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Japan Self-Defense Forces
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The , or JSDF, occasionally referred to as JSF, are the military forces in Japan that were established after the end of the post-World War II American occupation of Japan. For most of the post-war period the forces were confined to the islands of Japan and not permitted to be deployed abroad. In recent years, they have been engaged in international peacekeeping operations. Recent tensions, particularly with North Korea and China, have reignited the debate over the status of the SDF and its relation to society.
JSDF numbered 239,430 with 147,737 in the Ground Self-Defense Force, 44,327 in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, 45,517 in the Air Self-Defense Force, and 1,849 in the Joint Staff Office.
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The , or JSDF, occasionally referred to as JSF, are the military forces in Japan that were established after the end of the post-World War II American occupation of Japan. For most of the post-war period the forces were confined to the islands of Japan and not permitted to be deployed abroad. In recent years, they have been engaged in international peacekeeping operations. Recent tensions, particularly with North Korea and China, have reignited the debate over the status of the SDF and its relation to society.
Personnel and organization
The JSDF numbered 239,430 with 147,737 in the Ground Self-Defense Force, 44,327 in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, 45,517 in the Air Self-Defense Force, and 1,849 in the Joint Staff Office. Reserves numbered 57,899.
Chain of Command
Operational
Administrative
- Minister of Defense
- Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
Military branches
Military units
- Five armies,
- Five maritime districts, and
- Three air defense forces.
The result has been a unique military system. All SDF personnel are technically civilians: those in uniform are classified as special civil servants and are subordinate to the ordinary civil servants who run the Ministry of Defense. There are no military secrets, military laws, or offenses committed by military personnel; whether on-base or off-base, on-duty or off-duty, of a military or non-military nature, are all adjudicated under normal procedures by civil courts in appropriate jurisdictions.
Defense policy
Japan's Basic Policy for National Defense stipulates the following policies:
- Maintaining an exclusive defense oriented policy.
- To avoid becoming a major military power that might pose a threat to the world.
- Refraining from the development of nuclear weapons, and to refuse to allow nuclear weapons inside Japanese territory.
- Ensuring civilian control of the military.
- Maintaining security arrangements with the United States.
- Building up defensive capabilities within moderate limits.
Japan's military budget is to be maintained to only be 3% of the total Japanese budget. About 50% of that is spent on the personnel and the rest is split on supplies, new weapons, upgrades, etc.
Reflecting a tension concerning the Forces' legal status, the Japanese term ? (pronunciation: gun), referring to a military or armed force, and the English terms "military", "army", "navy", and "air force" are never used in official references to the JSDF.
Article 9
In theory, Japan's rearmament is thoroughly prohibited by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution which not only states, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes", but also declares, "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." In practice, however, the Diet (or Parliament), which Article 41 of the Constitution defines as "the highest organ of the state power", established the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. Due to such a constitutional tension concerning the Forces' status, any attempt at enhancing the Forces' capabilities and budget tends to be politically controversial. Thus the JSDF has very limited capabilities to operate overseas, lacks long range offensive capabilities such as long-range surface-to-surface missiles, aerial refueling , marines, amphibious units, or large caches of ammunitions. The Rules of Engagement are strictly defined by the Self-Defence Forces Act 1954.
Recent reforms and developments
After North Korea test fired a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in August 1998, subsequent North Korean tests as well as other issues contributing to rising tensions between the two countries have led to increased interest in Japan for a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Japan is in the process of deploying a multi-tiered BMD system comprised of upgraded Aegis vessels and Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Legislation that would allow authorities to authorize shooting down an incoming ballistic missile is also being considered. In December 2004, Japan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding creating a general cooperation framework for joint development of a sea-based BMD system.
In November 2005, constitutional revisions were proposed which would create a cabinet level Defense Ministry while keeping the old clauses mandating official non-aggression. Under the proposed revisions, the JSDF would also be formally referred to as a military force for the first time since its establishment. The new wording proposed is "In order to secure peace and the independence of our country as well as the security of the state and the people, military forces for self-defense shall be maintained with the prime minister of the cabinet as the supreme commander." The amendment is gaining more and more public support in recent years.
On June 8 2006, the Japanese cabinet endorsed a bill elevating the Defense Agency to Defense Ministry. This was passed by the Diet in December 2006.
Japan has also deepened its security and military ties with Australia and its leaders are talking about the formation of a military pact in Asia similar to NATO.
