On Free Will and Other Wills.
Introduction

by Valery Chalidze

Laplacian Determinism

Discussion about my freedom of will should start with the question of physical determinism. Physical determinism was proposed as part of the belief that elements of nature follow certain laws and that the laws are intelligible.

If there are either no laws, or only laws with uncontrollable random deviations, then our behavior would be characterized by random manifestations of will rather than free will under our control (definitions are still missing). Erratic behavior is well known among humans, but we should not rush to blame deviations from physical laws for that.

Strict physical laws direct everything in our world, but does this deprive us of hope for any manifestation of our free will? If the will of man is completely directed by physical laws, then Archmedes and Faraday were directed by physical laws into uncovering some of those laws, so we would have a marvelous set of self-formulating laws of physics.

The core of the problem is: no matter what word games philosophers have played for more than two thousand years, my free will is my ability to deviate from physical laws or my ability to find points of causal branching -- points in which a world, without violation of laws, could develop in two or more ways, and I am the mighty one who can pick one of those ways by my choice.

The scientific version of fatalism was expressed by Laplace in the following words:

"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.” (Translated quotation from the good young Wikipedia)

One can view these words as an example of the supreme arrogance of a scientist. He is the one, mind you, who told Napoleon that to formulate a scientific picture of the world, he did not need the hypothesis of God. Yet he articulated an ever-present determinism that, in fact, left no place for God, as God and his deeds would be determined by the laws of mechanical movements. Ah, that scientific passion for unveiling order!

A lot happened in physics after Laplace, but elementary acts of matter interaction are still expected to follow certain laws, so the observed material world might be still Laplace-like deterministic in the eyes of an order-seeking viewer. Indeed, no matter what miracles of particle-wave interactions are prescribed by twentieth-century physics, the fact is that macroscopic events are ruled by the same laws of conservation of energy, momentum and the moment of momentum that presided in Laplace's time.

All supposedly uncertain deviations from determinism, and all random peculiarities of the micro-world, become obedient to these rules as they come to what we are accustomed to call our every-day reality -- whatever that may mean. How probabilistic micro-reality adds up to a non- probabilistic macro-reality -- that is a depth of knowledge accessible only to the mentally obedient and spiritually enlightened members of the professional sect of physicists.

To calculate the solution of mechanical equations with all initial data, we need a powerful computer – an "intellect," in the words of Laplace -- or a “Demon,” as people often call it. Fortunately we have such a computer. It is called the Universe, and it is doing a nice job. It can calculate even the future, just as Laplace expected, except that it is somewhat slow: for tomorrow's results, we have to wait till tomorrow.

And indeed, as far as we know, there is only one possible outcome from the initial data, including the fact that there will be only one tomorrow. If there are other possibilities -- other solutions of equations with the same initial data -- we cannot see it from observing the results of today's calculations. If there were forks on the road, we took them without noticing, and we cannot go back and look. The known development of physics does not affect macroscopic determinism in an inanimate world; therefore, Laplace is still with us.

This scientific version of fatalism would be unbeatable, except for one source of doubt: why are there other observed reliable causal relations besides those dictated by Laplace’s equations? Isn't it funny that, as we will see, the possibility of causal relations between events is actually an argument against determinism?

Causality

One goes to prison not because during the commission of a crime he acquired a certain velocity leading him to prison, but because a bunch of guys maybe a century ago voted and wrote down that one should go to prison for committing a certain deed. The list of examples of such extra-Laplacian causal connections can be arbitrarily long, and it is helpful to analyze it to uncover different kinds of causality. There are too many non-physical causal connections outside us. There is even a swear word in academic circles for attempts to explain everything by physics: reductionism. Laplace's determinism is actually an extreme case of causal connection between the past and future. In this extreme case, all other causal connections between separate events are losing sense, as everything is predetermined at the starting moment. That fellow must go to prison due to a certain configuration of particles a billion years ago, and the wisdom of the judge or a verdict of guilt has nothing to do with it. Or, as they would say in parts of the Middle East, “it was written.”

