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First Taranaki War
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The First Taranaki War was an armed conflict over land ownership and sovereignty that took place between Maori and the New Zealand Government in the Taranaki district of New Zealand's North Island from March 1860 to March 1861.
The war was fought by more than 3500 imperial troops brought in from Australia, as well as volunteer soldiers and militia, against Maori forces that fluctuated between a few hundred and about 1500.
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Encyclopedia
The First Taranaki War was an armed conflict over land ownership and sovereignty that took place between Maori and the New Zealand Government in the Taranaki district of New Zealand's North Island from March 1860 to March 1861.
The war was fought by more than 3500 imperial troops brought in from Australia, as well as volunteer soldiers and militia, against Maori forces that fluctuated between a few hundred and about 1500. Total losses among the imperial, volunteer and militia troops are estimated to have been 238, while Maori casualties totalled about 200, although the proportion of Maori casualties was higher.
The war ended in a ceasefire, with neither side explicitly accepting the peace terms of the other. Though there were claims by the British that they had won the war, there were widely-held views at the time they had suffered an unfavourable and humiliating result. Historians have also been divided on the result. Historian James Belich has claimed that Maori succeeded in thwarting the British bid to impose sovereignty over them, and had therefore been victorious. But he said the Maori victory was a hollow one, leading to the invasion of the Waikato.
In its 1996 report to the Government on Taranaki land claims, the Waitangi Tribunal observed that the war was begun by the Government, which had been the aggressor and unlawful in its actions in launching an attack by its armed forces. An opinion sought by the tribunal from a senior constitutional lawyer stated that the Governor, Thomas Gore Browne, and certain officers were liable for criminal and civil charges for their actions.
The term "First Taranaki War" is opposed by some historians, who refer only to the Taranaki Wars, rejecting suggestions that post-1861 conflict was a second war. The 1927 Royal Commission on Confiscated Land also referred to the hostilities between 1864 and 1866 as a continuation of the initial Taranaki war.
Background
The catalyst for the war was the disputed sale of 600 acres (2.4 kmē) of land known as the Pekapeka block at Waitara. Pokikake Te Teira, a minor chief of the Te Atiawa iwi, sold the land to the British despite a veto by the paramount chief of the tribe, Wiremu Kingi and a "solemn contract" by local Maori not to sell. Governor Browne accepted the purchase with full knowledge of the circumstances and tried to occupy the land, anticipating it would lead to armed conflict. A year earlier Browne had written to the Colonial Office in England, advising: "I have, however, little fear that William King (Kingi) will venture to resort to violence to maintain his assumed right, but I have made every preparation to enforce obedience should he presume to do so."
Although the pressure for the sale of the block resulted from the colonists' hunger for land in Taranaki, the greater issue fuelling the conflict was the Government's desire to impose British administration, law and civilisation on the Maori as a demonstration of the substantive sovereignty the British believed they had gained in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. The hastily-written Maori translation, however, had given Maori chiefs an opposing view that the English had gained only nominal sovereignty, or "governorship" of the country as a whole while Maori retained "chieftainship" over their lands, villages and treasures.
By 1860, it was tacitly recognised that British law prevailed in the settlements and Maori custom elsewhere, though the British, who by then outnumbered Maori, were finding this fact increasingly irksome. One commentator observed, with reference to Waitara: "We seem to be fast approaching a settlement of that point, whether Her Fair Majesty or His Dark Majesty shall reign in New Zealand." The British were convinced that their system represented the best that civilization had to offer and saw it as both their duty and their right to impose it on other peoples.
However, in the 20 years since the signing of the Treaty, the Maori had made significant political advances. They had moved from being a collection of independent tribes to an effective confederation. This was called the Maori King Movement and was largely centred on the Waikato region, but had influence over large areas of the North Island. One of the uniting principles of the King Movement was their opposition to the sale of Maori land and the concomitant spread of British sovereignty.
Battle at Te Kohia
On February 22, 1860, Browne declared martial law in Taranaki and two days later executed a deed for the sale of the disputed Pekapeka block at Waitara, with 20 Maori signatories of Te Teira's family being accepted as representing all owners of the land.