History
Imperial Japanese armed forces' conduct up to Japan's defeat in World War II had a profound and lasting impact on the nation's attitudes toward wars, armed forces, and military involvement in politics. These attitudes were immediately apparent in the public's acceptance of not only the total disarmament, demobilization and the purge of all the military leaders from positions of public influence after the war but also the constitutional ban on any rearmament. Under General Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army, serving as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the Allied occupation authorities were committed to the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. All clubs, schools, and societies associated with the military and martial skills were eliminated. Martial arts were banned. The general staff was abolished, along with army and navy ministries and the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy. Industries serving the military were also dismantled.
The trauma of the lost war had produced strong pacifist sentiments among the nation, that found expression in the United States-written 1947 constitution, which, under Article 9, forever renounces war as an instrument for settling international disputes and declares that Japan will never again maintain "land, sea, or air forces or other war potential". Later cabinets interpreted these provisions as not denying the nation the inherent right to self-defense and, with the encouragement of the United States, developed the SDF step by step. Antimilitarist public opinion, however, remained a force to be reckoned with on any defense-related issue. The constitutional legitimacy of the SDF was challenged well into the 1970s, and even in the 1980s, the government acted warily on defense matters lest residual antimilitarism be aggravated and a backlash result.
Early development
Deprived of any military capability after 1945, the nation had only occupation forces and a few domestic police on which to rely for security. Rising Cold War tensions in Europe and Asia, coupled with leftist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Japan, prompted some conservative leaders to question the unilateral renunciation of all military capabilities. These sentiments were intensified in 1950 when most occupation troops were transferred to the Korean Conflict (1950-53) theater, leaving Japan virtually helpless to counter internal disruption and subversion, and very much aware of the need to enter into a mutual defense relationship with the United States to guarantee the nation's external security. Encouraged by the occupation authorities, the Japanese government in July 1950 authorized the establishment of a National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light infantry weapons.
Under the terms of the Mutual Security Assistance Pact, ratified in 1952 along with the peace treaty Japan had signed with the United States and other countries, United States forces stationed in Japan were to deal with external aggression against Japan while Japanese forces, both ground and maritime, would deal with internal threats and natural disasters. Accordingly, in mid-1952 the National Police Reserve was expanded to 110,000 men and named the National Safety Forces. The Coastal Safety Force, which had been organized in 1950 as a waterborne counterpart to the National Police Reserve, was transferred with it to the National Safety Agency to constitute an embryonic navy.
As Japan perceived a growing external threat without adequate forces to counter it, the National Safety Forces underwent further development that entailed difficult political problems. The war renunciation clause of the constitution was the basis for strong political objections to any sort of armed force other than conventional police force. In 1954, however, separate land, sea, and air forces for purely defensive purposes were created, subject to the command of the Prime Minister.
To avoid the appearance of a revival of militarism, Japan's leaders emphasized constitutional guarantees of civilian control of the government and armed forces and used nonmilitary terms for the organization and functions of the forces. At first, tanks were called "special vehicles". The forces' administrative department was granted only an agency status, rather than a full-fledged ministry status. The armed forces were designated the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), instead of the army, navy, and air force.
Although possession of nuclear weapons is not explicitly forbidden in the constitution, Japan, as the only nation to have experienced the devastation of nuclear attacks, expressed early its abhorrence of nuclear arms and its determination never to acquire them. The Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1956 limits research, development, and utilization of nuclear power to peaceful uses only, and beginning in 1956, national policy has embodied "three non-nuclear principles" — forbidding the nation to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or to allow them to be introduced into its territories. In 1976 Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1968) and reiterated its intention never to "develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons through its territory." Nonetheless, because of its generally high technology level and large number of operating nuclear power plants, Japan is generally considered to be "nuclear capable," i.e., it could develop a usable weapon in a short period of time if the political situation changed significantly.
Uniforms, ranks, and insignia
Dress uniforms in all three SDF branches are similar in style to those worn by United States forces. GSDF dress uniforms are olive green; MSDF personnel wear traditional blue dress, white service, and khaki work uniforms; and ASDF personnel wear the lighter shade of blue worn by the United States Air Force. The GSDF and MSDF share the same camouflage uniform similar to the Bundeswehr flecktarn with lighter shades of brown and green while the ASDF has its own unique camouflage uniform consisting of pattern similar to the Dutch military's camouflage scheme in brown and tan. The arm of service to which members of the ground force are attached is indicated by branch insignia and piping of distinctive colors: for infantry, red; artillery, yellow; armor, orange; engineers, violet; ordnance, light green; medical, green; army aviation, light blue; signals, blue; quartermaster, brown; transportation, dark violet; airborne, white; and others, dark blue. The cap badge insignia the GSDF is a sakura cherry blossom bordered with two ivy branches underneath, and a single chevron centered on the bottom between the bases of the branches; the MSDF cap badge insignia consists of a fouled anchor underneath a cherry blossom bordered on the sides and bottom by ivy vines; and the ASDF cap badge insignia features a heraldic eagle under which is a star and crescent which is bordered underneath with stylized wings.
