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Bay of Pigs Invasion
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The Bay of Pigs Invasion(known as La Batalla de Girón in Cuba), was an unsuccessful attempt by a U.S.-trained force of Cuban exiles to invade southern Cuba with support from U.S. government armed forces to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.
The invasion — planned and funded by the United States government beginning in 1960 — was launched in April 1961, several months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States.
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The Bay of Pigs Invasion(known as La Batalla de Girón in Cuba), was an unsuccessful attempt by a U.S.-trained force of Cuban exiles to invade southern Cuba with support from U.S. government armed forces to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.
The invasion — planned and funded by the United States government beginning in 1960 — was launched in April 1961, several months after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in the United States. The Cuban armed forces, trained and equipped by Eastern Bloc nations, defeated the invading force in three days and the event accelerated a rapid deterioration in Cuban-American relations. This was exacerbated the following year by the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The invasion is named after the Bay of Pigs, which is possibly inaccurately translated from the Spanish Bahía de Cochinos. The main landing at the Bay of Pigs specifically took place at the beach called Playa Girón.
Political background
On March 16, 1960, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the Central Intelligence Agency to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Cuban government of Fidel Castro. Eisenhower stated it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The CIA was initially confident it was capable of overthrowing the Cuban government, having experience assisting in the overthrow of foreign governments such as that of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. The plan (code-named Operation Pluto) was organized by Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., CIA Deputy Director for Plans, under CIA Director Allen Dulles.
The original CIA plan called for a ship-borne invasion at the old colonial city of Trinidad, Cuba, about 270 km (170mi) south-east of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains in Sancti Spiritus province. Trinidad had good port facilities, and arguably was close to much existing counter-revolutionary activities in the Escambray. The CIA later proposed alternative plans, and on 11 March 1961 President Kennedy and his cabinet selected the Bay of Pigs option (also known as Operation Zapata), because it had an airfield suitable for B-26 bomber operations and it was less militarily "noisy", so potentially more plausible deniability of US direct involvement. The invasion landing area was changed to beaches bordering the Bay of Pigs in Las Villas Province, 150 km south-east of Havana and east of the Zapata peninsula. The landings were to take place at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), and Caleta Buena Inlet (code-named Green Beach).
In early 1961, Cuba's army possessed Soviet-designed T-34 and IS-2 Stalin tanks, SU-100 self-propelled 'tank destroyers', 122 mm howitzers, other artillery and small arms, plus Italian 105 mm howitzers. The Cuban air force armed inventory included Douglas B-26 Invader light bombers, Hawker Sea Furies, and Lockheed T-33 jets, all remaining from the Fuerza Aérea del Ejército de Cuba (FAEC), the Cuban air force of the Batista regime.
Preparation and training for invasion
In May 1960, the CIA began to recruit anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the Miami area. Until July 1960, assessment and training was carried out on Useppa Island and at various other facilities in South Florida, such as Homestead AFB. Specialist guerrilla training took place at Fort Gulick, Panama. For the increasing ranks of recruits, infantry training was carried out at a CIA-run base code-named JMTrax near Retalhuleu in the Sierra Madre on the Pacific coast of Guatemala. The exiles group named themselves Brigade 2506 (Brigada Asalto 2506).In summer 1960, an airfield (code-named JMMadd, aka Rayo Base) was constructed near Retalhuleu, Guatemala. Gunnery and flight training of Brigade 2506 air crews was carried out by personnel from Alabama ANG (Air National Guard), using at least six Douglas B-26 Invaders in the markings of FAG (Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca), legitimate delivery of those to the FAG being delayed by about 6 months. A further 26 B-26s were obtained from US military stocks, 'sanitized' to obscure their origins, and about twenty of them were converted for offensive operations by deletion of defensive armament, standardization of the Eight-gun nose, addition of underwing drop tanks, rocket racks, etc. Nearby, paratroop training was at a base nicknamed Garrapatenango, near Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Training for boat handling and amphibious landings took place at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Tank training took place at Fort Knox, Kentucky and Fort Benning, Georgia. Underwater demolition training took place at Belle Chase near New Orleans.
