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Freedom of speech in the United States
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Freedom of speech in the United States is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by many state constitutions and state and federal laws. Criticism of the government and advocacy of unpopular ideas that people may find distasteful or against public policy, such as racism, are generally permitted. There are exceptions to the general protection of speech, however, including the Miller test for obscenity, child pornography laws, and regulation of commercial speech such as advertising.
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Freedom of speech in the United States is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by many state constitutions and state and federal laws. Criticism of the government and advocacy of unpopular ideas that people may find distasteful or against public policy, such as racism, are generally permitted. There are exceptions to the general protection of speech, however, including the Miller test for obscenity, child pornography laws, and regulation of commercial speech such as advertising. Other limitations on free speech often balance rights to free speech and other rights, such as property rights for authors and inventors (copyright), interests in "fair" political campaigns (Campaign finance laws), protection from imminent or potential violence against particular persons (restrictions on Hate speech or fighting words), or the use of untruths to harm others (slander). Distinctions are often made between speech and other acts which may have symbolic significance. Efforts have been made to ban flag desecration, for example, though currently that act remains protected speech.
Historical background
England
During colonial times, English speech regulations were rather restrictive. An English seditious libel law made criticizing the government a crime. Chief Justice Holt, writing in 1704, explained the apparent need for the prohibition of no government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all governments that the people should have a good opinion of it. The objective truth of a statement in violation of the seditious libel law was not a defense.
Until 1694, England had an elaborate system of licensing. No publication was allowed without the accompaniment of a government-granted license.
Colonies
The colonies originally had different views on the protection of free speech. During English colonialism in America, there were fewer prosecutions for seditious libel than England, but other controls over dissident speech existed. Professor Levy said that each community "tended to be a tight little island clutching its own respective orthodoxy and . . . eager to banish or extralegally punish unwelcome dissidents."
The most stringent controls on speech in the colonial period were controls that outlawed or otherwise censored speech that was considered blasphemous in a religious sense. A 1646 Massachusetts law, for example, punished persons who denied the immortality of the soul. In 1612, a Virginia governor declared the death penalty for a person that denied the Trinity under Virginia's Laws Divine, Moral and Martial, which also outlawed blasphemy, speaking badly of ministers and royalty, and "disgraceful words."
More recent scholarship, focusing on seditious speech in the 17th-century colonies (when there was no press), has shown that from 1607 to 1700 the colonists' freedom of speech expanded dramatically, laying a foundation for the political dissent that flowered among the Revolutionary generation. See Larry D. Eldridge, A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America (NYU Press, 1994). Leonard Levy wrote of this book: "Anyone who has not read A Distant Heritage cannot know the history of freedom of speech."
The trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 was a seditious libel prosecution for Zenger's publication of criticisms of the Governor of New York. Andrew Hamilton represented Zenger and argued that truth should be a defense to the crime of seditious libel, but the court rejected this argument. Hamilton persuaded the jury, however, to disregard the law and to acquit Zenger. The case is considered a victory for freedom of speech as well as a prime example of jury nullification. The case marked the beginning of a trend of greater acceptance and tolerance of free speech.
The First Amendment
In the 1780s after the American Revolutionary War, debate over the adoption of a new Constitution resulted in a division between Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton who favored a strong federal government, and Anti-Federalists, such as Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry who favored a weaker federal government. During and after the Constitution ratification process, Anti-Federalists and state legislatures expressed concern that the new Constitution placed too much emphasis on the power of the federal government. The drafting and eventual adoption of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, was, in large part, a result of these concerns, as the Bill of Rights limited the power of the federal government.
The First Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791. The Amendment states:
- Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
The Supreme Court applied the incorpation principle to the right of free speech with the case of Gitlow v. New York. This decision applied First Amendment speech rights to state laws as well as federal ones.
The Alien and Sedition Acts
In 1798, Congress, which contained several of the drafters and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights at the time, adopted the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The law prohibited the publication of "false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States."
The law did allow truth as a defense and required proof of malicious intent. The 1798 Act, however, made ascertainment of the intent of the framers in regard to the First Amendment somewhat difficult, as some of the members of Congress that supported the adoption of the First Amendment also voted to adopt the 1798 Act. The Federalists under President John Adams aggressively used the law against their rivals, the Democratic-Republicans. The Alien and Sedition Acts were a major political issue in the 1800 election, and after he was elected President, Thomas Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted under the Act. The Act expired and the Supreme Court never ruled on its constitutionality.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court declared "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
First Amendment interpretation
Freedom of speech in the U.S. follows a graduated system, with different types of regulations subject to different levels of scrutiny in court challenges based on the First Amendment, often depending on the type of speech.
Types of Speech
Core Political Speech
This is the most highly guarded form of speech because of its purely expressive nature and importance to a functional democracy. Most simply, core political speech is interactive communications about political ideas or issues that are not motivated by profit. Restrictions placed upon core political speech must weather strict scrutiny analysis or they will be struck down.
Commercial Speech
Not wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment is speech motivated by profit. Such speech still has expressive value although it is being uttered in a marketplace ordinarily regulated by the state. Restrictions of commercial speech are subject to a four-element intermediate scrutiny. (Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission)
Types of restraints on speech
Time, place, or manner restrictions
Time, place, or manner restrictions must meet the rational basis test (the lowest level of scrutiny) and are usually upheld, unless their requirements have an especially burdensome impact on speech. Note that any regulations that would force speakers to change how or what they say do not fall into this category (so the government cannot restrict one medium even if it leaves open another). Time, place, or manner restrictions must be:
- Content neutral
- A significant governmental interest
- Narrowly tailored
- Leave open ample alternative channels of communication
Content-based restrictions
Restrictions that require examining the content of speech to be applied must pass strict scrutiny.
