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Battle of Jenin
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The Battle of Jenin took place from April 3 to April 11, 2002 in the Palestinian Authority administered refugee camp of Jenin, in the West Bank. The battle was fought between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian militant forces as part of Operation Defensive Shield, during the Second Intifada.
As part of the operation, which involved incursions into West Bank cities and towns, Israel targeted the refugee camp of Jenin, after it deemed that the camp had "served as a launch site for numerous terrorist attacks against both Israeli civilians and Israeli towns and villages in the area".
The IDF employed armored bulldozers to clear out booby traps laid by the Palestinians inside the camp, alongside infantry, commando forces and assault helicopters.
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Encyclopedia
The Battle of Jenin took place from April 3 to April 11, 2002 in the Palestinian Authority administered refugee camp of Jenin, in the West Bank. The battle was fought between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian militant forces as part of Operation Defensive Shield, during the Second Intifada.
As part of the operation, which involved incursions into West Bank cities and towns, Israel targeted the refugee camp of Jenin, after it deemed that the camp had "served as a launch site for numerous terrorist attacks against both Israeli civilians and Israeli towns and villages in the area".
The IDF employed armored bulldozers to clear out booby traps laid by the Palestinians inside the camp, alongside infantry, commando forces and assault helicopters. The Palestinians fought harder than the Israelis had expected, and after an Israeli column walked into a deadly ambush, the Israelis began to rely more heavily on bulldozers. On April 11, the Palestinians began to surrender.
During the fighting, rumors of a massacre circulated.- Secretary-General of Palestinian Authority Cabinet Ahmed Abdel Rahman said, "They (Israeli solders) took hundreds of bodies to northern Israeli to hide their massacre they committed against our people.
"This massacre is not less than the massacres committed against the Palestinian people in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon."
He said thousands of Palestinians were either killed and buried in massive graveyards or smashed under houses destroyed in Jenin and Nablus. While Jenin remained sealed during the invasion, stories of hundreds and even thousands of civilians being killed, and buried alive in their homes as they were demolished, and of smoldering buildings covering crushed bodies, spread throughout the Arab world. However, subsequent investigations found no evidence to substantiate claims of a massacre and the final death toll was set at 52 to 56 Palestinians, of whom 5-26 may have been civilians and 23 IDF soldiers who were also killed in the fighting.
Background
The Jenin camp, 600 yards long, was home to 13,055 registered Palestinian refugees. The camp was administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Unlike other camps, whose residents had come from villages depopulated in the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many of the Jenin camp's men were residents of Gaza and Tulkarm who moved into the area in the late 1970s. Many of the residents came from Jordan after the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established. Israel considered the Islamist organizations' influence in Jenin relatively mild, compared to other camps. The camp was separate from the city in that ideological differences between the various organizations hardly played a role and affiliation was mostly based on financial support. The militants repelled takeover attempts by PA seniors. In February 2002, camp residents burned seven vehicles, sent by the governor in a show of force, and opened fire on the PA men. The organizations made Ata Abu Roumeileh the chief security officer. He oversaw the entrances, placed roadblocks, investigated suspicious people and kept strangers away from the camp.
Several hundred armed men from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas had been using the Jenin refugee camp as a base, known as "the martyrs' capital", and of the 100 suicide bombers who had launched attacks since the Second Intifada began in October 2000, 28 attacks had been launched from there. One of the key planners of attacks was Mahmoud Tawalbe, Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander of the camp.
Unlike other camps, the organizations in Jenin had a joint commander: Hazem Ahmad Rayhan Qabha, known as "Abu Jandal", an officer in the Palestinian National and Islamic Forces who had fought in Lebanon and served in the Iraqi Army. He was also involved in several encounters with the IDF. He set up a war room and divided the camp into fifteen sub-sectors, deploying about twenty armed men in each. During the battle, he began calling himself "The Martyr Abu Jandal".
Attacks attributed to Jenin
The IDF Spokesman has attributed 23 successful suicide bombings and a further 6 unsuccessful ones to Jenin during the Second Intifada before the battle. The following major attacks and suicide bombings were linked to the Jenin militancy infrastructure.
Hamas was attributed attacks from September 9, 2001 (a suicide attack in Nahariya), March 19, 2002 (a shooting attack in Hamam al-Maliach), and March 31, 2002 (a suicide attack in Haifa that left 15 casualties).
