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Battles of Latrun
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The Battles of Latrun refer to a series of military engagements between the Israel Defense Forces and the Jordanian Arab Legion on the outskirts of Latrun between 25 May and 18 July 1948 during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.
In May 1948, the locale of Latrun was situated within the area set aside for the Arab partition of Palestine and was under the control of the Arab Legion. It commanded the only road linking the Yishuv controlled area of Jerusalem to Israel.
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The Battles of Latrun refer to a series of military engagements between the Israel Defense Forces and the Jordanian Arab Legion on the outskirts of Latrun between 25 May and 18 July 1948 during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.
In May 1948, the locale of Latrun was situated within the area set aside for the Arab partition of Palestine and was under the control of the Arab Legion. It commanded the only road linking the Yishuv controlled area of Jerusalem to Israel. This gave Latrun major strategic importance in the context of the battle for the city of Jerusalem.
None of the five assaults launched by Israeli forces enabled them to take the position and Latrun remained under Jordanian control until the Six Day War. The besieged Jewish population of Jerusalem could nevertheless be supplied by the development of a passable road, dubbed the "Burma Road," avoiding Latrun and suitable for convoy traffic.
The Battle of Latrun left its imprint on the Israeli collective imagination and constitutes part of the "founding myth" of the Jewish State. The attacks costed the lives of 168 Israeli soldiers, but some accounts inflated this number to as much as 2,000. The combat at Latrun also carries a symbolic significance due to the participation Holocaust survivors.
Today, the battleground site has an Israeli military museum dedicated to the Israeli Armored Corps and a memorial to the Israeli War of Independence.
Context
1948 War
Following the vote of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine in November 1947, a civil war erupted in Palestine. At that time, the situation of the Jewish community of Jerusalem constituted one of the weak points of the Yishuv and a main cause for concern of its leaders. With nearly 100,000 inhabitants, constituting one-sixth of the total Jewish population of Mandate Palestine, the city was isolated in the heart of territory under Arab control.
In January, in the context of the "War of the Roads", the Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas of Abd al-Kader al-Husseini besieged the Jewish part of the city and prevented the passage of the supply convoys between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. By the end of March, the tactic proved its efficiency and the city was effectively cut off. The Haganah then launched Operation Nachshon that on April 4 and April 20 reprovisioned the city for a period of 2 months. Following the death of Abd al-Kader al-Husseini, the Arab League's military committee ordered the other Arab force in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army, to move its forces from Samaria (the northern part of today's West Bank) to the road of Jerusalem and the areas of Latrun, al-Ramla (Ramle) and Lydda (Lod).
In mid-May, the situation for the 50,000 Arab inhabitants of the city and the 30-40,000 in the outlying neighbourhoods was no better. After the massacre of Deir Yassin and the Jewish offensive of April that triggered the large-scale exodus of the Palestinian Arabs in other mixed cities, the Arab population of Jerusalem was frightened and feared for its fate. With the departure of the British on 14 May, the Haganah launched several operations to take the control of the city and the Arab leaders sent the alarm to King Abdullah I of Jordan for his army to come to their rescue.
Beyond its strategic importance, the city of Jerusalem also held an important symbolic value for all protagonists, being a holy place for Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
Around 15 May, with the British leaving, the situation in the newly declared State of Israel and the remnants of Palestine was chaotic. The Jewish forces had gained the advantage over the Arab forces, but they feared the intervention of the Arab armies that had been announced for 15 May.
Latrun
Latrun was located at the crossroad between the Tel Aviv–Ramla–Jerusalem and Ramallah–Isdud roads in the area allocated to the Arab state by the Partition Plan. At that site, the Jerusalem road entered the foothills of Judea at Bab al-Wad (Sha'ar HaGai). It dominated the Valley of Ayalon, and the force that occupied it commanded the road to Jerusalem.[See .]