The CIA used Douglas C-54 transports to deliver people, supplies, and arms from Florida at night. Curtiss C-46s were also used for transport between Retalhuleu and the CIA base code-named JMTide (aka Happy Valley), at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. On April 9, 1961, Brigade 2506 personnel, ships, and aircraft started transferring from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
Prior warnings of invasion
The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, via their secret intelligence network, as well as loose talk by members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami and was repeated in US and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the bombing of the El Encanto department store in Havana, desultory explosions, and arson. The Cuban government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively. The general Cuban population was not well informed, except for CIA funded Radio Swan. As of May 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the government’s hands.
Parties involved
Cuban government order of battle
The Cuban government order of battle is unclear and subject to dispute. Fidel Castro is given credit for directing strategy by Cuban government sources. Major Juan Almeida was Head of the Central Army at Santa Clara. Sergio del Valle Jiménez was Director of Headquarters Operations at Point One, Havana. Antonio Enrique Lussón Batlle, a Raul Castro loyalist, is also placed there. Orlando Rodriguez Puerta, previous commander of Fidel Castro's personal guard, was charged with direction of Cuban government forces in Matanzas Province directly north of combat area. Captain José Ramón Fernández was head of the School of Militia Leaders (Cadets) at Matanzas. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the Head of the Revolutionary National Police. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez was Minister of the Interior in 1961, and head of G-2.
Hispano-Soviets Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Alberto Bayo were advisors/and or commanders to intelligence and militia forces. Ciutat de Miguel under the name Angel Martínez Riosola was a significant leader/advisor for Cuban forces coming from Central Provinces. Victor Emilio Dreke Cruz, although nominally in charge of Central Province forces is generally considered to have played subordinate role to Ciutat de Miguel. Victor Dreke describes his part in the action as first fighting with parachutists and then being wounded in an ambush The documentary "Brothers in Arms" covers the life of one South African, a Robert Herboldt who had a role as quartermaster. While his presence at the site of action is generally conceded, the exact role of Arnaldo Ochoa, later to be commander of Cuban forces in Angola, is obscure. On 17 April, the head of the Cuban air force, "Maro" Guerra Bermejo, former driver for Raul Castro, was replaced by Raúl Curbelo Morales, Minister of Communication.
Hispano-Soviet advisors to Cuban government forces
Soviet-trained advisors were brought to Cuba from Eastern Bloc countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet Armies during World War II and having resided in the Soviet Union for long periods are thus known as "Hispano-Soviets"; the most senior of these were the Spanish Communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War Francisco Ciutat de Miguel (Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito), Enrique Lister and Cuba born (1892) Alberto Bayo.
The role of other Soviet Agents at the time is not well known, although they were there and well established in Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and can be presumed that in that emergency to have been actively involved in the Cuban government's defence. Some of these agents acquired far greater fame later. For instance, two KGB colonels, Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba about September 1959.
Existing resistance in Cuba
After the success of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, counter-revolutionary groups grew both in cities and in the countryside, particularly in the Escambray mountains, where a guerrilla war "War Against the Bandits" continued sporadically until about 1965. Prior to the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the CIA supported and supplied various groups with arms and other resources, but they were not included in the invasion plans due to concerns about information security. No quarter was given during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray mountains, where former rebels from the War Against Batista took different sides.
On April 3, 1961, a bomb attack on militia barracks in Bayamo killed four militia and wounded eight more; on April 6, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by sabotage. On April 14, 1961, the guerrillas of Agapito Rivera fought Cuban government forces near Las Cruces, Montembo, Las Villas, where several government forces were killed and others wounded.