There are nine officer ranks in the active SDF, along with a warrant officer rank, five NCO ranks, and three enlisted ranks. The highest NCO rank, first sergeant (senior chief petty officer in the MSDF and senior master sergeant in the ASDF), was established in 1980 to provide more promotion opportunities and shorter terms of service as sergeant first class, chief petty officer, or master sergeant. Under the earlier system, the average NCO was promoted only twice in approximately thirty years of service and remained at the top rank for almost ten years.
Recruitment and conditions of service
The total strength of the three branches of the SDF was 246,400 in 1992. In addition, the SDF maintained a total of 48,400 reservists attached to the three services. Even when Japan's active and reserve components are combined, however, the country maintains a lower ratio of military personnel to its population than does any member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Of the major Asian nations, only India and Indonesia keep a lower ratio of personnel in arms.
The SDF is an all-volunteer force. Conscription per se is not forbidden by law, but many citizens consider Article 18 of the constitution, which prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, as a legal prohibition of any form of conscription. Even in the absence of so strict an interpretation, however, a military draft appears politically impossible.
SDF uniformed personnel are recruited as private, E-1, seaman recruit, and airman basic for a fixed term. Ground forces recruits normally enlist for two years; those seeking training in technical specialties enlist for three. Naval and air recruits normally enlist for three years. Officer candidates, students in the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College, and candidate enlist students in technical schools are enrolled for an indefinite period. The National Defense Academy and enlisted technical schools usually require an enrollment of four years, and the National Defense Medical College require six years.
When the SDF was originally formed, women were recruited exclusively for the nursing services. Opportunities were expanded somewhat when women were permitted to join the GSDF communication service in 1967 and the MSDF and ASDF communication services in 1974. By 1991 more than 6,000 women were in the SDF, about 80% of service areas, except those requiring direct exposure to combat, were open to them. The National Defense Medical College graduated its first class with women in March 1991, and the National Defense Academy began admitting women in FY 1992.
In the face of some continued post-World War II public apathy or antipathy toward the armed services, the SDF has difficulties in recruiting personnel. The SDF has to compete for qualified personnel with well-paying industries, and most enlistees are "persuaded" volunteers who sign up after solicitation from recruiters. Predominantly rural prefectures supply military enlistees far beyond the proportions of their populations. In areas such as southern Kyushu and Hokkaido, where employment opportunities are limited, recruiters are welcomed and supported by the citizens. In contrast, little success or cooperation is encountered in urban centers such as Tokyo and Osaka.
Because the forces are all volunteer and legally civilian, members can resign at any time, and retention is a problem. Many enlistees are lured away by the prospects of highly paying civilian jobs, and Defense Agency officials complain of private industries looting their personnel. The agency attempts to stop these practices by threats of sanctions for offending firms that hold defense contracts and by private agreements with major industrial firms. Given the nation's labor shortage, however, the problem is likely to continue.
Some older officers consider the members of the modern forces unequal to personnel of the former Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, but the SDF are generally regarded as professional and able. Compared with their counterparts in other nations, members of the SDF are remarkably well educated and in good physical condition. Literacy is universal, and school training is extensive. Personnel are trained in the martial arts, such as judo and kendo, and physical standards are strict. The SDF probably does not attract the same high level of personnel as other institutions in Japan. Graduates of the top universities rarely enter the armed forces, and applicants to the National Defense Academy are generally considered to be on the level of those who apply to second-rank local universities.
General conditions of military life are not such that a career in the SDF seems an attractive alternative to one in private industry or the bureaucracy. The conditions of service provide less dignity, prestige, and comfort than they had before World War II when militarism was at a high point and military leaders were considered influential in not only military affairs but virtually all forms of government. For most members of the defense establishment, military life offers less status than does a civilian occupation. Those people who enter the SDF are often perceived by the citizenry as unable to find a better job.
As special civil servants, SDF personnel are paid according to civilian pay scales that do not always distinguish rank. At times, SDF salaries are greater for subordinates than for commanding officers; senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with long service can earn more than newly promoted colonels. Pay raises are not included in Defense Agency budgets and can not be established by military planners. Retirement ages for officers below general/flag rank range from fifty-three to fifty-five years, and from fifty to fifty-three for enlisted personnel. Limits are sometimes extended because of personnel shortages. In the late 1980s, the Defense Agency, concerned about the difficulty of finding appropriate post retirement employment for these early retirees, began providing vocational training for enlisted personnel about to retire and transferring them to units close to the place where they intend to retire. Beginning in October 1987, the Self-Defense Forces Job Placement Association provided free job placement and reemployment support for retired SDF personnel. Retirees also receive pensions immediately upon retirement, some ten years earlier than most civil service personnel. Financing the retirement system promises to be a problem of increasing scope in the 1990s, with the aging of the population.
