|
|
|
|
Battle of Crete
|
| |
|
| |
The Battle of Crete (German Luftlandeschlacht um Kreta; Greek ???? t?? ???t??) was a battle during World War II on the Greek island of Crete. The battle began on the morning of 20 May 1941, when Nazi Germany launched an airborne invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen Merkur ("Operation Mercury"). Greek rebels and Allied forces defended the island.
After one day of fighting, the Germans had suffered appalling casualties and none of their objectives had been achieved.
Discussion
Ask a question about 'Battle of Crete' Start a new discussion about 'Battle of Crete' Answer questions from other users |
Recent Posts
Encyclopedia
The Battle of Crete (German Luftlandeschlacht um Kreta; Greek ???? t?? ???t??) was a battle during World War II on the Greek island of Crete. The battle began on the morning of 20 May 1941, when Nazi Germany launched an airborne invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen Merkur ("Operation Mercury"). Greek rebels and Allied forces defended the island.
After one day of fighting, the Germans had suffered appalling casualties and none of their objectives had been achieved. The next day, through miscommunication and the failure of Allied commanders to grasp the situation, Maleme airfield in western Crete fell to the Germans, enabling them to fly in reinforcements and overwhelm the Allied forces.
The Battle of Crete was unprecedented in three respects: it was the first-ever mainly airborne invasion; it was the first time the Allies made significant use of intelligence from the deciphered German Enigma code; and it was the first time invading German troops encountered mass resistance from a civilian population. In light of the heavy casualties suffered by the parachutists, Adolf Hitler forbade further large scale airborne operations. However, the Allies were impressed by the potential of paratroopers, and started to build their own airborne divisions.
Prelude
Allied forces had occupied Crete when the Italians invaded Greece on 28 October 1940. Though the Italians were initially repulsed, the subsequent German intervention drove 57,000 Allied troops from the mainland. The Royal Navy evacuated many of them; some were taken to Crete to bolster its garrison.
Possession of Crete provided the Royal Navy with excellent harbours in the eastern Mediterranean. From Crete, the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania, which were critical to the Axis war effort, were within range of British bombers. Given its strategic value, Winston Churchill would later write in his book The Second World War, "To lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime."
With Crete in Allied hands the Axis southeastern flank could be threatened, with the possibility of British bombers based on Crete being within range of the Ploesti oilfields in Romania. However, the German army high command was preoccupied with the planned invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, and was against involvement. Nevertheless, senior Luftwaffe commanders were enthusiastic about the idea of seizing Crete by a daring airborne attack. The need of Luftwaffe officers to re-establish prestige after their defeat against the Royal Air Force over Britain in 1940 may have played a role in the thinking of Luftwaffe commanders, especially before the advent of the much more important - and army controlled - invasion of Russia. Hitler was won over by the audacious proposal, though the directive stated that the operation against Crete was to be in May because of the approaching attack on the Soviet Union. The priority of the attack in the east was underlined: Crete was under no circumstances allowed to interfere with the war against the Soviet Union.In advance of the land battle, the Germans launched frequent bombing raids against the island in order to establish air superiority. This air campaign eventually succeeded in its objective, forcing the Royal Air Force to remove its planes to Alexandria.
At the outset of the land battle, the Allies had the advantage of numerical superiority and naval supremacy. In their favour, the Germans had air superiority and greater mobility, which allowed them to concentrate their forces more effectively.
Order of battle
Allied forces
On 30 April 1941, a New Zealand Army officer, Major-General Bernard Freyberg VC was appointed commander of the Allied forces on Crete.
By May, the Greek forces consisted of approximately 9,000 troops: three battalions of the 5th (Crete) Division of the Hellenic Army, which had been left behind when the rest of the unit had been transferred to the mainland to oppose the German invasion; the Cretan Gendarmerie (a battalion-sized force); the Heraklion Garrison Battalion, a defence battalion made up mostly of transport and logistics personnel; and remnants of the 12th and 20th Hellenic Army divisions, which had escaped to Crete and were organized under British command. There were also cadets from the Gendarmerie academy and recruits from the Greek training centres in the Peloponnese who had been transferred to Crete to replace the trained soldiers sent to fight on the mainland. These troops were already organised into numbered recruit training regiments, and it was decided to use this existing configuration to organize the Greek troops, supplementing them with experienced men arriving from the mainland.
The British Commonwealth contingent consisted of the original 14,000-man British garrison and another 25,000 Commonwealth troops evacuated from the mainland. The evacuees were the typical mix found in any contested evacuation substantially intact units under their own command, composite units hurriedly brought together by leaders on the spot, stragglers without leaders from every type of unit possessed by an army, and deserters. Most of these men lacked heavy equipment. The key formed units were the New Zealand 2nd Division, less the 6th Brigade and division headquarters; the Australian 19th Brigade Group; and the British 14th Infantry Brigade. In total, there were roughly 15,000 combat-ready British Commonwealth infantry, augmented by about 5,000 non-infantry personnel equipped as infantry, and one composite (Australian) artillery battery. On 4 May, Freyberg sent a message to the British commander in the Middle East, General Archibald Wavell requesting the evacuation of about 10,000 personnel who did not have weapons and had "little or no employment other than getting into trouble with the civil population". However, few of these men had left Crete by the time the battle started.
In addition, The United States parachuted OSS paramilitary officers (modern day CIA Special Activities Division) into Crete to fight alongside the resistance that developed after the initial invasion.