Prelude to invasion
Air attacks on airfields (15 April)
At about 06.00 Cuba local time on 15 April 1961, eight Douglas B-26B Invader bombers in three groups, simultaneously attacked three Cuban airfields, at San Antonio de Los Baños and at Ciudad Libertad (formerly named Campo Columbia), both near Havana, plus the Antonio Maceo International Airport at Santiago de Cuba. The B-26s had been prepared by the CIA on behalf of Brigade 2506, and had been painted with the markings of the FAR (Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria), the air force of the Cuban government. Each was armed with bombs, rockets and machine guns. They had flown from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua and were crewed by exiled Cuban pilots and navigators of the self-styled Fuerza Aérea de Liberación (FAL). The purpose of the action (code-named Operation Puma) was to destroy most or all of the armed aircraft of the FAR in preparation for the main invasion. At Santiago, the two attackers reportedly destroyed a C-47 transport, a PBY Catalina flying boat, two B-26s and a civilian DC-3 plus various other civilian aircraft. At San Antonio, the three attackers reportedly destroyed 3 FAR B-26s, one Sea Fury and one T-33, and one attacker diverted to Grand Cayman due to low usable fuel. At Ciudad Libertad, the three attackers reportedly destroyed only non-operational aircraft such as two F-47 Thunderbolts. One of those attackers was damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and ditched about 50 km north of Cuba with the loss of its crew Daniel Fernández Mon and Gaston Pérez. Its companion B-26 continued north and landed at Boca Chica field (Naval Air Station Key West), Florida. The crew, José Crespo and Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo, were granted political asylum and made their way back to Nicaragua the next day via Miami and the daily CIA C-54 flight from Opa-Locka Airport to Puerto Cabezas. Their B-26, purposely numbered 933, the same as at least two other B-26s that day for disinformation reasons, was held until late on 17 April. Shortly before the attacks, a FAR T-33 piloted by Orestes Acosta crashed fatally into the sea during a reconnaissance sortie from Santiago de Cuba. That was probably unrelated to the actions that day, but on 17 April his name was quoted as a defector among the (CIA?) disinformation circulating in Miami.
Deception flight (15 April)
About 90 minutes after the eight B-26s had taken off from Puerto Cabezas to attack Cuban airfields, another B-26 departed on a deception flight that took it close to Cuba but headed north to Florida. Like the bomber groups, it carried false FAR markings and the same number 933 as painted on at least two of the others. Prior to departure, the cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by CIA personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the false appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. At a safe distance north of Cuba, the pilot feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the cowling, radioed a mayday call and requested immediate permission to land at Miami International airport. The pilot was Mario Zúñiga, formerly of the Cuban air force, and after landing he masqueraded as "Juan Garcia", and publicly claimed that three colleagues had also defected from the FAR. The next day he was granted political asylum and that night he returned to Puerto Cabezas via Opa-Locka.
Reactions (15 April)
At 10:30am on 15 April at the United Nations, the Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa attempted to accuse the US of aggressive air attacks against Cuba, and that afternoon formally tabled a motion to the Political (First) Committee of the UN General Assembly. In response, Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the UN, stated that US armed forces would not "under any conditions" intervene in Cuba, and that the US would do everything in its power to ensure that no US citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. He also stated that Cuban defectors had carried out the attacks that day, and he presented a UPI wire photo of Zuniga's B-26 in Cuban markings at Miami airport. Stevenson was later embarrassed to realise that the CIA had lied to him and to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.
On 15 April, the national police, led by Efigenio Ameijeiras, started the process of arresting thousands of suspected anti-revolutionary individuals, and detaining them in provisional locations such as the Blanquita Theatre, the moat of Fortaleza de la Cabana and the Principe Castle all in Havana, and the baseball park in Matanzas.
Phony war (16 April)
Following the air strikes on airfields on April 15, 1961, the FAR managed to prepare for armed action at least four T-33s, four Sea Furies and five or six B-26s. All three types were armed with machine guns for air-to-air combat and for strafing of ships and ground forces. CIA planners had reportedly failed to discover that the US-supplied T-33 jets had long been armed with M-3 machine guns. The Sea Furies and B-26s were also armed with rockets, for attacks against ships and tanks.
