Graham Priest
Encyclopedia
Graham Priest is Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy
Philosophy
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational...

 at the University of Melbourne
University of Melbourne
The University of Melbourne is a public university located in Melbourne, Victoria. Founded in 1853, it is the second oldest university in Australia and the oldest in Victoria...

 and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as a regular visitor at St. Andrews University. Priest is a fellow in residence at Ormond College. He was educated at the University of Cambridge
University of Cambridge
The University of Cambridge is a public research university located in Cambridge, United Kingdom. It is the second-oldest university in both the United Kingdom and the English-speaking world , and the seventh-oldest globally...

 and the London School of Economics
London School of Economics
The London School of Economics and Political Science is a public research university specialised in the social sciences located in London, United Kingdom, and a constituent college of the federal University of London...

. His thesis advisor was John Lane Bell
John Lane Bell
John Bell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario in Canada. He is an outstanding figure in mathematical logic and philosophy...

.

Work

He is known for his defense of dialetheism
Dialetheism
Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true...

, his in-depth analyses of the logical paradox
Paradox
Similar to Circular reasoning, A paradox is a seemingly true statement or group of statements that lead to a contradiction or a situation which seems to defy logic or intuition...

es, and his many writings related to paraconsistent
Paraconsistent logic
A paraconsistent logic is a logical system that attempts to deal with contradictions in a discriminating way. Alternatively, paraconsistent logic is the subfield of logic that is concerned with studying and developing paraconsistent systems of logic.Inconsistency-tolerant logics have been...

 and other non-classical logic
Non-classical logic
Non-classical logics is the name given to formal systems which differ in a significant way from standard logical systems such as propositional and predicate logic. There are several ways in which this is done, including by way of extensions, deviations, and variations...

s.

Priest, a long-time resident of Australia
Australia
Australia , officially the Commonwealth of Australia, is a country in the Southern Hemisphere comprising the mainland of the Australian continent, the island of Tasmania, and numerous smaller islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is the world's sixth-largest country by total area...

, is the author of numerous books, and has published articles in nearly every major philosophical and logical journal. He was a frequent collaborator with the late Richard Sylvan
Richard Sylvan
Richard Sylvan was a philosopher, logician, and environmentalist.- Biography :Sylvan was born Francis Richard Routley in Levin, New Zealand, and his early work is cited with this surname...

, a fellow proponent of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic.

Priest has also published on metaphilosophy
Metaphilosophy
Metaphilosophy, also called philosophy of philosophy, is the study of the nature, aims, and methods of philosophy. The term is derived from Greek word meta μετά and philosophía φιλοσοφία ....

.

In addition to his work in philosophy and logic, Priest practices Karate-do. He is 3rd Dan, International Karate-do Shobukai; 4th Dan, Shi’to Ryu, and an Australian National Kumite Referee and Kata Judge.

Books

  • On Paraconsistency (with R. Routley). Research Report #l3, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University l983. Reprinted as the introductory chapters of Paraconsistent Logic, G.Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (eds.), Philosophia Verlag, 1989. Translated into Romanian as chapters in I. Lucica (ed.), Ex Falso Quodlibet: studii de logica paraconsistenta (in Romanian), Editura Technica, 2004.
  • In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. Second edition Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-19-926330-2
  • Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-924421-9
  • Logic: a Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-19-289320-3 Translated into Portuguese as Lógica para Começar, Temas & Debates, 2002. Translated into Spanish as Una Brevísima Introducción a la Lógica, Oceano, 2006. Translated into Czech, as Logika – průvodce pro každého, Dokořán, 2007. Translated into Japanese, Iwanami Shoten, 2008.
  • Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge University, 2001. Second edition: Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is, Cambridge University Press, 2008. ISBN 9780521670265 http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521670265 German translation of Part 1 of Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is: Einführung in die nicht-klassische logic, Mentis 2008.
  • Towards Non-Being: the Semantics and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-19-926254-3
  • Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-19-926328-0
  • Logic: A Brief Insight, Sterling 2010. ISBN 1-4027-6896-6

