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Enigma machine
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The Enigma machine is any of a family of related electro-mechanical rotor machines that have been used to generate ciphers for the encryption and decryption of secret messages. The Enigma was invented by German engineer Arthur Scherbius at the end of World War I. It was used commercially from the early 1920s and was adopted by military and governmental services of a number of countries — most notably by Nazi Germany before and during World War II.
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Encyclopedia
The Enigma machine is any of a family of related electro-mechanical rotor machines that have been used to generate ciphers for the encryption and decryption of secret messages. The Enigma was invented by German engineer Arthur Scherbius at the end of World War I. It was used commercially from the early 1920s and was adopted by military and governmental services of a number of countries — most notably by Nazi Germany before and during World War II. A variety of Enigma models were produced, but the German military model, the Wehrmacht Enigma, is the version most commonly discussed.
The machine has gained notoriety because Polish mathematicians-cryptologists and then Allied cryptologists were able to decrypt a vast number of messages that had been enciphered on the machine. The intelligence gleaned from this source, codenamed ULTRA, was a substantial aid to the Allied war effort. The exact influence of ULTRA is debated, but an oft-repeated assessment is that decryption of German ciphers hastened the end of the European war by two years.
Though the Enigma cipher had cryptographic weaknesses, in practice it was only in combination with other factors (procedural flaws, operator mistakes, occasional captured machines and key tables) that those weaknesses allowed Allied cryptologists to decrypt messages.
Description
Like other rotor machines, the Enigma machine is a combination of mechanical and electrical systems. The mechanical mechanism consists of a keyboard; a set of rotating disks called rotors arranged adjacently along a spindle; and a stepping mechanism to turn one or more of the rotors with each key press. The exact mechanism varies, but the most common form is for the right-hand rotor to step once with every key stroke, and occasionally the motion of neighbouring rotors is triggered. The continual movement of the rotors results in a different cryptographic transformation after each key press.
The mechanical parts act in such a way as to form a varying electrical circuit—the actual encipherment of a letter is performed electrically. When a key is pressed, the circuit is completed; current flows through the various components and ultimately lights one of many different lamps, indicating the output letter. For example, when encrypting a message starting ANX..., the operator would first press the A key, and the Z lamp might light; Z would be the first letter of the ciphertext. The operator would then proceed to encipher N in the same fashion, and so on.
To explain the Enigma, we use the wiring diagram on the left. To simplify the example, only four components of each are shown. In reality, there are 26 lamps, keys, plugs and wirings inside the rotors. The current flows from the battery (1) through the depressed bi-directional letter-switch (2) to the plugboard (3). The plugboard allows rewiring the connections between keyboard (2) and fixed entry wheel (4). Next, the current proceeds through the—unused, so closed—plug (3) via the entry wheel (4) through the wirings of the three (Wehrmacht Enigma) or four (Kriegsmarine M4 or Abwehr variant) rotors (5) and enters the reflector (6). The reflector returns the current, via a different path, back through the rotors (5) and entry wheel (4), and proceeds through plug 'S' connected with a cable (8) to plug 'D', and another bi-directional switch (9) to light-up the lamp.
The continual changing of electrical paths through the unit because of the rotation of the rotors (which cause the pin contacts to change with each letter typed) implements the polyalphabetic encryption which provided Enigma's high security.
Rotors
The rotors (alternatively "wheels" or "drums"—Walzen in German) form the heart of an Enigma machine. Approximately 10 cm in diameter, each rotor is a disc made of hard rubber or bakelite with a series of brass spring-loaded pins on one face arranged in a circle; on the other side are a corresponding number of circular electrical contacts. The pins and contacts represent the alphabet—typically the 26 letters A–Z (this will be assumed for the rest of the description). When placed side-by-side, the pins of one rotor rest against the contacts of the neighbouring rotor, forming an electrical connection. Inside the body of the rotor, a set of 26 wires connects each pin on one side to a contact on the other in a complex pattern. The wiring differs for every rotor.