Palestinian Islamic Jihad was attributed attacks from July 16, 2001 (a suicide attack at the Binyamina Railway Station), October 28, 2001 (a shooting attack in Hadera), November 29, 2001 (a suicide attack near Pardes Hanna), January 25, 2002 (a suicide attack at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv—in cooperation with Fatah), January 5, 2002 (a suicide attack in Afula), March 20, 2002 (a suicide attack in Wadi Ara), April 10, 2002 (a suicide attack at the Yagur junction).
Fatah was attributed attacks from February 1, 2001 (a shooting of an Israeli civilian visiting Jenin), April 28, 2001 (a shooting at near Umm al-Fahm), June 28, 2001 (a shooting near Ganim), September 11, 2001 (a shooting at "Bezeq" workers near Shaked and detonation of a charge at an IDF force in the area), March 9, 2001 (a shooting near Yabed), October 4, 2001 (a shooting in Afula), October 27, 2001 (Infiltration to Mei Ami and laying of an explosives charge), November 27, 2001 (a joint PIJ and Fatah suicide attack in Afula), February 8, 2002 (a joint PIJ and Fatah suicide attack aimed at Tel Aviv, intercepted), March 12, 2002 (a shooting on the road to Katsir), March 21, 2002 (a suicide attack in Jerusalem), March 30, 2002 (a suicide attack in Tel Aviv).
Prelude
Limited Israeli forces had entered the camp along a single route twice in the previous month; they had encountered heavy resistance and quickly departed. Since the previous Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian militants had prepared by boobytrapping both the town and camp's streets in a bid to trap the Israeli soldiers, some of the bombs weighing as much as 113 kilograms. Islamic Jihad activist Tabaat Mardawi later said that Palestinian fighters had spread "between 1000 and 2000 bombs and booby traps" throughout the camp. "Omar the Engineer", a Palestinian bombmaker later claimed that some 50 homes were booby trapped, saying "We chose old and empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel because we knew the soldiers would search for them".
The Israeli command sent in three thrusts comprised mainly of the reservist 5th Infantry Brigade from the town of Jenin to the north, as well as a company of the Nahal Brigade from the southeast and Battalion 51 of the Golani Brigade from the southwest. The force of 1,000 troops also included Shayetet 13 and Duvdevan Unit special forces, the Armoured Corps, and Combat Engineers with armored bulldozer for neutralizing the roadside bombs that would line the alleys of the camp according to Military Intelligence. Anticipating the heaviest resistance in Nablus, IDF commanders sent two regular infantry brigades there, assuming they could take over the Jenin camp in 48-72 hours with just the one reservist brigade. The force's entry was delayed until April 2 due to rain. The 5th Infantry Brigade did not have any experience in Close Quarters Combat and did not have a commander when Operation Defensive Shield started, since the last commander's service ended a few days earlier. His substitute was a reserve officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yehuda Yedidia, who got his rank after the operation began. His soldiers were not trained for urban fighting. In March, after an IDF action in Ramallah, the television broadcast footage which was considered unflattering. As a result, the IDF high command decided not to allow reporters to join the forces.
Battle
Israeli forces entered on 2 April, five days after the invasion of Ramallah. On the first day, reserve company commander Moshe Gerstner was killed in a PIJ sector. This caused a further delay. Jenin was secured by the second day. A Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer drove along a three-quarter-mile stretch of the main street to clear booby traps. An Israeli Engineering Corps officer logged 124 separate explosions set off by the bulldozer. A Fatah leader in the camp later said that it was only when his forces saw the Israelis advancing on foot that they decided to stay and fight.
By the third day, the Palestinians were still dug in, and seven Israeli soldiers had been killed. Mardawi later testified to having killed two of them from close range, using an M-16. IDF chief of staff (Ramatkal) Shaul Mofaz urged the officers to speed things up. They asked for twenty-four more hours. Mofaz told reporters that the fighting would be complete by the end of the week, April 6. In some of the sectors, the forces were advancing at a rate of fifty meters a day.
The Israeli Intelligence assumed that the vast majority of the camp's residents were still in it. Most commanders argued that this obliged a careful advance for fear of striking civilians, and warned that using excessive force would cost the lives of hundreds of Palestinians. Lieutenant Colonel Ofek Buchris, commander of the 51st Battalion, was left in a minority opinion, saying "We're being humiliated here for four days now". When Mofaz instructed the officers to be more aggressive and fire five antitank missiles at every house before entering, one of them contemplated disobedience.