Axis forces
On 25 April Hitler signed Directive Number 28, ordering the invasion of Crete. The Royal Navy's forces from Alexandria retained control of the waters around Crete, so any amphibious assault would be quickly decided by the nature of an air-versus-ship battle, making it a risky proposition at best. With German air superiority a given, an airborne invasion was decided on.
This was to be the first truly large-scale airborne invasion, although the Germans had used parachute and glider-borne assaults on a much smaller scale in the invasion of France and the Low Countries, Norway and even mainland Greece. In the latter instance, German paratroops had been dispatched to capture the bridge over the Corinth Canal which was being readied for demolition by the Royal Engineers. German engineers were landed near the bridge in gliders, while parachute infantry attacked the perimeter defence. The bridge was damaged in the fighting, which slowed the German advance and gave the Allies time to evacuate 18,000 troops to Crete and an additional 23,000 to Egypt, albeit with the loss of most of their heavy equipment.
The intention was to use Fallschirmjäger to capture key points of the island, including airfields that could then be used to fly in supplies and reinforcements. The XI Fliegerkorps was to co-ordinate the attack by the 7th Flieger Division, which would insert its paratroopers by parachute and glider, followed by the 22nd Air Landing Division once the airfields were secure. The assault was initially scheduled for 16 May, but was postponed to 20 May, with the 5th Mountain Division replacing the 22nd Division.
Intelligence
British intelligence and the Ultra intercepts
By this time, Allied commanders had become aware of the imminent invasion through Ultra intercepts. General Freyberg was informed of the air component of the German battle plan, and started to prepare a defence based near the airfields and along the north coast. However, he was seriously hampered by a lack of modern equipment, and was faced with the reality that even lightly armed paratroopers would be able to muster about the same firepower as his own, if not more. In addition, it should be noted that although the Ultra intelligence Freyberg received was very detailed, it came only from decrypts of the air force code. The result was misleading information taken out of context. As an example, the German messages mentioned seaborne operations, which seriously affected Freyberg's troop deployment as he expected an amphibious landing, consequently detracting from the main German objective of the Maleme airfield. Furthermore, he was seriously hampered by his own superiors. Freyberg requested the demolition of the Cretan airfields, so that even if captured by the Germans, they would not be used to fly in significant reinforcements, but this was turned down by his superiors, who apparently considered the battle already won and were already planning to use the airbases against the Germans.
German intelligence
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the German Abwehr, originally reported a mere 5,000 British troops on Crete and no Greek forces. It is not clear whether Canaris, who had an extensive intelligence network at his disposal, was misinformed or was attempting to sabotage Hitler's plans (Canaris would be executed much later in the war for supposedly participating in the 20 July Plot). The Abwehr also predicted the Cretan population would welcome the Germans as liberators, due to their strong republican and anti-monarchist feelings, and would want to join the "…favorable terms which had been arranged on the mainland…" While it is true the late republican prime minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, had been a Cretan, and support for his ideas was strong on the island, the Germans seriously underestimated the depth of patriotic feeling on the part of the Cretans. In fact, King George II of Greece and his entourage escaped from Greece via Crete with the help of Greek and Commonwealth soldiers, Cretan civilians, and even a band of prisoners that had been released from captivity by the advancing Germans (see below).
German Twelfth Army Intelligence painted a less optimistic picture, but still believed the British Commonwealth forces to be much weaker than they actually were, and also underestimated the number of Greek troops who had been evacuated from the mainland. General Alexander Löhr, the theatre commander, was convinced the island could be taken with two divisions, but decided to keep 6th Mountain Division in Athens as a reserve. Events would prove this to have been a wise precaution.
Weapons
German
The Germans deployed a new weapon on Crete: the 7.5 cm Leicht Geschütz 40 "light gun" (actually a recoilless rifle). At 320 pounds (145 kg), it weighed only a tenth as much as a standard German 75 mm field gun, yet had two-thirds of its range. It fired a 13 lb (6 kg) shell over three miles (5 km). Adding to the airborne units' firepower was the fact one-quarter of them jumped with a MP40 submachine gun, often carried in addition to a bolt-action Karabiner 98k rifle. Moreover, almost every German squad was equipped with an MG34 light machine gun.
The Germans used color-coded parachutes to distinguish the canisters carrying rifles, ammunition, crew-served weapons and other supplies. Heavy equipment like the Leichtgeschütz 40 was dropped with a special triple-parachute harness designed to bear the extra weight.
The troopers also carried special strips of cloth which could be unfurled in pre-arranged patterns to signal low-flying fighters to coordinate air support and supply drops.
In contrast with the practice of most other nations' airborne forces, who jumped with personal weapons strapped to the body, German airborne procedure was for individual weapons to be dropped in canisters; this was a major flaw. While it facilitated exit from the aircraft and prevented loss and damage to the rifles, it left the paratroopers armed only with their sidearms and fighting knives in the critical few minutes after landing. The poor design of German parachutes compounded the problem: the standard German parachute harness had only a single riser connecting the paratrooper to the parachute canopy, and thus could not be steered toward weapons canisters and away from ground hazards during descent. Even the twenty-five percent of paratroops armed with submachine guns were at a distinct disadvantage, given the weapon's limited range. Many Fallschirmjäger were shot attempting to make it to their weapons canisters.
Greek
Greek troops were armed with the Mannlicher-Schönauer 6.5 mm mountain carbine or ex-Austrian 8 mm Steyr-Mannlicher M1895 rifles, the latter part of post–World War I reparations. About one thousand Greeks carried the antique Gras rifle. The garrison had been stripped of its best crew-served weapons, which were sent to the mainland. There were twelve obsolescent Saint Etienne light machine guns and forty other light machine guns of various manufacture at the Greek troops' disposal. Many of the Greek troops had less than thirty rounds of ammunition left, and could not be resupplied by the British, who had no stocks in the correct calibers. This affected their placement in the battle; those with insufficient ammunition were posted to the island's eastern sector, where the Germans were not expected in force. The Greeks made up for the lack of equipment with intensity of spirit; historian Christopher Buckley described their fight as one of "…extreme courage and tenacity." (154).