Articles

  • 'Gruesome Simplicity', Philosophy of Science 1976, 43, 432-7.
  • 'Modality as a Metaconcept', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1976, XVII, 401-414. http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093887632
  • 'The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition' (with S. Read), Mind 1977, LXXXVI, 109-113.
  • 'A Refoundation of Modal Logic', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1977, XVIII, 340-354. http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093888007
  • 'Logic of Paradox', Journal of Philosophical Logic 1979, 8, 219-241. Translated into French as ‘La Logique du Paradoxe’, Philosophie 94 (2007), 72-94.
  • 'Indefinite Descriptions', Logique et Analyse 1979, 22, 5-21.
  • 'A Note on the Sorites Paradox', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1979, 57, 74-75.
  • 'Two Dogmas of Quineanism', Philosophical Quarterly 1979, 29, 289-301.
  • 'Sense, Entailment and Modus Ponens', Journal of Philosophical Logic 1980, 9, 415-35.
  • 'Merely Confused Supposition' (with S. Read), Franciscan Studies 1980, 40, XVIII, 265-297.
  • 'Ockham's Rejection of Ampliation' (with S. Read), Mind 1981, 90, 274-9.
  • 'The Argument from Design', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1981, 59, 422-43.
  • 'The Logical Paradoxes and the Law of Excluded Middle', Philosophical Quarterly 1983, 33, 160-65.
  • 'To be and not to be: Dialectical Tense Logic', Studia Logica 198l, 41, 157-176; translated into Bulgarian and reprinted in Filosofska Missal XL(8), 1984, 63-76.
  • 'Lessons from Pseudo-Scotus' (with R. Routley), Philosophical Studies 1982, 42, 189-99.
  • 'The Truth Teller Paradox' (with C. Mortensen), Logique et Analyse 1981, 95-6, 381-8.
  • 'An Anti-Realist Account of Mathematical Truth', Synthese 1983, 57, 49-65. Reprinted as ch. 8 of D. Jacquette (ed.) Philosophy of Mathematics, Blackwell, 2002.
  • 'Logic of Paradox Revisited', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1984, 12, 153-179.
  • 'Semantic Closure', Studia Logica l984, 43, 117-29.
  • 'Introduction to Paraconsistent Logic' (with R. Routley), Studia Logica l983, 44, 3-16.
  • 'Hypercontradictions', Logique et Analyse 1984, 107, 237-43.
  • 'Hume's Final Argument', History of Philosophy Quarterly 1985, 2, 349-352.
  • 'Contradictions in Motion', American Philosophical Quarterly 1985, 22, 339-46.
  • 'Contradiction, Belief and Rationality', Proc. Aristotelian Society 1985/6, LXXXVI, 99-116.
  • 'Tense and Truth Conditions', Analysis 1986, 46, 162-6.
  • 'The Logic of Nuclear Armaments', Critical Philosophy 1986, 3, 107-113.
  • 'Unstable Solutions to the Liar Paradox' in Self Reference: Reflections and Reflexivity, S.J. Bartlett and P. Suber (eds.), Nijhoff, 1987.
  • 'Tense, Tense and TENSE', Analysis 47, 1987, 177-9.
  • 'Reasoning about Truth', Technical Report TR-ARP-2/88, Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University, 1988.
  • 'Consistency by Default', Technical Report TR-ARP-3/88, Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University, 1988.
  • 'When Inconsistency is Inescapable', South African Journal of Philosophy, 7, 1988, 83-89.
  • 'Primary Qualities are Secondary Qualities Too', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1989, 40 , 29-37.
  • 'Contradiction, Assertion, and "Frege's Point"' (with R. Sylvan), Analysis, 49, 1989, 23-6.
  • 'Reasoning About Truth', Artificial Intelligence, 39, 1989, 231-44.
  • 'Denyer's $ not Backed by Sterling Arguments', Mind, 98, (1989), 265-8.
  • 'Classical Logic Aufgehogen' in Paraconsistent Logic, G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (eds.), Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
  • 'Reductio ad Absurdum et Modus Tollendo Ponens' in Paraconsistent Logic, G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (eds.), Philosophia Verlag, 1989. Reprinted in Rumanian in I. Lucica (ed.), Ex Falso Quodlibet: studii de logica paraconsistenta (in Romanian), Editura Technica, 2004.
  • 'Relevance, Truth and Meaning' (with J. Crosthwaite) in Directions of Relevant Logic, R. Sylvan and J. Norman (eds.), Nijhoff, 1989.
  • 'Gegen Wessel', Philosophische Logik 1989, 2, 109-20.
  • 'Dialectic and Dialetheic', Science and Society 1990, 53, 388-415.
  • 'Boolean Negation, and All That', Journal of Philosophical Logic 1990, 19, 201-15.
  • 'Paraconsistent Dialogues' (with J.McKenzie), Logique et Analyse, 131-2 (1990), 339-57.
  • 'Was Marx a Dialetheist?', Science and Society, 1991, 54, 468-75.