By itself, a rotor performs only a very simple type of encryption—a simple substitution cipher. For example, the pin corresponding to the letter E might be wired to the contact for letter T on the opposite face. The complexity comes from the use of several rotors in series—usually three or four—and the regular movement of the rotors; this provides a much stronger type of encryption.
When placed in the machine, a rotor can be set to one of 26 positions. It can be turned by hand using a grooved finger-wheel which protrudes from the internal cover when closed. So that the operator knows the position, each rotor has an alphabet tyre (or letter ring) attached around the outside of the disk, with 26 letters or numbers; one of these can be seen through a window, indicating the position of the rotor to the operator. In early Enigma models, the alphabet ring is fixed; a complication introduced in later versions is the facility to adjust the alphabet ring relative to the core wiring. The position of the ring is known as the Ringstellung ("ring setting").
The rotors each contain a notch (sometimes multiple notches) used to control the stepping of the rotors. In the military versions, the notches are located on the alphabet ring.
The Army and Air Force Enigmas came equipped with several rotors; when first issued there were only three. On 15 December 1938, this changed to five, from which three were chosen for insertion in the machine. These were marked with Roman numerals to distinguish them: I, II, III, IV and V, all with single notches located at different points on the alphabet ring. This must have been intended as a security measure, but ultimately allowed the Polish Clock Method and British Banburismus attacks.
The Naval version of the Wehrmacht Enigma had always been issued with more rotors than the other services: at first, six, then seven and finally eight. The additional rotors were named VI, VII and VIII, all with different wiring, and had two notches cut into them at N and A, resulting in a more frequent turnover.
The four-rotor Naval Enigma (M4) machine accommodated an extra rotor in the same space as the three-rotor version. This was accomplished by replacing the original reflector with a thinner reflector and adding a special fourth rotor. The fourth rotor can be one of two types, "Beta" or "Gamma", and never steps, but it can be manually placed in any of the 26 positions.
Stepping motion
To avoid merely implementing a simple (and easily breakable) substitution cipher, some rotors turned with consecutive presses of a key. This ensured the cryptographic substitution would be different at each position, producing a formidable polyalphabetic substitution cipher.
The most common arrangement used a ratchet and pawl mechanism. Each rotor had a ratchet with 26 teeth and, every time a key was pressed, each of the pawls corresponding to a particular rotor would move forward in unison and try to engage with a ratchet, thus advancing the rotor by a single step. Preventing this was a thin ring of metal attached to the previous rotor, upon which the pawl rode. As this ring rotated, a notch machined into it would eventually align itself with the pawl, allowing this to drop into position, engage with the ratchet and advance the rotor. The first rotor, having no previous rotor (and therefore no notched ring), would advance with every keystroke. The five basic rotors (I–V) had one notch each, while the additional naval rotors VI, VII and VIII had two notches. The position of the notch on each rotor could be adjusted.
If this were it, rotor one would step 26 times for every step of rotor two and rotor two 26 times for every step of rotor three. However, the design included a feature known as "double-stepping". This was enabled due to each pawl being aligned with both the ratchet of its rotor and the rotating notched ring of the neighbouring rotor. If a pawl was allowed to engage with a ratchet through alignment with a notch, as it moved forward it would push against both the ratchet and the notch, advancing both rotors at the same time. In a three-rotor machine the double-stepping would effect rotor two only. This, if in moving forward allowed the ratchet of rotor three to be engaged, would move again on the subsequent keystroke, thus resulting in two consecutive steps. Rotor two also pushes rotor one forward after 26 of its steps, but as rotor one moves forward with every keystroke anyway there is no double-stepping. This double stepping caused the rotors to deviate from a normal odometer.
With three wheels and only single notches in the first and second wheels, the machine had a period of 26 × 25 × 26 = 16,900 (not 26 × 26 × 26 because of the double stepping of the second rotor.) Historically, messages were limited to a couple of hundred letters, and so there was very little risk of repeating any position within a single message.