Viewpoint-based restrictions
Restrictions that apply to certain viewpoints but not others face the highest level of scrutiny, and are almost always overturned, unless they fall into one of the court's special exceptions.
Special exceptions
Obscenity, defined by the Miller test by applying contemporary community standards, is one exception. It is speech to which all of the following apply: appeals to the prurient interest, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. (This is usually applied to more hard-core forms of pornography.)
Fighting words are words or phrases that are likely to induce the listener to get in a fight. This previously applied to words like nigger, but with people getting less sensitive to words, this exception is little-used. Restrictions on hate speech have been generally overturned by the courts; such speech cannot be targeted for its content but may be targeted in other ways, if it involves speech beyond the First Amendment's protection like incitement to immediate violence or defamation.
Speech that presents imminent lawless action was originally banned under the clear and present danger test established by Schenck v. United States, but this test has since been replaced by the imminent lawless action test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio. The canonical example, enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, is falsely yelling "Fire!" in a crowded movie theater. The trend since Holmes's time has been to restrict the clear and present danger exception to apply to speech which is completely apolitical in content.
Restrictions on commercial speech, defined as speech mainly in furtherance of selling a product, is subject to a lower level of scrutiny than other speech, although recently the court has taken steps to bring it closer to parity with other speech. This is why the government can ban advertisements for cigarettes and false information on corporate prospectuses (which try to sell stock in a company).
Limits placed on libel and slander have been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court narrowed the definition of libel with the case of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell made famous in the movie The People vs. Larry Flynt.
The Government Speech Doctrine establishes that the government may censor speech when the speech is its own, leading to a number of contentious decisions on its breadth.
Prior restraint
If the government tries to restrain speech before it is spoken, as opposed to punishing it afterwards, it must: clearly define what's illegal, cover the minimum speech necessary, make a quick decision, be backed up by a court, bear the burden of suing and proving the speech is illegal, and show that allowing the speech would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people" (New York Times Co. v. United States). U.S. courts have not permitted most prior restraints since the case of Near v. Minnesota in 1931.
Schools
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Supreme Court extended broad First Amendment protection to children attending public schools, prohibiting censorship unless there is "substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others". Several subsequent ruling have affirmed or narrowed this protection. Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986) supported disciplinary action against a student whose campaign speech was filled with sexual innuendo, and determined to be "indecent" but not "obscene". Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) allowed censorship in school newspapers which had not been established as forums for free student expression. Guiles v. Marineau (2006) affirmed the right of a student to wear a T-shirt mocking President George W. Bush, including allegations of alcohol and drug use. Morse v. Frederick (2007) supported the suspension of a student holding a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at a school-supervised event which was not on school grounds. In Lowry v. Watson Chapel School District, an appeals court struck down a school dress code and literature distribution policy for being vague and in practice overly prohibitive of criticism against the school district.
Such protections also apply to public colleges and universities. For example, student newspapers which have been established as forums for free expression have been granted broad protection by appeals courts.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), the Supreme Court of the United States held (in a unanimous decision) that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was offended by a school district that refused to allow a church access to school premises to show films dealing with family and child-rearing issues faced by parents.
State action and lack thereof
A major issue in freedom of speech jurisprudence has been whether the First Amendment merely runs against state actors or whether it can run against private actors as well. Specifically, the issue is whether private landowners should be permitted to utilize the machinery of government to exclude others from engaging in free speech on their property (which means balancing the speakers' First Amendment rights against the Takings Clause). The right of freedom of speech within private shopping centers owned by others has been vigorously litigated under both the federal and state Constitutions. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980).
Censorship
While personal freedom of speech is usually respected, freedom of press and mass publishing encounter some restrictions. Some of the recent issues include:
- United States military censoring blogs written by military personnel.
- The Federal Communications Commission censoring television and radio, citing obscenity, e.g., Howard Stern and Opie and Anthony (Though the FCC only has the power to regulate over the air broadcasts and not cable or satellite television or satellite radio).
See also Roth v. United States
As of 2005, United States was ranked 44th of 167 countries in annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders. In the 2006 index the United States has fallen nine places and is now ranked 53rd of 168 countries. The US ranked 48th in 2007, however, moving back up 5 places.
Freedom of expression
While freedom of expression by non-speech means is commonly thought to be protected under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has only recently taken this view. As late as 1968 (United States v. O'Brien) the Supreme Court stated that regulating non-speech can justify limitations on speech. The Court carried this distinction between speech and expression through the early part of the 1980s (Clark v. CCNV, 1984). It was not until the flag-burning cases of 1989 (Texas v. Johnson) and 1990 (United States v. Eichman), that the Supreme Court accepted that non-speech means applied to freedom of expression and freedom of speech.
Freedom of speech on the Internet
In a rare 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court extended the full protection of the First Amendment to the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, a decision which struck down portions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act, a law intended to outlaw so-called "indecent" online communication (that is, non-obscene material protected by the First Amendment.) The court's decision identified the Internet as a "free speech zone," and extended the same Constitutional protections given to books, magazines, films, and spoken expression to materials published on the Internet. Congress tried a second time to regulate the content of the Internet with the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). The Court again ruled that any limitations on the internet were unconstitutional in American Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft (2002).
In United States v. American Library Association (2003) the Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the authority to require public schools and libraries receiving e-rate discounts to install filters as a condition of receiving federal funding. The justices said that any First Amendment concerns were addressed by the provisions in the Children's Internet Protection Act that permit adults to ask librarians to disable the filters or unblock individual sites.
See also
Further reading
- Larry D. Eldridge, A Distant Heritage: The Growth of Free Speech in Early America (NYU Press, 1994).
External links
- - Americans' freedom of speech within the internet and how it is being put in jeopardy.
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