  • 'Minimally Inconsistent LP', Studia Logica, 1991, 50, 321-331.
  • 'Intensional Paradoxes', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32 (1991), 193-211. http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093635745
  • 'The Limits of Thought - and Beyond', Mind 100 (1991), 361-70.
  • Sorites and Identity', Logique et Analyse, 135-6 (1991), 293-6.
  • 'Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics' (with R.Sylvan), Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1992, 21, 217-32.
  • 'On Time', Philosophia, 50 (1992), 9-18.
  • 'What is a Non-Normal World?', Logique et Analyse 35 (1992), 291-302.
  • Another Disguise of the same Fundamental Problems: Barwise and Etchemendy on the Liar', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1993), 60-9.
  • 'Yu and Your Mind', Synthese, 95 (1993), 459-60.
  • 'Can Contradictions be True?, II', Proc. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 67 (1993), 35-54.
  • 'Derrida and Self-Reference', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994), 103-11.
  • 'The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference', Mind 103 (1994), 25-34.
  • 'Is Arithmetic Consistent?', Mind, 103 (1994), 337-49.
  • 'What Could the Least Inconsistent Number be?', Logique et Analyse, 37 (1994), 3-12.
  • 'Goedel's Theorem and Creativity', in Creativity, ed. T Dartnall, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. Reprinted with a different introduction as 'Goedel's Theorem and the Mind... Again', in Philosophy of Mind: the place of philosophy in the study of mind, eds. M.Michaelis and J. O'Leary-Horthorne, Kluwer, 1994.
  • 'Etchemendy and Logical Consequence', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1995), 283-92.
  • 'Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25 (1995), 57-66.
  • 'Multiple Denotation, Ambiguity and the Strange Case of the Missing Amoeba', Logique et Analyse, 38 (1995), 361-73.
  • 'Some Priorities of Berkeley', Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, ed. B.J.Copeland, Oxford University Press, 1996.
  • 'Everett's Trilogy', Mind, 105 (1996), 631-47.
  • 'On Inconsistent Arithmetics: Reply to Denyer', Mind, 105 (1996), 649-59.
  • 'The Definition of Sexual Harassment' (with J.Crosthwaite), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996), 66-82. Reprinted in G. Lee Bowie and Meredith Michaels (eds.), 13 Questions in Ethics and Social Philosophy, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 2nd ed., 1997.
  • 'Paraconsistent Logic', Encyclopaedia of Mathematics; Supplement, ed. M. Hazenwinkle, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 400-1.
  • 'Logic, Nonstandard', pp. 307–10, Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Supplement, ed. D.Borshert, MacMillan, 1996.
  • Paraconsistent Logic' (with K.Tanaka), Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, created 1996. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/
  • On a Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays', Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1997), 45-56.
  • 'The Linguistic Construction of Reality', Exordium 6 (1997), 1-7.
  • 'Sylvan's Box', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1997), 573-82. http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1039540770
  • 'Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic; I Finite Models', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26 (1997), 223-35.
  • Sexual Perversion', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997), 360-72. Translated into Croatian, ch. 9 of I. Primoratz (ed.), Suvremena filozofija seksualnosti, Zagreb: KruZak, 2003.
  • 'Yablo's Paradox', Analysis 57 (1997), 236-42.
  • 'Language, its Possibility, and Ineffability', pp. 790–794 of P. Wiengartner, G.Schurz and G.Dorn (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1997.
  • 'What's so Bad about Contradictions?', Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), pp. 410–26
  • On an Error in Grove's Proof' (with K.Tanaka), Logique et Analyse 158 (1997), 215-7.
  • 'Paraconsistent Logic', Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, 208-11, ed. E.Craig, Routledge, 1998.
  • 'Fuzzy Identity and Local Validity', Monist 81 (1998), 331-42.
  • 'Number', Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, 47-54, ed. E.Craig, Routledge, 1998.
  • 'To be and Not to Be - That is the Answer. On Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction', Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse 1 (1998), 91-130.