No additional air strikes against Cuban airfields and aircraft were specifically planned before 17 April, but pilots' exaggerated claims gave the CIA false confidence in the success of the 15 April attacks, until U-2 reconnaissance photos on 16 April showed otherwise. Late on 16 April, President Kennedy ordered cancellation of further airfield strikes planned for dawn on 17 April, to attempt plausible deniability of US direct involvement.
On April 16, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged armed rising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, only four survived Leonel Martinez and 12 others took to the countryside (ibid). On April 17, 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (then chief of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez and immediately executed. The CIA was unaware or unconcerned at this repression's effects on the planned operation (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan). Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano, a Catholic youth leader. Some estimates quote several hundred thousand people as being imprisoned before, during, and after the invasion.
Late on April 16, 1961, the CIA/Brigade 2506 invasion fleet converged on "Rendezvous Point Zulu", about 65km (40 miles) south of Cuba, having sailed from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua where they had been loaded with troops and other materiel, after loading arms and supplies at New Orleans. The fleet, cryptically labelled the "Cuban Expeditionary Force" (CEF), included five 2,400-ton (empty weight) freighter ships chartered by the CIA from the Garcia Line and outfitted with anti-aircraft guns. Four of the freighters, Houston (code name Aguja), Río Escondido (code name Balena), Caribe (code name Sardina), and Atlántico (code-name Tiburon), were planned to transport about 1,400 troops in seven battalions of troops and armaments near to the invasion beaches. The fifth freighter, Lake Charles, was loaded with follow-up supplies and some Operation 40 infiltration personnel. The freighters sailed under Liberian ensigns. Accompanying them were two LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) "purchased" from Zapata Corporation then outfitted with heavy armament at Key West, then exercises and training at Vieques Island. The LCIs were Blagar (code-name Marsopa) and Barbara J (code-name Barracuda), and they sailed under Nicaraguan ensigns. The CEF ships were individually escorted (outside visual range) to Point Zulu by US Navy destroyers USS Bache, USS Beale, USS Conway, USS Cony, USS Eaton, USS Murray, USS Waller. A task force had already assembled off the Cayman Islands, including aircraft carrier USS Essex with task force commander John A. Clark (Admiral) onboard, helicopter assault carrier USS Boxer, destroyers USS Hank, USS John W. Weeks, USS Purdy, USS Wren, and submarines USS Cobbler and USS Threadfin. Command and control ship USS Northampton and carrier USS Shangri-La were also reportedly active in the Caribbean at the time. USS San Marcos was a Landing Ship Dock that carried three LCUs (Landing Craft Utility) and four LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicles, Personnel). At Point Zulu, the seven CEF ships sailed north without the USN escorts, except for San Marcos that continued until the seven landing craft were unloaded when just outside the 5km (3mi) Cuban territorial limit.
Invasion
Invasion day (17 April)
At about 00.00 on April 17, 1961, the two CIA LCIs Blagar and Barbara J, each with a CIA "operations officer" and an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) of five frogmen, entered the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) on the southern coast of Cuba. They headed a force of four transport ships (Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe, and Atlántico) carrying about 1,300 Cuban exile ground troops of Brigade 2506, plus tanks and other armour in the landing craft. At about 01.00, the Blagar, as the battlefield command ship, directed the principal landing at Playa Girón (Blue Beach), led by the frogmen in rubber boats followed by troops from Caribe in small aluminum boats, then LCVPs and LCUs. The Barbara J, leading Houston, similarly landed troops 35km further northwest at Playa Larga (Red Beach), using small glass fibre boats.