British Commonwealth
British Commonwealth troops used their standard Lee-Enfield rifle, Bren light machine gun and Vickers medium machine gun. The Allies on Crete did not possess sufficient Universal Carriers or trucks, which would have provided the extra mobility and firepower needed for rapid-response teams to attack paratrooper units before they had a chance to dig in.
The Allies had about 85 artillery pieces of various calibres, many of them captured Italian pieces without sights.
Anti-aircraft defences consisted of one light anti-aircraft battery equipped with 20 mm automatic cannons, split between the two airfields. The guns were carefully concealed, often in nearby olive groves, and some were ordered to hold their fire during the initial assault so that they would not immediately reveal themselves to German fighters and dive-bombers.
Allied armor resources consisted of nine Matilda IIA infantry tanks, belonging to "B" Squadron, 7th Royal Tank Regiment, and sixteen Mark VIB light tanks from "C" Squadron, 4th Queen's Own Hussars. In common with most British tank units at the time, the Matildas' 2-pdr (40 mm) cannon had only armor piercing rounds which were not effective against infantry (high explosive rounds in such a small caliber was impractical).
The tanks had numerous maintenance problems. The engines, especially, were worn and could not be overhauled with the limited resources available on Crete. Most of the tanks were therefore used as mobile pillboxes to be brought up and dug in at strategic points. One of the Matildas had a damaged turret crank that allowed it to turn clockwise only. In the end, many of the British tanks were lost to the rough terrain, not in combat.
Strategy & tactics
Operation MERCURY
Hitler's directive authorising the operation, Directive Number 28, made it very clear that the forces used were primarily airborne and air units already in the area. Hitler's order was plain that the preparations for the operation must not conflict with Operation Barbarossa. The movement of forces for the Crete attack were not, under any circumstances, to interfere with the movement of forces for Operation Barbarossa. Further, units committed for the attack on Crete but earmarked for Barbarossa were to conclude operations before the end of May at the latest. Barbarossa was not to be delayed by the attack on Crete. This meant that the planned attack had to be launched within the allotted period, or else it would be cancelled. Planning had to be rushed, and much of the German operation would be improvised.
Though the German planners agreed on the necessity of taking Maleme, there was some debate over the concentration of forces there and the number to be deployed against other targets, such as the smaller airfields at Heraklion and Rethymnon. The Luftwaffe commander, General Alexander Löhr, and the naval commander, Counter Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, favored a heavier concentration against Maleme, to achieve overwhelming superiority of force. By contrast, Major-General Kurt von Student wanted to disperse his paratroops more widely, in order to maximize the effect of surprise. As a primary objective, Maleme offered several advantages: it was the largest airfield, capable of supporting heavy transports bearing reinforcements; it was near enough to the mainland to allow air cover from land-based Bf 109 fighters; and it was near the northern coast, so seaborne reinforcements could be brought up quickly. A compromise plan was forced by Hermann Göring and the final plan heavily emphasized securing Maleme first, while not ignoring the other Allied assets.
The final plan was code named Merkur, after the swift Roman god Mercury. German forces were divided into three battle groups, Center, West and East, each with a special code name following the classical theme established by MERCURY. A total of 750 glider troops, 10,000 paratroops, 5,000 airlifted mountain troops, and 7,000 seaborne troops were allotted for the invasion. The largest proportion of the forces were in Group West.
For more complete information on the disposition of forces, see Crete order of battle
German airborne doctrine was based primarily on parachuting in a small number of forces directly on top of enemy airfields. This force would capture the perimeter and any local anti-aircraft guns, allowing a much larger force to land by glider. Freyberg was aware of this after studying German actions of the past year, and decided to render the airfields unusable for landing. However, he was countermanded by the Middle East Command in Alexandria. They felt the invasion was doomed to fail now that they knew about it, and possibly wanted to keep the airfields intact for the RAF's return once the island was secure, in what is held by some to have been a fatal error. It is not clear whether this is the case, for the Germans proved they were able to land reinforcements without resort to fully-functioning airfields. One German pilot crash-landed his transport on a deserted beach; others landed in empty fields, discharged their cargo and took off again. With the Germans willing to sacrifice some of their numerous transport aircraft to win the battle, it is not clear whether a decision to destroy the airfields would have made any difference to the final outcome. The gliders, were, of course, designed to be expendable and consequently their pilots were even more daring in their landing choices.
Day one, 20 May
Maleme-Chania sector
At 8:00 am on 20 May German paratroopers landed near Maleme airfield and the town of Chania. The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd New Zealand Battalions defended Maleme airfield and its direct surrounding area. The Germans suffered heavy casualties within the first hours of the invasion. One company of the III Battalion, 1st Assault Regiment, lost 112 killed out of 126; 400 of the battalion's 600 men were killed before the end of the first day.
Of the initial forces, the majority were mauled by New Zealand forces placed near the airfield of Maleme and Greek forces near the town of Chania. Many of the gliders following the paratroops were hit by mortar fire within seconds of landing. Those who did land were wiped out almost to a man by the New Zealand and Greek defenders.