To make room for the naval fourth rotors "Beta" and "Gamma", introduced in 1942, the reflector was changed, by making it much thinner and the special thin fourth rotor was placed against it. No changes were made to rest of the mechanism. Since there were only three pawls, the fourth rotor never stepped, but could be manually set into one of its 26 positions.
When pressing a key, the rotors stepped before the electrical circuit is connected.
Entry wheel
The entry wheel (Eintrittswalze in German), or entry stator, connects the plugboard, if present, or otherwise the keyboard and lampboard, to the rotor assembly. While the exact wiring used is of comparatively little importance to the security, it proved an obstacle in the progress of Polish cryptanalyst Marian Rejewski during his deduction of the rotor wirings. The commercial Enigma connects the keys in the order of their sequence on the keyboard: QA, WB, EC and so on. However, the military Enigma connects them in straight alphabetical order: AA, BB, CC etc. It took an inspired piece of guesswork for Rejewski to realise the modification.
Reflector
With the exception of the early models A and B, the last rotor came before a "reflector" (German: Umkehrwalze, meaning "reversal rotor"), a patented feature distinctive of the Enigma family amongst the various rotor machines designed in the period. The reflector connected outputs of the last rotor in pairs, redirecting current back through the rotors by a different route. The reflector ensured that Enigma is self-reciprocal: conveniently, encryption was the same as decryption. However, the reflector also gave Enigma the property that no letter ever encrypted to itself. This was a severe conceptual flaw and a cryptological mistake subsequently exploited by codebreakers.
In the commercial Enigma model "C", the reflector could be inserted in one of two different positions. In Model D the reflector could be set in 26 possible positions, although it did not move during encryption. In the Abwehr Enigma, the reflector stepped during encryption in a manner like the other wheels.
In the German Army and Air Force Enigma, the reflector was fixed and did not rotate; there were four versions. The original version was marked A, and was replaced by Umkehrwalze B on 1 November 1937. A third version, Umkehrwalze C was used briefly in 1940, possibly by mistake, and was solved by Hut 6. The fourth version, first observed on 2 January 1944 had a rewireable reflector, called Umkehrwalze D, allowing the Enigma operator to alter the connections as part of the key settings.
Plugboard
The plugboard (Steckerbrett in German) permitted variable wiring that could be reconfigured by the operator (visible on the front panel of Figure 1; some of the patch cords can be seen in the lid). It was introduced on German Army versions in 1930, and was soon adopted by the Navy as well. The plugboard contributed a great deal to the strength of the machine's encryption: more than an extra rotor would have done. Enigma without a plugboard—"unsteckered" Enigma—can be solved relatively straightforwardly using hand methods; these techniques are generally defeated by the addition of a plugboard, and Allied cryptanalysts resorted to special machines to solve it.
A cable placed onto the plugboard connected letters up in pairs, for example, E and Q might be a "steckered" pair. The effect was to swap those letters before and after the main rotor scrambling unit. For example, when an operator presses E, the signal was diverted to Q before entering the rotors. Several such steckered pairs, up to 13, might be used at one time.
Current flowed from the keyboard through the plugboard, and proceeded to the entry-rotor or Eintrittswalze. Each letter on the plugboard had two jacks. Inserting a plug disconnected the upper jack (from the keyboard) and the lower jack (to the entry-rotor) of that letter. The plug at the other end of the crosswired cable was inserted into another letter's jacks, thus switching the connections of the two letters.
Accessories
A feature that was used on the M4 Enigma was the Schreibmax, a little printer which could print the 26 letters on a small paper ribbon. This did away with the need for a second operator to read the lamps and write the letters down. The Schreibmax was placed on top of the Enigma machine and was connected to the lamp panel. To install the printer, the lamp cover and all lightbulbs had to be removed. Besides its convenience, it could improve operational security; the printer could be installed remotely such that the signal officer operating the machine no longer had to see the decrypted plaintext information.