Buchris stuck to an aggressive warfare of softening antitank fire and extensive use of bulldozers. In his sector, a method for guaranteeing lower risk to the soldiers was developed: A bulldozer rams the corner of a house, opening a hole. Then, an Achzarit arrives and disembarks troops into the house. Buchris' battalion was advancing faster than the reserve forces, creating a bridgehead within the camp, which attracted most of the Palestinian fire. During the first week of fighting, the battalion suffered five casualties. On April 8, Golani Brigade commander, Colonel Tamir, arrived from Nablus. Having crawled with Buchris to the front line, he warned that the fighting style must be changed completely - call in more troops and perhaps take the command out of the reserve brigade's hand. By evening, division commander Brigadier General Eyal Shlein told his men that the mission must be accomplished by 6:00 PM on April 9. Buchris himself was later badly wounded.
As the IDF advanced, the Palestinians fell back to the heavily defended camp center - the Hawashin district. The Israelis began to call in AH-1 Cobra helicopters to hit rooftop positions along with Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers to detonate the booby traps and clear a path for tanks.
Ambush
At 6:00 AM, reserve battalion 7020's support company was ordered to form a new line, west of the former one. Its commander, Major Oded Golomb, set out with a force to take a position in a new house. He strayed from the original path, perhaps for tactical considerations, but failed to report to his commander. The force walked into a Palestinian ambush, finding themselves in an inner courtyard surrounded by tall houses (nicknamed "the bathtub") and under fire from all directions. Rescue forces from the company and the battalion hurried to the location and were hurt by fire and explosive charges. The exchange of fire went on for several hours.
A reconnaissance aircraft documented much of the fight and the footage was transmitted live and was watched in the Israeli Central Command war room by the high ranking officers. During the battle, the Palestinians managed to snatch three Israeli soldiers' bodies into a nearby house. Colonel Ram, the Shayetet commander who had fought in the camp with his men, quickly put up a rescue force. Mofaz told him that negotiation over the bodies might force the IDF to halt the operation and get it in trouble similar to the 2000 Hezbollah cross-border raid. On the edge of the alley leading to "the bathtub", Ram questioned the wounded reservists. Finally, he broke with his troops to the nearby house and, after a battle, located the bodies and got them out. In the afternoon, all Israeli casualties were evacuated from the area. It became the deadliest day for the IDF since the end of the 1982 Lebanon War.
During that day, the IDF censored reports on the events, leading to a wave of rumors. Partial information leaked through phone calls made by reservists and internet sites. By evening, when Chief of Central Command, Brigadier General Yitzhak Eitan, had a press conference, there were rumors of a helicopter carrying dozens of fighters shot down, the death of the Ramatkal's deputy and a heart attack suffered by the Israeli Minister of Defense.
Change in Israeli tactics
After the ambush, all Israeli forces began to advance by the "Buchris method". Several officers demanded that F-16s be sent to drop bombs, but the IDF high command refused. The number of Caterpillar D9s in operation increased to a dozen, and the IDF maintained that the heavy bulldozers were mainly used to clear walls and streets of booby traps, open routes and widen alleyways for armored fighting vehicles, and to secure locations and movement for IDF troops.
A day later, Mahmoud Tawallbe and two other militants went into a house so as to get close enough to a tank or armored D-9 bulldozer to plant a bomb. According to a British military expert working in the camp for Amnesty International, a D9 driver probably saw him and rammed a wall down onto him.
At 7:00 AM on April 11, the Palestinians began to surrender. Qabha refused to surrender, and was among the last to die. Zakaria Zubeidi was among the only fighters who did not surrender. He slipped out of the area surrounded by the IDF, moved through the houses and left. Mardawi surrendered along with Ali Suleiman al-Saadi, known as "Safouri", and thirty-nine others. He later said that "There was nothing I could do against that bulldozer".
Aftermath
After the battle, Israeli intelligence estimated that half the population of noncombatants had left before the invasion, and 90% had done so by the third day, leaving around 1,300 people. The EU's contribution to the UN report said "at least 4,000 remained inside and did not evacuate the camp". David Holley, a Major in the British Territorial Army and a military adviser to Amnesty International, reported that an area within the refugee camp of about 100m by 200m was flattened. The BBC reported that ten percents of the camp were destroyed in the fighting. Most of the demolition occurred in the Hawashin neighborhood, where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives. The Israelis also claimed to have found explosive-making labs.