A number of German forces had landed off-site near both airfields, as is common in airdrops, and set up defensive positions to the west of Maleme airfield, and "Prison Valley" in the Chania area. Although both forces were bottled up and failed to take the airfields, they were in place and the defenders had to deploy to face them.
Greek police forces and cadets were also in action, with the First Greek Regiment (Provisional) combining with civilians to rout a detachment of German paratroopers dropped at Kastelli. Meanwhile, the 8th Greek Regiment and elements of the Cretan forces severely hampered movement by the 95th Reconnaissance Battalion on Kolimbari and Paleochora, where Allied reinforcements from North Africa could potentially be landed.
Rethimnon-Heraklion sector
A second German wave arrived in the afternoon, one group attacking Rethimnon at 4:15 pm and another at Heraklion at 5:30. As with the earlier actions, the defenders were waiting for them and inflicted heavy casualties.
Heraklion was defended by the British 14th Infantry Brigade, augmented by the Australian 2/4th Battalion and the Greek 3rd, 7th and "Garrison" (ex-5th "Crete" Division") battalions. The Greek units were sorely lacking in equipment and supplies, the Garrison Battalion especially, as the bulk of its matériel had shipped to the mainland with the division, but they would fight with distinction nonetheless.
The Germans pierced the defensive cordon around Heraklion on the first day, seizing the Greek barracks on the west edge of the town and capturing the docks; the Greeks counterattacked both points and recaptured them. Some German units began using captured townspeople as human shields, and the Germans dropped leaflets urging surrender and threatening dire consequences if an Allied surrender was not effected immediately. The next day Heraklion was heavily bombed. The battered Greek units were rotated out and assumed a defensive position on the road to Knossos..
As night fell, none of the German objectives had been secured. The risky plan attacking at four separate points to fully use surprise rather than concentrating on one seemed to have failed, although the reasons were unknown to the Germans.
Towards the evening of 20 May the Germans at Maleme were slowly pushing back the New Zealanders from Hill 107, which overlooked the airfield. The Axis commanders on Crete decided to throw everything into the Maleme sector the next day.
Among the paratroopers who landed on the first day of the battle was former world heavyweight champion boxer Max Schmeling, who held the rank of Gefreiter (lance corporal/private first class) at the time. Schmeling survived the battle and the war.
Civilian Uprising
Everywhere on the island, Cretan civilians, armed and otherwise, joined the battle with whatever weapons were at hand. In some cases, ancient rifles which had last been used against the Turks were dug up from their hiding places and pressed into action. In other cases, Cretan civilians went into action armed only with what they could gather from their kitchens or barns, and many German parachutists were knifed or clubbed to death in the olive groves that dotted the island. In one recorded case, an elderly Cretan clubbed a parachutist to death with his walking stick before the German could disentangle himself from his parachute lines. The Cretans soon supplemented their makeshift weapons with captured German small arms. Their actions were not limited to harassment - the civil population also played a significant role in the Greek counter-attacks at Kastelli Hill and Paleochora, and it took all of the strength of character of the British and New Zealand advisors at these locations to prevent massacres. Civilian action also checked the Germans to the north and west of Heraklion, and in the town centre itself.
This was the first occasion during the war that Germans had encountered widespread and unrestrained resistance from a civilian population, and for a period of time it unbalanced them. However, once they had overcome their shock at these actions, the German paratroopers reacted with equal ferocity. Further, as most Cretan partisans wore no identifying insignia such as armbands, the Germans felt free of all of the constraints implied by the Geneva conventions. In his book 'The Lost Battle', MacDonald argues that battlefield mutilations (attributed to the torture of injured Germans by civilians) were more than likely a result of carrion birds and physical decay of corpses left in the extreme heat.
The Escape of the King
The majority of Cretans, as mentioned above, were Venizelist Republicans — as were a significant number of mainland Greeks. In 1924 George II, King of the Hellenes had been deposed and exiled to Romania, only to return in 1935 after the collapse of republican government. The Germans regarded George as a hopeless Anglophile and an obstacle to their conquest of Greece, which they believed to be mostly anti-monarchist. After the king escaped to Crete on 22 April and issued a defiant memorandum to the Germans, Hitler responded by attacking the king in a speech given on 4 May. The British feared the propaganda coup that the capture by airborne troops of a sovereign monarch under their protection would represent.
The king was staying in a villa near the village of Perivolia, outside Chania. He and his entourage narrowly escaped capture at that house and at the abode of Emmanouil Tsouderos, the prime minister. From the garden of Tsouderos's home, German paratroopers were seen landing in the area of the king's villa, although it later turned out they were members of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Parachute Rifle Regiment, which was assigned to the Galatas sector and whose members had been dropped near the villa by mistake. An evacuation by the Royal Navy had already been arranged, with Colonel J.S. Blunt, the British military attaché to Greece acting as liaison. A platoon of New Zealand infantry under Lieutenant W.H. Ryan was assigned as a bodyguard, along with a complement of Cretan gendarmes. The king was accompanied by his cousin, Prince Peter; Colonel Dimitrios Levidis , Master of Ceremonies; Prime Minister Tsouderos and Kyriakos Varvaressos, Governor-in-Exile of the Bank of Greece.
The party had several close calls with both the Germans and the native Cretans. A detachment was sent back for some papers left behind by Mr. Tsouderos; they returned to report the house was already occupied, meaning the Germans were by now aware of the king's presence nearby. Lieutenant Ryan had the king remove his Greek general's uniform, which was adorned with gold braid and other ornaments that were bound to attract attention. At one point the group were pinned down by the rifle fire of Cretan mountaineers. Prince Peter shouted to them in Greek, and they replied "Germans also speak Greek and wear Greek uniforms". Eventually convinced that the royal retinue were not German spies, they let them pass. That night, the evacuees rested in the village of Therisso. There, they were startled by a clamour at the doors, which turned out to be the prison escapees released earlier in the day. Patriotism apparently overwhelmed any sympathy for their German emancipators and antipathy to the monarchist constitution, and the prisoners moved on to forage for weapons instead of betraying their fellow fugitives.