At both assault beaches, the invaders overcame a few Cuban militia, and they then attempted to seize control of the few access roads leading south across the swamps towards the beaches. After landings, it soon became evident that the Brigade 2506 ground forces were not going to receive effective support and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles involving heavy USSR equipment. After the initial success, the CIA/Brigade 2506 forces suffered considerable reverses. When the invasion started, the three remaining Cuban FAR Hawker Sea Furies were able to engage the Brigade 2506 forces on the beaches within 15 minutes. When the FAR B-26s arrived to take over bombing the beaches, the Sea Furies changed targets to the amphibious support ships, damaging the flagship Marsopa and sinking the Houston, which was the main supply ship, for the loss of one Sea Fury. Its captain beached the Houston on the swampy part of the Zapata peninsula on the left bank of the bay, and while most of its troops were able to swim ashore, they lost most of their equipment. By mid-morning, rockets fired from Sea Furies and also from two T-33 jets had also sunk the Rio Escondido, which blew up and sank about two miles south of Girón. The two remaining freighters Caribe and Atlántico then retreated south to international waters.
About two hours after the initial landings, five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action code-named Operation Falcon. About 30 men plus heavy equipment were dropped south of Australia sugar mill on the road to Palpite and Playa Larga, but the equipment was lost in the swamps and the troops failed to block the road. Other troops were dropped at San Blas, at Jocuma between Covadonga and San Blas, and at Horquitas between Yaguaramas and San Blas. These positions to block the roads were heavily maintained for two days, while reinforced by advancing Brigade ground troops from Playa Girón.
Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy had also canceled sorties of attacks on Cuban airfields planned for 16 April and dawn on 17 April.
Naval action during the Bay of Pigs extended beyond the attacks on the invaders' supply vessels. The Cuban government lost at least two vessels, the PE (Patrol Escort) Baire,and the B.J. Driscoll with extensive but apparently not specifically reported loss of life. The Brigade 2506 command ship Blagar successfully fought off attacking aircraft.
On the night of April 17/18, 1961, a planned air strike on airfields by B-26s of Brigade 2506 from Puerto Cabezas reportedly failed due to incompetence and bad weather.
Invasion day plus one (D+1) 18 April
On April 18, 1961, in the only air attack mission by the Cuban exiles from Puerto Cabezas that day, six B-26s attacked Cuban militia and army units, including columns of vehicles moving toward Playa Larga, using bombs, napalm and rockets, causing heavy casualties. The group of B-26s was code-named Lobo Flight, led by an American CIA contract pilot, and included Mario Zuniga, the "defector" pilot. It is reported that one of the attacks by Lobo Flight caused at least nine hundred casualties to the Cuban government forces. In these attacks, Cuban ground forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of Cuban army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by napalm.
. A photo of a burned bus, presumably one of those used to transport Cuban militia, can be seen on page 154 of Wyden (1979).
But by 8:00 AM, despite heavy losses here and there, the Cuban Army had driven the exiles from Playa Larga and the Red Beach area, and forced them south towards Girón, while Cuban militia, supported by Sea Furies and T-33 jets, plus Russian-made artillery and tanks, drove the paratroopers from their advanced positions around Yaguaramas and Covadonga, forcing them back towards San Blas where the surviving paratroops dug in and held out for the rest of the day, resisting all Cuban attempts to dislodge them from their positions near the beachheads.
On April 18, Directorio guerrilla Marcelino Maganaz died in action in Sierra Maestra.
Invasion day plus two (D+2) 19 April
The final air attack mission (code-named Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract air crews and pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. The Cubans shot down two of these B-26s, killing four American airmen.
One of the C-46s delivered arms and equipment to the Girón airstrip occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces. The C-46 also evacuated Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named Chico Two) that had been shot down and crash-landed at Girón on 17 April.
Combat air patrols were flown by Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk jets of VA-34 squadron operating from USS Essex (CVS-9), with nationality and other markings removed. Sorties were flown to reassure Brigade soldiers and pilots, and to intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war
Without direct air support, and short of ammunition, Brigade 2506 ground forces retreated to the beaches in the face of considerable onslaught from Cuban government artillery, tanks and infantry.