  • 'The Trivial Object and the Non-Triviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions', Journal of Applied and Non-Classical Logic, 8 (1998), 171-83.
  • 'The Import of Inclosure; some Comments on Grattan-Guiness’, Mind 107 (1998), 835-40.
  • 'Dialetheism', Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, created 1998. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
  • 'What not? A Defence of a Dialetheic Account of Negation', in D.Gabbay and H.Wansing (eds.), What is Negation?, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
  • 'Negation as Cancellation, and Connexivism', Topoi 18 (1999), 141-8.
  • 'On a Version of one of Zeno's Paradoxes', Analysis 59 (1999), 1-2.
  • 'Perceiving Contradictions', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999), 439-46.
  • 'Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Triviality’, the Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1999), 549-58.
  • 'Validity', pp. 183–206 of A.Varzi (ed.) The Nature of Logic, CSLI Publications, 1999. (European Review of Philosophy, vol. 4). An abbreviated version under the same title appears as pp. 18–25 of The Logica Yearbook, 1997, ed. T.Childers, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Republic.
  • 'Truth and Contradiction', Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000), 305-19.
  • 'Paraconsistent Belief Revision', Theoria 68 (2001), 214-28.
  • 'Could everything be True?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 189-95.
  • 'The Logic of Backwards Inductions', Economics and Philosophy 16 (2000), 267-85.
  • ‘Worlds Apart', Mind! 2000 (a supplement to Mind 109 (2000)), 25-31.
  • ‘Vasil’év and Imaginary Logic’ , History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2000), 135-46.
  • 'Motivations for Paraconsistency: the Slippery Slope from Classical Logic to Dialetheism', in D.Batens et al. (eds.), Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, Research Studies Press, 2000.
  • 'Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic II; the Genera Case', Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2000), 1519-29.
  • ‘On the Principle of Uniform Solution: a Reply to Smith’, Mind 109 (2000), 123-6.
  • ‘Objects of Thought’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 494-502.
  • Logic: One or Many’ in J. Woods, and B. Brown (eds.), pp. 23–28 of Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches Proceedings of the 1999 Conference of the Society of Exact Philosophy, Stanmore: Hermes, 2001.
  • 'Heidegger and the Grammar of Being’, ch. 10 of R.Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early 20th Century Philosophy, Routledge, 2001.
  • ‘Why it’s Irrational to Believe in Consistency’, pp. 284–93 of Rationality and Irrationality; Proc. 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, eds., B.Brogard and B.Smith, 2001.
  • 'Paraconsistent Logic', Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 6, pp. 287 – 393, eds. D.Gabbay and F. Guenthner, 2nd edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
  • 'Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences', in J. Meheus (ed.), Inconsistency in Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
  • ‘Logicians Setting Together Contradictories. A Perspective on Relevance, Paraconsistency, and Dialetheism’, ch. 14 of D.Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell, 2002.
  • ‘Fuzzy Relevant Logic’, Paraconsistency: the Logical Way to the Inconsistent, ed. W.Carnielli et al., Marcel Dekker, 2002.
  • 'The Hooded Man', Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2002), 445-67.
  • ‘Rational Dilemmas’, Analysis 62 (2002), 11-16.
  • ‘Meinong and the Philosophy of Mathematics’, Philosophica Mathematica 11 (2003), 3-15..
  • 'On Alternative Geometries, Arithmetics and Logics, a Tribute to Lukasiewicz', Studia Logica 74 (2003), 441-468.
  • 'Where is Philosophy at the Start of the Twenty First century?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2003), 85-96.
  • ‘Geometries and Arithmetics’, pp. 65–78 of P.Weingartner (ed.), Alternative Logics; Do Sciences Need Them?, Springer Verlag, 2003.
  • A Site for Sorites', pp. 9–23 of J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2003.
  • 'Inconsistent Arithmetic: Issues Technical and Philosophical', pp. 273–99 of V. F. Hendricks and J. Malinowski
    Jacek Malinowski
    - External links :*...