Though forced to abandon their pack mules and lacking proper clothing and equipment for mountain climbing, the entourage arrived safely at their rendezvous point. There, joined by evacuating members of the British diplomatic corps, they signalled HMS Decoy and were plucked from the shore, arriving in Alexandria on the night of 22 May. By pure coincidence two other members of the Greek Royal family were in the same waters at this time. Prince Philip was a Lieutenant serving as search light officer on HMS Valiant and Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, was on HMS Kelly which was sunk on the 23rd May.
Day two, 21 May
The next morning it was found that the New Zealand infantry battalion defending the airfield on Hill 107 had mistakenly withdrawn at night, although they continued to pour artillery fire into the area. This gave the German forces control of the airfield, just as a sea landing took place nearby. That evening Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft started flying in units of the Fifth Mountain Division. These troops moved into the line as soon as their planes landed, many of which were hit by artillery fire and littered the airfield.
Naval attack on 21 May
Before midnight, Force D of the Royal Navy intercepted a flotilla of reinforcements, escorted by an Italian small destroyer, the Lupo, successfully preventing their landing.
The convoy, comprising around 20 caïques, was fiercely defended by the Regia Marina unit. Some ten boats and 2,000 German troops were saved due to the skillful maneuvers conducted by the Italian commander, Francesco Mimbelli, against an overwhelmingly superior force. About 300 German soldiers and two Italian seamen died in action, as well as two British from HMS Orion..
Day three, 22 May
Realising that Maleme was now the key to holding the entire island, the defending force organised for a counter-attack by two New Zealand battalions, the 20th Battalion of the 4th brigade and the 28th Maori Battalion of the 5th Brigade on the night of 21–22 May. Fears of a sea landing meant that a number of units that could have taken part in the attack were left in place, although this possibility was removed by a strong Royal Navy presence which arrived too late for the plans to change.
The force attacked at night, but by this time the original paratroops had set up defensive lines, and the newly arrived mountain troops proved difficult to dislodge. The attack slowly petered out, failing to retake the airfield. From this point on the defenders were involved in a series of withdrawals to the eastern end of the island, in an attempt to avoid being out-flanked by the oncoming German forces.
Naval attack on 22 May
Admiral Andrew Cunningham, determined that no German troop transports should reach Crete, sent Admiral King's Force C (three cruisers and four destroyers) into the Aegean through the Kaso Strait, to attack a second flotilla of transports escorted by the Italian torpedo boat Sagittario. The force sank a caïque separated from the main flotilla at 8.30am thus saving it from an air attack that struck cruiser HMS Naiad at this time. The pilots were trying to avoid killing their troops in the water. King's squadron, still under constant air attack and running short of anti-aircraft ammunition, steamed on toward Milos sighting the Sagittario at ten o'clock. King made the difficult decision not to attack, despite his overpowering advantage, due to the shortage of ammunition and a torpedo charge executed by the Italian warship. He had succeeded, however, in forcing the Germans to abort this seaborne operation. During the search and withdrawal from the area Force C suffered heavy losses. Naiad was damaged by near misses and the cruiser HMS Carlisle was hit. Admiral Cunningham later criticized King decisions.
Force C met up with Rear Admiral Rawling's Force A1 at the Kithera channel where more air attacks inflicted damage on both forces. A bomb struck Warspite and then the destroyer Greyhound was sunk. King sent Kandahar and Kingston to pick up survivors while the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji provided anti-aircraft support, forgetting their ammunition shortage. Gloucester was hit by several bombs while the fleet was withdrawing and had to be left behind due to the intense air attacks. Seven hundred and twenty-two officers and ratings from this ship lost their lives.
The air attacks on Force A1 and Force C continued. Two bombs hit the battleship Valiant (with Lieutenant Prince Philip of Greece on board) and later another hit Fiji, disabling it. A Junkers 88 flown by Lieutenant Gerhard Brenner dropped three bombs on Fiji, sinking it. Five hundred survivors were rescued by Kandahar and Kingston the next morning. The Royal Navy lost two cruisers and a destroyer sunk but had managed to turn the invasion fleet around.
23-27 May
Fighting against a constant supply of fresh troops the Allied troops began a series of retreats working southward across Crete.
23 May: the Sinking of Kelly and Kashmir
The 5th Destroyer Flotilla: Kelly, Kipling, Kelvin, Jackal and Kashmir, under Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten, was ordered to leave Malta on 21 May, to join the fleet off Crete. It arrived in the area after Gloucester and Fiji were sunk. They were first sent to pick up survivors but were then diverted to attack some caïques off the Cretan coast and then shell the Germans at Maleme. Kelvin and Jackal were diverted on another search while Mountbatten with Kelly, Kashmir and Kipling were to go to Alexandria.
While the three ships were rounding the western side of Crete they came under heavy air attack from 24 Stuka dive bombers. Kashmir was hit and sank in two minutes and Kelly was hit and turned turtle soon after. Kipling survived 83 bombs aimed at her, while she picked up 279 survivors from the two ships. The Noel Coward film In Which We Serve was based on this action.