SDF personnel benefits are not comparable to such benefits for active-duty military personnel in other major industrialized nations. Health care is provided at the SDF Central Hospital, fourteen regional hospitals, and 165 clinics in military facilities and on board ship, but the health care only covers physical examinations and the treatment of illness and injury suffered in the course of duty. There are no commissary or exchange privileges. Housing is often substandard, and military appropriations for facilities maintenance often focus on appeasing civilian communities near bases rather than on improving on-base facilities.
Missions and deployments
Having renounced war, the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession of nuclear weaponry, it held the view that it should possess only the minimum defense necessary to face external threats. Within those limits, the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 provides the basis from which various formulations of SDF missions have been derived. The law states that ground, maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression.
The general framework through which these missions are to be accomplished is set forth in the Basic Policy for National Defense adopted by the cabinet in 1957; it remains in force. According to this document, the nation's security would be achieved by supporting the United Nations Organization (UN) and promoting international cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs and enhancing public welfare, by gradually developing an effective self-defense capability, and by dealing with external aggression on the basis of Japan-United States security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the UN.
The very general terms in which military missions are couched left specifics open to wide interpretation and prompted the criticism that the nation did not possess a military strategy. In the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, the cabinet sought to define missions more specifically by setting guidelines for the nation's readiness, including specific criteria for the maintenance and operation of the SDF. Under these guidelines, in cases of limited and small-scale attack, Japanese forces would respond promptly to control the situation. If enemy forces attacked in greater strength than Japan could counter alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until the United States could come to its aid. Against nuclear threat, Japan would rely on the nuclear deterrence of the United States. To accomplish its missions, the SDF would maintain surveillance, be prepared to respond to direct and indirect attacks, be capable of providing command, communication, logistics, and training support, and be available to aid in disaster relief.
The outline specified quotas of personnel and equipment for each force that were deemed necessary to meet its tasks. Particular elements of each force's mission were also identified. The GSDF was to defend against ground invasion and threats to internal security, be able to deploy to any part of the nation, and protect the bases of all three services of the Self-Defense Forces. The MSDF was to meet invasion by sea, sweep mines, patrol and survey the surrounding waters, and guard and defend coastal waters, ports, bays, and major straits. The ASDF was to render aircraft and missile interceptor capability, provide support fighter units for maritime and ground operations, supply air reconnaissance and air transport for all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early warning units.
The Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 envisioned a modernized SDF with an expanded role. While maintaining Japan-United States security arrangements and the exclusively defensive policy mandated by the constitution, this program undertook moderate improvements in Japanese defense capabilities. Among its specific objectives were bettering air defense by improving and modernizing interceptor-fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, improving antisubmarine warfare capability with additional destroyers and fixed-wing antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and upgrading intelligence, reconnaissance, and command, control, and communications. Most of the goals of this program were met, and the goals of the Mid-Term Defense Estimate for FY 1991 through FY 1995, although building on the early program, were considerably scaled back.
The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting, earthquake disasters, searches for missing persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments and levees in the event of flooding. The SDF has not been used in police actions, nor is it likely to be assigned any internal security tasks in the future.
Peacekeeping
In June 1992, the National Diet passed a UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law which permitted the SDF to participate in UN medical, refugee repatriation, logistical support, infrastructural reconstruction, election-monitoring, and policing operations under strictly limited conditions. The non-combatant participation of the SDF in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in conjunction with Japanese diplomatic efforts contributed to the successful implementation of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords for Cambodia. In May 1993, fifty-three members of the SDF were sent to Mozambique to participate in the UN peacekeeping operation there. Nevertheless, the dispatching of SDF personnel outside Japan's borders remained a controversial issue, and members of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the major opposition party, and other parties in the Diet continue to oppose the foreign mobilization of SDF personnel, even to rescue endangered Japanese citizens.
The first overseas deployment without a UN agreement occurred in 2004. The troops were sent to Iraq as peace keepers. In 2005 they briefly assisted the people of Indonesia following the Tsunami.
In 2004, the Japanese government ordered a deployment of troops to Iraq at the behest of the United States: A contingent of the Japan Self-Defense Forces was sent in order to assist the U.S.-led Reconstruction of Iraq.This controversial deployment marked a significant turning point in Japan's history as it is the first time since the end of World War II that Japan sent troops abroad except for a few minor UN peacekeeping deployments. As article 9 of the Constitution of Japan prohibits Japan from using military force except in self-defence, this intervention is considered by some people to be illegal.