We see that mechanical determinism is so extreme that for any event, there is no causal reason except one: the initial state of the Universe or its state in any preceding moment. The Demon rules in this ballroom.

Throughout history, there was much philosophical speculation about causality. Different religious doctrines suggested different levels of causality, be they the free will of humans, the will of the gods, or even mighty fate. No matter how strong some systems of thought were in the belief that everything is written, there were usually exceptions for some choice, some way to change what is written. Without these loopholes, there would be no way to justify personal responsibility, legal sanctions or even the joy of acting.

Logic

Except, of course, when people don't care for logic, which is often the case. Or when they somehow assume that logic itself can bifurcate if we really need to reach a conclusion with contradictory tenets. Mechanical determinism of Laplace's style is the only doctrine that does not leave any loopholes for chance or for free will.

As to logic, here is a recent example. After millennia of human bewilderment, a biologist made a discovery: there is no freedom of will, only the action of genes, environment and stochasticism. [Antony R. Cashmore “The Lucretian swerve: The biological basis of human behavior and the criminal justice system.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Doi:10.1073/pnas.0915161107] Conclusion: as no criminal actually makes a choice to commit a crime, we should change the legal system and relinquish our preoccupation with the question of sanity. But wait: how can we change the legal system without exercising free will? And why didn’t genes, the environment and stochasticism change our legal system without waiting for this great discovery? And if a person is only, as the author puts it, a "mechanical force of nature" and a "bag of chemicals", then how might the illusion of free will "have survival value despite the fact that it is nonsensical and unsupported by evidence"?

The same mechanical force of nature quoted Lucretius Carus: “If the atoms never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect — what is the source of the free will possessed by living things throughout the earth?” This was quoted often throughout the ages; yet let’s not forget that this is a question, not a Laplace-like statement. We are still to seek the answer.

One might suspect a latent assumption in the writing of this self- proclaimed bag of chemicals: we philosophers, of course, have some free will, unlike the criminal masses, so we can propose and achieve changes in the legal system. I would be ready to discuss that possibility, no matter how inegalitarian it sounds. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that we all possess free will equally. In any case, proclamations that "I don't have a free will" or "I do have a free will" should not leave "I" undefined. Not knowing what is "I" leads to not knowing many other things. But then, maybe it is simply an artificial grammatical split? Maybe "I" and "have free will" are the same?

Discussion on free will can be somewhat reminiscent of the "liar's paradox". Indeed, the opinion of those who negate freedom of will should simply be disregarded. Why? If they are wrong, their opinion should be disregarded because they are wrong. If they are right, their opinion should be disregarded because they don't know what they are talking about: it is not even their opinion as they do not have free will to disagree with us "freewillers". We can learn from the whole body of such negating arguments across all ages, no more than from a random generator of words. In short, maybe there is no free will, but there is nothing to learn from those who tell us that. What they tell us is the same as what we would hear from a person delivering post-hypnotic suggestions from an unknown entertainer – a magician. (Compatabilists should always enjoy the protection of free speech. As they are not strict determinists, there is still hope for them.)

So, the discussion should be only among us, the freewillers. If we are wrong and we do not have a free will, then it doesn't matter what we'll say: it is not we who are talking. If we are right, then let’s try to understand what we are talking about: what is will, what is freedom of it, and what is the "I" who supposedly has it?

As to why we are freewillers before freedom of will is proven: that is because free will loves to manifest itself without permission.

More Demonology

So, if there is only one cause for every event – the initial state of the Universe -- then there is no additional causality to speak of. But if there are random chances from time to time, interfering with the predetermined movements of particles, then there are causes and causal chains which theoretically can be followed back to that stochastic event that produced a deviation from earlier, predetermined movements. But if I did not control that stochastisity, then it is not my will overcoming the Demon.