    (eds.), Trends in Logic: 50 Years of Studia Logica (Studia Logica Library, Vol. 21), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
  • 'Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought’ (with Jay Garfield), Philosophy East West 53 (2003), 1-21. Reprinted as ch. 5 of J. Garfield, Empty Words, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • 'Consistency, Paraconsistency and the Logical Limitative Theorems', in Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen (XIX Deutscher Kongress für Philosphie), ed. W. Hogrebe and J. Bromond, Akademie Verlag, 2004.
  • ‘Chunk and Permeate I: the Infinitesimal Calculus’ (with Bryson Brown), Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (2004), 379-88.
  • 'Intentionality - Meinongianisn and the Medievals', (with Stephen Read), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82 (2004), 421-442.
  • 'Spiking the Field Artillery', in J. C. Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), ch. 3 of Truth and Deflationism, Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • 'Problems with the Argument for Fine Tuning' (with Mark Colyvan and Jay Garfield), Synthese 145 (2005), 325-38.
  • 'Words Without Knowledge', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005), 686-94
  • ‘The Limits of Language’ in K. Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, (second edition) Vol.7, 156-9, Elsevier, 2005.
  • ‘Analetheism: a Phyrric Victory’ (with Brad Armour-Garb), Analysis 65 (2005), 167-73.
  • ‘Analysing of the Iraqi Adventure’, Ormond Papers 22 (2005), 147-50.
  • 'The Paradoxes of Denotation', ch. 7 of Self-Reference, eds. T. Bolander, V. F. Hendrix, and S. A Pedersen, CLSI Lecture Notes, Stanford University, 2006.
  • ‘Logic, Paraconsistent’, in D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (second edition), Macmillan, 2006, Vol. 7, 105-6.
  • ‘Logic, Relevant (Relevance)’, in D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (second edition), Macmillan, 2006, Vol. 8, 358-9.
  • ‘Motion’, in D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (second edition), Macmillan, 2006, Vol. 6, 409-11.
  • ‘Restricted Quantification in Relevant Logic’, (with JC Beall, R. Brady, A. Hazen, and G. Restall) Journal of Philosophical Logic 35/6 (2006), 587-98. http://consequently.org/papers/rrq.pdf
  • `What is Philosophy?’, Philosophy 81 (2006), 189-207.
  • ‘A Hundred Flowers’, Topoi 25 (2006), 91-5.
  • ‘Not so Deep Inconsistency: a Reply to Eklund’ (with JC Beall), Australasian Journal of Logic 5 (2007) 74-84.
  • ‘Paraconsistency and Dialetheism’, pp. 129–204 of Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 8, eds. D. Gabbay and J. Woods, North Holland, 2007.
  • ‘Reply to Slater’, pp. 467–74 of J-Y Beziau, W. Carnielli and D. Gabbay (eds.), Handbook of Paraconsistency, College Publications, 2007.
  • ‘60% Proof: Proof, Lakatos and Paraconsistency’, (with Neil Thomason), Australasian Journal of Logic 5 (2007), 89-100.
  • ‘Revenge, Field, and ZF’, ch. 9 of JC Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • ‘How the Particular Quantifier became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs’, Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2007), 197-213.
  • 'Translation of ‘Logic of Paradox’, ‘La Logique du paraqdoxe’, Philosophie 94 (2007), 72-94.