Another accessory was the remote lamp panel. If the machine was equipped with an extra panel, the wooden case of the Enigma was wider and could store the extra panel. There was a lamp panel version that could be connected afterwards, but that required, just as with the Schreibmax, that the lamp panel and lightbulbs be removed. The remote panel made it possible for a person to read the decrypted plaintext without the operator seeing it.
In 1944 the Luftwaffe introduced an extra plugboard switch, called the Uhr (clock). There was a little box, containing a switch with 40 positions. It replaced the default plugs. After connecting the plugs, as determined in the daily key sheet, the operator turned the switch into one of the 40 positions, each position producing a different combination of plug wiring. Most of these plug connections were, unlike the default plugs, not pair-wise. In one switch position, the Uhr did nothing simply emulating the 9 stecker wires with plugs.
Mathematical description
The Enigma transformation for each letter can be specified mathematically as a product of permutations. Assuming a three-rotor German Army/Air Force Enigma, let denote the plugboard transformation, denote that of the reflector, and denote those of the left, middle and right rotors repectively. Then the encryption can be expressed as
.
After each key press, the rotors turn, changing the transformation. For example, if the right hand rotor is rotated positions, the transformation becomes , where is the cyclic permutation mapping A to B, B to C, and so forth. Similarly, the middle and left-hand rotors can be represented as and rotations of and . The encryption transformation can then be described as
.
Operation
In German military usage, communications were divided up into a number of different networks, all using different settings for their Enigma machines. These communication nets were termed "keys" at Bletchley Park, and were assigned codenames, such as "Red", "Chaffinch" and "Shark". Each unit operating on a network was assigned a settings list for its Enigma for a period of time. For a message to be correctly encrypted and decrypted, both sender and receiver had to set up their Enigma in the same way; the rotor selection and order, the starting position and the plugboard connections must be identical. All these settings (together the key in modern terms) must have been established beforehand, and were distributed in codebooks.
An Enigma machine's initial state, the cryptographic key, has several aspects:
- Wheel order (Walzenlage)—the choice of rotors and the order in which they are fitted.
- Initial position of the rotors—chosen by the operator, different for each message.
- Ring settings (Ringstellung)—the position of the alphabet ring relative to the rotor wiring.
- Plug settings (Steckerverbindungen)—the connections of the plugs in the plugboard.
- In very late versions, the wiring of the reconfigurable reflector.
Enigma was designed to be secure even if the rotor wiring was known to an opponent, although in practice there was considerable effort to keep the wiring secret. If the wiring is secret, the total number of possible configurations has been calculated to be around 10114 (approximately 380 bits); with known wiring and other operational constraints, this is reduced to around 1023 (76 bits). Users of Enigma were confident of its security because of the large number of possibilities; it was not then feasible for an adversary to even begin to try every possible configuration in a brute force attack.
Indicators
Most of the keys were kept constant for a set time period, typically a day. However, a different initial rotor position was chosen for each message, a concept similar to an initialisation vector in modern cryptography, because if a number of messages are sent encrypted with identical or near-identical settings a cryptanalyst, with several messages "in depth", might be able to attack the messages using frequency analysis. The starting position was transmitted just before the ciphertext. The exact method used was termed the "indicator procedure"—weak indicator procedures allowed the initial breaks into Enigma.
One of the earliest indicator procedures was used by Polish cryptanalysts to make the initial breaks into the Enigma. The procedure was for the operator to set up his machine in accordance with his settings list, which included a global initial position for the rotors (Grundstellung—"ground setting"), AOH, perhaps. The operator turned his rotors until AOH was visible through the rotor windows. At that point, the operator chose his own, arbitrary, starting position for that particular message. An operator might select EIN, and this became the "message settings" for that encryption session. The operator then typed EIN into the machine, twice, to allow for detection of transmission errors. The results were an encrypted indicator—the EIN typed twice might turn into XHTLOA, which would be transmitted along with the message. Finally, the operator then spun the rotors to his message settings, EIN in this example, and typed the plaintext of the message.