Late on 19 April, destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray (code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate retreating Brigade soldiers from beaches, before opportunist firing from Cuban army tanks caused Commodore Crutchfield to order a withdrawal.
Invasion day plus four (D+4) 21 April
From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties were flown by A4D-2Ns to obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. Reconnaissance flights are also reported of Douglas AD-5Ws of VFP-62 and/or VAW-12 squadron from USS Essex or another carrier, such as USS Shangri-La that was part of the task force assembled off the Cayman Islands.
On 21 April, Eaton and Murray, joined on 22 April by destroyers USS Conway and USS Cony, plus USS Threadfin (submarine) and a CIA PBY-5A Catalina flying boat, continued to search the coastline, reefs and islands for scattered Brigade survivors, about 24-30 being rescued.
Aftermath
Casualties
Aircrews killed in action between April 15, 1961 and April 19, 1961 totalled six from FAR (Cuban air force), ten Cuban exiles and four US citizens.
By the time fighting ended on April 21, 1961, 68 Brigade 2506 ground forces personnel were killed in action and the rest were captured. Cuba's losses during the Bay of Pigs Invasion are more difficult to determine, but they are considered to be higher. Most sources estimate them to be in the thousands, mostly resulting from a number of failed counter-attacks to drive Brigade 2506 into the sea. Triay mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch states about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting. The Cuban government initially reported its army losses to be 87 dead and many more wounded during the three days of fighting the invaders. The number of those killed in action in Cuba's army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. However, these figures are for Cuban army losses only, not including militia or armed civilian loyalists. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action. In addition, two Cuban FAR B-26s, one Sea Fury, and an unknown number of military vehicles, T-34 tanks, artillery and other equipment were lost or damaged in the battle.
The total casualties for Brigade 2506 were 104 killed in action, and a few hundred more were wounded. One US paratrooper attached to the unit was also killed.
In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain Thomas Willard Ray, who was shot down flying a B-26, was returned to his family from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him its highest award, the Intelligence Star.
Prisoners
On April 18, 1961, at least seven Cubans plus two CIA hired US citizens (Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio province.
Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, particularly at the dreaded Fortaleza de la Cabana and El Morro Castle, 18th-century Spanish fortresses built to protect Havana Harbor. The Cuban government authorities had converted their dungeons into prisons, their walls into paredones de fusilamiento (firing squad walls). Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia, and more than one hundred others died within these colonial prisons.
The 1,209 captured Brigade 2506 members were quickly put on trial for treason. Some were executed, and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.
In May 1961, Fidel Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for 500 large tractors, presumably for agriculture. The trade rose to US$28 million. Negotiations were non-productive until after the Cuban missile crisis. On December 21, 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a US lawyer, signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine; the money was raised by private donations. On December 29, 1962, Kennedy met with the returning brigade at Palm Beach, Florida.
The Royal Bank of Canada had maintained an office in Havana after the Castro regime had in 1960 taken over the bank's operations in the country. The office's function was to facilitate trade between Canada and Cuba, but after the invasion, RBC's Special Representative acted as an intermediary between the U.S. and Cuban governments in managing the ransom for the prisoners.
Political reaction
The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy Administration and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, CIA Director Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA. Responsibility of the Kennedy administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans was not apparent until later.
In August 1961, during an economic conference of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy through Richard N. Goodwin, a young secretary of the White House. It said: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever."
Later analysis
CIA report
The CIA wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. Errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:
- The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.
- They believed that the involvement of the US in the incident could be denied.
- They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Lynch 2000). The invasion by a foreign country boosted the support of the Fidel Castro government.
The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Cuban government's counter-intelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including Enrique Lister, had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a later interview with CNN, he said, "…all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro." Grayston Lynch among others, also points to Cuban government forces rounding up of hundreds of thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior to and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003), destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959, were gone or silent.
Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in Marines to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.
Hindsight of invasion warnings
An April 29, 2000 Washington Post article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. Radio Moscow broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961 predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later.