Public opinion regarding this deployment was sharply divided, especially given that Japan's military is constitutionally structured as solely a self-defense force, and operating in Iraq seemed at best tenuously connected to that mission. The Koizumi administration, however, decided to send troops to respond to a request from the US. Even though they deployed with their weapons, because of constitutional restraints, the troops were protected by Australian forces. The mission is ongoing. Japan has extended the troop mandate so that they are still in Iraq and are scheduled to stay until at least December 10, 2007. Which that is unkown how long they will be there if the date is changed.
6 JGSDF officers have been deployed to Nepal as part of a UN-mandated peacekeeping effort to enforce a ceasefire between government forces and communist rebels at the last week of March. As required by Article 9 regulations, they are not to engage in any potential combat operations.
In a recent press release, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura had stated that discussions with Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura were taking place regarding the possibility of creating a permanent law for JSDF forces to be deployed in peacekeeping missions outside Japan.
Role in national life
The Defense Agency, aware that it could not accomplish its programs without popular support, paid close attention to public opinion. Although the Japanese people retained a lingering suspicion of the armed services, in the late 1980s antimilitarism had moderated, compared with its form in the early 1950s when the SDF was established. At that time, fresh from the terrible defeat of World War II, most people had ceased to believe that the military could maintain peace or serve the national interest. By the mid-1970s, memories of World War II had faded, and a growing number of people believed that Japan's military and diplomatic roles should reflect its rapidly growing economic strength. At the same time, United States-Soviet strategic contention in the area around Japan had increased. In 1976 Defense Agency director general Sakata Michita called upon the cabinet to adopt the National Defense Program Outline to improve the quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly defensive role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a ceiling on military expenditures of 1 % of the gross national product (GNP) and a prohibition on exporting weapons and military technology. The outline was adopted by the cabinet and, according to public opinion polls, was approved by approximately 60 % of the people. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF improved and public approval of the improved forces went up.
In November 1982, when the Defense Agency's former director general, Nakasone Yasuhiro, became prime minister, he was under strong pressure from the United States and other Western nations to move toward a more assertive defense policy in line with Japan's status as a major world economic and political power. Strong antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public opinion, however, especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone chose a compromise solution, gradually building up the SDF and steadily increasing defense spending while guarding against being drawn beyond self-defense into collective security. In 1985 he developed the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. Although that program had general public backing, its goals could not be met while retaining the ceiling of 1 % of GNP on military spending, which still had strong public support. At first the government tried to get around the problem by deferring payment, budgeting only the initial costs of major military hardware. But by late 1986, it had become obvious that the 1 % ceiling had to be superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an extraordinary night meeting, the cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987 Asahi Shimbun poll indicated that this move was made in defiance of public opinion: only 15 % approved the removal of the ceiling and 61 % disapproved. But a January 1988 poll conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister reported that 58 % approved the defense budget of 1.004 % of GNP for fiscal year 1987.
During 1987 the Japanese government reviewed ways in which it could assist friendly forces in protecting shipping in the Persian Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously considered, including sending minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the government determined that sending any military forces to the gulf would be unacceptable to the Japanese people. Instead, the Japanese government agreed to fund the installation of radio navigation guides for gulf shipping.
Appreciation of the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s, with over half of the respondents in a 1988 survey voicing an interest in the SDF and over 76 % indicating that they were favorably impressed. Although the majority (63.5 %) of respondents were aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance of national security, an even greater number (77 %) saw disaster relief as the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore continued to devote much of its time and resources to disaster relief and other civic action. Between 1984 and 1988, at the request of prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in approximately 3,100 disaster relief operations, involving about 138,000 personnel, 16,000 vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small craft. In addition, the SDF participated in earthquake disaster prevention operations and disposed of a large quantity of World War II explosive ordnance, especially in Okinawa. The forces also participated in public works projects, cooperated in managing athletic events, took part in annual Antarctic expeditions, and conducted aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for fishermen and on geographic formations for construction projects. Especially sensitive to maintaining harmonious relations with communities close to defense bases, the SDF built new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those areas. Soundproofing was installed in homes and public buildings near airfields. Despite these measures, local resistance to military installations remained strong in some areas.
Notable JSDF figures
See also
Footnotes
Other references
Further reading
- Maeda, Tetsuo, David J. Kenney (ed. and intro.), and Steven Karpa (trans.). The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan’s Military Forces. Chicago: edition q, 1995. ISBN 1883695015.
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