At the receiving end, the operation was reversed. The operator set the machine to the initial settings and typed in the first six letters of the message (XHTLOA). In this example, EINEIN emerged on the lamps. By moving his rotors to EIN, the receiving operator then typed in the rest of the ciphertext, deciphering the message.
The weakness in this indicator scheme came from two factors. First, use of a global ground setting—this was later changed so the operator selected his initial position to encrypt the indicator, and sent the initial position in the clear. The second problem was the repetition of the indicator, which was a serious security flaw. The message setting was encoded twice, resulting in a relation between first and fourth, second and fifth, and third and sixth character. This security problem enabled the Polish Cipher Bureau to break into the pre-war Enigma system as early as 1932. However, from 1940 on, the Germans changed the procedures to increase the security.
During World War II, codebooks were only used each day to set up the rotors, their ring settings and the plugboard. For each message, the operator selected a random start position, let's say WZA, and a random message key, perhaps SXT. He moved the rotors to the WZA start position and encoded the message key SXT. Assume the result was UHL. He then set up the message key, SXT, as the start position and encrypted the message. Next, he transmitted the start position, WZA, the encoded message key, UHL, and then the ciphertext. The receiver set up the start position according to the first trigram, WZA, and decoded the second trigram, UHL, to obtain the SXT message setting. Next, he used this SXT message setting as the start position to decrypt the message. This way, each ground setting was different and the new procedure avoided the security flaw of double encoded message settings.
This procedure was used by Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe only. The Kriegsmarine procedures on sending messages with the Enigma were far more complex and elaborate. Prior to encryption with the Enigma, the message was encoded using the Kurzsignalheft code book. The Kurzsignalheft contained tables to convert sentences into four-letter groups. A great many choices were included, e.g. logistic matters such as refueling and rendezvous with supply ships, positions and grid lists, harbor names, countries, weapons, weather conditions, enemy positions and ships, date and time tables. Another codebook contained the Kenngruppen and Spruchschlüssel: the key identification and message key. More details on
Abbreviations and guidelines
The Army Enigma machine used only the 26 alphabet characters. Signs were replaced by rare character combinations. A space was omitted or replaced by an X. The X was generally used as point or full stop. Some signs were different in other parts of the armed forces. The Wehrmacht replaced a comma by ZZ and the question sign by FRAGE or FRAQ. The Kriegsmarine, however, replaced the comma by Y and the question sign by UD. The combination CH, as in "Acht" (eight) or "Richtung" (direction) were replaced by Q (AQT, RIQTUNG). Two, three and four zeros were replaced by CENTA, MILLE and MYRIA.
The Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe transmitted messages in groups of five characters. The Kriegsmarine, using the four rotor Enigma, had four-character groups. Frequently used names or words were to be varied as much as possible. Words like Minensuchboot (minesweeper) could be written as MINENSUCHBOOT, MINBOOT, MMMBOOT or MMM354. To make cryptanalysis harder, more than 250 characters in one message were forbidden. Longer messages were divided into several parts, each using its own message key. For more details see Tony Sale's translations of "General Procedure" and "Officer and Staff procedure".
History and development of the machine
Far from being a single design, there are numerous models and variants of the Enigma family. The earliest Enigma machines were commercial models dating from the early 1920s. Starting in the mid-1920s, the various branches of the German military began to use Enigma, making a number of changes in order to increase its security. In addition, a number of other nations either adopted or adapted the Enigma design for their own cipher machines.
Commercial Enigma
On 23 February 1918 German engineer Arthur Scherbius applied for a patent for a cipher machine using rotors and, with E. Richard Ritter, founded the firm of Scherbius & Ritter. They approached the German Navy and Foreign Office with their design, but neither was interested. They then assigned the patent rights to Gewerkschaft Securitas, who founded the Chiffriermaschinen Aktien-Gesellschaft (Cipher Machines Stock Corporation) on 9 July 1923; Scherbius and Ritter were on the board of directors.