We have another, almost extreme teaching: contemporary quantum theory, which says that in a micro-world, stochastic events actually happen all the time. Experiments such as diffraction of electrons and the tunnel effect support this conclusion. The natural question is whether this is stochastic in principle, or stochastic due to our lack of knowledge. In quantum physics, it is considered bad manners to ask that, because certain things were proclaimed to be beyond our knowledge in principle. As a result we have two worlds, one inside another. There is no strict local determinism in the micro-world, but when micro-characteristics average to the present characteristics of the macro-world, they somehow become obedient to the usual laws of mechanics. This still leaves a considerable area for the forces of determinism, as the macro-world apparently is not affected by the uncertainty of quantum events. As far as we can tell, all mechanical laws are still in effect, and quantum fluctuations do not change the trajectory of falling rocks.

The question for philosophy is how often stochastic events affect what happens in the macro-world. For humans not preoccupied with diffraction of electrons, sudden explosions of the stars, and the birth of galaxies, the important questions are the predictability of events, and personal responsibility. In the extreme case of Laplacian determinism, predictability of events is possible, but responsibility does not make any sense. If we go to the other extreme and deny causality altogether, there will be no predictability, and also no reason for responsibility. All human experience (which can be wrong, nevertheless) teaches us that there is some level of predictability in both the inanimate and the social worlds. At the same time there is free will, choice and a basis for responsibility. The questions remain: how strong are the causal connections between events, and how free is our free will? Are we dependent in our actions on the fussy movements of the electrons in our brains (that is possible), or are we able to direct our will according to our culture, ethics and wishes? And, one would add, our uniqueness. Actually, one proven example of a free act would be enough for me. I would not be too sad to recognize numerous limitations on free will.

If there is physical determinism, with the future "written" by equations, can it be that there are also causal, even logical connections between the past and future? Indeed, if it was pre- determined that I will win at roulette on the number 6, how did the same equations pre-determine that I will receive payment according to the announced rules of the game and according to my bet (though this never happened to me; bad karma). We should remember that even the short time between the announcement of my winning and my receiving payment is long enough for quadrizillions of oscillations of particles inside the gambling joint; so there are plenty of possibilities for purely physical bifurcations and for stochasticity. Yet in normal life people receive payments. An unproven but wise conclusion: they receive payment due to the rules of social free will, and not thanks to Laplace. If there are bifurcations and stochasticity, they must be those acts of Nature that free will uses to deviate from the Demonic equations. In other words, determinism of particles' movement can only accidentally cause occasional causal connections between events that humans hope to control. Yet we do observe those connections time after time (although they are rare in comparison with the frequency of particles' collisions).

If everything is predetermined, then it does not matter whether I will write the next word or not, because I will write it any way (or not). I can honestly be bewildered about the future, even if it is pre-determined, because I don't know how that future is pre-determined in the Book of Faith.

As I search for a way out of the slavery of this Demon, deep down I know that there is no real proof possible, except to find something wrong in the anatomy of the Demon itself, something that will show that he is not as powerful as we fear. The goal is tricky: to find something that violates determinism but does not destroy it in general (we would be in bad shape otherwise).

For non-determinism in the physical world, there must be branching possibilities of processes with no effect on energy, momentum and the moment of momentum. It sounds like a fantastic possibility, but there is hope. (Yes, hope. I am ready to be impartial, but I am not a disinterested philosopher here at all).

In trying to figure out what exactly makes me not controlled by the Demon of mechanics or physics, I am in the dark, because there are no experimental proofs that such a mechanism will allow my freedom of will. Some freedom for the World, yes, but not for me, because my will would not know how to use it. It is a long way between deviations from Laplace and utilizing them as free will.