In 1948, Latrun comprised a detention camp and a fortified police station occupied by the British, a Trappist monastery, and several Arab villages: Latrun, Imwas, Dayr Ayyub and Bayt Nuba.
During the civil war, after the death of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the forces of the Arab Liberation Army positioned themselves around the police fort and the surrounding villages, to the indifference of the British. They regularly attacked supply convoys heading for Jerusalem. At that time, the Israeli and Jordanian military staffs had not yet understood the strategic importance of the place.
Chronology
Military movements before the battle
Operation Maccabi (8–16 May)
On 8 May, Haganah launched Operation Maccabi against the Arab Liberation Army and the Palestinian irregulars who occupied several villages along the Jerusalem road and prevented the resupplying of Jerusalem's Jewish community. The Givati Brigade (on the west side) and Harel Brigade (on the east side) were engaged in fights, notably in the Latrun area.
Between 9 and 11 May, a battalion of the Harel brigade attacked and took the village of Bayt Mahsir, used by Palestinians as a base for the control of Bab al-Wad. The "Sha'ar HaGai" battalion of the Harel brigade also took a position on the hills north and south of the road. It had to withstand the fire of the Arab Liberation Army artillery and the "unusual"[It is Benny Morris who points out.] one of British armoured vehicles, but succeeded in holding the position and entrenched there
To the west, on 12 May, Givati brigade troops took the British detention camp on the road leading to Latrun, but abandoned it the next day.. Between 14 and 15 May, its 52nd battalion took the villages of Abu Shusha, al-Na'ani and al-Qubab north of Latrun, thus cutting off the zone from al-Ramla, the main Arab town in the area. Lapierre and Collins report also that a platoon of the Givati brigade fired on and then penetrated the fort without encountering any resistance on the morning of 15 May.
Again to the east, on 15 May, the troops of the Harel brigade took Dayr Ayyub, which they abandoned the next day.
It is at that moment that the Israeli officers in the field understood the strategic importance of Latrun. A report was sent from OC Harel brigade to OC Palmach that concluded that "The Latrun junction becomes the main point in the battle [of Jerusalem]" [exact words must be taken from the source], but "that appreciation was not shared by the staff one week previously". Meanwhile, due to the advance of the Egyptian army, Givati brigade received the order to redeploy more on the southern front, and the Harel brigade to remain in the Jerusalem sector
This decision to leave the area, and the fact of not perceiving its strategic importance, would later be a source of controversy between Haganah chief of operations Yigael Yadin and Yitzhak Rabin, commander of the Harel brigade.
The Arab Legion takes control
During the confusion of the last days of the British Mandate and with the "entry in war" of the Arab armies, the position of Latrun changed hands without combat.
First, around 14–15 May, an order was given to Fawzi al-Qawuqji and his Arab Liberation Army to withdraw and to leave the place to the Arab Legion. According to Yoav Gelber, this departure occurred before the arrival of the Jordanian troops at Latrun and the position was just kept by 200 irregulars. Benny Morris nevertheless points out that a platoon of legionnaires of the 11th company along with irregulars was there and took the fort. Indeed, as auxiliary force of the British in Mandatory Palestine, several elements of the Arab Legion served in Palestine during the Mandate. The British had promised that these units would have withdrawn before the end of April, but for "technical reasons", several companies didn't leave the country. John Bagot Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion, formed it into one division with two brigades, each made up of two infantry battalions, in addition to several independent infantry companies. Each battalion was given an armored-car company, and the artillery was made a separate battalion with three batteries. Another "dummy" brigade was formed to make the Israelis believe it was a reserve brigade, thus deterring them from counterattacking into Transjordan.