  • ‘The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism’ (with J. Garfield and Y. Deguchi), Philosophy East and West 58 (2008), 395-402.
  • ‘Jaina Logic: a Contemporary Perspective’, History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (2008), 263-278.
  • ‘Precis of Towards Non-Being’, Review of Metaphysics 74 (2008), 185-90.
  • ‘Replies to Nolan and Kroon’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2008), 208-14.
  • ‘Many-Valued Modal Logic: a Simple Approach’, Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2008), 190-203.
  • ‘The Closing of the Mind: How the Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs’, Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2008), 42-55.
  • ‘Graham Priest and Diderik Batens Interview Each Other’, The Reasoner 2 (No. 8) (2008), 2-4.
  • ‘Creating Non-Existents: Some Initial Thoughts’, Studies in Logic, 1 (2008), 18-24.
  • ‘Badici on Inclosures’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 583-96.
  • ‘Logical Pluralism Hollandaise’, The Australasian Journal of Logic, 6 (2008), 210-14.
  • 'Envelops and Indifference', (with Greg Restall), pages 283-290 in Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things, essays in honour of Shahid Rahman, edited by Cédric Dégremont, Laurent Keiff and Helge Rückert, College Publications, 2008. http://consequently.org/papers/envelopes.pdf
  • 'Conditionals: a Debate with Jackson', ch. 13 of I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Worlds and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • ‘Beyond the Limits of Knowledge’, ch. 7 (pp. 93–104) of J. Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • ‘The Structure of Emptiness’, Philosophy East and West 59 (2009), 467-480.
  • ‘Mountains are Just Mountains’ (with Jay Garfield), pp. 71–82 of J. Garfield and M. D’Amato (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism. Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • ‘Obituary for Leonard Goddard’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009) 693-4.
  • Translation of ‘Objects of Thought’ into Japanese, in Human Ontology 15 (2009), 1-12. (Trans. S. Yamahguchi.)
  • ‘Neighbourhood Semantics for Intentional Operators’, Review of Symbolic Logic, 2 (2009), 360-373.
  • ‘Not to Be’, ch. 23 of R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonical, and R. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge 2009.
  • 'Dualising Intuitionist Negation', 13(2): 165-84 (2009).
  • 'A Case of Mistaken Identity’, ch. 11, pp. 205–222 of J. Lear and A. Oliver, The Force of Argument, Routledge, 2010.
  • ‘Hopes Fade for Saving Truth’, Philosophy 85 (2010), 109-140. http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&pdftype=1&fid=7209084&jid=PHI&volumeId=85&issueId=01&aid=7209076
  • ‘Two Truths: Two Models’, to appear in the Cowherds (eds.), Moonshadows, Oxford University Press.
  • ‘The Truth(s) about the Two Truths’, (with T.Tilemans and M. Siderits) to appear in the Cowherds (eds.), Moonshadows, Oxford University Press (2010).
  • ‘Inclosures, Vagueness and Self-Reference’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Volume 51, Number 1 (2010), 69-84.

External links

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