One Israeli special forces commander who fought in the camp said that "the Palestinians were admirably well prepared. They correctly analyzed the lessons of the previous raid". An internal investigation published by the IDF six months after the battle implicitly cast the responsibility for the death of the thirteen soldiers on the soldiers themselves, for straying from their path unreported. It also said that the focusing on the rescue instead of subduing the enemy complicated things. Buchris was given the Chief of Staff citation. On May 31, 2002 the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot published an interview with Moshe Nissim, nicknamed "Kurdi Bear", a D-9 operator who took part in the battle. Nissim said he had driven his D-9 for seventy-five hours straight, drinking whiskey to avoid fatigue, and that apart from a two-hour training before the battle, he had no prior experience in driving a bulldozer. He said he had begged his officers to let him destroy more houses and added: "I didn't see, with my own eyes, people dying under the blade of the D-9. and I didn't see house[s] falling down on live people. But if there were any, I wouldn't care at all."
Mardawi told CNN from his prison in Israel, that after learning the IDF was going to use troops, and not planes, "It was like hunting ... like being given a prize... The Israelis knew that any soldier who went into the camp like that was going to get killed... I've been waiting for a moment like that for years". After leaving Ramallah on May 14, 2002, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat praised the refugees' endurance and compared the fighting to the Battle of Stalingrad. Addressing a gathering of about 200 people in Jenin, he said: "People of Jenin, all the citizens of Jenin and the refugee camp, this is Jenin-grad. Your battle has paved the way to the liberation of the occupied territories". The battle became known among the Palestinians as "Jeningrad".
Removal of bodies
The IDF intended to bury those identified by the army as terrorists in a special cemetery for fallen enemy troops in the Jordan Valley. Some of the bodies had already been removed from the camp Thursday and moved to a site near Jenin, but had not been buried. Others had been buried by Palestinians during the battle in a mass grave near the hospital on the outskirts of the camp. The petitioners claimed the IDF's decision violated international law as the Jordan Valley cemetery would be a mass grave and dishonor the dead.
On April 12, in response to a petition presented by the Adalah organization, the Israeli High Court ordered the IDF not to remove the bodies of Palestinians killed in battle until a hearing was held on the matter. The petition was signed by MKs Mohammed Barakeh and Ahmed Tibi. Following the court's decision, issued by Supreme Court President Aharon Barak, the IDF stopped clearing the bodies from the camp. On April 15, Adalah and LAW, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, filed a petition, asking the Court to order the IDF to immediately hand over the bodies of Palestinians to the International Committee of the Red Cross or the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, claiming that despite Sunday's court's ruling, the IDF was leaving the bodies of dead Palestinians to rot in the Jenin refugee camp.
Casualties
Initially, reporting of casualty numbers varied widely and fluctuated day to day. On April 10, the BBC reported that Israel estimated 150 Palestinians had died in Jenin but the Palestinians were saying the number was far higher. Saeb Erekat, on a phone interview to CNN from Jericho, estimated 500 dead in Operation Defensive Shield in total. On April 11, the Palestinians reported 500 dead. On April 12, Brigadier-General Ron Kitri said on Israeli Army Radio that there are apparently hundreds killed. He later retracted this statement. Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, said that thousands of Palestinians had been killed and buried in mass graves, or lay under houses destroyed in Jenin and Nablus. On April 13, Palestinian Information Minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo, accused Israel of digging mass graves for 900 Palestinians in the camp. On April 14, the IDF gave a final figure of 45 casualties. On April 18, Zalman Shoval, adviser to Sharon, spoke of 65 bodies, five of them civilians. On April 30, Qadoura Mousa, director of the Fatah for the northern West Bank, set the total dead at fifty-six.
After the battle, the UN estimated the death toll at 52 Palestinians and 23 Israelis. One Palestinian Fatah official reportedly put the death toll at fifty-six. In 2004, Haaretz journalists Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff wrote that 23 Israelis had died and 52 had been wounded; Palestinian casualties included 53 dead, hundreds wounded and about 200 captured. According to retired IDF General Shlomo Gazit, the death toll was 55 Palestinians and 33 Israels.