Chiffriermaschinen AG began advertising a rotor machine—Enigma model A—which was exhibited at the Congress of the International Postal Union in 1923 and 1924. The machine was heavy and bulky, incorporating a typewriter. It measured 65×45×35 cm and weighed about 50 kg. A model B was introduced, and was of a similar construction. While bearing the Enigma name, both models A and B were quite unlike later versions: they differed in physical size and shape, but also cryptographically, in that they lacked the reflector.
The reflector—an idea suggested by Scherbius's colleague Willi Korn—was first introduced in the Enigma C (1926) model. The reflector is a key feature of the Enigma machines.
Model C was smaller and more portable than its predecessors. It lacked a typewriter, relying instead on the operator reading the lamps; hence the alternative name of "glowlamp Enigma" to distinguish from models A and B. The Enigma C quickly became extinct, giving way to the Enigma D (1927). This version was widely used, with examples going to Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Spain, United States, and Poland.
Military Enigma
The Navy was the first branch of the German military to adopt Enigma. This version, named Funkschlüssel C ("Radio cipher C"), had been put into production by 1925 and was introduced into service in 1926. The keyboard and lampboard contained 29 letters—A-Z, Ä, Ö and Ü—which were arranged alphabetically, as opposed to the QWERTZU ordering. The rotors had 28 contacts, with the letter X wired to bypass the rotors unencrypted. Three rotors were chosen from a set of five and the reflector could be inserted in one of four different positions, denoted a, ß, ? and d. The machine was revised slightly in July 1933.
By 15 July 1928, the German Army (Reichswehr) had introduced their own version of the Enigma—the Enigma G, revised to the Enigma I by June 1930. Enigma I is also known as the Wehrmacht, or "Services" Enigma, and was used extensively by the German military services and other government organisations (such as the railways), both before and during World War II. The major difference between Enigma I and commercial Enigma models was the addition of a plugboard to swap pairs of letters, greatly increasing the cryptographic strength of the machine. Other differences included the use of a fixed reflector, and the relocation of the stepping notches from the rotor body to the movable letter rings. The machine measured 28×34×15 cm (11"×13.5"×6") and weighed around 12 kg (26 lbs).
By 1930, the Army had suggested that the Navy adopt their machine, citing the benefits of increased security (with the plugboard) and easier interservice communications. The Navy eventually agreed and in 1934 brought into service the Navy version of the Army Enigma, designated Funkschlüssel M or M3. While the Army used only three rotors at that time, for greater security the Navy specified a choice of three from a possible five.
In December 1938, the Army issued two extra rotors so that the three rotors were chosen from a set of five. In 1938, the Navy added two more rotors, and then another in 1939 to allow a choice of three rotors from a set of eight. In August 1935, the Air Force also introduced the Wehrmacht Enigma for their communications. A four-rotor Enigma was introduced by the Navy for U-boat traffic on 1 February 1942, called M4 (the network was known as "Triton", or "Shark" to the Allies). The extra rotor was fitted in the same space by splitting the reflector into a combination of a thin reflector and a thin fourth rotor.
There was also a large, eight-rotor printing model, the Enigma II. In 1933 the Polish Cipher Bureau detected that it was in use for high-level military communications, but that it was soon withdrawn from use after it was found to be unreliable and to jam frequently.
The Abwehr used the Enigma G (the Abwehr Enigma). This Enigma variant was a four-wheel unsteckered machine with multiple notches on the rotors. This model was equipped with a counter which incremented upon each key press, and so is also known as the "counter machine" or the Zählwerk Enigma.
Other countries also used Enigma machines. The Italian Navy adopted the commercial Enigma as "Navy Cipher D"; the Spanish also used commercial Enigma during their Civil War. British codebreakers succeeded in breaking these machines, which lacked a plugboard. The Swiss used a version of Enigma called model K or Swiss K for military and diplomatic use, which was very similar to the commercial Enigma D. The machine was broken by a number of parties, including Poland, France, Britain and the United States (the latter codenamed it INDIGO). An Enigma T model (codenamed Tirpitz) was manufactured for use by the Japanese.