On 15 May, the Arab States entered the war, and Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and Egyptian contingents invaded Palestine. Among these, the Jordanian expeditionary corps was mainly constituted by an elite mechanised force "encadrée" by British officers and named Arab Legion. It comprised:
- the 1st brigade
[In the Jordanian expeditionary corps, each brigade is composed of 2 regiments each of them likely composed of 3 or 4 companies. This information is nevertheless "dubious" (sujette à caution ?). The sources are contradictory at that level. The divergences are likely to be due to the fact that the "battalion", which is generally the unit that subdivides the brigade is named regiment in the Arab Legion.] comprising the 1st and 3rd battalions that lead to Nablus; - the 3rd brigade under the orders of colonel Ashton comprising the 2nd battalion under the orders of Major Geoffrey Lockett and the 4th battalion under the orders of lieutenant colonel Habes al-Majali that took position at Ramallah;
- the 5th and 6th battalions acting independently.
Glubb first understood ("pris conscience") of the strategical importance of Latrun in the battle for Jerusalem. His objective was double. He wanted to prevent the Israelis to strengthen Jerusalem and to supply the city, and he wanted to "make diversion" to keep the strengths of the Haganah far from the city, warranting to the Arabs the control of East-Jerusalem
In more of the 11th company already there, he sent to Latrun the whole 4th regiment. During the night between 15 to 16 May, a first contingent of 40 legionnaires secunded by a undetermined number of Bedouins strengthened the position. and the remaining of the regiment reached the are on 17 May.
On 18 May, the strengths of the Arab Legion deployed aroudn Latrun and Bab al-Wed and the road was blocked again. The Israeli general staff needs several days to realize the actual location of the Jordanian forces around Latrun and Jerusalem because these latter, particularly feared (redoutées ?) have been announced at several places of the country.
Situation at Jerusalem
At Jerusalem, after the successful offensives that enabled the Jewish forces to take control of the buildings and the strongholds that had been abandoned by the British, Glubb Pacha sent the 3rd regiment of the Arab Legion to strengthen the Arab irregulars and fight the Jewish forces. After "violent" fighting, the Jewish positions in the Old City of Jerusalem were threatened (this felt indeed on 28 May). "L'étau se resserre autour de la ville" : on 22 and 23 May, the second Egyptian brigade, composed mainly of several battalions of irregulars and several units of the regular army, reached the southern outskirts of Jerusalem and participated to the attack of Ramat Rachel.
Glubb nevertheless knew that the Israeli army would at one moment or the other stronger than his and that he had to prevent the strengthening of the Harel and Etzioni brigades to secure East-Jerusalem. He redeploys his strengths on 23 May to reinforce the blockade. The Iraqi army, at that time secunded by tanks, "relève" the units of the Legion in northern Samaria and these lattests were redeployed towards the Jerusalem sector. The 2nd regiment of the Legion moved to Latrun. That was a full Jordanian brigade that positioned in the area.
In the Israeli side, several leaders of the Jewish city sent alarmed cables to David Ben Gurion where they described the situation as desperate et where they consider not to be able to hold more than two weeks.. Fearing that without supply, the city would end by collapsing, Ben Gurion ordered to take Latrun. This decision seemed strategically needed but was politically delicate, because Latrun was in the area allocated to the Arab State according to the term of the Partition Plan and this attacked was contrary to the non-aggression agreements concluded with the Kind Abdullah[Until the last days preceding the war, the Zionist authorities and the King Abdullah of Jordan maintained a dialogue. Some historians, such as Avi Shlaim, consider that this dialogue went up to a tacit non-aggession agreement but this thesis is controversial.] This decision was also opposed by the Chief of Operations, Yigael Yadin who considered that there were other military priorities at that moment, in particular on the south front, where the Egyptian army risked to threaten Tel Aviv is Yad Merdechai would come to fall. But that was David Ben Gurion who fixed the Israeli military policy. This "divergence" (différend?) influenced the historiography of the battle and was debated in Israel during numerous years
Operation Bin Nun Alef (24–25 May)
The task to lead Operation Bin Nun (lit. Nun's son, in reference to Joshua, Nun's son, conqueror of Canaan according to the Book of Joshua) was given to Shlomo Shamir, a former officer of the British army. His force consisted of 450 men of the Alexandroni Brigade and 1,650 men of the 7th Brigade. Of these, about 140 to 145 were immigrants who had just arrived in Israel, nearly 7% of the total. Their heavy weaponry was limited to two French "canon de montagne" of 1906 (nicknamed Napoleonchik), one 88 mm cannon with 15 rounds of ammunition, one Davidka, 10 3-inch mortars and 12 armored vehicles. Three hundred soldiers of the Harel Brigade that were also in the area were not aware of the operation, but assisted after findind out about it by intercepting a radio transmission.