UN fact-finding mission
On April 8, a UN envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, said the devastation in the camp was "horrific beyond belief". He said it was "morally repugnant" that Israel had not allowed emergency workers in for 11 days to provide humanitarian relief. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has asked the Security Council to consider sending an armed multinational force to the region, under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter which authorizes military force to impose council decisions. Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres told Annan that Israel would welcome a UN official "to clarify the facts", saying "Israel has nothing to hide regarding the operation in Jenin. Our hands are clean". On April 19, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution to send a fact-finding mission to Jenin. Abed Rabbo said the mission was "the first step toward making Sharon stand trial before an international tribunal". The fact-finding team was led by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari. The other two members were Cornelio Sommaruga, former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (controversial in Israel for previous "Red Swastika" remarks), and Sadako Ogata, the former UN high commissioner for refugees who was Japan's special envoy on Afghan reconstruction.
Head of the IDF Operation Branch, Major General Giora Eiland, convinced Mofaz that the team would demand investigating officers and soldiers, and that it might accuse Israel of war crimes. He warned that it would pave the road to an international force. Eiland and Mofaz's position was accepted by Sharon.Official Israeli sources said that Israel was surprised that the composition of the team was not discussed with them in advance, adding "We expected that the operational aspects of the fact-finding mission would be carried out by military experts". On April 22, Israeli Defense Minister, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and Peres spoke to Annan. Ben-Eliezer expressed his disappointment at the make-up of the team, and expressed his hope that the mission would not overstep its mandate. Peres asked Annan to deny reports that the mission would look into events outside the refugee camp, and that the finding would have legal validity. Annan said that the mission would only investigate what happened inside Jenin, but may have to interview residents currently outside the camp. He added that the findings would not be legally binding.
The Israeli government was concerned about the mission, and the cabinet secretary, Gideon Saar, threatened to ban the team from entering Jenin. On April 23, Sharon, decided the team was no longer acceptable. The reason given was the lack of military experts on the UN team. Israel also claimed not to have been adequately consulted. The US rebuked Sharon's decision, and a White House official said "We were the sponsors of that and we want it implemented as written. We support the initiative of the secretary general". On April 24, Annan refused to delay the mission. Ben-Eliezer said: "In the last month alone, 137 people were slaughtered by Palestinians and nearly 700 wounded. Is there any one who is investigating that?" On April 25, the UN agreed to postpone by two days the arrival of the team, and agreed to an Israeli request that two military officers be added to the team. Annan said the talks with Israel talks had been "very, very constructive and I'm sure we'll be able to sort out our differences". Peres said that a delay would give the Israeli cabinet the opportunity to discuss the mission before the team arrived. Israeli Government spokesman, Avi Pazner, said that he expected the UN mission to investigate "terrorist activity" and guarantee immunity for Israeli soldiers. Israel Radio said that Israel was also pushing for the right for both sides to review the team's report before was to be presented to Annan. On April 28, Israeli Communications Minister, Reuven Rivlin, told reporters after a lengthy cabinet meeting that the UN had gone back on its agreements with Israel over the team, and so it would not be allowed to arrive. Speaking for the cabinet, he said that the composition of the team and its terms of reference made it inevitable that its report would blame Israel. The Security Council convened to discuss Israel's decision not to grant entry to the UN team.
On April 30, Annan decided to disband the team, On May 2, the team was disbanded. On May 4, Israel was isolated in an open debate in the Security Council. The deputy US ambassador to the UN, James Cunningham, said it was "regrettable" Israel had decided not to cooperate with the fact-finding team. Nasser Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian observer to the UN, said the council failed to give Annan its full support, and that the council caved in to "blackmailing" by the Israeli Government. The General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Israel's military action in Jenin by 74 votes to four, with 54 abstentions. The Bush administration supported Israel as part of a deal in which Sharon agreed to lift the siege of the Mukataa in Ramallah.
Report
On July 31, the UN issued its report indicating at the time the report was issued 52 Palestinians killed had been verified and it's possible that as many as half of them were civilians. The UN criticized the Palestinians and the Israelis for having exposed civilians to danger. The Israeli Foreign Ministry indicated that the report "repudiates malicious lies". Daniel Taub, a senior Foreign Ministry official, said "There was no massacre, and statements by the Palestinian leadership talking about hundreds of civilians that were killed were nothing more than atrocity propaganda".