24-26 May
After air attacks on Allied positions in Kastelli on 24 May, the 95th Gebirgs Pioneer Battalion advanced on the town. These air attacks enabled the escape of German paratroopers captured on 20 May; the newly liberated paratroopers killed and captured several New Zealand officers assigned to lead the 1st Greek Regiment. Despite this setback, the Greeks put up determined resistance, but with only 600 rifles and a few thousand rounds of ammunitions available for a force of 1,000 ill-trained men, were unable to repel the German advance. Fighting with the remnants of 1st Greek Regiment continued in the Kastelli area until 26 May hampering the efforts of the Germans to secure the port for the landing of reinforcements.
27 May
| "Awful news from Crete. We are scuppered there, and I'm afraid the morale and material effects will be serious. Certainly the Germans are past-masters in the art of war—and great warriors. If we beat them, we shall have worked a miracle." | | Alexander Cadogan, end of diary entry for 27 May 1941 |
The Germans finally secured the port at Kastelli and landed some light tanks.
Battle of "42nd Street"
In a ferocious bayonet charge on the morning of 27 May, the New Zealand 28th (Maori) Battalion, the Australian 2/7th Battalion and the Australian 2/8th Battalion, cleared a section of road between Souda and Chania which was under threat from troops of the German 141st Mountain Regiment.
Orders to Evacuate
Command in London eventually decided the cause was hopeless and on 27 May ordered an evacuation. Major-General Freyberg concurrently ordered his troops to begin withdrawing to the south coast to be evacuated.
Evacuation to Egypt, 28–31 May
Over four nights 16,000 troops were evacuated to Egypt by ships including the light cruiser HMS Ajax. The majority of these troops embarked from Sphakia. A smaller number were withdrawn from Heraklion on the night of 28 May. This task force was attacked en route by Luftwaffe dive-bombers and suffered serious losses. More than 9,000 Anzacs and thousands of Greeks were left behind to defend the remaining territory as best they could. They fought on until they were surrounded. The cities of Irakleio and Rethymno were taken in the following days by the Germans. A small Italian force assisted the capture of Rethymno. By the 1st of June, the island of Crete was under German control.
Defense of 8th Greek Regiment
The defense of the 8th Greek Regiment in and around the village of Alikianos is credited with protecting the Allied line of retreat. Alikianos, located in the "Prison Valley", was strategically important and it was one of the first targets the Germans attacked on the opening day of the battle. The 8th Greek was composed of young Cretan recruits, gendarmes, and cadets. They were poorly equipped and only 850 strong roughly battalion, not regiment-sized. Attached to the 10th New Zealand Infantry Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard Kippenberger, little was expected of them by Allied officers. The Greeks, however, proved such pessimism wrong. On the first day of battle they decisively repulsed the Engineer Battalion. During the next several days they held out against repeated attacks by the 85th and 100th Mountain Regiments. For seven days they held Alikianos and protected the Allied line of retreat. The 8th Greek Regiment is credited with making the evacuation of Western Crete a possibility by many historians such as Antony Beevor and Alan Clark.
The Anzacs fall back
The Germans pushed the British, Commonwealth, and Hellenic forces steadily southward, using aerial and artillery bombardment followed by waves of motorcycle and mountain troops (the mountainous terrain making it difficult to employ tanks). The Souda Bay garrisons at Souda and Beritania gradually fell back along the lone road to Vitsilokoumos, just to the north of Sphakia. About halfway there, near the village of Askifou lay a large crater nicknamed "The Saucer". It was the only spot in the rugged terrain sufficiently wide and flat enough to support a large-scale air drop. Troops were stationed about its perimeter to prevent a German airborne force from landing to block the retreat. At the village of Stilos, the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the 2/7th Australian Battalion held off a German mountain battalion which had begun a flanking manœuvre, but they were forced to withdraw for lack of air and artillery support, despite their superior numbers. Fortunately for the ANZACs, German air assets were being concentrated on Rethymnion and Heraklion, and they were able to retreat down the road safely in broad daylight.
The Maori make a stand
The general retreat of the brigade was covered by two companies of the 28th (Maori) Battalion under Captain Rangi Royal. (Royal's men had already distinguished themselves at 42nd Street.) They overran the 1st Battalion, 141st Gebirgsjäger Regiment and halted the German advance. When the main unit was safely to the rear, the Maori in turn made their own fighting retreat of twenty-four miles, losing only two killed and eight wounded, all of whom they were able to carry to safety. Thus, the Layforce commando detachment was the only major unit in this area to be cut-off and unable to retreat.
The lost detachment
Layforce had been sent into Crete by way of Sphakia when it was still hoped that large-scale reinforcements could be brought into Crete from Egypt to turn the tide of the battle. The battalion-sized force was split up, with a 200 man detachment under the unit's commander, Robert Laycock, stationed at Souda to cover the retreat of the heavier units. Laycock's men, augmented by three of the remaining British tanks, were joined by the men of the 20th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, who had been assigned to guard the Souda docks and refused to believe that a general evacuation had been ordered. After a day's fierce fighting, Laycock decided to retreat under cover of night to nearby Beritiana. He was joined there by Captain Royal and the Maoris, who took up separate defensive positions and eventually made their fighting retreat. Laycock and his force, however, were cut-off by superior German forces near the village of Babali Khani. Pummelled from the air by dive bombers, Layforce Detachment was unable to get away. Laycock and his brigade major, novelist Evelyn Waugh were able to escape by crashing through German lines in a tank. Most of the other men of the detachment and their comrades from the 20th were either killed or captured.
Tradition
During the evacuation Admiral Cunningham was determined that the "Navy must not let the Army down". When Army officers expressed concerns that he would lose too many ships, Cunningham said that "It takes three years to build a ship, it takes three centuries to build a tradition".