The Jordanian forces were under the order of lieutenant colonel Habes al-Majali.. He "disposed" of the 4th regiment and 600 Jordanian volunteers secunded by 600 local volunteers. The 2nd regiment of the brigade, commanded by Major Geoffrey Lockett, had just left Jerusalem and arrived Latrun during the battle.. The brigade totals 2300 men secunded by 800 auxiliaries. It disposes 35 armoured vehicles among which 17 Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars each armed with an anti-tank 2 pounder gun. At the artillery level, it could rely on 8 25 pounder Howitzers/Field guns, 8 6 pounder anti-tank guns, 10 2 pounder anti-tank guns also 16 3-inch mortars.
H Hour was initially fixed at midnight on 23 May. But it was delayed 24 hours because it had not been possible to gather troops and weapons in time. Because, no reconnaissance patrol was made, the Israelis didn't know the exact composition of enemy forces.. Intelligence reports just talked about "local irregular forces".
On 24 May at 19:30, Shlomo Shamir was warned that an enemy force of around 120 vehicles, comprising armoured vehicles and artillery lead probably to Latrun. Attacking urges. Hour H was advanced by 2 hours and fixed at 22:00.
The attack was planned on two axes :
- The battalion of the Alexandroni brigade had to take the village of Latroun, the police fort and then Imwas in order to block any new Arab reinforcement, and also to protect the passage of supply convoys;
- The 72nd Battalion would "contourn" the position by the south to join the Jerusalem road at the level of Bab al-Wad ; it would then cross the road and climb the ridges to take Dayr Ayyub, Yalu and Bayt Nuba, and would ambush there to cover the passage of convoys. It would be supported by three "automitrailleuses" and two half-tracks of the 73rd battalion.
During the night, an unexpected event occurred : a "barricade" on the road that must be "empruntée" by the brigade for the attack had to be dismantled. Hour H is once more modified to be fixed at midnight. Finally, the troops "se mirent en mouvement" between 2 and 5 in the morning and could not benefit of the obscurity of the attack.
The attackers were rapidly discoverted, which "privated" the Israelis of the surprise effect. The battle started at 4 in the morning. The Israeli forces were submitted to a strong fire. The artillery tried to intervene but felt rapidly out of ammunition or was not at range to provide a counter-battery fire.[Counter-battery fire is a military tactic that consists in targeting, with one's own strategy, the one of the adversary.]
In front of the total failure of the attack, Shlomo Shamir ordered the retreat at 11:30. But this one occurred "à découvert", under a "leaded sun" and while the soldiers had no water. Numerous men were killed or injured by Arab fire. It was only at 14:00 that the first injured men reached the autobus they had left in the morning. The Arab Legion nevertheless didn't take advantage of this victory while, according to Benny Morris, it could easily have performed a counter-attack up to the Israeli headquarters located at Hulda.
Jordanians and Arab irregulars had 5 deaths and 6 injured. The Israelis counted 72 deaths (52 from the 32nd battalion and 20 from the from the 72nd, 6 prisoners and 140 injured.
Ariel Sharon, future Prime Minister of Israel, but then lieutenant, headed a platoon of the 32nd battalion and was heavivy injured at the stomach during the battle.