The Palestinians disagreed. Erekat said that an "Israeli massacre in Jenin's refugee camp clearly happened" and that "crimes against humanity also took place". Palestinian Planning Minister, Nabil Shaath, said: "I know it does not satisfy everybody ... but still it identifies what happens in Jenin as a war crime against humanity and that is very important". Annan denounced Israel's refusal to admit the UN investigators into the camp but said "I would hope that both parties will draw the right lessons from this tragic episode and take steps to end the cycle of violence which is killing innocent civilians on both sides". He added that "While some of the facts may be in dispute, I think it is clear that the Palestinian population have suffered and are suffering the humanitarian consequences which are very severe".
Massacre allegations
The battle attracted widespread international attention due to Palestinian allegations that a massacre had been committed. On April 4, The Observer reported that Palestinians called the incident a 'massacre', alleging that houses were bulldozed with families still inside, helicopters fired indiscriminately on a civilian area, and ambulances were prevented from reaching the wounded. A camp resident who worked at the Jenin hospital said: "I saw the Israelis line up five young men with their legs spread and their hands up as they faced a wall. The soldiers then sprayed them from head to toe with gunfire". CNN correspondent, Ben Wedeman, heard stories of bodies being loaded into trucks and driven away, and of bodies being left in the sewers and bulldozed. Palestinian cabinet minister, Saeb Erekat, accused the Israelis of trying to cover up the killing of civilians.
On April 9, Haaretz reported that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was privately referring to the battle as a "massacre" but the next day, they reported Peres for expressing concerns that "Palestinian propaganda is liable to accuse Israel that a 'massacre' took place in Jenin rather than a pitched battle against heavily armed terrorists". Haaretz editor Hanoch Marmari later said in a lecture that "Some correspondents might have been obsessive in their determination to unearth a massacre in a refugee camp". Mouin Rabbani, Director of the Palestinian American Research Center in Ramallah, cited Peres' alleged statement and his office's decision to establish a PR committee as an indication that a massacre had taken place.
In early May, Human Rights Watch completed its report on Jenin. The report said there was no massacre, but accused the IDF of war crimes. On April 18, Derrick Pounder, a British forensic expert who was part of an Amnesty International team granted access to Jenin, said: "I must say that the evidence before us at the moment doesn't lead us to believe that the allegations are anything other than truthful and that therefore there are large numbers of civilian dead underneath these bulldozed and bombed ruins that we see".
In November, Amnesty International reported that there was "clear evidence" that the IDF committed war crimes against Palestinian civilians, including unlawful killings and torture, in Jenin and Nablus. The report also accused Israel of blocking medical care, using people as human shields and bulldozing houses with residents inside, as well as beating prisoners, which resulted in one death, and preventing ambulances and aid organizations from reaching the areas of combat even after the fighting had reportedly been stopped. Amnesty criticized the UN report, noting that its officials did not actually visit Jenin. The Observer reporter, Peter Beaumont, wrote that what happened in Jenin was not a massacre, but that the mass destruction of houses was a war crime.
In early May, the IDF released a videotape showing what it called "a phony funeral that the Palestinians organized in order to multiply the number of casualties in Jenin". The tape showed six people putting a green sheet on the ground. In the next scene, someone was walking toward the sheet, lying on it before being wrapped inside. The following scene showed a procession of over a dozen people, some of them carrying the body and then dropping it. Then, the dropped person unwraps the sheet and runs away, along with several other participants in the procession.
Harel and Issacharoff wrote that the IDF's misconduct with the media, including Kitri's statement, contributed to the allegations of massacre. Mofaz later admitted that the limitations imposed on the media were a mistake. Head of the Operations Directorate, General Dan Harel, said: "Today, I would send a reporter in every APC".
According to Lorenzo Cremonesi, the correspondent for the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera in Jerusalem, who visited the camp on April 13, 2002, the hospital was almost deserted as doctors played cards in the emergency room. He spoke to 25 lightly wounded patients who told heartrending stories but when asked for names of the dead and urged to show where the bodies were, became evasive. "In short, it was all talk and nothing could be verified," wrote Cremonesi. "At the end of that day, I wrote that the death toll was not more than 50 and most of them were combatants". Cremonesi criticized Israel's exclusion of the media from Jenin, saying, "If you hide something from me, that means first and foremost that you want to hide it, and secondly, that you have done something wrong."
See also
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