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Agranat Commission
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The Agranat Commission was an official National Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The Committee was headed by Shimon Agranat, Chief Justice of Israel's Supreme Court. Its other members were Justice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Yitzchak Nebenzahl, and former Chiefs of Staff Yigal Yadin and Chaim Laskov.
The Committee sat for 140 sessions, during which they listened to the testimony of 58 witnesses.
r Interim Report, released on 1 April 1974, caused a stir in the country by placing the onus of responsibility on Chief of Staff David Elazar, the Chief of Military Intelligence General Eli Zeira, and the Chief of the Southern Command General Shmuel Gonen.
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Encyclopedia
The Agranat Commission was an official National Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The Committee was headed by Shimon Agranat, Chief Justice of Israel's Supreme Court. Its other members were Justice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Yitzchak Nebenzahl, and former Chiefs of Staff Yigal Yadin and Chaim Laskov.
The Committee sat for 140 sessions, during which they listened to the testimony of 58 witnesses.
Determinations
Their Interim Report, released on 1 April 1974, caused a stir in the country by placing the onus of responsibility on Chief of Staff David Elazar, the Chief of Military Intelligence General Eli Zeira, and the Chief of the Southern Command General Shmuel Gonen. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:
- IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."
- Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his deputy, Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for dismissal.
- Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
- Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty (Rabinovich, 502). He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."
Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's) became more vociferous (Rabinovich, 502).
In response to these findings, Elazar resigned as Chief of Staff, and Zeira and Gonen were removed from active duty. Although she was vindicated by the report, Golda Meir herself resigned one month later in response to public pressure.
Critique of the Report
The findings of the Agranat Commission have been the focus of sharp debate among the Israeli public up until today. Particular criticism relates to its exoneration of the country's political leadership, especially Defense Minister Dayan. According to the Report: "As long as he accepts the opinions of his advisers, he does not bear any personal responsibility."
Further criticism responds to the Commission's recommendations, stemming from the failure of military intelligence to assess the Arab states' intent, that the IDF should not consider the intentions of hostile states, but rather their capacity for war. Thirty years later, Giora Eiland, Head of the National Security Council, wrote: "Both the proscription against considering intent and the concentration on the prevention of threats—two central messages of the Agranat Commission [Report]—frustrated and delayed the rebuilding and preparedness of the IDF for years."
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