The Enigma wasn't perfect, especially after the Allies got hold of it, thus allowing the Allies to decode the German messages, which proved vital in the Battle of the Atlantic.
It has been estimated that 100,000 Enigma machines were constructed. After the end of the Second World War, the Allies sold captured Enigma machines, still widely considered secure, to a number of developing countries.
Surviving Enigma machines
The effort to break the Enigma was not disclosed until the 1970s. Since then, interest in the Enigma machine has grown considerably and a number of Enigmas are on public display in museums in the U.S. and Europe. The Deutsches Museum in Munich has both the three and four-wheel German military variants, as well as several older civilian versions. A functional Enigma is on display in the NSA's National Cryptologic Museum at Fort Meade, Maryland, where visitors can try their hand at encrypting messages and deciphering code. The Armémuseum in Stockholm in Sweden currently has an Enigma on display. There are also examples at the Computer History Museum in the United States, at Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom, at Polish Army Museum in Poland at the Australian War Memorial, and in foyer of the Defence Signals Directorate, both located at Canberra in Australia, as well as a number of other locations in Germany, the U.S., the UK and elsewhere. The now-defunct San Diego Computer Museum had an Enigma in its collection, which has since been given to the San Diego State University Library. A number are also in private hands. Occasionally, Enigma machines are sold at auction; prices of US$20,000 are not unusual.
Replicas of the machine are available in various forms, including an exact reconstructed copy of the Naval M4 model, an Enigma implemented in electronics (Enigma-E), various computer software simulators and paper-and-scissors analogues.
A rare Abwehr Enigma machine, designated G312, was stolen from the Bletchley Park museum on 1 April 2000. In September, a man identifying himself as "The Master" sent a note demanding £25,000 and threatened to destroy the machine if the ransom was not paid. In early October 2000, Bletchley Park officials announced that they would pay the ransom but the stated deadline passed with no word from the blackmailer. Shortly afterwards the machine was sent anonymously to BBC journalist Jeremy Paxman, but three rotors were missing. In November 2000, an antiques dealer named Dennis Yates was arrested after telephoning The Sunday Times to arrange the return of the missing parts. The Enigma machine was returned to Bletchley Park after the incident. In October 2001, Yates was sentenced to ten months in prison after admitting handling the stolen machine and demanding ransom for its return, although he maintained that he was acting as an intermediary for a third party. Yates was released from prison after serving three months.
In October 2008 the Spanish daily newspaper El País reported that 28 Enigma machines were discovered by chance in an attic of the Army headquarters in Madrid during inventory taking. These machines helped Franco's Nationalists win the Spanish Civil War because although the British code breaker Alfred Dilwyn Knox broke the code generated by Franco's Enigma machines in 1937, this information was not passed to the Republicans and they never managed to decipher any of the messages generated by these machines. The Nationalist government continued to use Enigma machines into the 1950s and eventually purchased 50 of them. Some of the original 28 machines are now on display in the Spanish military museums.
Enigma derivatives
The Enigma was influential in the field of cipher machine design, and a number of other rotor machines are derived from it. The British Typex was originally derived from the Enigma patents; Typex even includes features from the patent descriptions that were omitted from the actual Enigma machine. Owing to the need for secrecy about its cipher systems, no royalties were paid for the use of the patents by the British government. A Japanese Enigma clone was codenamed GREEN by American cryptographers. Little used, it contained four rotors mounted vertically. In the U.S., cryptologist William Friedman designed the M-325, a machine similar to Enigma in logical operation, although not in construction.
A unique rotor machine was constructed in 2002 by Netherlands-based Tatjana van Vark. This unusual device was inspired by Enigma but makes use of 40-point rotors, allowing letters, numbers and some punctuation to be used; each rotor contains 509 parts.