On March 4, Browne ordered Colonel Charles Emilius Gold, commanding the 65th Regiment, the Taranaki Militia and the Taranaki Rifle Volunteers, to occupy the disputed block of land at Waitara in preparation for a survey. Four hundred men landed at Waitara the next day to fortify a position and the survey of the land began on March 13 without resistance.
On the night of March 15, however, Kingi and about 80 men built an L-shaped pa, or defensive strong point, at Te Kohia, at the south-west extremity of the block, commanding the road access. The next day, they uprooted the surveyors' boundary markers and when ordered the next day, March 17, to surrender, they refused. Gold's troops opened fire and the Taranaki wars had begun.
Gold's troops, by then numbering almost 500, poured in heavy fire all day from as near as 50 metres, firing 200 rounds from two 24-pound howitzers as well as small arms fire. Despite the firepower, the Maori suffered no casualties and abandoned the pa that night. Though it was small – about 650 square yards – the pa had been situated so that it was difficult to surround completely and had also been built with covered trenches and 10 anti-artillery bunkers, roofed with timber and earth, that protected its garrison.
The British objective at Waitara had been a rapid and decisive victory that would destroy the main enemy warrior force, checking and crippling Maori independence and asserting British sovereignty. That mission failed and the Te Kohia clash ended as little more than a minor skirmish with a result that disappointed English settlers.
Yet for Maori, too, the engagement had strong symbolic importance. Outnumbered and outgunned, Kingi needed to draw allies from several places, but by Maori tikanga, or protocol, support would not be offered to an aggressor. Te Kohia pa, hastily built and just as quickly abandoned, appeared to have been built for one purpose: to provide plain evidence of the Governor's "wrong". The aggressor having been identified, others were then free to launch reprisals under utu laws.
Within days, Maori war parties began plundering the farms south of New Plymouth, killing six settlers who had not taken refuge in the town. Fearing an attack on New Plymouth was imminent, the British withdrew from Waitara and concentrated around the town.
The Battle of Waireka
The military action at Waitara brought the result Kingi had been hoping for and within 10 days of the Te Kohia battle, about 500 warriors from the Taranaki, Ngati Ruanui and Nga Rauru iwi converged on the New Plymouth area to provide support. The warriors built an entrenched and stockaded pa named Kaipopo on one of the hills at Waireka, about 8km southwest of New Plymouth and 4km from the Omata stockade that lay on the road to the town. The area was scattered with some houses built by European settlers, and on March 27, five settlers, including two boys, were either shot or tomahawked in the Omata district.
Tensions in New Plymouth quickly climbed and many settlers abandoned their farms to flee for the safety of the town. Among those who remained in the Omata area were the Rev. Henry Brown, the Rev. Thomas Gilbert and several others who were either French or Portuguese. All felt safe: both ministers were treated by Maori as tapu or untouchable, while the others were confident the Maori grievance was with only the British.
About 1pm on March 28, a British force of about 335 men – 28 Navy, 88 from the British 65th Regiment, 103 members of the newly-formed Taranaki Rifle Volunteers and 56 from a local militia – set off in two columns to "rescue" those who had remained behind. It would be the first occasion on which a British Volunteer corps engaged an enemy on the battlefield.
Captain Charles Brown, in command of the settlers, was ordered to march down the coast until he reached the rear of the Maori positions at Waireka. The Regulars, under Lieut-Colonel G.F. Murray, marched down the main road to Omata, intending to dislodge a war party reported to be at Whalers Gate, north of Omata. Once the road was clear, it was intended they would be joined by the Volunteers and militia, who had "rescued" the settlers, before marching back to New Plymouth. Because of the heightened state of fear in New Plymouth, however, Murray had been ordered to return his troops to the town before nightfall. The Volunteers were armed with muzzle-loading Enfield rifles and the militia had old smooth-bore muskets from the 1840s, with each man issued with just 30 rounds of ammunition.
Murray met no resistance at Whalers Gate, but as he approached Waireka he heard the sound of rapid firing towards the coast. He entrenched his men and opened fire on the Kaipopo pa with a rocket tube. The gunfire Murray heard was being exchanged between about 200 Maori warriors who, armed mostly with double-barrel shotguns and some rifles, were firing from the cover of bush and flax in the river gully, and the militia and Volunteers, who had retreated to the safety of the farmhouse of settler John Jury.
