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Chevauchée
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A chevauchée (French for "promenade" or "horse charge", depending on context) was a method in medieval warfare for weakening the enemy, focusing mainly on wreaking havoc, burning and pillaging enemy territory, in order to reduce the productivity of a region; as opposed to siege warfare or wars of conquest. The chevauchée could be used as a way of forcing an enemy to fight, or as a means of discrediting the enemy's government and detaching his subjects from their loyalty.
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A chevauchée (French for "promenade" or "horse charge", depending on context) was a method in medieval warfare for weakening the enemy, focusing mainly on wreaking havoc, burning and pillaging enemy territory, in order to reduce the productivity of a region; as opposed to siege warfare or wars of conquest. The chevauchée could be used as a way of forcing an enemy to fight, or as a means of discrediting the enemy's government and detaching his subjects from their loyalty. This usually caused a massive flight of refugees to fortified towns and castles, which would be untouched by the chevauchée.
Early uses
The chevauchée has gained recognition for its use during the Hundred Years' War between the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of France. It was not a new tactic and had been used many times before, for example William the Conqueror had used the tactic before the Battle of Hastings to encourage Harold to engage in a battle. The difference was that during the Hundred Years' War the tactic was used more frequently, on a larger scale and more systematically than before.
The English used the chevauchée in lieu of a larger standing army and was carried out primarily by small groups of mounted soldiers, rarely more than a few thousand men. This was the characteristic English strategy in the 1340s and 1350s after first being used by the forces of Edward III of England in the Second War of Scottish Independence.
In part because of these tactics, the French were drawn into the battle of Crécy. This battle, which marked the beginning of the end of chivalry, resulted in a decisive victory for the English. The chevauchée was also used at times by the French. The chevauchée was a challenge to the king’s pride and security, but the leaders were mostly focused on the taking of booty and hostages, as opposed to engaging in military battles. Besides booty, the chevauchée was more aimed at undermining the opposing king’s authority. In addition, these raids also served to undermine his finances. The use of the chevauchée declined at the end of the 14th century as the warfare devolved into sieges.
Tactics
According to historian Kelly DeVries, chevauchée tactics developed into a regular strategy in the Hundred Years' War following the Black Death when Edward III of England no longer had the troops to engage in regular battles.
Specific tactics were "a quick cavalry raid through the countryside with the intention of pillaging unfortified villages and towns, destroying crops and houses, stealing livestock, and generally disrupting and terrorizing rural society. Most of troops used in a chevauchée during the Hundred Years' War were made up of light horse or hobelars. The mercenary groups known as the 'Free companies' were also prominent in using the chevauchée." These tactics had been successfully used against the English by the Scots in the Wars of Scottish Independence.
The idea of the chevauchée had been known in Spain in the Middle Ages long before the Hundred Years' War. The tactic had been perfected over the Reconquista, seven centuries of warfare between Christians and Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula. Abandoning large armies, most of the fighting occurred during a chevauchée and during small sieges. A particularly good example of the chevauchée in Spanish warfare existed in southern Valencia between 1356 and 1379 during the War of the Two Pedros. During this period of near constant warfare, the forces of the Kingdom of Castile continuously destroyed grain, olive trees and vineyards so that nothing remained to be harvested.
Notable uses
Although often the province of mercenaries, the chevauchée was also undertaken by famous captains. After the fall of Calais to the English in 1347, Edward III of England launched raids into the French interior as he sensed the French weakness. Edward, the Black Prince took his mounted force into Artois, while Henry of Grosmont, 1st Duke of Lancaster burned Fauquembergues to the ground.
Shortly thereafter, Edward III decided to lead a grand chevauchée with his whole army into the heart of France from Calais at the beginning of September. However, the starting date came and passed, because while morale was high, his forces were just as exhausted as the French. A truce was agreed upon between the French and the English in that same month, which disappointed some in his army who were eager for loot.
In 1355-1356, Edward, the Black Prince, led a chevauchée from Bordeaux to the French Mediterranean coast, resulting in much destruction and another challenge to French supremacy. Extra defenses were built at Tours to deter the Black Prince from attacking the town.
During the 1370s, the English launched chevauchées led by Robert Knolles and John of Gaunt, 1st Duke of Lancaster, the third surviving son of Edward III, but little was achieved militarily.