Reorganisation of the central front
At the end of May, David Ben Gurion was convinced that the Arab Legion expected to take control of all Jerusalem. Moreover, after the fighting, the situation there deteriorated: the Jewish community had very small reserves of fuel, bread, sugar and tea, which would alst for 10 days, and water for 3 months.. In Glubb's perspective, the aim was still to prevent the Israelis from reinforcing the city and taking control of its Arab part.
On 29 May, the UN Security Council announced its intention to impose a ceasefire for 4 weeks, which would prevent further capture of territory and thus prevent resupplying the besieged city.
From a military point of view, the 10th Harel Brigade required reinforcements and Ben Gurion dispatched it a battalion of the 6th Etzioni Brigade. He considered it imperative that the 7th Brigade join the forces in Jerusalem as well as a contingent of 400 new recruits to reinforce the Harel Brigade. Weapons and spare parts that had arrived in Israel by air were also now ready for combat on the Jerusalem front. The commander of the 7th Brigade wished to neutralize the negative effects of the debacle on the morale of the troops and on his prestige.
The central front was reorganized and its command given to an American volunteer fighting on the Israeli side, Colonel David Marcus, appointed Aluf (Major General). He took command of the Etzioni and 7th Brigades, and the one of the 10th Palmach Harel Brigade.
Operation Bin Nun Bet
Shlomor Shamir was again given the command of the operation. He disposed the 7th brigade and 52nd battalion of Givati brigade that replaces the 32nd that had been decimed by the former battle. The 73rd battalion was an armoured force comprising 13 half-tracks armed with fire-throwers and 22 "auto-mitrailleuses" of local fabrication.
The Israelis sent numerous recon patrols, but they nevertheless had no clear idea of the adversary's forces. They expected to fight 600 men of the Legion and of the Arab Liberation Army, so a force was allocated that was not sufficient to keep the 4 km-wide front of the Latrun salient. Transjordanians still had in fact a full brigade and are supported by several hundreds of irregulars.
Taking into account the mistakes of the former attacks, this new one was organised with high precision and the area from where the units had to launch their attack had been cleansed on 28 May, in particular the two hamlets of Bayt Jiz and Bayt Susin, where a counter-attacks had been launched by the Arab miliciens during the first battle, and Hill 369.
The attack was once more foreseen on two axes:
- The 72nd and 52nd infantry battalions had to perform on foot a long countering by the south up to Bayt Susin and then take Bad al-Wed and attack respectively Dayr Ayyub and Yalu for after oblicating towards the village of Latrun and attack this by the east;
- The 71st infantry battalion and 73rd mechanised battalion had to assault the police fort, the monastery and the village of Latrun by south-west.
Around midnight, the mean of the 72nd and the 52nd passed silently Bab al-Wed and then separated towards their respective target. A company took Deir Ayyub, which was empty, but then was discovered while it escalated a close hill. It was submitted to the joint fire of the Legion's artillery and machines guns. Thirteen men were killed and several other injured. The company composed mainly of immigrants then retreated to Bad al-Wed. The 52nd battalions that was at that moment preparing to take the hill in front of Yalu received to order to retreat too.
On the other front, the forces divided in two parts. The infantrymen of the 71st took rapidly the monastery and then fought for the control of the village. On the other side, the Israeli artillery succeeded in neutralizing the weapons of the fort. The half-tracks crossed the defence fence and the flame-throwers took the defenders by surprise. Nevertheless, the light coming from the fire they created destroyed the cover of the night and they became easy targets for the 60 mm Jordanians canons deployed in the area. They were rapidly neutralized and destroyed. The sapers succeeded nevertheless to make the door explode, but in the confusion were not followed by the infantrymen. Chaim Laskov, chief of operations on that front, ordered to company D of the 71st battalion that had been kept in reserve to intervene but one of the soldiers made accidently explode a mine, killing 3 men and injuring numerous others. The explosing attracked a heavy fire from the Jordanian artillery and the men escaped towards the west in panic.