About 5.30pm, Murray sounded the bugle for a retreat, withdrawing his Regulars for the march back to New Plymouth so they could arrive before dark. His withdrawal left the settler force, which had already suffered two killed and eight wounded, isolated at the farmhouse with little ammunition and late in the night, carrying their casualties, they scrambled across paddocks to the Omata stockade, arriving about 12.30am, before returning to New Plymouth.
Late in the afternoon, meanwhile, Captain Peter Cracroft, commander of the HMS Niger, had landed 60 bluejackets at New Plymouth and marched via Omata to Waireka, encountering Murray as he prepared to retreat. Cracroft's troops fired 24-pound rockets into the pa from a distance of about 700 metres and stormed it at dusk, tearing down three Maori ensigns. The first man into the pa was leading seaman William Odgers, who was awarded a Victoria Cross for bravery – the first awarded in the New Zealand wars. Cracroft's men then returned to New Plymouth, without making contact with the settler force, who were still at the Jury farmhouse.
Cracroft was lauded as a hero for his mission, with claims of the number of Maori killed by his troops ranging from 70 to 150. Total European losses were 14 killed and wounded. Historian James Belich claimed the pa was more of a camp and all but empty and the total Maori casualties amounted to no more than one. He described the "legend" of Waireka as a classic example of the construction of a paper victory, with invented claims of "enormous" losses and a great British victory.
The settlers, apparently overlooked in the fracas, watched the action from their house and the next day made their own way to New Plymouth, where Gilbert said: "It was no wish of ours that an armed expedition should be set on foot on our behalf. We were perfectly safe."
Murray was widely condemned for his actions in withdrawing his troops and a court of inquiry was convened into his conduct.
The Battle of Puketakauere
On April 20, 1860 Browne ordered a suspension of hostilities against Taranaki Maori, fearing the intervention of the King Movement and a possible attack on Auckland. He knew he lacked the resources to defend Auckland if troops were engaged in Taranaki. Both Kingi and the Government made repeated diplomatic approaches to King Potatau Te Wherowhero seeking his allegiance, but by early May Potatau seemed to have decided to offer at least token support to Taranaki Maori, sending a Kingite war party to the district under the control of war chief Epiha Tokohihi. Kingi seized the opportunity to spark a confrontation with the imperial government to demonstrate the viability of resistance and draw stronger Kingite support..
Early in June, Atiawa war chief Hapurona began building a stockaded pa, Onukukaitara, adjacent to an ancient, and apparently unpopulated and unfortified, pa known as Puketakauere. The two pa were sited on a pair of low hills 800m southeast of Te Kohia and 1.6km south of the garrison known as Camp Waitara (site of the modern town of Waitara), which had been established to protect the surveying of Waitara. The pa posed a military threat to the Waitara garrison and was seen as extreme provocation.
On June 23, a British reconnaissance party approached the pa, in what may have been an attempt to bait the Maori, and was fired on. Colonel Gold immediately authorised an attack. Before dawn on June 27, the British commander at Waitara, Major Thomas Nelson, marched out with 350 experienced troops and two 24-pound howitzers to storm the pa, which was defended by about 200 Atiawa.
The troops intended to encircle the two hills, cutting off a path of retreat for the Maori, before destroying Onukukaitara, above the flax-covered stockade of which flew a flag. The troops split into three divisions for the march. Nelson led the main body of almost 180 men and the two howitzers on an approach from the north, intending to bombard the stockade from the south-west. A second division of 125 men, led by Captain William Messenger, was given the more difficult task of approaching the area in darkness through a swampy gully and high fern and scrub to the east, taking possession of the apparently deserted Puketakauere, blocking the path of any possible reinforcements and supporting Nelson's efforts against the main target. His approach was made more challenging by the heavy mid-winter rain that had deepened the swamp. The remaining division, about 60 men under Captain Bowdler, was to take up a position on a mound between the pa and Camp Waitara, blocking an escape to the north.