According to the British Ambassador to the US, David Ormsby-Gore, British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, indicated that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion. More recent analysis suggests that the sources such as those used in the Ormsby-Gore intelligence estimate were not aware of related material.
Invasion legacy in Cuba
The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "Marxist-Leninist". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the Cuban Missile Crisis a year and a half later. Castro was now increasingly wary of further US intervention and more susceptible to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure its security. There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (Defense Day) to prepare the population for an invasion.
Invasion legacy for Cuban exiles
Many who fought for the CIA in the Bay of Pigs remained loyal after the fiasco. Some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 29 captains. By March 2007, about half of the Brigade had died.
Popular culture references
In his book "Downsize This!", Michael Moore has a chapter called "Those Keystone Cubans", discussing US-Cuban relations. He says that the Bay of Pigs Invasion "...resembles an old Keystone Cops movie," due to the mismanagement of the operation.
The plot of the novel "American Tabloid," by James Ellroy, surrounds the lives of various fictional characters responsible for plotting the invasion. In the book, President John F. Kennedy is assassinated by the planners as a direct result of his failure to provide U.S. military aid, particularly air support, to the exiles.
The preparation and undertaking of the invasion is extensively covered in Littel's novel "The Company", with a major character joining the invasion forces on the beach. Though it is a fictionalised account, it seems to tally with what others have written here.
The invasion and its failure play a prominent role in the plot of the semi-historical 2006 film The Good Shepherd.
Billy Joel references the event in the song "We Didn't Start the Fire".
In the Fox TV series "24", President Taylor referenced the Bay of Pigs when discussing the Sangala political crisis in an episode aired on January 12, 2009.
Muppets Tonight introduced a parody of the TV-series Baywatch under the name Bay of Pigswatch in episode 1, 1996.
Part of Norman Mailer's novel, Harlot's Ghost is concerned with the invasion. The protagonist, fictional CIA agent Herrick Hubbard, is intimately concerned with the Miami side of the operation.
An upcoming film, Fire Bay recounts the invasion from the standpoints of some of the key people involved. Michael Biehn is set to star as the CIA mastermind Richard M. Bissell, Jr. who along with several others, plan and carries out the infamous invasion. The film is scheduled for release in 2010.
In the video game Metal Gear Solid 3, the main antagonist, named The Boss, states that the disaster and betrayal of the Bay Of Pigs Invasion, of which she was a part of, was one of the main reasons for her defection.
Playa Girón today
Little remains of the original village, which in the 1960s was small and remote. It is still remote, with just a single road to the village and out again, but it has grown markedly since the invasion. Few people there today were residents at the time. The road from the north is marked by frequent memorials to the Cuban dead. There are billboards marking where invaders were rounded up and showing pictures of their being led away. Another at the entrance to the village quotes Castro's comment that the Bay of Pigs was the "first defeat of Yankee imperialism." A two-room museum, with aircraft and other military equipment outside, shows pictures, arms and maps of the attack and photos of Cuban soldiers who died. Billboards and other material also remember the US financed "mercenaries".
See also
External links
- Columbia reference on Bay of Pigs Invasion at Encyclopedia.com http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-BayPigsI.html
- History of Cuba - Bay of Pigs Invasion http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/baypigs/pigs.htm History of Cuba]
- JFK Library site's entry on Kennedy and the bay of pigs invasion http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/JFK+and+the+Bay+of+Pigs.htm
- Klaus, Erich. 2003. Cuba air force history, world air forces http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm
- NY Times headline, April 18, 1961, Anti-Castro Units Land in Cuba; Report Fighting at Beachhead; Rusk Says US Won't Intervene http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0417.html#article
- Sandy Kossin's invasion paintings http://illustrationart.blogspot.com/2008_01_01_archive.html
- Studyworld Bay of Pigs Invasion http://www.studyworld.com/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion.htm
- — Includes maps of the Invasion and Documents.DEAD LINK
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