Some Hopes For Indeterminism

There has been some theorizing about the possibility of hidden parameters that can assure deviation from the deterministic rules of the world. Early in the twentieth century, it was fashionable to proclaim indeterminism due to a peculiarity of the newly-discovered wave-like behavior of sub-atomic particles. That particular indeterministic hope did not bring assurance that we are free from control of the Demon. These days, that fellow is certainly not purely Laplacian, as there is more to our world than mechanical equations; but any deviation from determinism in the micro-world somehow does not stand in the way of bringing predictable deterministic results in the macro-world. One can hardly hide from the Demon behind a fog of probabilities if the behavior of the macroscopic system is clearly established. Unless, of course, if our will -- whatever that is -- can free itself by manipulating these probabilistic interactions in the micro-world. That is the problem: we don't know what makes our will free, but we also don't know what will is. But then, we humans often construct definitions as we go.

So many smart people over the course of millenia have struggled with the problem of physical determinism and free will that we would expect to have logical proof of this or that position on a subject. But there is none. However, there are persuasive arguments (and I am repeating myself in part):

1. If Laplace’s Demon is watching, and all events are connected by a chain of physical causation that in principle can be calculated, then there is no reason for an additional causal connection. There would not be even a hope for systematic causal connections outside of those given by interactions of separate particles and fields.

2. A variant of this argument is the existence of more or less consistent logic. There is an endless quantity of chains of inferences with the same rules; humans have repeated some of them for two thousand years. Could a Demon be so agreeable as to allow Euclidean wisdom to stay the same in an ever-changing world? I refer not to the properties of triangles, for instance, but rather to human statements about them. Could the Demon occasionally allow for deviations in proofs of theorems not by a school kid, but in textbooks? Or for deviations in arithmetic that would not lead to a teacher's disapproval or criminal punishment when uncovered? The existence of these competing determinisms -- Laplacian and logical -- really undermines my fear of the Demon.

3. One could try to use thermodynamics with its irreversible processes as a defense against the totalitarian control of the Demon. I might come to that (without enthusiasm). It is, after all, a classical bewilderment: how T-symmetrical mechanical laws lead to irreversible processes.

4. And here is a good catch: the Demon can solve numerous equations – a task we will never be able to do -- but he doesn’t decipher codes; he a is simpleton in this area. With attacks of high energy particles against a living cell, he can damage clever mechanisms that require biological codes for their action; but he cannot read the code because it is not part of the equations of physics. So we are relatively safe: the Demon can bang on our door, but it will not manage to pick our lock. Alexander the Great was behaving exactly like the Laplacian Demon when he used his sword to cleave the Gordian knot. This argument calls for a separate discussion on informational versus material interaction. In fact, this is the way to hope for liberation of life from the Demon's control if all other hope will fail.

Is it possible that life itself created a code barrier to defend itself from the Demon, and there is no other violation of physical determinism? Numerous code-reading molecules in living cells are hiding from the deterministic yet disorganized forces of the Demon. There might be a refuge for will and, in fact, for free will. This hope for a code barrier sounds good. Nothing can help the Demon to cross it; but I also know that conservation laws should not be violated. It looks like a clever theoretical task is needed to overcome this problem. (Of course, once separate atoms form code-bearing and code-reading large molecules, the dynamic variables of those atoms become the internal variables of new bodies; but I cannot say whether this transformation depends on mechanical bifurcations. May be it is better to present it as disappearing equations from a giant system of equations the Demon has to solve.)

Persuasive arguments, not just logic and experimental illustrations, do play a role in physics. Still, finding the precise mechanism behind a deviation from physical determinism is an attractive goal for science. In fact, I think it was Schrodinger who wrote that the study of life by physicists might lead to the discovery of new laws. This is a noble task.

All that is said here so far is only about physical determinism versus free will. There are other determinisms: cellular, genetic, social and whatnot; but Laplacian control is the only one that could be totalitarian. The others most likely allow for loopholes. So the first question is not whether there is free will, but rather how will operates despite the pressure of physical equations.

Valery Chalidze
Benson, Vermont
April 7, 2010