The battle was still not lost for the Israeli but the wake coming, Laskov considered that his men could not hold in front of a Legion's counter-attack and he preferred ordering the reatreat.. It was also time for the Jordanians whose 4rd regiment was completely out of ammunitions.
73rd battalions suffered 50% losses and the whole of the engaged forces had counted 44 deaths and the double of injured.. According to the sources, the Legion suffered between 12 and 20 deaths among which the lieutenant commanding the fort. On their side, Jordanians reported 2 deaths on their side and 161 at the Israelis.
David Marcus later attributed the responsibility of the defeat to the infantery, stating : "the artillery cover was correct. The armoured were good. The infantery, very bad". Benny Morris considers that the mistake was rather to disperse the forces on several objectives instead of concentrating the full brigade on the main objective : the fort.
"Burma Road"
On 28 May, after they took Bayt Susin, the Israelis controlled a narrow corridor between the coast and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, this corridor didn't dispose of any road that could have enabled to trucks to supply the city.
A patrol of the Palmach moving by feet discovered some pists that linked several abandonned villages in the hills south of the road controlled by the Arab Legion. In the night between 29 and 30 may, jeeps sent in the hills confimred there was a crossable way..
The decision was then taken to build a road in the zone. This was given the name of "Burma road", refering to the supply road between Burma and China built by the British during World War two.]
The engineers immediately started immediately to build the road while convoys of jeeps, mules and camels were organised from Hulda to carry mortars and 65 mm canons to Jerusalem. Without knowing the goals of these works, the Jordans understood that something was happening in the hills. They performed artillery bombings, that would nevertheless have been rapidly stopped under the orders of the top British officer, and they sent patrols to stop the works, but without success.
Nevertheless, it is mainly food that the unhabitants of Jerusalem need. Starting 5 june, the Israeli engineers started to settle the road so that it permitted the passage of trucks of civil transport required to supply the city. 150 workers, working in four teams, installed a pipeline to supply with water the city, because the other pipeline, crossing Latrun, was cut by the Jordans..
In O Jerusalem, Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins talked about heroic action, when during the night from 6 to 7 june, in front of the critical situation of Jerusalem and to improve the morale of the population, 300 unhabitants of Tel-Aviv were requisitionned to carry on their back, on a few kilometers not yet ready for the passage of trucks, what would be needed to food the unhabitants of Jerusalem one more day.
The first phase of these works was achieved for the 10 june truce and on 19 june, a convoy of 140 trucks, each carrying 3 tons of marchandise as well as numerous weapons and ammunitions reached Jerusalem. The siege of the city was then definitevely left.
This Israeli success was punctuated by an incident that marqued memory : the dath of David Marcus, accidentely killed by an Israeli sentinel during the night between 10 and 11 june..
Operation Yoram
Between 30 may and 8 june, the situation between the Israeli and Arab armies evolved few, rather marking a statu quo on the field. They fought hardly and violently and suffered heavy losses. Exhauted they welcomed the ceasefire that the United Nations succeeded to enforce for 11 June..
It was in that context that David Ben Gurion took the decision to take off from the front of Galilee the 11th brigade Yiftach, an elite unit under the command of Yigal Allon to launch just before the truce a third assault against Latrun.
They would have a support of artillery provided by a battery of four canons of 65 mm and of four mortars of 120 mm; part of the weapons recently delivered to Israel.
That time, it was decided to perform a concentrated attack on the south of the Legion position with some diversion attacks carried on the north of the sector. :
- a battalion of the Harel brigade would have to take hill 346 located between he 4th and the 2th regiment of the Legion;
- a battalion of the Yiftah brigade would then turn around hill 315 and attack Latrun and the police fort;
- un battalion of the Yiftah brigade would carry out diversion attacks on Salbit, Imwas and Bayt Nuba.