About 7am, Nelson's howitzers began pounding their target, but created only a small breach in the fort. His men then approached the pa across open ground, but came under heavy fire from Maori concealed just metres away in deep trenches in a small natural gully. The attack was described by some survivors as "hotter than anything in the great Indian battles or in the attack on the Redan in the Crimea".
As they came under fire, Messenger's division found itself the target of other Maori who ambushed them from outlying trenches on the fern-covered slopes. Messenger's division became disordered and was split into groups. Many troops were tomahawked in the swamp or drowned as they fled to the flooded Waitara River. Most of the wounded were abandoned and many of those were hacked to death. A group of survivors with Messenger managed to join Nelson, who sounded the retreat, while others remained hiding in the swamp and fern and returned to camp later.
Puketakauere was both the most important and most disastrous battle of the First Taranaki War for the British, who suffered losses of 32 killed and 34 wounded, almost one in five of the force engaged. It was also one of the three most clear-cut defeats suffered by imperial troops in New Zealand. Despite claims at the time that the British killed between 130 and 150 of the enemy, Maori casualties were estimated to be just five, including two Maniapoto chiefs..
Colonel Gold came under heavy criticism for the defeat. He was accused of cowardice and stupidity and an attempt was made to persuade the senior militia officer to arrest him. He was subsequently replaced by Major-General Thomas Pratt.
The real reason for the Maori victory, however, was a combination of tactics and engineering techniques. Hapurona had enticed the British to fight at a place of his own choosing and then used the twin ploys of deception and concealment. He created a false target for the British artillery with the fortification of Onukukaitara which, despite its flag and flax-covered stockade, was essentially an empty pa. Maori defences were instead concentrated on the old, apparently unfortified pa, where deep trenches concealed the well-armed warriors until the British were almost at point-blank range. When the British were split into two groups at the two hills, Hapurona was also able to switch warriors from each focus of action, forcing the British to fight two battles while the Maori fought just one.
In the wake of the demoralising loss, the central portion of New Plymouth was entrenched and most women and children were evacuated to Nelson, out of fear the town would be attacked. The garrison was reinforced with almost 250 soldiers from the 40th Regiment, sent from Auckland, as well as additional artillery.
Further clashes
From August to October 1860, there were numerous skirmishes close to New Plymouth, including one on August 20 involving an estimated 200 Maori, just 800 metres from the barracks on Marsland Hill. Many settlers' farms were burned and the village of Henui, 1.6km from town, was also destroyed. Several farmers and settlers, including children, were killed by hostile Maori as they ventured beyond the town's entrenchments, including John Hurford (tomahawked at Mahoetahi on August 3), Joseph Sarten (shot and tomahawked, Henui, December 4), Captain William Cutfield King (shot, Woodleigh estate, February 8, 1861) and Edward Messenger (shot, Brooklands, March 3). There were frequent skirmishes around Omata and Waireka, where extensive trenches and rifle pits were dug on the Waireka hills to threaten a British redoubt on the site of the Kaipopo pa.
With British forces in Taranaki boosted to about 2000 by July, the British intensified efforts to crush resistance. Governor Browne was particularly worried that a general uprising would occur while the bulk of troops in the country were concentrated in Taranaki and he appealed to Britain and Australia for more reinforcements. Major Nelson, meanwhile, destroyed several Te Atiawa villages including Manukorihi, Tikorangi and Ratapihipihi, Pratt launched a major attack with 1400 men near Waitara on September 9, burning and looting four entrenched villages, and in October, he marched with a force of more than 1000 to the Kaihihi River at Okato to conduct an operation with sapping and heavy artillery to destroy several more pa. On November 6, a party of between 50 and 150 Ngati Haua Kingites were routed in a surprise attack by 1000 troops at Mahoetahi.
There were some humiliating setbacks for the British, however, with 1500 troops retreating from a small Maori force at Huirangi on September 11 and a force of 500 suffering casualties in an ambush while destroying a pa on September 29.
Kingite warriors continued to travel between Taranaki and Waikato, providing a peak force of about 800 in January 1861, with weapons and ammunition being bought on the black market in Auckland, Waiuku and Kawhia, while in Taranaki posts at Omata, the Bell Block, Waireka and Tataramakia were garrisoned – with each of those often surrounded by a cordon of pa.
