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Battle of Chickamauga
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The Battle of Chickamauga, fought September 18 to September 20, 1863, marked the end of a Union offensive in south-central Tennessee and northwestern Georgia called the Chickamauga Campaign. The battle was the most significant Union defeat in the Western Theater of the American Civil War.
The battle was fought between the Union Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans and the Confederate Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg, and was named for the (now South) Chickamauga Creek, which flows into the Tennessee River about 3.5 miles (5.6km) northeast of downtown Chattanooga. Chickamauga was a local Indian word meaning "Stagnant River" or, less accurately, "River of Death," a usage that may have begun after the battle.
Initial movements in the Chickamauga CampaignIn his successful Tullahoma Campaign in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans moved southeast from Murfreesboro, Tennessee, driving Bragg across the state of Tennessee to the city of Chattanooga, suffering only 560 casualties along the way. Seizing Chattanooga would open the door for the Union to assault Atlanta and the heartland of the South. General-in-chief Henry W. Halleck was insistent that Rosecrans move quickly to take Chattanooga. President Abraham Lincoln declared that "whoever controls Chattanooga will win the war." Chattanooga was also vital to the Confederate States of America. The location between Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Raccoon Mountain, and Stringer's Ridge was strategically important. In addition, Chattanooga was a rail hub (with lines going north toward Nashville and Knoxville and south toward Atlanta), a center of banking, commerce, and manufacturing (iron and coke) located on the navigable Tennessee River.
Rosecrans delayed for weeks, but finally renewed the offensive on August 16, aiming to force the Confederates out of Chattanooga by threatening their supply lines to the south. A major obstacle on his route was the Tennessee River. Rosecrans devised a diversion to prevent Bragg from opposing his crossing at Caperton's Ferry. The Second Battle of Chattanooga was part of the diversion. Colonel John T. Wilder of the XIV Corps moved a brigade near Chattanooga and bombarded the city with artillery for two weeks, fooling Bragg as to the direction of the Union advance. Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee without opposition. The terrain he faced in northwestern Georgia was formidable, consisting of the long chain of rugged mountains known as Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, which had very poor road networks.
Bragg and the Confederate high command were nervous about this development and took steps to reinforce Bragg. General Joseph E. Johnston's army dispatched a division from Mississippi under Maj. Gen. Hiram T. Walker by September 4, and General Robert E. Lee dispatched a corps under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet from Virginia.
Three corps of Rosecrans's army split and advanced by separate routes, on the only three roads that were suitable for such movements. On the right flank, the XX Corps under Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook moved southwest to Valley Head, Alabama; in the center, the XIV Corps under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas moved just across the border to Trenton, Georgia; and on the left, the XXI Corps under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden moved directly toward Chattanooga around Lookout Mountain. On September 8, after learning that Rosecrans had crossed into his rear, Bragg evacuated Chattanooga and moved his army south along the LaFayette Road toward LaFayette, Georgia. He was aware of Rosecrans's dispositions and planned to defeat him by attacking his isolated corps individually. The corps were spread out over 40 miles (65 km), too far apart to support each other.
Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was demoralized and fleeing to either Dalton, Rome, or Atlanta, Georgia. Instead, Bragg's Army of Tennessee was encamped at La Fayette, some 20 miles (32 km) south of Chattanooga. Confederate soldiers who posed as deserters deliberately added to this impression. Rosecrans ordered McCook to swing across Lookout Mountain at Winston's Gap and use his cavalry to break Bragg's railroad supply line at Resaca, Georgia. Crittenden was to take Chattanooga and then turn south in pursuit of Bragg. Thomas was to continue his advance toward La Fayette. On September 10, Thomas's advance division, under Maj. Gen. James Negley, encountered a Confederate division under Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, and a skirmish occurred at Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain. The minor engagement became known as the Battle of Davis' Cross Roads. After the encounter, Negley's Federals withdrew back to Stevens's Gap in Lookout Mountain.
Bragg decided to attack Crittenden and ordered Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk to attack Crittenden's lead division, under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, early on September 13, with Polk's corps and Walker's corps, assuming that Crittenden's divisions were separated. However, Polk realized that Crittenden had in fact concentrated his divisions and elected not to attack, infuriating Bragg. For the second time in three days, Bragg had been unable to get his subordinates to attack in a timely fashion, and now Rosecrans was belatedly concentrating his forces.
By September 17, the three Union corps had closed up and were much less vulnerable to individual defeat. Yet Bragg decided that he still had an opportunity. Reinforced with troops arriving from Virginia under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, and troops from Mississippi under Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, he decided on the morning of September 18 to advance on Crittenden's left and cut the three union Corps from their supply base at Chattanooga.