Black Prince campaign
The chevauchée by the Black Prince in the autumn of 1355 was one of the most destructive in the history of English warfare.
Starting from Bordeaux, the Black Prince traveled south into lands controlled by Jean I, Comte d'Armagnac with Toulouse as the apparent ultimate target. Edward departed with an Anglo-Gascon force of five thousand men. He laid waste to the lands of Armagnac before turning eastward into Languedoc.
The count of Armagnac reinforced his fortresses instead of engaging Edward. The residents of Toulouse prepared for a siege as Edward approached, but the Black Prince was not equipped for a difficult siege and bypassed the city, crossing two rivers to the south that the French had thought impassible by a large force and had hence left unguarded.
Edward continued south, pillaging and burning and causing a great deal of mayhem. While the forces of Armagnac remained in Toulouse, Edward backtracked across the two rivers without much harassment. Only after it was apparent that Edward was departing did Armagnac harass the English. After the campaign, Armagnac was rebuked by James I, Count of La Marche, Constable of France and lost great favor with the people of Toulouse for his cowardice and lack of generalship.
The result of this chevauchée by the Black Prince was that the important city of Toulouse realized that they were on their own to protect themselves and were forced to become militarily self-reliant. This process repeated itself throughout France in the wake of a chevauchée. Toulouse became an essential part of the country’s security over the next two centuries. The chevauchée of 1355 was the only time during the Hundred Years' War that Toulouse was seriously threatened.
Unlike large cities such as Toulouse, the rural French villages were not built or organized to provide a defense. With these small villages lacking much in the way of fortifications, they were much more attractive targets to members of a chevauchée. In the absence of great walls, the villages picked a building, often a stone church, in which to defend themselves. They surrounded the church with ditches and stocked it with stones and crossbows. Even with these measures, the peasants did not stand much of a chance against the professional fighters of a chevauchée. Even if these measures of self-defense were successful for a short while, resistance could not be maintained for long and surrendering after resisting was often more costly than immediately surrendering. While there was an established practice of holding nobles and knights for ransom, villagers would most often not be able to pay a ransom that made it worth a pillager’s time to take one hostage, instead of just killing them. Therefore it is not surprising that the peasant villages put up whatever meager resistance that they could.
In the summer of 1356, the Black Prince undertook a second great chevauchée. This too lacked a clear objective. Edward had an estimated 7,000 men under his command. The chevauchée began on 4 August, 1356, against the city of Bourges. This chevauchée differed from the first in that, in addition to the raiding, burning and looting, there was also military action taken against objectives away from the main body of the force. Edward burned the suburbs of Bourges, but did not capture the city. However, he did capture the less important city of Audley.
Several small forces of French knights were defeated and Edward paused to besiege and capture the small town of Romorantin, where several French leaders were holed up. By this time the army of John II of France was in pursuit.
Edward marched West along the Loire River to Tours, burning the suburbs before marching south. By this time the French army was only thirty miles (50 km) away and had superior numbers. The French pursued faster than the English marched. By 18 September, 1356, Edward entered Poitiers. The next day, outside the city, the Battle of Poitiers was fought, which resulted in a great English victory and the capture of John II of France, who eventually died in captivity after his large ransom, twice the yearly income of France, went unpaid.
Abandoning the tactic
By the early years of the 15th century, many important French towns were under English control, including Caen, Falaise, Cherbourg and Rouen. This decreased the need for the chevauchée as the new king, Henry V of England, shifted his focus to the conquest of France.
Popular culture
A table-top miniature wargame called Chevauchée, designed to simulate the action associated with this term, was published at one point by the game development company Skirmisher Publishing LLC. It is currently out of print, but, according to the company, is due to be republished.
See also
Further reading
- Allmand, Christopher, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988
- Fowler, Kenneth, Medieval Mercenaries, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publisher, 2001
- Hewitt, H. J., The Black Prince’s Expedition of 1355-1357, Manchester, England: The University Press, 1958
- Neillands, Robin, The Hundred Years War, New York: Routledge, 1990
- Sumption, Jonathon, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle, Vol. 1., Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990
- Villalon, L. J. Andrew and Kagay, Donald J., Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005
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