Pratt's sapping campaign
In December 1860, Major-General Pratt began operations against a major Maori defensive line called Te Arei ("The barrier") on the west side of the Waitara River, barring the way to the historic hill pa of Pukewairangi. The principal defences were Kairau and Huirangi, skilfully engineered lines of rifle-pits, trenches and covered walkways. Backed with heavy artillery and a force of 900 men, Pratt advanced from Waitara on December 29 towards the Matarikoriko pa, between Puketakauere and the Waitara River, before building a redoubt on the old Kairau pa under heavy day-long fire from bush-covered rifle pits 150m away. Both sides exchanged heavy fire the next day, with British troops expending 70,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and 120 rounds of shot and shell and suffering three deaths and 20 wounded. The pa was captured on December 31 after being abandoned, and a stockade and blockhouses built on the site for a garrison of 60.
A second redoubt, No.2, was built in 11 hours on January 14 500m past the Kairau redoubt and garrisoned by 120 men with artillery. Four days later, Pratt and a force of 1000 moved out another 400m to build Redoubt No.3, which was garrisoned with 300 men and made the headquarters of the 40th Regiment.
At 3.30am on January 23, 1861, No.3 Redoubt was stormed by a force of 140 warriors of Ngati Haua, Ngati Maniapoto, Waikato and Te Atiawa, led by Rewi Maniopoto, Epiha Tokohihi and Hapurona. Fierce fighting at close quarters, involving rifles, bayonets, shotgun, hand grenades and tomahawks, took place over the newly-built parapet and in the boundary trench and lasted until daylight when British reinforcements arrived from Redoubt No.1. British losses in the fight were five killed and 11 wounded. Maori losses were estimated at 50.
From January 22, the day before the attack on No.3 Redoubt, Pratt began employing the Royal Engineers to systematically apply the technique of sapping to advance towards Te Arei. Excavating through night and day under frequent fire, Pratt's sap extended 768 yards and crossed the rifle pits of the Huirangi pa, prompting Maori to abandon the pa and fall back on Pukerangiora. Despite widespread criticism for his slowness and caution, Pratt pressed on towards Te Arei, creating the most extensive field-engineering works ever undertaken by British troops n New Zealand. Five more redoubts were built as the saps continued to the edge of the cliff above the Waitara River, but ceased after the intervention of Kingite chief Wiremu Tamehana, who helped negotiate a truce. A ceasefire was formally effected on March 18, 1861, ending the first phase of the Taranaki War.
By early 1861, settler opinion was evenly divided on Browne's stance against Maori and the fairness of the Waitara purchase and many believed the British had little hope of wearing the enemy down with further military campaigns. Even Pratt expressed doubts the war could be won. The district had also suffered great economic hardship, with emigration all but coming to a stop and the destruction of three-quarters of farmhouses at Omata, Bell Block, Tataraimaka, and settlements nearer the town.
The Maori victory in resisting British attempts to impose sovereignty over them in Taranaki was a hollow one, however, with Browne and his successor, George Grey, changing their target and opting to destroy Kingite power by invading Waikato.
See also
Further reading
- Alexander, David, et al. (eds.). Waitara Campaign Historic Trail. Wellington: Department of Lands and Survey.
- Belich, James (1996) Making peoples. Penguin Press.
- Maxwell, Peter (2000). Frontier, the battle for the North Island of New Zealand. Celebrity Books.
- Prickett, Nigel (2002). Landscapes of Conflict. Random House.
- Simpson, Tony (1979). Te Riri Pakeha. Hodder and Stoughton.
- Sinclair, Keith (ed.) (1996). The Oxford illustrated history of New Zealand (2nd ed.) Wellington: Oxford University Press.
- Stowers, Richard (1996). Forest rangers. Richard Stowers.
- Vaggioli, Dom Felici (2000). History of New Zealand and its inhabitants, Trans. J. Crockett. Dunedin: University of Otago Press. Original Italian publication, 1896.
- "The people of many peaks: The Maori biographies". (1990). From The dictionary of New Zealand biographies, Vol. 1, 1769-1869. Bridget Williams Books and Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand.
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