Major Alistair Hamilton, a company commander in the Black Watch, had declared, "The Black Watch leaves Crete when the snow leaves Mount Ida". Hamilton himself never left the island: he was killed by a mortar round, but his men were ordered off, and they reluctantly complied. The consensus among the men was that they were letting their Greek allies down, and while most British heavy equipment was destroyed in order to keep it from falling into enemy hands, the men turned over their ammunition to the Cretans who were staying behind to resist the Germans.
Surrender
Meanwhile, Colonel Campbell, the commander at Heraklion, was also forced to surrender his contingent. Rethimno fell as well, and on the night of the 30th, German motorcycle troops linked up with Italian troops who had landed that day on the Gulf of Mirabella. The Italian commander in the Dodecanese had volunteered the services of his men as early as 21 May, but the request had to pass through German channels to Hermann Göring, who finally authorized the move when it became clear that the German effort was not moving ahead as quickly as planned.
On 1 June the remaining 5,000 defenders at Sphakia surrendered, although many took to the hills and caused the German occupation problems for years. By 1941 an estimated 500 British Commonwealth troops remained at large, to say nothing of the Greeks, who were more easily able to blend in with the native population.
It must have been a bitter pill for the British to learn that they lost the battle against German elite troops who were for a major part originally taken prisoner-of-war during the invasion of The Netherlands. Because the British were only able to transport about 1,200 captured German paratroopers before the Dutch capitulation to Germany, the majority of the captured German paratroopers escaped to the German occupier.
Aftermath
Allied commanders were worried about the Germans using Crete as a "springboard" to further operations in the area, possibly an airborne attack on Cyprus or a seaborne invasion of Egypt in support of the German/Italian forces operating from Libya. However, these fears were soon put to rest when Operation Barbarossa opened, and it was clear that the German operation was defensive in nature.
Losses among the German paratroops were very high in Hitler's opinion, and the Germans were forced to reconsider their airborne doctrine, which eliminated this weapon from large scale use in the Soviet Union. Ironically, the use of paratroopers in force impressed the Allies. The German casualty rate was hidden from Allied planners, who scrambled to create their own large airborne divisions after this battle.
The battle of Crete did not delay Operation Barbarossa. The start date for Barbarossa (22 June 1941) had been set several weeks before the Crete operation was considered, and the directive by Hitler for Operation Merkur made it plain that the preparations for Merkur must not interfere with Barbarossa. Units assigned to Merkur and earmarked for Barbarossa were to redeployed to Poland and Romania by the end of May, and in the event, the movement of units from Greece was not delayed by Merkur. Indeed, the transfer of Fliegerkorps VIII during the battle in order to reach their assigned positions in time for Barbarossa was a key reason in allowing the Royal Navy to evacuate so many of the defenders. The reasons for the delay of Operation Barbarossa owed nothing to the battle of Crete, but was because of the need to allow swollen rivers to fall and for airfields to dry out in Poland.
The loss of Crete, particularly as a result of the failure of the British land forces to recognise the strategic importance of the airfields, served as a wake-up call for the British Government. As a direct consequence, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was given responsibility for defending its own bases from ground and air attack. The RAF Regiment was formed on 1 February 1942 to meet this requirement.
Casualties
Official German casualty figures are hard to determine with exactitude due to minor variations between different documents produced by the various German commands on various dates. Davin has calculated an estimate of 6,698 based upon an examination of various sources, which are summarized as follows:
- [
table of German casualty source documents to come]
This total of 6,698 excludes the wounded suffered by 8 Fliegerkorps as well as any casualties suffered by the Kriegsmarine in the aborted seaborne landings. Davin also notes that his estimate might exclude several hundred lightly wounded soldiers. Other minor omissions are possible. However, Davin states in regard to the Battle of Crete:
Reports of German casualties in British reports are in almost all cases exaggerated and are not accepted against the official contemporary German returns, prepared for normal purposes and not for propaganda.
These exaggerated reports of German casualties began to appear almost immediately after the battle had ended. Taylor cites a report published in the New Zealand newspaper Press on 12 June 1941 that:
The Germans lost at least 12,000 killed and wounded, and about 5,000 drowned
Winston Churchill claimed that the Germans must have suffered well over 15,000 casualties while Admiral Cunningham felt that the figure was more like 22,000. Buckley, based on British intelligence assumptions of two enemies wounded for every one killed, gave an estimate of 16,800 total casualties. Despite the enduring popularity of these rather fanciful estimates, the U.S. Army Center of Military History, citing a report of the Historical Branch of the British Cabinet Office, concludes military historians largely accept estimates of between 6,000 and 7,000 German casualties as correct.
The Australian Graves Commission counted a combined total of roughly 5,000 German graves in the Maleme-Suda Bay area, at Retimo and at Heraklion. Davin concludes that this total would have included a sizeable number of deaths during the German occupation due to sickness, accidents or fighting with partisan forces.
The German casualties included a lengthy list of commissioned officers. Leading this list is Major General Wilhelm Süssman, commander of the 7th Flieger Division and Group Centre in the assault, who died in a glider accident on 20 May before reaching Crete. Also prominent on this list is Major General Eugen Meindl, commander of Luftlande Sturmregiment and Group West in the assault, who was shot in the chest on 20 May and evacuated the following morning. According to Davin, the only German prisoners evacuated to Egypt were 17 captured officers.
Also prominent among the German casualties were the three von Blücher brothers who died in the battle.