The Israeli operation started by a artillery barrage on the fort, the Latrun village and the surrounding positions. Hills 315 and 346, each occupied by a company of the Legion, were not targeted not to altert the Jordanians.
(...)
Attacks organised during Operation Dani
Offensive of 16 July
- On 16 July, with 2 battalions of the Harel brigade;
Frontal attack of 18 July
- On 18 July, with 1 battalion of the Yiftach brigade supported by 2 Cromwell tanks.
A last attempt ?
Consequences
Historiography
Israeli historiography and collective memory
The "prescience" of the Commander-in-Chief
The criminal negligence
The dram of the alienation
The myth of guilt
Qirbet Quriqur
Commemoration
Jordanian historiography
Palestinian historiography and collective memory
Confrontation of the historiographies in the context of the 1948 War
Maps
Documentation
Works about the 1948 Palestine War and the military operations that occurred at Latrun
- Abu Nowar, Ma'n, The Jordanian-Israeli War 1948-1951: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ithaca, 1999, ISBN 0863722865.
- Gelber, Yoav, Palestine 1948, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2006, ISBN 1845190750.
- Karsh, Efraïm, The Arab-Israeli Conflit - The Palestine War 1948, Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1841763721.
- Khalidi, Walid, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Institute For Palestine Studies, 1992.
- Itzchaki, Ariè, Latrun. The Battle for the road of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1982.
- Lapierre, Dominique and Collins, Lapierre, O Jerusalem, Robert Laffont, 1971, ISBN 2266106988 and ISBN 0671785893
- Levi, Ytzhak, Nine Measures: The Battles for Jerusalem in the War of Independence, Ma'arachot, 1986.
- Morris, Benny, 1948, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300126964.
- Tal, David, War and Palestine 1948. Strategy and Diplomacy., Frank Cass & Co, 2003, ISBN 071465275X.
Protagonist biographies
- Morris, Benny, The road to Jerusalem, I.B. Tauris, 2002 ISBN 1860648126.
- Shapira, Anita, Igal Allon, Native Son. A Biography, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007 ISBN 9780812240283.
- Silberman, Neil, A Prophet from Amongst You: The Life of Yigael Yadin, Soldier, Scholar, and Mythmaker of Modern Israel, Addison Wesley, 1994. ISBN 9780201570632
Works concerning the « myth » of Latrun and its impact on the Israeli identity
- Abramson, Glenda (editor), Modern Jewish Mythologies, Hebrew Union College Press, 1993, ISBN 0878202161 . In particular, the article of Anita Shapira, Myth and Identity : the case of Latrun 1948, pp.37-56.
- Shapira, Anita, L'imaginaire d'Israël : histoire d'une culture politique, Calmann-Lévy, 2005, ISBN 978-2702136331.
Articles related to Jordanian historiography
- Rogan, Eugène et Shlaim, Avi (editors), The War for Palestine 1948, chap.4, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 2746702401.
Cartography
- and compressing all the roads, towns, villages and settlements. It is signed by Moshe Dayan and A. Sudki El-jundi.
- .
Official documents
Glubb, John Bagot, Solier with the Arabs, Harper, 1957. al-Majali, Habes, Moudhakkirati (« My Memories »), Amman, 1960. Rabin, Yitzhak Memories, 1980, ISBN 0-520-20766-1. Shamir, Shlomo The Battle for Jerusalem, Posner, 2001, ISBN 9652190209. Sharon, Ariel, Warrior. An Autobiography, Simon & Schuster, 1989, pp.47-61, ISBN 0671605550.
Filmography
Literature
External links
- with Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé and Anita Shapira.
- : The Battle of Latrun based on Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Institute For Palestine Studies, 1992.
- .
- .
- Anonymous, on the website of the Jordanian Embassy in the Unites States.
- .
- Isseroff, Ami, .
- Thomas, Steven, .
See also
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