Battle of ChickamaugaAs Bragg marched north along the LaFayette Road to engage Crittenden's XXI Corps on September 18, his cavalry and infantry fought with Union cavalry and Union mounted infantry under the command of Col. Robert Minty and Col. John T. Wilder (whose command was armed with Spencer repeating rifles). The forces under Hood, Walker, and Simon B. Buckner crossed West Chickamauga Creek against this pressure and bivouacked just to the west of the creek; Crittenden's corps was one mile (1.6 km) to the west of their position. Although Bragg had achieved some degree of surprise, he failed to strongly exploit it. Rosecrans, observing the dust raised by the marching Confederates in the morning, anticipated Bragg's plan. He ordered Thomas and McCook to Crittenden's support, and while the Confederates were crossing the creek, Thomas began to arrive in Crittenden's rear area.
On the morning of September 19, Thomas's four divisions were spread out north of Crittenden's position. Bragg, however, was unaware of the arrival of Thomas and believed that Crittenden occupied the left flank of the Union position. The Union commanders were equally unaware of the Confederate dispositions and did not know that they had crossed the creek the night before. Early that morning, the Confederate corps under Buckner and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's division joined Hood and Walker. The fighting that morning started with an attack by Thomas, who believed he was attacking only a small force under cavalry commander Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest to his front. The fight expanded and lasted throughout the day as Bragg and Rosecrans engaged more of their armies. The fighting would seesaw back and forth with first one side attacking and then in turn being attacked, but as the day wore on the Confederates' numerical advantage began to be felt and the Union forces began to be slowly driven back toward the LaFayette Road.
That night, as Rosecrans rearranged his divisions to form a more compact defensive line, Bragg made plans to resume his offensive on September 20 by once again attempting to envelop the Union left flank. He reorganized his army into two wings, commanded by Polk and Longstreet (who had just arrived from Virginia), based on locations of units at the time, without regard for the existing command structures. Bragg seemed to have been unaware of the severity of the fighting that day, because when Longstreet arrived that night, Bragg told him that "the troops have been engaged in ... severe skirmishing while endeavoring to get in line of battle."
On September 20, Confederate Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill was supposed to assault the Union right flank at 7:30 a.m. However, he delayed two hours, later claiming he had not received orders, but more likely pouting over being passed over for wing command. General Thomas's men would use the quiet morning hours to construct crude breastworks along their line around Kelly field. Shortly after Hill's attack commenced, one of his divisions under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge attacked Thomas's left flank and was able to flank it and gain Thomas's rear temporarily. By 10:15 a.m., part of Maj. Gen. James S. Negley's division, which had been held in reserve, had pushed north and repulsed the assault. The next Confederate attack was by Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, but he was stopped by fire from the breastworks at Kelly Field. Bragg was concerned about the failure of his attacks on the Union left and ordered a general assault along the entire line, changing his strategy from a flanking attack to a full frontal assault. At 11 a.m., assaults by Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart and Walker were repulsed.
Thomas requested reinforcements, and Rosecrans began shifting units to react to the initial attacks on his flank. At about 11 a.m., General T.J. Wood was ordered to replace Brig. Gen. John Milton Brannan's division, which had been ordered to Thomas's aid. Brannan had not followed the order, however, after being attacked by Stewart's men; the order was poorly written and told Wood to close up and support Reynolds. Although he could not close up on him, he could move his men to a supporting position, which created a real gap that corps commander Alexander McCook was trying to fill when Longstreet's entire wing of the army attacked. They were able to exploit this gap and struck the columns of Union soldiers in their flanks as they moved. Longstreet had, however inadvertently, achieved another successful surprise assault, for which he had a well-deserved reputation in the war.
The Union troops in the gap began to retreat, carrying Rosecrans along with them, and McCook's and Crittenden's commands soon followed. By 1 p.m., Thomas was the sole commander left on the battlefield. He received word from Rosecrans to withdraw the troops to Rossville, Georgia, a few miles to the north in the direction of Chattanooga. But Thomas was too heavily engaged to move. He began consolidating forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. The Union Reserve Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, who was north of the battlefield at MacAfee's Church, heard the firing to the south and, on his own initiative, sent Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman to support Thomas. Steedman arrived about 2:30 p.m., just in time to stop Longstreet's attempt to envelop Thomas's right flank. At about 4 p.m., Longstreet made one final effort but could not break the stubborn Union defense. At the same time, Thomas repulsed a renewed assault by Cheatham on his left flank.
AftermathThomas withdrew to Rossville that night. His heroic defense that day earned him the nickname The Rock of Chickamauga. It is recognized that although his troops fought valiantly, it was his personal determination that saved the Union army from disaster. Bragg failed to pursue the Union forces, due to the horrible losses he had suffered and also for want of logistical support.
On September 21, Rosecrans's army withdrew to the city of Chattanooga while the Confederates occupied the surrounding heights and laid siege upon the Union forces. Unable to break the siege, Rosecrans was relieved of his command of the Army of the Cumberland on October 19. It took the relief forces of Maj. Gens. Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman and the Battle of Chattanooga that November to break Bragg's grip on the city.
Considered a Confederate victory for halting the Union advance, the Battle of Chickamauga was a costly one. It claimed an estimated 34,624 casualties (16,170 for the Union; 18,454 for the Confederates).
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