The Allies lost 3,500 soldiers: 1,751 dead, with an equal number wounded, and an enormous number captured (12,254 Commonwealth and 5,255 Greek). There were also 1,828 dead and 183 wounded among the Royal Navy. After the war the Allied graves from the four burial grounds that had been established by the German forces were moved to the site of Suda Bay War Cemetery.
A large number of civilians were killed in the crossfire or died fighting as partisans. Many Cretans were shot by the Germans in reprisals, both during the battle and in the occupation that followed. The Germans claimed widespread mutilation of corpses by Cretan partisans but MacDonald (1995) suggests this was down to the breakdown of dead bodies in the very high temperatures as well as carrion birds. One Cretan source puts the number of Cretans killed by German action during the war at 6,593 men, 1,113 women and 869 children.. German records put the number of Cretans executed by firing squad as 3,474, and at least a further 1,000 civilians were killed in massacres late in 1944.
Attacks by German planes, mainly Ju-87 and Ju-88, destroyed a number of British ships: three cruisers (Gloucester, Fiji and Calcutta) and six destroyers (Kelly, Greyhound, Kashmir, Hereward, Imperial and Juno). Seven other ships were damaged, including the battleships Warspite and Valiant, and the cruiser Orion.
| Crete Military Casualties | Killed | Missing
(presumed dead) | Total Killed and Missing | Wounded | Captured | Total |
|---|
| British Commonwealth | 3,579 | | | 1,900 | 12,254 | 17,733 | | German | 2,124 | 1,917 | 4,041 | 2,640 | 17 | 6,698 | | Greek | | | | | 5,225 | | | Italian | | | | | | |
See also
The 11th Day: Crete 1941 documentary containing eyewitness accounts of participants in battle and resistance movement von Blücher brothers
Resistance
Notable participants
David Coke • Roald Dahl • Roy Farran • Bernard Freyberg • Alfred Hulme • Robert Laycock • Patrick Leigh Fermor • John Pendlebury • Max Schmeling • Theodore Stephanides • Evelyn Waugh • Lawrence Durrell • Charles Upham • Geoffrey Cox • Dan Davin (who wrote a book on the battle)
External links
- John Hall Spencer, , Pen and Sword Books Ltd (Barnsley), 2008, ISBN 9781844157709
- Major Tim Saunders, , Pen and Sword Books Ltd (Barnsley), 2007, ISBN 9781844155576
-
Further reading
Crete 1941: Germany's lightning airborne assault, Campaign series. Osprey Publishing: Oxford, New York. 2005 ISBN 1-84176-844-8*Barber, Laurie and Tonkin-Covell, John. Freyberg : Churchill's Salamander, Hutchinson 1990. ISBN 1-86941-052-1Beevor, Antony. Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, John Murray Ltd, 1991. Penguin Books, 1992. Pbk ISBN 0-14-016787-0 Boulder : Westview Press, 1994. LCCN 93047914Buckley, Christopher. Greece and Crete 1941, London, 1952. Greek pbk edition (in English): P. Efstathiadis & Sons S.A., 1984. Pbk ISBN 960-226-041-6*Clark, Alan. The Fall of Crete, Anthony Blond Ltd., London, 1962. Greek pbk edition (in English): Efstathiadis Group, 1981, 1989. Pbk ISBN 960-226-090-4Comeau, M. G. Operation Mercury : Airmen in the Battle of Crete, J&KH Publishing, 2000. ISBN 1-900511-79-7*Elliot, Murray. Vasili: The Lion of Crete, Century Hutchinson New Zealand Ltd., London, Australia, South Africa. Greek paperback edition (in English): Efstathiadis Group S.A., 1987, 1992. Pbk ISBN 960-226-348-2Greene, Jack and Massignani, Alessandro. The naval war in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, Chatam Publishing, 1998.*Harokopos, George. The Fortress Crete, subtitled on cover '1941-1944' and within 'The Secret War 1941-1944' and 'Espionage and Counter-Espionage in Occupied Crete', Seagull Publications. Greek paperback edition/English translation: B. Giannikos & Co., Athens, 1993. Translation and comments by Spilios Menounos. Pbk ISBN 960-7296-35-4Keegan, John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (2003) ISBN 0-375-40053-2Kokonas, N.A., M.D. The Cretan Resistance 1941-1945, forwarded by P. Leigh Fermor and others. London, 1993. Greek paperback edition (in English): Graphotechniki Kritis, Rethymnon, Crete, Greece. Pbk ISBN 960-85329-0-6Lind, Lew. Flowers of Rethymnon: Escape from Crete, Kangaroo Press Pty Ltd, 1991. ISBN 0-86417-394-6*MacDonald, C. The Lost Battle - Crete 1941, MacMillan 1995 ISBN 0333616758Mazower, Mark. Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941-44, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993. ISBN 0-300-05804-7Moss, W. Stanley. Ill Met By Moonlight: The Story of the Kidnapping of General Karl Kreipe, the German Divisional Commander in Crete, The MacMillan Company, NY, 1950Psychoundakis, George. The Cretan Runner: His History of the German Occupation, English translation and introduction by Patrick Leigh Fermor. London, 1955. Greek paperback edition (in English): Efstathiadis Group S.A., 1991. Pbk ISBN 960-226-013-0Shores, Christopher and Cull, Brian with Malizia, Nicola. Air War For Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete 1940-41, Grub Street, 1987 ISBN 0-948817-07-0Thomas, David A. Crete 1941: The Battle at Sea, Andre Deutsch Ltd. Great Britain, 1972. Greek pbk edition (in English): Efstathiadis Group, Athens 1980
|
| |
|
|