Fiction
The play, Breaking the Code, by Hugh Whitemore is about the life and death of Alan Turing, who was the central force in breaking the Enigma in Britain during World War II. Turing was played by Derek Jacobi, who also played Turing in a 1996 television adaptation of the play. The television adaptation is generally available (though currently only on VHS). Although it is a drama and thus takes artistic license, it is nonetheless a fundamentally accurate account. It contains a two-minute, stutteringly-nervous speech by Jacobi that comes very close to encapsulating the entire Enigma codebreaking effort.
Robert Harris' 1995 novel Enigma is set against the backdrop of World War II Bletchley Park and cryptologists working to read Naval Enigma in Hut 8. The book, with significant changes in the story, was made into the 2001 film, Enigma, directed by Michael Apted and starring Kate Winslet and Dougray Scott; the film has been criticized for many historical inaccuracies and neglecting the role of Biuro Szyfrów in breaking the Enigma code. An earlier Polish film dealing with the Polish aspects of the subject was the 1979 Sekret Enigmy (The Enigma Secret).
Wolfgang Petersen's 1981 film Das Boot includes an Enigma machine which is evidently a four-rotor Kriegsmarine variant. It appears in many scenes which probably capture well the flavour of day-to-day Enigma use aboard a World War II U-Boat.
See also
Further reading
- Calvocoressi, Peter. Top Secret Ultra. Baldwin, new edn 2001. 978-0-947712-36-5
- Cave Brown, Anthony. Bodyguard of Lies, 1975. A journalist's sensationalist best-seller that purported to give a history of Enigma decryption and its effect on the outcome of World War II. Worse than worthless on the seminal Polish work that made "Ultra" possible. See Richard Woytak, prefatory note (pp. 75–76) to Marian Rejewski, "Remarks on Appendix 1 to British Intelligence in the Second World War by F.H. Hinsley," Cryptologia, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 76–83.
- Garlinski, Józef Intercept, Dent, 1979. A superficial, sometimes misleading account of Enigma decryption before and during World War II, of equally slight value as to both the Polish and British phases. See Richard Woytak and Christopher Kasparek, "The Top Secret of World War II," The Polish Review, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 1983, pp. 98–103 (specifically, about Garlinski, pp. 101–3).
- Herivel, John. Herivelismus and the German military Enigma. Baldwin, 2008. 978-0-947712-46-4
- Keen, John. Harold 'Doc' Keen and the Bletchley Park Bombe. Baldwin, 2003. 978-0-947712-42-6
- Large, Christine. Hijacking Enigma, 2003, ISBN 0-470-86347-1.
- Marks, Philip. "Umkehrwalze D: Enigma's Rewirable Reflector — Part I", Cryptologia 25(2), April 2001, pp. 101–141.
- Marks, Philip. "Umkehrwalze D: Enigma's Rewirable Reflector — Part II", Cryptologia 25(3), July 2001, pp. 177–212.
- Marks, Philip. "Umkehrwalze D: Enigma's Rewirable Reflector — Part III", Cryptologia 25(4), October 2001, pp. 296–310.
- Perera, Tom. The Story of the ENIGMA: History, Technology and Deciphering, 2nd Edition, CD-ROM, 2004, Artifax Books, ISBN 1-890024-06-6
- Rejewski, Marian. "How Polish Mathematicians Deciphered the Enigma," Annals of the History of Computing 3, 1981. This article is regarded by Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing's biographer, as "the definitive account" (see Hodges' Alan Turing: The Enigma, Walker and Company, 2000 paperback edition, p. 548, footnote 4.5).
- Quirantes, Arturo. "Model Z: A Numbers-Only Enigma Version", Cryptologia 28(2), April 2004.
- Ulbricht, Heinz. Enigma Uhr, Cryptologia, 23(3), April 1999, pp. 194–205.
- Welchman, Gordon. The Hut Six Story: breaking the Enigma codes. Baldwin, new edition, 1997. 978-0-947712-34-1
External links
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- Historical and technical details on the Enigma
- various Enigma documents and
- Home of the British codebreakers durings the Second World War
- Graham Ellsbury's pages on the breaking of Enigma
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- by Dr. Wladyslaw Kozaczuk
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