended to make dismounted attacks on the division's flanks while the BMP-equipped "heavy" regiment supported the division's tank regiment on the main axis of advance. Both types of infantry regiment nevertheless were officially titled "Motor Rifle" units.
A line of development in the Soviet Armed Forces from the 1980s was the provision of specialised IFVs for use by their airborne forces. The first of these was the BMD-1, which had the same firepower as the BMP-1, but which could be carried in or even parachuted from the standard Soviet transport aircraft. This made airborne formations into mechanized infantry at the cost of reducing their "bayonet" strength, as the BMD could carry only three, or at most four, paratroopers in addition to its crew. They were used in this role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This trend was not followed by Western nations.
The present day
At present, almost all infantry units from industrialized nations are provided with some type of motor transport. Infantry units equipped with IFVs rather than lighter vehicles are commonly designated as "heavy", indicating more combat power but also more costly long-range transportation requirements.
In the British Army, "heavy" units equipped with the tracked Warrior IFV are described as "Armoured Infantry", and units with the wheeled Saxon APC as "Mechanised Infantry". This convention is becoming widespread; for example the French Army has "Motorisées" units equipped with the wheeled VAB and "Mécanisées" (armoured) units with the tracked AMX-10P.
The transport and other logistic requirements have led many armies to adopt wheeled APCs when their existing stocks of tracked APCs require replacement. An example is the Canadian Army, who have used the LAV III wheeled IFV in fighting in Afghanistan. The US Army has also followed this trend, having formed brigades which use the Stryker wheeled IFV (although they will continue to field "heavy" formations for many years to come). On the other hand, the Italian, Spanish and Swedish armies are adopting (and exporting) new indigenously-produced tracked IFVs. The Swedish CV90 IFV in particular has been adopted by several armies.
A recent trend seen in the Israel Defense Forces and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the introduction of exceptionally well-armoured APCs such as the IDF Achzarit which are converted from obsolete Main Battle Tanks (such as the Russian T-55). Such vehicles are usually expedients, and lack of space prevents the armament of an IFV being carried in addition to an infantry section or squad. In the Russian Army, such vehicles were introduced for fighting in urban areas, where the risk from short range infantry anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7 is highest, after Russian tank and motor infantry units suffered heavy losses fighting insurgents in Grozny during the First Chechen War in 1995.
Many APCs and IFVs currently under development are intended for rapid deployment by aircraft. New technologies which promise reduction in weight, such as electric drive, may be incorporated. However, facing a similar threat in Post-invasion Iraq to that which prompted the Russians to convert tanks to APCs, the occupying armies have found it necessary to apply extra armour to existing APCs and IFVs, which adds to the overall size and weight. Some of the latest designs (such as the German Puma (IFV)) are intended to allow a light, basic model vehicle which is air-transportable to be fitted in the field with additional protection, thereby ensuring both strategic flexibility and survivability.
As support for armoured formations
It is generally accepted that armoured formations are much less effective without the support of infantrymen; the pre-WWII notion of "tank fleets" has not proved to be sound. By themselves, tanks generally cannot hold ground, nor operate alone in thick country or built-up areas. Though many nations' armoured formations included an organic mechanized infantry component at the start of World War II, the proportion of mechanized infantry in such combined arms formations was increased by most armies as the war progressed.
The lesson was re-learned, first by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War with India, where the nation fielded two different type of armoured divisions, one which was almost pure armour (the 1st) while the other was more balanced (the 6th). The latter division showed itself to be far more combat capable than the former. Having achieved spectacular successes in the offensive with tank-heavy formations during the Six Day War, the Israeli Defense Force found in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, that a doctrine that relied primarily on tanks and aircraft proved inadequate. As a makeshift remedy, paratroopers were provided with motorized transport and used as mechanized infantry in coordination with the armour. After the war the IDF reorganized its armoured formations on the basis of the lesson learned. The doctrine is now universal in nations capable of supporting armoured formations.
See also
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